them for their continuance in it. If, therefore, the legislature assumes executive and judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be made, nor, if made, can it be effectual, because in that case they may put their proceedings into the form of an act of assembly, which will render them obligatory on the other branches." In the Kircheval letter, in case a judiciary chosen by the people should be found unattainable, which he fully expected, a decided preference is expressed for executive appointment over legislative election. Upon this question he says: "Let us at least not adopt the evil and reject the good of the English precedent; let us retain removability on the concurrence of the executive and legislative branches, and nomination by the executive alone. Nomination to office is an executive function. To give it to the legislature, as we do, is a violation of the principle of the separation of powers. It swerves the members from correctness, by temptations to intrigue for office themselves, and to a corrupt barter of votes; and destroys responsibility by dividing it among a multitude. By leaving nomination in its proper place among executive functions, the principle of the distribution of power is preserved, and responsibility weighs with its heaviest force on a single head."

We have quoted the sentiments of Jefferson not merely for their intrinsic value, but because they have almost the weight of admissions from a hostile quarter. He was not originally particularly zealous for the adoption of the federal constitution. At no period of his life was he suspected of any bias in favor of the judiciary; nor was he ever accused of that distrust of the people, reverence for the past and predilection for English institutions, which are charged, with some degree of justice, upon certain other statesmen of that day.

Whoever desires to see the most complete and masterly exposition of the subject will read the numbers of the Federalist from the lxxvi to the lxxx, inclusive, the wonderful ability of which justifies the declaration of a British essayist, that "the work altogether, for comprehensiveness of design, strength, clearness and simplicity, has no parallel among the political writings of men, not even excepting those of Montesquieu and Aristotle." No extracts from these papers can be made without doing them injustice by an imperfect presentation of their compact and philosophical reasoning. Hardly a sentence can be omitted or a phrase altered or dislocated without impairing their power. From every fresh perusal of them we rise with increased admiration.

The particular question, whether a popular election of judges is desirable, is not dwelt upon, because such a project was at that time unknown, and seemed inconceivable. But the argument in favor of executive appointment and permanent tenure of office covers the whole ground. It has been already remarked that the real controversy between those who favor and those who oppose an elective judiciary turns upon the question whether this department of the government ought to be dependent or independent. Under every government, and in every generation, occasions arise when men are charged with crime and put upon trial, against whom violent popular prejudice is excited. That of the demented negro Freeman in New York, whom Mr. Seward volunteered to defend against the remonstrance of his own nearest personal and political friends, may be instanced as an illustration. Who can fail to perceive that when the voice of the people is crying out

for the blood of a victim he is not likely to have an impartial trial before a judge who is himself speedily to be put upon trial before the same people on the question of his own re-election. And if the judge, as many honorable men would, rises superior to all personal considerations, how impossible it is that the prisoner and his friends should, from the beginning, feel the same confidence in his impartiality as if his continuance in office were not liable to be affected by his leanings during the trial! Public confidence in the impartiality of a judge is only second in importance to actual impartiality. A judge is also frequently called upon to administer an unpopular law: will he do that, or be thought to do it, fairly and efficiently, on the eve of an election at which he is a candidate for a second term? In civil causes, the rights of a corporation may be at stake which a popular majority, in the excitement of the moment, may feel has no rights that they are bound to respect. Ought such a cause to be determined before a judge who has been, or is liable to be, elected upon such an issue? The litigation may be between two individuals, one of whom is unpopular or unknown, wholly destitute of influence, while the other is a powerful member of the dominant political party, whose influence largely contributed to secure the original nomination of the judge, and who is able to control his renomination and re-election; in such a case will there be, or will there be thought to be, a fair determination of the merits of the controversy?

The court may be called upon to perform that most solemn and responsible duty of adjudging to be unconstitutional a statute passed by a unanimous legislature, and upon much popular urgency. Is an elective judiciary for such a purpose a tribunal as impartial as the lot of humanity admits? No doubt a majority of cases will be heard and decided with entire fairness, however judges are chosen; and so they would be if they were selected by lot. But the question is, what is the best and wisest system, the one likely to produce the most perfect results on those occasions which try men's souls?

Furthermore, which method of selection is best calculated to secure for the judicial office men who, by character and attainments, are fittest for the adequate performance of its difficult and important duties? By that of executive appointment the choice devolves upon one man, the governor of the State, who must usually be a person of considerable experience, of fair character, and of reasonable ability. In only a few instances can he have any strong motive to be controlled by individual favoritism. He must know, or have the means of knowing, personally or by reputation, the qualities of all within the natural range of candidates. An improper nomination will be a lasting injury to himself, while one conspicuously successful will always redound to his credit. To have placed on the bench a Marshall, a Story, a Kent, or a Shaw, is a great public benefit, not likely to be forgotten in estimating the services of a president or governor, either during his life or after his death. Besides the negative, upon an improper selection, possessed by the council or senate, always operates to make the executive careful in his choice, and to correct any error into which he may accidentally fall. It would be difficult to name any case in which the advantages of individual responsibility are greater, or in which it is surer to produce satisfactory results.

The next alternative is a choice of judges by the legislature. The arguments against this plan may be

found in the lxxvii number of the Federalist, and seem to us sufficiently cogent, both theoretical and practical. Nevertheless, this method must be admitted to have produced tolerably satisfactory results in many of the States, especially in those as small as Connecticut and Vermont. But, in principle, it is indefensible in view of those who believe in an independent judiciary; while it has few practical recommendations to that class who desire to have judges immediately reflect the popular will. By the sincere believers in either theory it must be rejected as a lukewarm and unattractive arrangement. We regard it as a mere compromise, unlikely to be disturbed where it exists, but unworthy to be adopted by those who consider the question as one of the greatest in American constitutional law.

No one has yet proposed, on this continent, the introduction of the Athenian practice of a plebiscite or popular vote upon the question of banishing or putting to death a particular obnoxious citizen. The nearest approach to such delightful democratic simplicity would seem to be to have a popular majority choose judges for the shortest possible term, so as to secure their direct and immediate responsibility to the people. Except on the score of convenience, we do not know why any one who favors a popular election of judges ought not to prefer, whenever it is attainable, a direct popular vote upon any question to be judicially determined. If vox populi est vox Dei, why weaken its power by an indirection which can only cast doubts on the divinity of its origin? But there are those, even at the present day, who believe that there ought to be a government of laws, and not of men. To their minds there is something shocking in the spectacle of a struggle in caucus or convention over a party nomination to a high judicial office, followed by a heated campaign between the political parties into which voters are divided, accompanied by the newspaper abuse and personal vituperation sure to ensue; the position of a judge finally elected, after such an ordeal, seems to them an introduction as unfavorable as possible to the duties of his office.

The two systems have been conspicuously tried for many years past in different States; indeed, in every State which has adopted an elective judiciary the two have existed side by side within the same territorial limits, the federal judges being appointed by the president and the State judges chosen by the people. We appeal to the candor of all intelligent observers, to say under which of the two methods justice has been administered with the greater degree of purity, impartiality, energy, intelligence and learning? How have those courts been constituted whose decisions are cited with respect here and in England, and how those which are a byword and reproach throughout Christendom? We do not propose to point the moral by citing instances either of praise or of obloquy. To every one there will, occur conspicuous examples of great and venerable magistrates who have enjoyed the respect and reverence of all men, and, on the other hand, the names of judges who have clothed themselves with infamy as with a garment. By which system has each class been produced? Or, if it be said that extreme illustrations are unfair, under which system has there been the larger proportion of conscientious, laborious, painstaking, careful and learned judges; and under which has the tendency been to a slovenly, superficial, slipshod performance of judicial duties? Which has tended to superiority, and which to mediocrity or

inferiority? By their fruits let the two systems be judged.

It is seldom that a man or community consents voluntarily to surrender the immediate exercise of any accustomed power. Even its delegations to agents requires a considerable exertion of moderation and self-restraint. If the people of New York shall deliberately resign the power of electing their judges, and return to the ways of ancient wisdom, they will, in our opinion, evince a high degree of political intelligence, and furnish to the world a striking proof of their fitness for self-government, and their capacity to profit by the lessons of experience.

This action was

1. Amendment of summons. brought against "The Maxim Gas Machine Company," whose proper corporate name (as it subsequently appeared), was "The Maxim Gas Machine Company of New York." The summons was amended by inserting after the name of the defendant the words "of New York." There was no doubt of the identity of the defendant, for the summons was served on the secretary of the company.

Held, that the amendment was properly allowed. It was not the substitution of a new defendant, nor a change of parties, nor the striking out a party, as in the cases relied on by the defendant. Hoyt v. The Maxim Gas Machine Co., of New York. Opinion by Larremore, J.

2. Manufacturing corporations. - No certificate of approval by a justice of the supreme court is required to the certificate of incorporation of a corporation for manufacturing and chemical purposes by the act of February 17, 1848, or the amendments thereto. Ib.

1. When tender should be continuous: contracts of service: measure of damages. - Appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff. This action is on a contract for the plaintiff's services as an actor in defendant's theater from September 15, 1870, to June 1, 1871, at a salary of $65 per week and a benefit. It was brought in September, 1871, and plaintiff in his complaint alleges he was wrongfully discharged on the fourth of April, and that he could not procure thereafter other employment. He does not allege performance or tender of, or readiness to perform any services during the period for which he claims salary. He asks to recover his weekly salary up to June first, and also for his benefit night. He was awarded $688.10 as compensation on the contract rate per week as for full performance, with some addition for the benefit night. It appeared by plaintiff's testimony, that, upon his discharge, he denied defendant's right to discharge him, and offered performance, and that about a week afterward he left the city and went to Baltimore, and for the remainder of the period of his engagement spent his time there or in Virginia. "He went a fishing." The justification he offers for not seeking other employment is that "the season in New York theaters had almost expired, and he did not think he could have got employment

of his standing in any theater." Held, that the jury have correctly found that the plaintiff was wrongfully discharged, the reason assigned being his refusal to act in a part inferior to the role of characters which he had agreed to represent. But it cannot be held that he earned wages for services to the defendant when he was engaged in his own pursuits or amusements at the south without having obtained any consent or license of the defendant, or having given him some notice of his remaining subject to immediate recall when wanted, or in some other way offering or continuing a tender of his service during the period. The absence of an effort to obtain other employment appeared by plaintiff's own testimony. If voluntarily idle he failed in his duty to his employer. If he desired to claim full contract compensation he could not accept the employer's dismissal as a license to indulge in a relaxation of its requirements and go about his own business. Judgment reversed. Polk v. Daly. Opinion by Robinson, J.

2. Where tender is equivalent to performance.—The tendered performance can only be maintainable as a substitute for the actual upon the ground that the thing agreed to be sold has independent existence, and the corpus not being perishable or changeable the title had so far passed that the vendor remained but the trustee of the vendee in respect to it, and on subsequent payment of the price the specific thing may still be delivered over, or duly accounted for to the vendee, as upon an agreement for the sale and purchase of real estate, where the vendor has tendered a conveyance (21 Wend. 460), and for goods sold, the delivery whereof has been tendered. Ib.

TRUSTS.

1. Property charged with trust: demurrer: pleadings. — Appeal from order overruling demurrer. Prior to June 9, 1868, the plaintiff had agreed with the St. Paul and Pacific R. R. Co. to furnish certain sums of money to aid in the construction of a branch road of that company. On that day the St. Paul and Chicago Railway Co. (the successor of the former company) entered into a written agreement with one Childs, in behalf of plaintiffs, under which plaintiffs would be entitled to receive certain amounts in money bonds and stock of that company. The complaint then avers a subsisting indebtedness to plaintiffs of the equivalent of 3,000 shares of stock; also a transfer of the property and assets of the company to the defendant Rice in trust, and an agreement by him to deliver to plaintiffs said shares; the transfer by Rice to the Minnesota Construction Company with like agreement and trust; the transfer by the latter company to the defendant, the Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company; that this last transfer was in fraud of plaintiffs' rights, and was taken with full knowledge of the previous transactions and the trust thereby imposed.

Held, these averments raise the presumption of liability on the part of the defendants, and of a trust impressed upon the property and against the Construction Company, and the Milwaukee and St. Paul Company, so as to require an appropriation of said trust fund, for the payment of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs seem to be entitled to some relief, and if defendants are aggrieved by any of the averments of the complaint, which are unnecessary or indefinite, the remedy is by motion and not by demurrer. Order affirmed. Thornton et al. v. St. Paul and Chicago Railway Company et al. Opinion by Larremore, J.

2. Demurrer will not lie to the prayer of the complaint. 38 How. Pr. 97, cited. Ib.

3. Trustee of fraudulent trust: waiver of defense: resulting trust: creditor's bill.- Plaintiff brought action in the nature of a creditor's bill to assail the title to certain property of defendant, impleaded with one B. G. Stokes, who, as was alleged, had advanced money for the purchase of the house and lot, the title to which was taken in the name of defendant, while plaintiff was insolvent, and in fraud of the rights of plaintiff, his creditor. The referee, before whom the case was submitted, found in addition to the facts stated above, that said Stokes was indebted at the time of such transaction to plaintiff in a sum exceeding the purchase-money paid, for which plaintiff subsequently recovered a judgment, upon which execution was issued and returned unsatisfied.

Held, that nothing in the conduct of the former suit raises the presumption that the action was not prosecuted with proper vigor, or that it was urged with the purpose, on the part of the plaintiff, to assail defendant's title or of any connivance between plaintiff and Stokes. Sections 51 and 52 of the statute of “Uses and Trusts," which provide that a trust created in favor of creditors of a party paying the consideration money of real estate conveyed to another, may inure to the benefit of all such creditors, must be deemed to have been waived (Code, §§ 144, 148), inasmuch as the absence of any other creditor was not presented by answer or demurrer. Defendant not only became trustee of a resulting trust to the extent of, the money advanced in the purchase of the property, but should be held to an account, like any other trustee of a fraudulent trust, for all benefits she had received from the property. Judgment affirmed. Hiler v. Hettrick, impleaded, etc. Opinion by Robinson, J.

UNDERTAKINGS.

1. Liability of sureties on the dismissal of appeal: Code of Procedure. — Appeal from judgment in favor of plaintiffs. This action is brought to recover upon an undertaking given by the defendants, as sureties, under section 334 of the Code, on an appeal to the court of appeals, which was conditioned to pay all costs and damages which should be awarded against the appellant on that appeal, not exceeding $500. That appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents (these plaintiffs), and judgment entered therefor. The appellants here claim, on the authority of Drummond v. Hudson, 14 N. Y. 60, that the appeal having been dismissed, no judgment against the sureties was warranted by the terms of the undertaking. Held, in the case cited, the undertaking was given under section 335 of the Code, to pay on affirmance, but made no provision for a case of dismissal. The undertaking in the case at bar is under section 334, for it provides for costs and damages awarded the respondents on the appeal. Judgment affirmed. McSpedon et al. v. Bouton et al. Opinion by Robinson, J.

2. Failure to justify no defense to the undertaking. — Though proof was allowed of exception to the sureties on the appeal, and their failure to justify, this constituted no defense to this action. Decker v. Auderson, 39 Barb. 346, cited. Ib.

3. Discharge in bankruptcy: non-joinder of parties: partnership: assignees of undivided interests.-The discharge of one of the plaintiffs in bankruptcy, pending the appeal in the former action, has no bearing upon the merits of the claim upon the undertaking. On his

becoming bankrupt his solvent partner and the assignee in bankruptcy become tenants in common of the copartnership assets, the latter having an undivided interest therein. 5 Johns. Ch. 70; 3 Paige, 527; 8 Wend. 444, cited. The non-joinder of any assignee of an undivided interest was only available as a defense for non-joinder by way of abatement. Ib.

WAIVER. See Trusts.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.*

ATTACHMENT.

Action to recover a debt alleged to be due from defendants to A and B, which plaintiff claimed to have attached. Judgment was perfected in an action in which F. was plaintiff against said A and B, on the 31st of August, 1863. On the same day, and a short time prior to the entry of the judgment, an attachment was issued in the action to the plaintiff herein, under and by virtue of which after the judgment was perfected he claimed to attach the debt, to recover which the action was brought. Held, that the power to levy by virtue of the attachment did not survive the recovery of judgment in the action, and that no new right or interest in the property of defendants could be thereafter acquired under it. Lynch, late Sheriff, v. Crary et al. Opinion by Andrews, J.

ATTORNEYS' LIEN.

1. Plaintiff obtained a judgment in an action for assault and battery, which he assigned to his attorney as security for costs. Notice of the assignment was given to defendant. On appeal, the judgment was reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide event. Before the new trial the parties settled, and plaintiff executed a release to defendants. Plaintiff's attorney proceeded with the action, and, upon default, obtained a report directing a judgment for plaintiff for fifty dollars and costs. Upon motion of defendant this report was set aside: Held, that, so far as the judgment was concerned, the assignment became a nullity by its reversal; that the cause of action was not assignable; that the provision in the order granting a new trial, making the costs to abide event, did not aid the attorney, as it still remained subject to plaintiff's control whether the cause should again be tried, and that, therefore, the attorney as against defendant had no lien, either legal or equitable, which could affect the settlement. Pulver v. Harris. Opinion by Grover, J. 2. Also, held, that the motion to set aside the report was not addressed to the discretion of the court, but defendant had an absolute right to the relief sought, and the court had no right to impose terms or conditions upon granting it. Ib.

3. An attorney acquires a lien for his costs upon the recovery of a judgment, and where notice of the lien is given to the judgment debtor, the court will protect the lien. But retaining an attorney to prosecute

* In the case of the Mechanics and Traders' Bank v. Dakin, decided by the commission of appeals, an abstract of which is given in No. 11 of the present vol., p. 167, a motion was made at the September term of the commission for a reargument upon the ground that the decision was directly in conflict with Thurber v. Blanck, 50 N. Y. 80. The commission denied the motion upon the ground that, as a new trial had been ordered, either party, if dissatisfied with the result, could go to the court of appeals for a final settlement of the controversy. The question, therefore, as to the right of an attaching creditor to attach a bond and mortgage fraudulently assigned by the debtor, and his right to maintain an action to set aside the fraudulent transfer, may perhaps be considered as not yet entirely free from doubt.

an action, and its commencement by him, gives him no lien upon what may in the event of a trial be recovered therein. Ib.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. Chapter 580, Laws of 1872, "An act in relation to certain local improvements in the city of New York," is not unconstitutional, because one owner of land assessed, who has failed to institute proceedings to vacate the assessment until after the time limited for that purpose by the act, is not released therefrom, while other owners may have procured its vacation as to their lands. No inequality of taxation is legally produced thereby, as the lands relieved are required to be re-assessed, and if any inequality is practically produced by the vigilance of some and the neglect of other owners in availing themselves of the prescribed remedy, it is no fault of the law. In re petition of De Lancey to vacate assessment. Opinion by Church, Ch. J.

2. Proceedings instituted to vacate an assessment under the act in relation to frauds in assessments for local improvements in the city of New York (chap. 338, Laws 1858), are applicable only to the lands described in the proceedings; and the vacation of the assessment as to those lands does not operate to render the assessment for the whole improvement invalid. Ib.

COSTS.

The statute (Code, § 367, subd. 6) gives full costs, where costs are allowed upon appeals from orders to this court. Brown v. Leigh. Per curiam opinion.

NEW YORK.

1. Commissioners of records: constitutional law. One of the commissioners of records for the city and county of New York, appointed under the act of 1855 (chap. 407, Laws of 1855), died. Another ceased to be a resident of this State. The three remaining commissioners united in certificates to accounts for services rendered under their employment by the assignor of relator. The accounts thus certified were presented to defendant, the county treasurer, for payment, under the provision of the act directing the necessary expenses to be paid by the county treasurer, upon the certificate of the commissioners. Money had been regularly appropriated to pay the expenses, of which a sufficient sum to pay the accounts remained in the treasury. Defendant refused to pay. Held, that as the act made no provision for a vacancy or for an appointment in the place of the commissioners named, the three commissioners still in office had power to act; and all having joined in the certificates, the presumption was that such acts were legally done, and at a meeting of all, the accounts were therefore properly certified; that as the act provided for a special service by an agency outside the city or county government, the accounts did not require to be audited by an auditing officer of the city or county; that said act was not repealed by any of the acts subsequently passed, reorganizing and remodeling the city and county governments, and that the relator was entitled to a peremptory mandamus directing defendant to pay the accounts. That the duties of the office of commissioner of records of the city and county of New York, are entirely outside of and independent of the duties of the office of register of said city and county, and the former does not supersede or in any way interfere with the latter, and that the office of commissioner of records was not an existing office at the time of the adoption of the present State constitution, and

said act is not repugnant to the provision thereof (art. 10, § 2), which substantially declares that all county officers whose offices then existed, and whose election or appointment was not provided for in the constitution, shall be elected or appointed by the electors of the county, or such county authorities as the legislature shall direct. People ex rel. Kingsland v. Palmer, County Treasurer, etc. Opinion by Allen, J.

2. The policy of the law is to guard against the failure of a public service, and a grant of power in the nature of a public office to several does not become void upon the death or disability of one or more. Ib.

3. The repeal of statutes by implication is not favored by the law, and when a latter and former statute can stand together, both will stand unless the former is expressly repealed or the legislative intent to repeal is very manifest. Ib.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. The firm of J. C. D. & Co. consisted of five members, S., G., W., H. and R. W. and H. assigned their interests to S., and retired. The remaining partners continued the business under the same firm name. S. and R. executed chattel mortgages upon their respective interests to secure individual debts; the mortgagees took possession of the firm property under their mortgages, and upon the same day G. sold his interest to a stranger. Plaintiff, the mortgagee of S., purchased the latter's interest upon sale under the mortgage, and took an assignment from the purchaser of the interest of R. Defendants, under executions issued upon judgments against the members of the old firm for firm debts, levied upon the property and took it from the possession of plaintiff. In an action for conversionHeld, that the levy was valid; that, after the dissolution of the old firm, occasioned by the retirement of W. and H., the joint property continued liable for the firm debts; that the transfers by the remaining partners simply conveyed their respective interests in any surplus after paying partnership debts; that the effect of the transfers was not enlarged, nor were the rights of the creditors as between them and the assignees of such interests affected by the fact that the separate interests of all the partners were disposed of. Menagh v. Whitwell. Opinions by Rapallo and Allen,

JJ.

2. It seems, however, that the new firm acquired the absolute right of disposal of the property, and if it had transferred the same, in the absence of fraud, the right of the creditors of the old firm would have been lost, or if it had incurred liabilities and contracted debts, as between the creditors of the old and new firms, the latter would have the preference. Ib.

3. Lease: interest. - In an action for the settlement of partnership accounts - Held, that a lease for a term of years, from one of the partners to the firm, for the purposes of the business, is subject to the continuance of the business, and upon a dissolution of the partnership by the death of either of the partners, the lease terminates. Where, however, the demised premises cannot be actually employed during the whole year, and the firm has received, at the time of the dissolution, the substantial benefits thereof, and the use during that portion of the year for which for the purposes designed the premises are of any value, the lessor is entitled to be credited for the rent for the year in the settlement of the partnership accounts. Johnson, adm'r, v. Hartshorn, ex'r, etc. Opinion by Church, Ch. J.

4. There is no fixed rule as to the allowance of inter

est in the settlement of partnership accounts, it depends upon the circumstances of the case. Ib.

5. Compound interest cannot be allowed upon balances in favor of one partner, but may be charged upon debits, in cases of bad faith, refusal to account and private use of the money of the firm, and the question of its propriety in such cases is one of fact for the trial court, whose decision is conclusive. Ib.

VALUABLE CONSIDERATION.

1. Husband and wife: purchaser for value: collateral security.-Action to foreclose a mortgage. It appeared that, in the fall of 1866, John White, the mortgagor, being indebted to his wife, defendant Jane White, conveyed the premises in question to his son, the defendant John P. White, who, at the same time, conveyed them to said Jane White. John White, at that time, was not indebted, except to his wife and son, and there was no fraud in the conveyances. The deeds were delivered to Jane White, who kept them until March, 1868, without having them recorded, when John P. White, without her consent, destroyed them. In November, 1868, John P. White, to secure an indebtedness of $1,000, gave the bond and mortgage in question. No securities were surrendered, nor did it appear that any agreement was made to extend or suspend the time of payment.

Held, that the title of Jane White was good as against the mortgagee; that he was not a purchaser for a valuable consideration, within the meaning of the recording act (1 R. S. 856, § 1). Carey v. White et al. Opinion by Allen, J.

2. An extension of time by a valid agreement for any time, however short, is a valuable consideration, but the mere taking of collateral securities on time is not, per se, and in the absence of any agreement beyond it, an extension of time for the payment of the original debt. (Platt v. Coman, 37 N.Y. 440, limited.) Ib. 3. The authorities upon the question as to what constitutes a valuable consideration, collated and discussed. Ib.

WILL.

1. Construction: parol evidence.· A bequeathed certain sums of money to "The society for the relief of indigent aged females." In an action to determine which of the parties was entitled to the bequest — Held, that the name of the defendant more nearly assimilated to that used in the will, and its objects, as disclosed by its charter, were more in harmony with the description of the corporation intended, that the testator having with reasonable accuracy described and named defendant, it was not competent to show by parol, that an institution of a different name and character was intended, and that defendant was entitled to the bequests. St. Luke's Home for Indigent Christian Females v. An Association for the Relief of Respectable Aged Indigent Females in the city of New York. Opinion by Allen, J.

2. The construction of a written instrument is a question of law, and every court to whom the question of construction is submitted is entitled to the benefit of every circumstance which the law permits to be considered in determining the meaning of the particular words used. An appellate court, therefore, is not bound by the conclusions of the court below as to those circumstances. Ib.

Ex-Judge Louis Dent, brother-in-law of President Grant, is very ill, and his speedy death is expected.