men charged in the declaration) being admitted-Held, that there
✓ was reasonable and probable cause for proceeding to outlawry, not-
withstanding the defendant was aware at the time of issuing the
exigent that the plaintiff was allowed and had an agent in London :—
Held also, that, under not guilty, the reversal of the outlawry was
not put in issue:—and semble, that, if it had been, the rule of court
and entry thereof inthe officer's book was not evidence of that fact.
Drummond v. Pigou, 228,

For Injuries resulting to Individuals from public Nuisances.

3. The defendants, under the authority of an act of parliament,
which enabled them to close certain antient ways therein mentioned,
provided they opened another and a different way therein also described,
stopped up and obstructed the ways, and kept and continued them so
stopped up (no new ones being opened) for a period which the jury
found to have been unreasonable and unnecessary. The plaintiff
carried on the business of a bookseller in a court which formed a con-
tinuation of the line of thoroughfare so obstructed by the defendants,
and his customers were proved to have consisted almost entirely of
persons who had been in the habit of using the thoroughfare; and
it was also proved, that, in consequence of the way being so ob-
structed, his business had materially declined:-Held, that the injury
thus sustained by the plaintiff was such as to entitle him to maintain
an action on the case, notwithstanding there might be many other
individuals on the same line of thoroughfare similarly damnified by
the act of which he complained. Wilkes v. The Hungerford Market
Co. 446.

4. In case for a nuisance, the declaration stated that the plaintiff
was possessed for the residue of a term of a messuage, and that he was
disturbed in its enjoyment by the alleged nuisance. The defendants
pleaded that they were possessed of their workshops and manufactory
(the nuisance complained of) for ten years before the plaintiff be-
came possessed of his term. The plaintiff replied that the term
whereof he held the residue was created four years before the defen-
dants were possessed of their said workshops and manufactory:-
Held, on demurrer, that the plea was bad; the defendants should at
least have alleged an user for twenty years. Elliotson v. Feetham, 174.
Against Carriers for Negligence-see CARRIERS.

Against the Sheriff for taking insufficient Pledges-see SHERIFF, 1.
CHARTER-PARTY- -see SHIP AND SHIPPING.

COACH PROPRIETORS-see CARRIERS.
CONDITION PRECEDENT-see TAXES, 3, 4.
CONVEYANCE-see ACT OF PARLIAMENT.

COSTS.

Of a former Trial, ssustav))—}jetmofI 243 prioritno plestomosina toʻl
grad J The 64th rule of Hilary Term, 2 Will: 4, applies only to cases
-to where a new trial is granted upon the whole record. Bower v. Hill,
od qure540. ginit sit is 97we zaw tucbustab sdt pribast-diw

nobaed 2. On the trial of a right of way, in one count claimed as a public,
#1 and in another as a private way, a general verdict was found for the
defendants.
5. The court afterwards directed a new trial, expressly
to thi by the rule confining it to the right claimed in the second count. In

the rule no mention was made of costs, nor any reservation of the
defendant's verdict on the first count: Held, that the defendants
Jomwere nevertheless entitled to the costs of the issues found for them
boom on the first trial and not in contest on the second, they having suc-
bod, rozobceeded on such second trial. Id. 9oms bɔa qoyɔutbola zong
it komunalo bra, qu bqgo's

Of Motions and Rules.

I

3. Where a special case, on which judgment had been given for the
plaintiff in this court, was at the instance of the defendant turned
into a special verdict, that he might have an opportunity of obtaining
the judgment of a court of error thereon, this court, after the lapse of
two years, and after the costs of the trial and special case had been
taxed and paid, refused to allow the plaintiff the costs thereby occa-
04 is sioned. Collins v. Gwynne, 332.

Taxation of Costs.

L

4. An abstract of a title to an estate sold by auction disclosed a con-
veyance in fee and a deed assigning terms to attend the inheritance
dated in 1737, (shewing some terms outstanding, which occasioned
considerable expense), and a perfect title by possession for sixty
years-Held, that the costs thus occasioned were allowable on taxa-
tion:-Held, also, that the costs of attested copies of the will of the
vendor's father ought not to be allowed. Ex parte Quick, 184.
And see ATTORNEY, 4.

5. In an action for a vexatious and excessive distress, the plaintiff
cannot recover by way of damages the extra costs necessarily incurred
by him in a former action of replevin. Grace v. Morgan, 790.
Under 43 Geo. 3, c. 46, s. 3.

96. The verdict of the jury is not conclusive as to the amount for
which the plaintiff had reasonable cause (within the meaning of the
statute) for holding the defendant to bail. Mantell v. Southall, 132.
Under 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58 (Interpleader Act).

7. The sheriff is entitled to costs under the interpleader act only
under very special circumstances. West v. Rotherham, 802.
Against Executors and Administrators-see EXECUTORS AND ADMINIS-

TRATORS, 5.

COVENANT.

Covenants running with the Land... I oft alt ni palantare s

TZAZTVOJ

..' 1. The defendant and one H., by indenture dated June, 1826, de-
mised and confirmed to the plaintiff the residue of a term of thirty
years created by an indenture of August, 1815, to commence on the
expiration of a lease for twenty-one years granted by H. in November,
1815, viz. at Christmas, 1836. H. having failed in payment of rent
to the lessors pursuant to his covenant in the lease of August, 1815,
an ejectment was, in 1825, brought by the lessors, wherein they ob-
tained a judgment under which the plaintiff (who was in possession
under the lease of November, 1815) was evicted. In the lease of
1826, the defendant and H. covenanted severally, and not the one
for the other of them, that the plaintiff, paying the rent reserved and
performing the covenants, should, during the term thereby demised,
quietly enjoy the premises, without any let or disturbance of, by, or
from the defendant and H. or either of them, &c., or of any person
or persons claiming or to claim by, from, or under them, or any of
them:-Held, that no action could be maintained against the defen-
dant for a breach of his covenant until the term thereby granted
should actually come into existence. Ireland v. Bircham, 207.

2. Quære, whether, under this covenant, the defendant would be
responsible for the default of H.: or whether the disturbance was by
parties claiming by, from, or under the defendant and H., or either
of them, within the meaning of the covenant. Id.

3. J. S. being possessed of an equitable estate in certain property,
by indenture dated in 1762, demised a portion thereof to K. for ninety-
eight years at the yearly rent of 57., and by another indenture of the
same date demised other part of the premises to K. for the like term
and at the like rent. J. S. having afterwards acquired the legal
estate, by indenture dated in 1773-reciting the two indentures of
1762, and that the parties had come to a further agreement respect-
ing the property, whereby they had agreed that K. should have the
whole of the premises leased to him at the yearly rent of 10%. only;
but, instead of cancelling the two several leases already granted of
part, they should remain, and another lease be granted of the residue
of the property at the ground-rent of 101., which rent should be con-
sidered the same as the two several rents of 57. each so reserved by
the leases of 1762; and that notwithstanding such several reservations
no more than 10%, per annum in the whole should be payable for the
entire premises demised to K. the whole of the premises except
such parts as had already been demised to him by the indentures of
1762, for the same term; K. covenanting for himself, his executors,
administrators, and assigns, to pay the rent and keep the premises in
repair:-Held, that the assignee of the reversion could not maintain
an action of covenant against the assignees of K. for breach of the

COVENANT.

Covenants running with the Land (Continued)...

covenants contained in either of the leases of 1762. Whitton v. Pea-
cock, 630.

:-

4. In covenant by assignee of lessee against lessor upon a covenant
running with the land, the venue was laid in London. At the trial
it appeared from the evidence that the land was situate in Surrey :-
Held, that, inasmuch as it did not appear upon the record that the
venue was laid in the wrong county, the defendant was not entitled
to have a nonsuit entered. Boyes v. Hewetson, 831.

Personal Covenants.

5. It was agreed between A. and E. (the lessees of the V. Theatre)
SAT by and the plaintiff, that, in consideration of 3134. paid by the plaintiff
bere! to A. and E., they would pay the plaintiff 3607. on the 31st Decem-
ber, 1834, if all of them and one B. F. should be living on any part
ffy of that day; that the plaintiff should till that day, if all of them, A., E.,
To the plaintiff, and B. F., should so long live, or so long during the
same period as all of them should live, have the free use of two

་

private boxes in the V. Theatre; that, if all of them, A., E., the

5 plaintiff, and B. F., should be living on any part of the 31st Decem-
od Liber, 1834, the plaintiff should pay nothing for the use of the boxes;
but, if either of them should die before that day, the plaintiff should
make such compensation for the use of the two boxes during the time
he should have been entitled thereto, as should be just and reason-
able:-Held, that this was a mere personal covenant by A. and E.
with the plaintiff, and therefore not binding, as to the use of the
boxes, on an assignee of the theatre. Flight v. Glossop, 220.

CROWN LANDS,

1. By the 57 Geo. 3, c. 97, s. 6, the commissioners of woods and forests
are authorized and empowered to contract and agree with any person for
the sale of any part or parts of the possessions or land revenues of the
crown which shall in their judgment be desirable to be sold, and to give
the purchaser a certificate in the form therein prescribed; and it is de-
clared that the purchaser shall, after the inrolment of the certificate, "be
deemed to be in actual possession and seisin of the premises, rights, and
interests by him purchased, and that he shall hold the same as fully and
amply to all intents and purposes as his majesty might have done if such
sale had not taken place." In 1803, the defendant inclosed part of the
waste of the manor of Iscoed, (part of the demesnes of the crown), and
remained in uninterrupted possession of the waste so inclosed until after
the year 1826, when the manor of Iscoed was purchased from the crown
by the lessor of the plaintiff. The property so purchased by the lessor of
the plaintiff was described in the certificate of the commissioners as "all
that the manor of Iscoed, with the rights, members, and appurtenances
thereto belonging." In ejectment brought by the purchaser to recover

CROWN LANDS—(Continued).

the possession of the waste so inclosed by the defendant:-Held, that it
did not pass under this contract of sale; for that the commissioners neither
had the power under the statute to make sale of property so situated, nor
by their certificate affected to exercise such power if they had it. Doe
d. Watt v. Morris, 276.

2. Although the king can never be put out of possession in point of law
by the wrongful entry of a subject; yet there may be an adverse possession
in fact against the crown. Therefore after such an adverse possession by
a subject for twenty years, the crown could only recover the land by an
information of intrusion; consequently, ejectment would not lie at the
suit of the grantee of the crown, notwithstanding the rights of the crown
are not barred by the statute of limitations. Id.

3. And semble, that, even if the waste land in question had not been
out of the actual possession of the crown for twenty years, it would not,
under the circumstances, have passed under the word "manor" in the
certificate.

Id.

CUSTOM-see PLEADING, 3, 4.

DEMI-MARK- -see WRIT OF RIGHT, 10.

DEVASTAVIT- -see EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 3.
DEVISE.

ཝཱཐཱ

Construction of.

:

> big targ
1. T. J. Selby, by his will devised as follows:-"To my right and
lawful heir at law (for the better finding out of whom, I direct adver-
tisements to be published immediately after my decease in some of
the public papers) all my manors, lands, &c., in B., to hold the afore-
said manors, &c, to my heir at law, his heirs, executors, administra-
tors or assigns, for ever, subject and chargeable with the payment of
all my just debts, funeral charges, bonds, annuities, and all legacies
hereinafter mentioned [various legacies to relations on his mother's
side]: all which debts, legacies, &c., I do hereby order and direct to
be paid by the said heir at law, his heir, executor, or assigns, within
twelve months after my decease; but, should it so happen that no heir
at law is found, I do hereby constitute W. Lowndes, of &c., my lawful
heir, on condition he changes his name to Selby; and I give the
estates and all the manors before mentioned, together will all rights
&c. before mentioned, to the aforesaid W. Lowndes, subject to and
chargeable with all the legacies, debts, &c., before mentioned:- Held,
that, on failure of an heir of the blood of the testator, within the time
limited for payment of the legacies, &c., the fee simple vested under
this devise in W. Lowndes; and that the condition was satisfied by
his changing his name to Selby within a reasonable time, and without
a licence from the crown. Davies, dem., Lowndes, ten., 71.

2. Testator devised the residue of his freehold, copyhold, and lease-
hold estates, &c., to his wife for life; and from and immediately after
her decease to his son and daughters, naming them, "and their law-