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parish. By the 55 Geo. 3, c. 51, for the more easy assessing, collecting, and levying county rates, it is enacted, s. 1, that the sessions may order a fair and equal county rate to be made, and for that purpose to assess every parish, according to a certain rate of the full and fair annual value of the messuages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments rateable to the relief of the poor therein, any law or statute to the contrary notwithstanding. It was decided, that the county rate was a parochial tax within the meaning of the first act, and that that act was not repealed by either of the later acts, and therefore that the property of the Canal Company was not liable to be rated at the increased value caused by their occupation of it. Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Aylesbury, 4 Railway Cases, 314.
Injunction, p. 549. A railway company entered upon land, and drew a trig-line along it, without the consent of, and without having given any notice to the owner, whereupon he filed his bill, and applied for an injunction. The company having stated that they entered upon the land solely for the purpose of making a survey, and that they did not intend to proceed any further without giving the requisite notices, the Court refused to make any order on the motion, but reserved the costs. Fooks v. The Wilts, Somerset, and Weymouth Railway Come pany, 4 Railway Cases, 210.
Liabilities of Provisional Committee-men, p. 690. A railway company having been formed, the secretary wrote to the defendant, inviting him to be a member of the provisional committee, to which he wrote a letter of assent. His name was then published as one of the provisional committee, and he afterwards presided at a meeting of that committee. An action having been brought against him for the price of stationery supplied by order of the secretary; it was decided that the proper question for the jury was, whether the defendant, by assenting to join the provisional committee, had authorised the pledging of his credit for such things as were necessary for the use of that committee ; and, therefore, that the jury were right in finding that he was liable for the stationery supplied after such consent. Barnett v. Lambert, 4 Railway Cases, 308.
Quære, whether, on a division of the committee, an action can be maintained against one of the minority for goods supplied by the order of the majority. Ib.
ed to award com
their verdict for the money to be
chase of the lands
and for the money
occasioned to such lands by the execution of the
tained before the
competent for the
Compensation Cases, p. 223. By sect. 117 of 7 Regina v. The Hull Dock Company, (11 Jurist, 15, June 27, the jury summon. 1846).]-Rule calling upon William Jubb to shew cause why a pensation for the writ of certiorari should not issue, directed to the clerk of the peace taken by the com- of the borough of Kingston-upon-Hull, to remove into this court pany shall deliver
an inquisition, held and taken by and before the coroner of the paid for the pur. town of Kingston-upon-Hull, and county of the same town, under required for the the provisions of stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. ciii, “ An Act for making New works, and for the money to be paid Docks,” &c. at Kingston-upon-Hull, for the purpose of assessing to the lands of the the sum of money to be paid to William Jubb by the Dock Company ance of such lands, at Kingston-upon-Hull, for the purchase of his interest in a certain to be paid by way brew-house and yard situate &c., and also the sum of money to be of compensation for the damage paid to him by the said company for any damage by him sustained
by the execution by the said company of the several works by the works, whether it said act authorised. It appeared that William Jubb was the owner be for damage sus
and occupier of the brewery and premises in question at Kingstoninquiry or for future damage, upon-Hull, which the Hull Dock Company required for the purpose either temporary or permanent :- of new docks to be constructed under the powers given by stat. 7 & 8 Held, that it was
Vict. c. ciii, (local and personal, public). By sect. 79 of that act, jury to award compensation for the damage
power is given to the company to purchase lands. By sect. 83 it is whichahe party enacted, that the owners of such lands, or of any estate or interest having to give up
therein as aforesaid, may agree to accept, and, subject to the restrichis premises as a tions in this act contained as to the payment thereof, may accept can obtain suitable premises in
satisfaction for the value of such lands, or any interest therein, to which to carry on
which such party shall be entitled; and, in addition to compensation for the value of such lands, or of the interest therein to be so conveyed, such parties shall be entitled to "compensation for any damage by them sustained, by reason of the severing or dividing of such lands, or otherwise, owing to the exercise of the powers of this act.” By sect. 103 it is enacted, that the company shall give notice of their intention to take lands, and that every such notice shall state that the company are willing to treat for the purchase of the interest of such party; and, as to the compensation to be made for the damage that may be sustained by him by reason of the making of the said docks and works hereby authorised,” by sect. 104 it is enacted, that, if such party and the company differ as to the amount of compensation to be paid to such party for his interest, or "for any damage that may be sustained by him by reason of the execution of the works hereby authorised,” the amount shall be settled in manner
reason of his
brewer, until he
hereinafter provided. By sect. 106 it is enacted, that if any difference shall arise, or if no agreement can be come to, between the company and the owners of any lands taken or required for, or injuriously affected by, the execution of the works hereby authorised, as to the value of such lands, or
as to the compensation to be made in respect thereof,” the amount of the compensation to be paid by the company shall be settled by the verdict of a jury in the manner hereinafter mentioned. By sect. 108 it is enacted, that, one month before issuing their warrant for summoning a jury, the company shall give notice to the party, and in such notice shall state what sum of money they are willing to give such party “for his interest in such lands, and for the damage to be sustained by him by the execution of the works hereby authorised.” By sect. 117 it is enacted, " that such jury” (the jury to be summoned to award compensation for the loss of any property taken by the company) “shall deliver their verdict for the sum of money to be paid for the purchase of the lands required for the works hereby authorised, or of any interest therein, belonging to the party with whom such question of disputed compensation shall so have arisen, and also the sum of money to be paid for the injury done to the lands of any such party by the severance of such lands from the lands required by the company, and also the sum of money to be paid by way of compensation for the damage occasioned to any such lands by the execution of the works, whether it be for damage sustained before the time of the inquiry, or for future damage, either temporary or permanent, or for any recurring damage of which the cause is then only in part obviated, and which cannot or will not be further obviated, by the company; and the sums of money to be paid for the injury done by any such severance as aforesaid, or by way of compensation for any such damage as aforesaid, shall in every case be assessed separately from the value of the lands, or the sum to be paid for the purchase thereof, or of any interest therein.” The notices required by the 103rd and 108th sections were served by the company on Mr. Jubb; and on the 30th March, 1846, another notice, in pursuance of sect. 114, stating that a warrant had been issued to the coroner of Hull, requiring him to summon a jury “to inquire of, assess, and determine, by their verdict in that behalf, the sum of money to be paid for the purchase of the interest of you the said William Jubb in a certain brewhouse,” &c., “and also the sum of money to be paid to you the said William Jubb, for any damage by you sustained by the execution of the
works aforesaid.” On the inquisition, it was objected on behalf of the company, that the 117th section defined and restricted the subjects of inquiry for the jury, and that they had no power to enter upon the question of compensation to Mr. Jubb for loss or damage which he might sustain in his business from the taking of his brewhouse and premises by the company. The coroner overruled the objection, and the finding of the jury was as follows :-“The jurors assess and determine upon their oath the compensation to be paid by the said Company to the said William Jubb, as follows:-(that is to say), the sum of 4001. for the purchase of the interest of him in his brewhouse, yard, and premises, with the appurtenances, and all the bricks and buildings connected therewith; and the further sum of 3001. as compensation for the damage, loss, and injury which he the said William Jubb will sustain by reason of his having to give up his business as a brewer, until he can find suitable premises in which to carry on his said business of brewer.” By the 289th section it is enacted, “that no proceeding in pursuance of this act or the said recited acts, or either of them, shall be quashed or vacated for want of form; nor shall the same be removed by certiorari or otherwise into any of the superior courts.” Cur, adv. vult.
Lord DENMAN, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the Court.This was an application for a writ of certiorari to remove into this court, in order to quash it, a certain inquisition to award compensation to William Jubb for the loss of some premises taken from him by the Hull Dock Company for the construction of new works. The finding of the jury, so far as it is material to the present purpose, is as follows :-[His Lordship read it.)
And the objection applies to the latter part of this finding, it being contended on behalf of the company, that the jury have exceeded the powers given to them by the Hull Dock Act, and that, by reason of that excess, the inquisition is wholly void. The question, therefore, turns upon the true construction of that act; and although several clauses were referred to in the course of the argument, it was at length agreed that the 117th is the material section. That is in these terms:-[His Lordship read it.]
And the question is, (as it was throughout the argument properly assumed to be) whether it was competent for the jury, under this clause, to award the latter sum of 300l. for the kind of injury alleged to have been sustained? Because, in this stage of the proceedings, it must be assumed that there was sufficient proof of such injury, and
it is certain that damage to the amount awarded may have been sustained by the interruption or breaking up of such a trade, and that, therefore, it must be considered, à priori, a reasonable subject for compensation.
The difficulty in this case arises from the language of the latter branch of the clause under which alone this species of compensation can be given; the former part expressly relating to the purchase of land (meaning, in this act, any kind of property) and to “ the money to be paid for the injury to the lands of any such party (meaning, of course, the party interested) by the severance of such lands.” Then follows the third branch of injury: “And, also, the sum of money to be paid by way of compensation for the damage occasioned to any such lands:”—Not to the owner of, or party interested in, such lands; nor is such owner or party mentioned or designated, except by implication, arising from the expression, “sum of money to be paid,” which can only mean to the owner or party interested. That such must have been the meaning, and that the words “owner or party interested” have been accidentally omitted, or are to be considered as understood, seems tolerably clear from this, that any injury to property as unconnected with an owner is unmeaning and absurd. And, in this very act, such is the form of expression generally used. In sect. 100, “making compensation for any damage thereby occasioned to the owners or occupiers of such land” is the language; In sect. 103, “ damage sustained by him (the party interested) by making the docks.” And, again, in sect. 104, “compensation for any injury that may be sustained by him by reason of the execution of the works.”
To this may be added, that, in sect. 106, wherein mention is first made of having recourse to a jury, in the event of certain other modes of adjustment having failed, that jury is to assess “ the amount of the compensation to be paid by the company.” And it is to be observed, that “compensation” is mentioned without any limitation or restriction, and must be understood as meaning remuneration or satisfaction for injury or damage of every description. If, then, the words “ damage occasioned to any such lands” may be considered as virtually incorporating “ owner of,” or “ party interested in,” any such lands, the rest we think is quite clear; because we have no doubt but that the expressions "damage before the inquiry," and “ future damage, temporary or permanent,” are large enough to sustain the finding of the jury as to the latter sum of 3001. And