of poor law calendar months after the offence was committed or the matter Note to of complaint arose; except in proceedings taken by a district Sect. 11. poor law auditor for the recovery of moneys certified to be due under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 32; the 12 & 13 Vict. In the case c. 103, s. 9, having enacted “that nothing in the provisions auditors. of the said Act herein recited (i.e. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11) shall be deemed to apply to any such proceeding by any auditor, but that no auditor shall commence any such proceeding after the lapse of nine calendar months from the disallowance or surcharge by such auditor, or, in the event of an application by way of appeal against the same to the court of Queen's Bench or to the Poor Law Board, after the lapse of nine calendar months from the determination thereupon." Section 11 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, applies to an order of Orders of justices made for the payment of expenses of the maintenance removal. of a pauper under an order of removal, and therefore an application for an order to enforce them must be made within six calendar months of the time when demanded. An order for payment of such costs would not be a warrant or order of removal within the exemption in section 35 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43. Collumpton v. Brighton, 3 L. T. (N.S.) 318; S. C. nom. Hill, app., Thorncroft, resp., 7 Jur. (N.s.) 163 ; 24 J. P. 741. An order for expenses of maintenance of a pauper under a suspended order of removal made under 35 Geo. 3, c. 101, s. 2, within six months from the time when the expenses became payable is within the time limited by 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11. Reg. v. Scalcoates, 9 B. and S. 911. Act. The 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11, applies to an information Vagrant under 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, s. 4, and therefore there must be a chargeability of the wife and children of the man consequent on his remaining away, and the offence is not complete till the chargeability. It is, therefore, sufficient if the information be laid within six months of the chargeability. Reeves v. Yates, 31 L. J. M. C. 241; 8 Jur. (N.s.) 751; 1 H. & C. 435. By some it was considered that this Act prevented proceedings Poor rates being taken for the recovery of a poor rate more than six months after the rate was made; but the better opinion was that it did not. The statute contemplates complaints upon which the justices" have or shall have authority by law to make any order for the payment of money or otherwise, and not cases where the order for payment has already been made by other competent authority, and the justices' aid is only sought to enforce it. This is clear from sections 13 and 16, as, on a complaint under the Act, the party complained against may be apprehended, and if he cannot enter into satisfactory recognizances, may be committed until the hearing. This cannot be done in the case of a defaulter in pay Note to ment of poor rates. The forms given in the schedule, Sect. 11. moreover, show that this Act contemplates cases where the Church rates. Compensation for damage. justices adjudge the party to pay a sum of money, and not where a party has already been adjudged and assessed to pay a sum by another authority, namely, the overseers. Section 27 also refers to warrants of distress to enforce these orders, and therefore shows that warrants of distress are not themselves such orders or complaints as are meant originally. Further, the levying of poor rates is regulated by an express statute, the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 14. It has since been held that the words "such complaint in section 11 refers to complaints mentioned in section 8, viz., complaints upon which a justice may make an order for the payment of money or otherwise," and that section 11, therefore, does not apply to proceedings for enforcing a rate by the mere issuing of a warrant of distress. Sweetman v. Guest, 37 L. J. M. C. 59; 18 L. T. (N.S.) 49; 52 L. R. 3 Q. B. 262. As regards the recovery of arrears of poor rates, see East Dean v. Everett, 3 L. T. (N.s.) 700; 7 Jur. (N.s.) 124; 25 J. P. 565. In But see Reg. v. JJ. of Shrewsbury, 31 L. T. p. 114. that case more than six months after a demand of immediate payment of a church rate, which was not complied with, a second demand was made and a refusal given. Three days after a summons was taken out to levy the same by distress (53 Geo. 3, c. 127, s. 7), which the justices dismissed on the ground that the matter of complaint arose more than six months before the summons; and it was held that the justices had acted within their jurisdiction. The court, however, said, referring to the rate, that it must not be considered as lost, and that in the case of another ratepayer, the magistrates may be asked to state a case for the opinion of the court, showing the ground of their determination in point of law; and if they do so, and the court think their ground wrong, it will say so. Ib. 22 J. P. 395. In the Shrewsbury case it is to be observed that church rates are enforced by an order of justices, and not by a warrant of distress, like poor rates. See also Backhouse v. Bishopwearmouth, 25 J. P. 70. When a person summoned before justices, for non-payment of a church rate, bona fide objected before them to the validity of the rate, the court held that the justices had no power to make an order, though he did not object to their jurisdiction to decide the points which he had raised. Reg. v. Leicester JJ., 29 L. J. M. C. 203; 24 J. P. 391. An order of two justices under 8 Vict. c. 18, awarding compensation for damage done to a landowner by the construction of a railway, is within 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11. Reg. v. Leeds and Bradford Railway Company, 21 L. J. (N.S.) M. C. 193; 16 Jur. 817; 16 J. P. 631. In the same case it was also held that the section had a retrospective operation. Note to Sect. 11. It has been held that, in proceeedings for the recovery of Metropolis Building expenses under 18 & 19 Vict. c. 122, ss. 73, 103, section Act. 11 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, being taken in connection with 18 & 19 Vict. c. 122, ss. 73 and 103 (the matter of complaint being the non-payment of the expenses), the time of limitation ran from the demand and not from the completion of the works in respect of which the expenses were incurred, and therefore that the complaint was in time, though beyond six months from the completion of the works. Labalmondiere v. Addison, 28 L. J. M. C. 25; 1 E. & E. 41; 23 J. P. 26. The limitation under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11, applies Sanitary to proceedings for the recovery of expenses incurred by a authorities. local board under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63, s. 51 (now 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 36). The complaint must be made within six calendar months of the amount being due and notice of the amount due being given to the party, and not within six months of the demand of payment. Eddlestone, app., Francis, resp., 7 C. B. (N.S.) 568; 3 L. T. (N.s.) 270. The provision in 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11, applies to expenses incurred by a local board under section 150 of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), which corresponds to the second clause of the repealed statute, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, s. 63; but the six months do not commence to run till after the expiration of the three months during which the apportionment of the expenses may be disputed. Jacomb v. Dudson, 32 L. J. M. C. 113; 7 L. T. (N.8.) 674; 3 B. & S. 461. The words in 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 1, "orders for the payment of money or otherwise," include orders of every kind which a justice of the peace has authority to make; and therefore where a local Act for the improvement of a borough provided that if buildings should be erected" contrary to any requirement by the corporation," the corporation might "make a complaint thereof before a justice,' " who was em powered to make an order directing the demolition of the building; the complaint in such case upon which an order for demolition was to be founded must be made within six months after the completion of the building erected contrary to the provisions of the local Act. Morant, app., Taylor, resp., L. R. 1 Exch. D. 188; 45 L. J. M. C. 73; 34 L.T. (N.S.) 139; followed in Vestry of Paddington v. Snow, 45 L. T. (N.S.) 475. Note to Sect. 11, Lands Clauses and Interest costs not paid. If a nuisance (as under the Smoke Acts) be a continuing nuisance, the limitation of six months in 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11, will not apply. Higgins v. Northwich Union, 22 L. T. (N.S.) 752; 34 J. P. 452, n. 806. The commitment by two justices under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63, s. 39 (now 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 196), of an overseer and collector of borough rates for non-delivery of a rate book in his possession by virtue of his office of overseer and collector, is a civil and not a criminal proceeding, being in the nature of a distraint; and the limitation of six months in 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11, therefore, does not apply; semble, per Lush, J., such limitation will only apply where the object of the proceeding is punishment and not merely coercion. Meyer v. Harding, 17 L. T. (N.S.) 140; 31 J. P. 740. The limit of six months imposed by section 11 of this Act was held to apply to proceedings which were based upon section 129 of the Public Health Act, 1848 (section 251 of the Public Health Act, 1875). West v. Dowman, 42 L. T. (N.S.) 340. And the six months' limitation with regard to the recovery of extra cost of repairing highways caused by extraordinary traffic under 41 & 42 Vict. c. 77, s. 23, dates from the certificate and demand of payment, and not from the time when the repairs are made. White v. Colson, 46 J. P. 565. An adjudication by two justices under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, and Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, of a sum below £50 to be paid by a railway company as compensation for injury done to lands, is an order within section 1 of this Act, and is bad under this section if the complaint on which the order is founded be made more than six calendar months after the cause of complaint arose; and such an order may be brought up by certiorari to be quashed. In re James Edmundson, 17 Q. B. 67. But where a person is required to give up any lands under the 121st section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act (8 & 9 Vict.c.18), and have the amount of compensation settled by two justices, if the lands have not been injuriously affected it is not necessary that the complaint should be made, under sections 1, 11, of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, to the justices within six months from the time of the notice. Reg. v. Hannay, 31 L. T. (N.s.) 702, distinguishing, with hesitation, re Edmund son, supra. Under a local Act interest might be charged after three acccruing on months if certain costs were not paid, and the whole recovered as damages. On a case stated it was held that interest did not begin to accrue before the expiration of three months, and therefore that a demand of the amount due from an owner within three months of the completion of the works was a good demand from the date of which the period of six Note to months for obtaining the money by an order of magistrates Sect.11. pursuant to 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11, began to run. Parkinson v. Blackburn, 22 J. P. 418. With reference to 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11, the following case may also be consulted: Reg. v. Mainwaring, 27 L. J. (N.s.) M. C. 278; 4 Jur. (N.s.) 928; 22 J. P. 367. hearing of and infor 12. And be it enacted, that every such complaint As to the and information shall be heard, tried, determined, complaints and adjudged by one or two or more justice or jus- mations. tices of the peace, as shall be directed by the Act of parliament upon which such complaint or information shall be framed, or such other Act or Acts of parliament as there may be in that behalf; and if there be no such direction in any such Act of parliament, then such complaint or information may be heard, tried, determined, and adjudged by any one justice of the peace for the county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place where the matter of such information shall have arisen; and the room or Places in which jusplace in which such justice or justices shall sit to hear tices shall and try any such complaint or information shall be sit to hear deemed an open and public court, to which the &c., to be public generally may have access, so far as the same open court. can conveniently contain them; and the party against Parties whom such complaint is made or information laid plead by shall be admitted to make his full answer and defence attorney. thereto, and to have the witnesses examined and cross-examined by counsel or attorney on his behalf; and every complainant or informant in any such case shall be at liberty to conduct such complaint or information respectively, and to have the witnesses examined and cross-examined by counsel or attorney on his behalf. complaints, deemed an allowed to counsel or |