Acts not amounting to perjury.

foreign to the purpose, or altogether immaterial, and neither any way pertinent to the matter in question, nor tending to aggravate or extenuate the damages, nor likely to induce the jury to give a readier credit to the substantial part of the evidence, it cannot be perjury (a). Thus, if on a trial to determine whether a person is sane or not a witness introduces his evidence by giving an account of a journey, which he took to see the party, and swears falsely in relation to some of the circumstances of the journey, this would not be sufficient to support an indictment for perjury (b).

It is not necessary to constitute perjury that the false oath be believed, or that any person be damaged by it; for the prosecution is grounded, not on the damage to the party, but on the abuse of public justice. A false verdict is not regarded as perjury, because it is said the jurors do not swear to depose the truth, but only to judge of the depositions of others. So the breaking of their oaths by interpreters, officers in charge of the jury, &c., does not amount to perjury;

(a) I Hawk. c. 69, s. 8; 3 Russ. 10.

(b) It is suggested that there is no solid ground for this rule as to materiality; that it originated in a misapprehension. The authorities on which it is based "appear to be cases in which the witness misunderstood the gist of the question, and was so rather mistaken than perjured. If this were so, the inference drawn from the cases ought to be, not that the circumstances must be material, but that the witness must understand that the court requires him to answer specifically upon these points. It is obviously a very different thing to give an answer circumstantially incorrect under a misapprehension of the point of the question asked, and wilfully to swear falsely on some circumstance collateral to the principal point at issue. It clearly ought to be the duty of the witness to give true answers to every question asked by the court. To allow him to answer immaterial questions falsely is to extend an arbitrary impunity to a certain number of perjuries, for it cannot be supposed that any witness knows at the time of swearing whether the question which he answers is material or not."-Fitz. St. 279.

The groundlessness of this rule was adverted to by Erle, C. J., in the following terms: "Whenever the question arises whether a person may not be guilty of perjury, who, with intent to mislead the court, wilfully swears falsely on a matter which, in the opinion of the judge, is of doubtful admissibility, or immaterial to the inquiry, it will be one well worthy of the careful consideration of all the judges."-R. v. Mullany, 34 L. J. (M.C.) III.

inasmuch as it is an essential of perjury that the accused has been sworn to depose to the truth.

Upon an indictment for perjury, it is sufficient if any one of the assignments of perjury be proved (c).

Perjury is one of the offences included under the Procedure. Vexatious Indictments Act; and, therefore, no bill of indictment can be presented to or found by the grand jury unless one of the preliminary steps indicated in the Act has been taken (d).

Any judge (e) may direct the prosecution of a person who appears to have been guilty of perjury in his evidence given before him, and may commit the accused to gaol unless he gives sufficient security for his appearance at the assizes (ƒ).

two witnesses

It is a well-known rule that the testimony of a There must be single witness is not sufficient to convict on a charge in perjury. of perjury. Two witnesses at least must contradict what the accused has sworn; or, at any rate, one must so contradict, and other evidence must materially corroborate that contradiction (g). But this rule does not apply when the perjury consists in the defendant's having contradicted what he swore on a former occasion; in this case the testimony of a single witness in support of the defendant's own original statement will suffice (h). The reason usually assigned for the rule is, that if one witness were allowed to suffice to prove perjury, it would only be oath against oath. But other considerations, such as the great necessity for the protection of witnesses, also have weight (i).

(c) R. v. Rhodes, 2 Lord Raym. 886.

(d) v p. 359.

(e) As to who are comprised in this term, see the Act. (f) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 19.

(g) v. R. v. Boulter, 21 L. J. (M.C.) 57; 5 Cox, 543(h) R. v. Knill, 5 B. & Ald. 929, n.

(i) v. Best, Ev. 754. This rule seems to be a second instance (v. p. 24) of the law's interference with the province of the jury. It should always be a part of their duty to estimate the credibility of witnesses.

Punishment.

Perjury is a misdemeanor. At one time it was punished with death; afterwards with fine and imprisonment. Now the punishment is again more severe, namely, penal servitude to the extent of seven years, or imprisonment to the same extent (k).

Subornation.

SUBORNATION OF PERJURY.

The procuring another to take such a false oath as constitutes perjury in the principal (1). The offence does not amount to subornation if that other does not actually take the false oath; but it is nevertheless punishable.

The punishment for subornation is the same as for perjury itself: and the same course has to be taken under the Vexatious Indictments Act (m).

Administering or taking voluntary oaths.

VOLUNTARY OATHS.

It will be remembered that in a former chapter (n) it was shewn that administering or taking certain oaths was illegal and an offence against Government. This section deals with quite another matter. The evil to be guarded against in this case is the misuse of a valuable engine of the law, and the consequent weakening of its effect when resorted to on proper occasions.

It is unlawful for a justice of the peace or other person to administer or receive, or cause or allow to be administered or received, any oath, affidavit or solemn affirmation touching any matter whereof he has not jurisdiction or cognizance by some statute in force (0).

(k) 2 Geo. 2, c. 25, s. 2. In cases where another's life is wilfully "sworn away" by a perjurer, it is hard to see why the latter should not be regarded as guilty of murder. The punishment for the crime is by no means excessive.

(2) 4 Bl. 138.

(m) For a list of statutes applicable to perjury, &c., v. Arch. 887. (n) v. p. 57.

(0) 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 62, s. 13.

The offence is a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. The administering, &c., is punishable, although the person did not act wilfully in contravention of the statute, but only inadvertently (p).

FALSE DECLARATIONS.

A great number of statutes declare punishable false Statutes punishing false declarations with regard to the subjects with which declarations. such statutes deal. We will merely mention a few of the chief (q):

Parliamentary elections: 6 Vict. c. 18, s. 81; 35 & 36 Vict. c. 33.

Municipal elections: 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 76, s. 34; 35 & 36 Vict. c. 33.

Under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869: 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 14.

In matters relating to the customs, excise, &c. : 16 & 17 Vict. c. 107, s. 198; 18 & 19 Vict. c. 96, s. 38.

Before Registrars as to Births, Marriages, or Deaths: 6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 86, s. 41; 37 & 38 Vict. c. 88, ss. 40, 46. Before Magistrates: 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 62, s. 18.

BRIBERY.

The corrupt treatment of one intrusted with a public charge, to influence him in the discharge of his duty in

that character.

The offence, which may be thus generally defined, Bribery a wide comprises acts differing considerably from each other.

They may be divided into two classes:

(p) R. v. Nott, 12 L. J. (M.C.) 143.

(q) A full list will be found in Arch. 887, and with more detailed treatment in Rosc. 475.

term.

Bribery to
influence con-
duct of one
in office.

Bribery to procure place, &c.

I. Where some person concerned in the administration of public justice () is approached by one bringing him a reward, in order to influence his conduct in his office.

2. Where some person having it in his power to procure, or aid in procuring, for another a public place or appointment, is so approached (s).

I. The offence of offering to, or receiving by, an officer, judicial or ministerial (t), an undue reward to influence his behaviour in his office, is a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment. Both the giver and the taker are guilty. And though the reward be refused, the offerer is equally punishable for the attempt. The offence is not restricted to the case of influencing the higher officers, such as judges or members of the Government; but extends to those in a subordinate position, for example, constables, as if one bribe a constable to refrain from executing a warrant. A particular species of bribery, viz., corruptly iufluencing jurymen, will be treated of hereafter under the title embracery (u).

2. For the sake of convenience we may distinguish two varieties of this offence ::

i. When the place or appointment is in the gift of some public officer.

ii. When it is determined by public election.

i. This offence may also be regarded as following under the first class (1), inasmuch as the presentation to the place by the public officer is one of the duties of

(r) v. infra, as to ministerial officers.

(8) v. I Hawk. c. 67, ss. 1-3.

(t) The text books, in general, confine the offence of bribery to a bribery of judicial officers; but this definition of the offence seems too narrow. Arch. 891.

(u) v. p. 95.