may be, and there to deliver him to the keeper thereof, Sect. 23 and requiring such keeper to receive such defendant into such house of correction or gaol, and there to imprison him, or to imprison him and keep him to hard labour, as the case may be, for such time as the statute on which such conviction or order is founded as aforesaid shall direct, unless the sum or sums adjudged to be paid, and also the costs and charges of taking and conveying the defendant to prison, if such justice or justices shall think fit so to order, shall be sooner paid.

first in

Section 19 applies to cases in which the particular statute Commitunder which the proceedings are taken is silent on the sub- ment in ject of levying the penalty or compensation, as well as to stance. other statutes in which the mode of enforcing the penalty, &c., is expressly directed; section 21 applies to cases where the particular statute under which the proceedings are taken makes no provision for the commitment of the defendant in case no sufficient distress can be found; and section 22 to cases in which the statute gives no remedy in default of distress; the present section applies to cases in which the particular statute makes no provision for the penalty, &c., being levied by distress, but directs that if it be not paid forthwith or within a certain time, the defendant shall be imprisoned, &c. In every such case the section provides that the penalty, &c., shall not be levied by distress, but that the defendant shall be committed for such time as the statute on which the conviction or order is founded shall direct, unless the penalty, &c., shall be sooner paid. The statute, moreover, only makes each person included in the conviction liable for the costs of conveying him to gaol; therefore a conviction adjudging each of the persons convicted to be imprisoned until the costs of conveying all to gaol had been paid, is bad; Reg. v. Cridland, 3 Jur. (N.s.) 1213; 7 E. & B. 853. The warrant of commitment must be under seal, and it may be issued by any justice having jurisdiction (see section 29, post, p. 137), and be backed if the defendant be not found within the jurisdiction. See section 3, ante, p. 13.

it

may

ment.

In Re Fletcher, 13 L. J. (N.S.) M. C. 16; 1 D. & L. 726, it Term of was held that a warrant of commitment directing the gaoler imprisonto imprison a person for three months, omitting the day of the month on which it was granted, was bad; but this was

Note to overruled in the subsequent case of In re Bowdler, 17 L. J. R. Sect. 23. 243 Q. B. ; 12 J. P. 708, where the court held that the term

Execution

stable.

of imprisonment was to be calculated from the time when the prisoner was taken into custody, and not from the date of the order of commitment; therefore, a warrant without a date is good, and if the defendant be not immediately apprehended under it, the term of his imprisonment will commence from the time that he is taken. In Ex parte Foulkes, 11 J. P. 728, the court said that there was no necessity to specify in the order of commitment the day from whence the term of imprisonment was to run, as it must be computed from the day of its execution. See also Braham v. Joyce, 19 L. J. (N.S.) Exch. 1; 14 J. P. 39, on the same point.

"One calendar month" in a sentence of imprisonment means a period expiring on that day in the succeeding month which corresponds numerically with the day on which the sentence is pronounced. If there should be no corresponding day in the next month, then the sentence expires on the last day of that month, i.e., the last day of the short month. Nigoti v. Colville, 40 L. T. (N.s.) 522; 43 J. P. 143; L. R. 4 C. P. D. 233; S. C. Migotti v. Colville, 43 J. P. 620; 14 C. C. C. 305.

A justice's warrant of commitment upon a conviction for a of warrant penalty, following the form given in 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, by conschedule (0.1), and addressed "to the constable of a parish,” can only be executed by the parish constable, and not by a county police constable stationed at a parish; Reg. v. Sanders, 1 Law Rep. C. C. R.; 36 L. J. M. C. 87; 10 C. C. C. 445.

Power to justices to

mitment

where the conviction

penalty, nor

of money,

24. And be it enacted, that where a conviction order com- does not order the payment of any penalty, but that the defendant be imprisoned, or imprisoned and is not for a kept to hard labour for his offence, or where an the order order is not for the payment of money, but for the for payment doing of some other act, and directs that in case of the defendant's neglect or refusal to do such act he shall be imprisoned, or imprisoned and kept to hard labour, and the defendant neglects or refuses to do such act, in every such case it shall be lawful for such justice or justices making such conviction or order, or for some other justice of the peace for the

and the punishment is by imprisonment,

&c.

be levied by distress, and

same county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, Sect. 24. or place, to issue his or their warrant of commitment (P. 1, 2), under his or their hand and seal or hands and seals, and requiring the constable or constables to whom the same shall be directed, to take and convey such defendant to the house of correction or common gaol for the same county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place, as the case may be, and there to deliver him to the keeper thereof, and requiring such keeper to receive such defendant into such house of correction or gaol, and there to imprison him, or to imprison him and keep him to hard labour, as the case may be, for such time as the statute on which such conviction or order is founded as aforesaid shall direct; and in all Costs may such cases where by such conviction or order any in default sum for costs shall be adjudged to be paid by the defendant defendant to the prosecutor or complainant, such mitted for a sum may, if the justice or justices shall think fit, term. be levied by warrant of distress (P. 3, 4), in manner aforesaid, and in default of distress the defendant may, if such justice or justices shall think fit, be committed (P. 5) to the same house of correction or common gaol in manner aforesaid, there to be imprisoned for any time not exceeding one calendar month, to commence at the termination of the imprisonment he shall then be undergoing, unless such sum for costs, and all costs and charges of the said distress, and also the costs and charges of the commitment and conveying of the defendant to prison, if such justice or justices shall think fit so to order, shall be sooner paid.

may be com

further

Under this section it is competent for one justice to issue Jurisdiction the warrant of commitment, though the conviction or order of justices.

Note to upon which it proceeded was required to be made by two Sect. 24. justices. See section 29, post. If the defendant be not

Aggravated assault on women and children.

Imprisonment for a subse

quent offence to commence at expiration of that

found within the jurisdiction, and search be made for him, the warrant may be backed in like manner as an ordinary warrant. Seee section 3, ante, p. 13. Under section 18, p. 136, the justices in all cases of summary convictions or of orders may in their discretion award such costs as they may deem just and reasonable. The present section provides for the levying of those costs by distress (P. 3, 4), and in default of distress a warrant of commitment (P. 5) may issue, and the term of imprisonment in that case will commence at the termination of the period of imprisonment mentioned in the original warrant of commitment, unless the costs be paid before that period expires.

The 16 Vict. c. 30, s. 1, gives jurisdiction to two justices sitting at a place where petty sessions are usually held to convict persons accused of aggravated assaults committed on females and male children under fourteen years of age; and it has been held that a warrant of commitment under that Act, in the general form provided by 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43 (Schedule P. 1), is sufficient without any allegation that the convicting justices were sitting at a place where petty ses sions are usually held; Ex parte Allison, 24 L. J. R. (N.S.) M. C. 73; 18 J. P. 746.

As to a case in which it was held that the form given in the schedule to this Act (P. 1) was not applicable, see Eggington v. Lichfield, Mayor, &c., 24 L. J. Q. B. 360; 1 Jur. (N.s.) 908; 19 J. P. 819.

25. And be it enacted that where a justice or justices of the peace shall upon any such information or complaint as aforesaid adjudge the defendant to be imprisoned, and such defendant shall then be for previous in prison undergoing imprisonment upon a convicoffence. tion for any other offence, the warrant of commitment for such subsequent offence shall in every such case be forthwith delivered to the gaoler to whom the same shall be directed; and it shall be lawful for the justice or justices issuing the same, if he or they shall think fit, to award and order therein and thereby that the imprisonment for such subsequent offence shall commence at the expiration of the im

prisonment to which such defendant shall have been Sect. 25. previously adjudged or sentenced.

ment.

This assimilates the practice with regard to summary con- Term of victions and orders for a subsequent offence to that of 7 & 8 imprisonGeo. 4, c. 28, s. 10, under which the court may award imprisonment for a subsequent offence when a sentence is passed for felony, and the person convicted is already in prison for another offence. It is discretionary with the justices whether or not they will order imprisonment for a second offence to commence from the termination of the imprisonment for the first. But whether they do so or not it is imperative that a warrant be forthwith delivered by the constable to the gaoler to whom it is directed. In Wilkes v. Rex (in error), 4 Burr. C. P. 367, it was decided that a judgment of imprisonment against a defendant to commence in future, i. e., from and after the determination of an imprisonment to which he was before sentenced for another offence, is good in law; and it has since been held that 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 25, applies equally to a case where a defendant is at one and the same time sentenced for several offences, wherefore a conviction is good which imposes a sentence "to commence at the expiration of the first three calendar months' imprisonment to which he has this day been adjudged by us the said justices;" Reg. v. Paine, 16 L. T. (N.S.) 282; S. C. Reg. v. Cutbush and another, L. R. 2 Q. B. 379; 36 L. J. M. C. 70; 8 B. & S. 319; 10 C. C. C. 489; and Reg. v. Maidstone JJ., 31 J. P. 454.

tion be dis

may be re

distress

cutor, &c.,

fault may

26. And be it enacted, that where any information If informa or complaint shall be dismissed with costs as afore- missed costs said, the sum which shall be awarded for costs in covered by the order for dismissal may be levied by distress upon prose(Q. 1) on the goods and chattels of the prosecutor who in deor complainant in manner aforesaid; and in default of be comdistress or payment such prosecutor or complainant mitted. may be committed (Q. 2) to the house of correction or common gaol in manner aforesaid, for any time not exceeding one calendar month, unless such sum, and all costs and charges of the distress, and of the commitment and conveying of such