Either Compensation as penalties. (Id., ss. 44, 45, post, App., 126, 127). If the inquiry relates to the value of lands to be purchased, and also to compensation for injury done, or to be done, to the lands held therewith, the jury must deliver their verdict separately (u) for the sum to be paid in respect of the lands, and for the sum to be paid as compensation for damage; (Id., s. 49, post, App., 127); and the sheriff then gives judgment for the purchase-money or compensation so assessed (x), and the verdict and judgment is signed by the sheriff (y), and, being so signed, is afterwards kept by the clerk of the peace among the records of the county, and is deemed a record; and the same, or a copy, is good evidence in all courts and elsewhere (z); and all persons may inspect such verdicts and judgments, and obtain a certified copy, or extracts thereof. (Id., s. 50, post, App., 127). (u) These words are directory only, and enable the company or the claimant at the meeting, to call upon the sheriff to keep the evidence distinct, and to find and adjudicate a separate sum in respect of each claim. Corrigal v. The London and Blackwall Railway Company, 5 Man. & G. 249; Ex parte The London and Greenwich Railway Company, 2 Ad. & E. 678; S. C. 4 Nev. & Man. 450; R. v. Sheffield Railway Company, 11 A. & E. 194. () The jury may find that the claimant has sustained no damage, R. V. The Lancaster and Preston Junction Railway Company, 14 Law J., (Q. B.), 84. (y) In Taylor v. Clemson, 2 Q. B. 1028, Maule, J., suggested that an (z) Where a railway company re- sessed by a Jury. Compensation assessed by a Jury. If the jury give a verdict for a greater sum than the sum previously offered by the company, all the costs of the inquiry fall on the company (a); but if for the same, or a less sum, or if the owner of the lands fail to appear at the inquiry, the costs are apportioned between the parties (b). (Id., s. 51, post, App., 127). In cases of difference, the costs are settled by one of the Masters of the Queen's Bench h; and such costs include all reasonable costs, charges, and expenses incurred in summoning, impannelling, and returning the jury taking the inquiry, the attendance of witnesses, the employment of counsel and attornies, recording the judgment and verdict thereon, and otherwise incident to such inquiry. (Id., s. 52, post, App., 128). Costs are recoverable by distress; and if payable by the party entitled to (a) The inquisition need not shew on its face by whom the costs are to be paid. Where a company were liable to pay costs to be recoverable before a justice, if the same sum or a larger sum than that previously offered were awarded to the party whose lands were taken, Williams, J., observed, on this point, "It is suggested that the inquisition ought to shew the facts which ascertain the liability to costs; but it is obvious that that is not so, because the costs are not a matter for the consideration of the jury: they are recovered by a proceeding quite independent of the inquiry, and there is no reason that any thing respecting them should appear by the inquisition." R. v. The Trustees of Swansea Harbour, 8 A. & E. 439. (b) Quære, whether the statute ought not to have provided for the payment of the claimant's costs in cases where the company have not previously made any offer of compen sation. The company may perhaps altogether refuse to recognise a claim for compensation, and the claimant would then be entitled to require the company to issue a warrant under the provisions of stat. 8 Vict. c. 18, s. 68, (post, App., 130); and, quære, whether in such a case it is incumbent on the company to make an offer of a certain sum for compensation. Sect. 38 (post, App., 125) seems to be applicable to all cases where the company may be required to issue a warrant. It is quite clear that the power to recover the costs of the inquiry must be given by the statute, expressiy. In Corrigal v. The London and Blackwall Railway Company, 5 Man. & G. 219, it was de. cided that a claimant was not entitled to the costs of an inquiry, because the act had only provided for three classes of cases, neither of which included the claimant's case. See also R. v. The London and Blackwall Railway Company, 4 Railw. Cas. 119. sessed by a Jury. compensation, they may be deducted and retained by the Compensation ascompany, or recovered by distress. (Id., s. 53, post, App., 128). A party is also, as we have seen, ante, 160, entitled to have compensation assessed by a jury, although the company may not have given him notice of their intention to take his lands. (Id., s. 68, post, App., 130). The foregoing is an outline of the contents of the 8 Vict. c. 18, with respect to the assessing of compensation by the verdict of a jury; and, by referring to the various sections of the statute, it will be seen how the proceedings are to be conducted. And here it may be observed, that one of the many advantages which will arise by the introduction of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act is, that, in future, all proceedings, in assessing compensation by juries under special railway acts, will be uniform in their character. Many decisions are to be found in the books on the construction of provisions similar to the above, contained in special railway acts; but these provisions, although similar in their general character, differ from each other in particulars of greater or less importance, and, consequently, no general rules could be extracted from the decided cases, for the attainment of one general course of practice in such proceedings. And although many of these decisions are no longer applicable, some useful points may be extracted. move inquisition. In the first place, it is necessary to point out a very im- Certiorari to rcportant provision in the new act. It is enacted, that "No proceeding in pursuance of that or the special act, or any acts incorporated therewith, shall be quashed or vacated for want of form, or be removed, by certiorari or otherwise, into any of the superior courts" (c). The effect of this enactment is, that the inquisition cannot be removed by certiorari into the (e) 8 Vict. c. 18, s. 145, post, App. 153; 8 Vict. c. 20, s. 156, post, App. 195. Certiorari to remove Inquisition. Court of Queen's Bench (d); and, the certiorari being thus taken away, the Court will not interfere to review the inquisition, unless it clearly appears that the proceeding relates to some matter over which the sheriff has no jurisdiction whatever, or unless the proceeding itself is impeached as being invalid, on the ground of malversation (e). The case of The Queen v. The Bristol and Exeter Railway Company (ƒ) may appear, at first sight, to break in upon the rule above laid down. There a certiorari was applied for to quash an inquisition, and one of the objections relied upon was, that the lands, taken by a railway company, and for which the jury were summoned to assess compensation, were situate more than one hundred yards beyond the line of deviation. It was contended by the counsel in support of the writ, that, although the certiorari was taken away by the special act, yet, as the proceedings were altogether illegal, and there was a total want of jurisdiction, the certiorari would lie. On the other hand, it was contended, that, if the proceedings were merely null, the certiorari was unnecessary, and the parties entering would be liable in trespass. The Court of Queen's Bench refused to grant the certiorari; and it appears that the learned Judges adopted the argument urged by the counsel for the defendants. Littledale, J., observes, "The parties applying are not without remedy, for they may bring trespass, if the proceedings are void. It is argued that there will be a primâ facie (d) It has been decided that this clause is applicable to inquisitions. R. v. The Sheffield Railway Company, 11 A. & E. 194. See also R. v. The Justices of Lindsey, 14 Law J., Mag. C. 151. ; 3 Dowl. & L. 101. (e) R. v. The Justices of the West Riding of York, 5 T. R. 629; R. v. (f) 11 A. & E. 202, n.; S. C., 2 Railway Cases, 99. justification, if the proceedings be not quashed. I doubt whether that would be so in any case; but clearly it would not be so where there has been a deviation from the line laid down." It therefore appears that a writ of certiorari was refused, on the ground that the party had a sufficient remedy by action, although it was assumed that the affidavits shewed that the sheriff had no jurisdiction to assess compensation for the lands which were taken for the purposes of the railway (g). But, in the subsequent case of The Queen v. The Sheffield and Manchester Railway Company (h), the Court took occasion to repeat the general proposition, that, whenever a want of jurisdiction appeared, it was competent for the Court of Queen's Bench to interfere by certiorari, although the writ be taken away by the express words of a statute. Lord Denman, C. J., says: "I think the argument on the part of the company has been pressed to an alarming extent. I hear, with much surprise, that, in the case of a court appointed to try questions of 40s. damages, under an act of Parliament containing a clause similar to the one in question, if that court should think fit to try a case in which 40,000l. was in question, our jurisdiction would be taken away, by the judge making a false return. This Court holds jurisdiction over all inferior courts; and where certiorari is taken away by an act of Parliament, it must be in the terms of that act, and for something done (g) The party whose lands were taken, afterwards brought ejectment against the company. But the Court of Exchequer decided that the special act authorised the company to make such a deviation as included the lands in question. See Doe d. Payne v. The Bristol and Exeter Railway Company, 6 M. & W. 320; post, 312; (h) 1 Railway Cases, 537; S. C., Certiorari to re move Inquisition. |