Note to As to rates. As to a street. Statement of case. the justices did right or wrong in the particular case, and to answer the questions submitted to the court by the justices. See the observations of Blackburn, J., on this point in St. Botolph v. Whitechapel, 2 L. T. (N.s.) 507; 24 J. P. 564. The court will not entertain an appeal upon a question of fact. Therefore where a magistrate, upon the construction of the 5th rule of section 26 of the Metropolitan Building Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122), decided that a certain place, being a row of houses forming part of a line of thoroughfare, was a street, the court declined to interfere with his decision. Newman, app., Baker, resp., 8 C. B. (N.S.) 200, s. 2. The Act only gives the justices the power of asking the opinion of the court upon a point of law; and the question for the court is not whether the justices came to a right conclusion, but whether there was any evidence in support of that conclusion. Green v. Pensam, 22 J. P. 727. Per Erle, C. J., the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, is a very salutary statute; it was intended to enable all these summary jurisdictions to obtain an authoritative decision upon any point of law which may arise before them. City of London v. Acocks 8 C. B. (N.S.) 773. And per Mellor, J., in Sweetman v. Guest, 37 L. J. M. C. 59; 18 L. T. (N.S.) 49; L. R. 3 Q. B. 262, the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43 was intended to give justices an opportunity when exercising summary jurisdiction, of getting advice on points of law in cases in which they had no means of doing so before the Act. Where the justices have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of a rate, they cannot under this Act state a case for a superior court. Ex parte May, 31 L. J. M. C. 161; 26 J. P. 340; 2 B. & S. 426, following the rule in Reg. v. Kingston-on-Thames JJ., E. B. & E. 256, and Reg. v. Bradshaw, 29 L. J. (N.s.) M. C. 176; 6 Jur. (N.s.) 629, namely, that the duty of magistrates when payment is sought to be enforced, is to see that there is a rate as is alleged, and that the party summoned is assessed to it, and that he has not paid his assessment; when they have ascer tained these matters, the rate being good on the face of it, their duty is to enforce payment, and not to enter into the question of its legality, which is for the jurisdiction of the quarter sessions on appeal. Whether a “lane" is a "street," within the meaning of the Metropolis Management Acts, is a question of fact and not of law; and a magistrate cannot be compelled to state a case under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, for the opinion of the high court upon the point. Reg. v. Sheil, 50 L. T. (N.s.) 590. In drawing up the special case care should be taken that it contains every question which it is desired to submit for the of case. opinion of the superior court, as that court has no power to Note to give an opinion on a question asked by the parties to the case, Sect. 2. but which the justices by whom the case is stated have not submitted for the opinion of the court. St. James, West- Statement minster, app., St. Mary, Battersea, resp., 29 L. J. (N.S.) M. C. 26; 6 Jur. (N.S.) 100. See also Hills v. Hunt, 15 C. B. 1, where the court would not allow a special case to be amended, by raising a point which the parties had not raised for the consideration of the court. A magistrate, like a judge, is bound to know the law, and if he sees the existence of any fatal objection, even though that objection is not taken by either of the parties, it is the duty of the magistrate to act upon what he knows to be the law; therefore a magistrate cannot refuse to state a case on the ground that an objection has not been formally brought to his notice, where the objection is of such a kind as goes to the root of the whole matter before him for adjudication, and one, therefore, which he must be presumed to have known. In Costs. making absolute a rule to compel a magistrate under such circumstances to state a case, the court refused to allow the appellant the costs of the rule, because he had not raised the objection distinctly before the magistrate. Ex parte Markham, 21 L. J. (N.S.) 748; 39 J. P. 150. In the case of Wickham v. Phillips ("Times" newspaper, 18th April, 1883), Mr. Justice Field is reported to have observed with reference to a case sent back to justices to be restated, that "when the court sends back a case to be stated, the court does so on the faith of the magistrates acting as judges, and stating the facts truly, whatever their own opinion on the case may be. If a different course were taken in this respect, the confidence the court reposes in magistrates would be shaken." In a case stated from sessions, Lord Denman, C. J., said that the justices have done right if they ask the opinion of the court whether the facts stated in the case will warrant the finding which they made; but wrong if they refer to the court the mere question of fact and asks it opinion as a jury upon it. Reg. v. Pilkington, 13 L. J. (N.s.) M. C. 64 ; 8 J. P. 724. The duty of the court upon a case stated, under 20 & 21 13 C. B. (N.s.) 62. The proper mode of stating a case for the opinion of the court is to submit some point or points of law for its consideration, and not to seek the decision of the court on the evidence generally as to its sufficiency to support a conviction. Reg. v. Brennan, 6 C. C. C. 381. Note to Statement of case. The justices cannot state a case which they decline to hear for want of jurisdiction: per Blackburn, J., "I think nothing can be clearer than that the justices made a mistake in granting the case, as the statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, does not apply. The justices, when the question of jurisdiction was raised before them, decided, rightly or wrongly, that they had no jurisdiction. If they were right, then the parties can only go and renew the information before other justices who are not interested. If they were wrong, then the remedy is to apply for a rule under Jervis' Act, commanding them to hear and determine the case. There was no need of a case to be stated under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, to raise the point of law regarding the interest of parties. The Act, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, was only intended for those cases where formerly there was no means of bringing the matter otherwise before the superior court, but it was never intended to decide in this way a question of jurisdiction. The parties have mistaken their remedy." Wakefield v. West Riding Railway Company, 30 J. P. 389; 12 Jur. (N.S.) 936. Where, however, the justices have heard the case, and determined to dismiss the information on the ground that they have no jurisdiction, they may state a case. See Muir v. Hoare, post, p. 158. No point can be stated in a case for the opinion of a superior court which was not taken before the justices: therefore, upon a conviction under 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, for knowingly permitting persons of notoriously bad character to assemble and meet together in his inn, against the tenor of his license, upon a case stated, it was held, upon the argument of the case, that the appellant could not object that there was no evidence of his knowledge, that point not having been taken before the justices. Purkis v. Constable, 5 Jur. (N.s.) 790; 23 J. P. 197; see also Mottram, app., Eastern Counties Railway Company, resp., 7 C. B. (N.s.) 58, on the same point. Again, no case can be stated under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, s. 2, unless the determination of the justice be upon an information or complaint; consequently, a case cannot be stated on the refusal of justices to grant a certificate for a beer license under 32 & 33 Vict. c. 27. Garratt v. Potts, 23 L. T. (N.S.) 410; S. P. West v. Potts, 34 J. P. 760. If a defendant be charged with obstructing the works of a local board of health, he is not necessarily entitled to have the case dismissed by the magistrates because the obstruction took place in assertion of a private right. Nor are justices, under such circumstances, warranted in refusing, as frivolous, an application to state a case. Reg. v. Pollard (Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire), 14 L. T. (N.S.) 599, Q. B. Lush, J. A question as to what is a "new building" within the Local Note to Government Act, 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. 98), s. 34 (now the Sect. 2. Public Health Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, ss. 157, 159), of case. may properly be raised as a question of law for the opinion of Statement the court under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. Hobbs v. Dance, L. R. 9 C. P. 30. The court has no power hostilely to vary a special case which has been stated by counsel for the purpose of raising a different question from that which the parties originally contemplated. This was so held where, by consent of parties and under a judge's order, pursuant to the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, a case was stated for the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas. Mersey Dock Trustees v. Jones, 8 C. B. (N.S.) 124. The court, it is apprehended, will not entertain a case if the point of law involved in it has been before decided. Where the quarter sessions sent a case for the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench, being ignorant that the point stated in it had been previously decided, the court refused to review their judgment. Reg. v. St. John the Evangelist, 2 Jur. 46. In Hastings v. St. James, Clerkenwell, L. R. 1 Q. B. 43, the court said: "It is important that points arising on settled law, which are determined, should not be again disturbed." Section 2 empowers the justices to state a case for the opinion of a superior court in the event of an acquittal as well as of a conviction. Davys v. Douglas, 28 L. J. R. (N.S.) M. C. 193; 32 L. T. 283; 23 J. P. 135. And it would seem from Ex parte Smith, 27 L. J. R. (N.S.) M. C. 186, that a judge at chambers can grant an order upon the justices to state a case under this Act. See sections 5 and 7, post, as to the authority of a judge at chambers under the Act. A case stated under this Act set out the grounds of the determination in respect of one of the conclusions at which the justices had arrived, but as to the other set out objections, and then stated that they were overruled. This, it would seem, is a sufficiently setting forth of the "grounds of determination" within the meaning of the Act. Christie v. St. Luke, Chelsea, 27 L. J. (N.S.) M. C. 153; 22 J. P. 496. In Blackpool v. Bennett, 23 J. P. 198, it was held that a case stated under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, sufficiently set forth facts to support a conviction under a bye-law of a local board of health, when such facts are stated as warranted an inference that the offence had been committed. This enactment gives a remedy to parties in cases where before they possessed none; but it does not enable parties to Note to Statement of case. avoid the ordinary and legitimate modes of redress which It has been held that justices have no power to state a case on refusing to make an order authorizing an urban sanitary authority to enter premises under section 305 of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), inasmuch as their refusal is not the determination of a complaint within 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, s. 2. Diss Urban Sanitary Authority, apps., Aldrich, resp., W. N. 1877, p. 46; L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 179; 36 L. T. (N.S.) 663. Where, by the rules of a friendly society, disputes between the society and a member are to be referred to justices, pursuant to 21 & 22 Vict. c. 101, s. 5, the justices it was held might be compelled to state and sign a case under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. Watts v. Kent JJ.; Pearch v. Kent JJ., 35 L. J. M. C. 190; S. C. Reg. v. Lambarde and others, JJ. of Kent, L. R. 1 Q. B. 388: but this was overruled, and now, where by the rules of a friendly society disputes between the society and a member are to be referred to justices, such justices have no power to state a case under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. Callaghan v. Dolliven, L. R. 4 C. P. 288; 38 L. J. M. C. 110, overruling Watts v. Kent JJ., supra. Where the security of such a society is summoned as such security before the justices to answer a complaint against the |