the tribunals of justice in the cities can long continue without demoralizing the honor of the entire community. If not arrested here, such causes are as sure as the cholera or the small-pox, which cities are the first to breed, to sweep the entire State. Every honest man and virtuous woman in the State ought to be admonished of the feebleness and perils of our administration of criminal justice, by the fearful fact that year by year this city of one million of people has more crime committed within its borders than London with three millions of people. Against less than seventy-three thousand criminal arrests in London each year there are more than seventy-five thousand in New York city; and in London criminal trials are far more prompt, and the proportion tried and convicted is far greater than here. The administration of criminal justice all over the State is much less efficient than it was prior to 1846. In the country, as well as in the city, crimes have increased in greater ratio than population since 1846, and the criminal classes cast their votes for judicial officers upon pledges of gentle dealing with offenders. We believe these damning facts are not due to the greater vice or lawlessness of our people, or to any feebleness of republican institutions, but that they are, in a great measure, the legitimate result of our false and feeble judicial system. This system, to the knowledge of all of us, calls to the polls every vicious and criminal voter by all the direct interest he feels in his own safety for the past, and by his hopes of impunity for the future. It appeals to the honest and virtuous voter only by a remote interest, or a mere disinterested sense of duty. It combines together the selfish voters, by all the strength of a direct common interest and peril, to sustain the most unscrupulous candidate; while the honest and patriotic voters, affiliated with opposing parties, are separated by party ties and prejudices, and all cooperation based on the merits of the judicial candidates is greatly embarrassed, if not defeated. Those who are the natural supporters of the best judicial candidate are marshaled in hostile array, about issues which are utterly foreign to all the qualifications of a judge. Such are the natural results of applying the method of election to officers to whom it is not adapted, and to which the authors of our republican system never intended it should be applied. In the presence of such facts and tendencies - convinced as we are by our experience that the elective system applied to judges has neither inspired nor strengthened any thing good among the people, but that it has lowered the dignity of the bench, weakened the force of law, impaired public confidence in the administration of justice, made criminals more numerous and bold, and life and character and property less safe we cannot refrain from this appeal; and we earnestly call upon all the voters of this State to cast their ballots, irrespective of all party considerations, for a return to that method of judicial appointments which the experience of the States, the nation, and the mother country has alike approved. By order of the Association. WM. M. EVARTS, President. A. R. MACDONOUGH, Secretary. Hon. James C. Smith, who was appointed last spring to fill a vacancy on the bench of the supreme court of this State, has been nominated for that office by the republicans of the eighth district. COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. AGENCY. Action to recover the purchase price of a quantity of hops alleged to have been sold to defendant. The contract for the purchase was made by V., who represented himself to be the agent of defendant. He was in fact the agent of a firm composed of defendant and G. W., and had no authority to act for defendant individually. Defendant moved for a nonsuit on the ground of the non-joinder of the partner. The motion was denied. Held, that defendant was not individually liable for the purchase price of the hops. An agency cannot be created by the representations of an assumed agent. Marvin, Adm'x, etc., v. Wilber. Opinion by Peckham, J. AGREEMENT. Between attorneys as to suit pending.-This was an action brought by the attorney-general under the provisions of the act authorizing him to institute suits for the purpose of annulling certain contracts for canal repairs (ch. 869, Laws of 1868). After the trial upon demurrer to the complaint, and a decision in favor of the defendants, it was verbally agreed between the attorney-general and defendants' attorney, in consideration of defendants' waiving all claim for costs, that no further proceedings in the action should be taken, but the same should be considered as finally disposed of. In consequence of the agreement, and relying upon it, defendants' counsel omitted to take any further steps in the action, and notified his client that it was finally disposed of. About two years after, the successor to the attorney-general entered an order upon the decision sustaining the demurrer and appealed therefrom to the general term, which appeal was on motion dismissed. Held, no error (Grover and Peckham, JJ., dissenting). That the verbal agreement having been acted upon by the parties' attorneys, and defendant having been prevented thereby from taking the usual steps to cut off the right of appeal, the agreement should be deemed as effectual as if in writing, and the general term had the right in its discretion to dismiss the appeal. People of the State of New York v. Stephens et al. Opinion by Rapallo, J. CONTRACT. Action to recover for certain "granite heads " alleged to have been sold and delivered to defendant by plaintiff. It appeared that K. contracted to build certain sewers for defendant. In the contract it was provided that, in case of delay in the performance of the work, that defendant could take possession and complete the same, using such materials as were found upon the line of the work. Plaintiff delivered stones for "culvert heads" upon the line of the work, under a contract with K., by which the former was to receive his pay after the stones were set, inspected and approved. After such delivery and before a portion of the stones were set, K. abandoned the work and the city assumed and completed it, and with plaintiff's knowledge used said stones, which were accepted and approved. Evidence was given tending to show that plaintiff knew of the conditions of K.'s contract, and it did not appear that he asserted any claim to the stones, or that he objected to their being taken and used. Held, that the mere taking by defendant was not a recognition of the ownership of plaintiff, so as to raise an implied promise to pay. That if plaintiff, knowing the conditions of the contract, stood by and saw de fendant acting under it, and asserted no claim or made no objection to such taking and use, he was estopped from claiming the property as against defendant, and could not recover, and that a refusal of the court so to charge was error. Hogan v. City of Brooklyn. Opinion by Allen, J. Also held, that in the exclusion of evidence of the acts of the city officials on the part of defendant, in the absence of plaintiff, in accepting the stones, was error. Such acceptance was on the contract with K., and plaintiff's absence or presence was immaterial. CONVERSION. Sale of stocks pledged.- Action upon a promissory note. The complaint alleged a sale of certain stocks pledged as security and the application of the proceeds upon the note. The answer admitted the sale, but that it was tortious, because made without a previous demand and notice, and claimed that plaintiff was liable for conversion. Plaintiff, upon the trial, proved without objection that the stocks were sold at auction, and bid off by himself; the sale was made without notice. The court held that there was no conversion, and gave judgment for the amount of the note. Held, no error. That defendant not having objected upon the trial that plaintiff was precluded from showing there was no sale had waived his right, and the court was justified in determining the case irrespective of the pleadings. That the sale was voidable at defendant's election, and he having elected to treat it as illegal, there was no sale and therefore no conversion. Bryan, Ex'x, etc., v. Baldwin. Opinion by Grover, J. FRAUD. Proof of to invalidate a sale.-A creditor of a vendor who seeks to invalidate a sale upon the ground of fraud must prove facts from which a legitimate inference of fraudulent intent can be drawn. Evidence simply justifying a suspicion is not sufficient, nor is the vendor's fraudulent intent sufficient. There must be proof that the vendee was also implicated in the fraud, and proof of inadequacy of price alone does not accomplish this. Jaeger v. Kelley, Sheriff, etc. Opinion by Church, C. J. INDICTMENT. Variance.- Plaintiff in error was indicted for forging and altering a check, which was set forth in the indictment. Upon the check as given in evidence upon the trial was the indorsement of the payees named therein, and a revenue stamp, neither of which were set forth in the description of the check contained in the indictment. The counsel for the prisoner requested the court to direct the jury to acquit the prisoner on the ground of a variance between the indictment and the proof. The court refused the request, and counsel excepted. Held, that the omission did not constitute a variance. Neither the indorsement nor revenue stamp formed a part of the check, which is a complete instrument of itself. Miller v. The People. Opinion by Rapallo, J. INSURANCE. Agent.-Action to compel defendant to account for moneys alleged to have been received by him as agent, upon a policy of insurance upon the life of D., plaintiff's intestate. Said D. had agreed with the company in which he was insured for the surrender of his policy and a return to him of his premium notes, which notes had been sent to the company's agent to be delivered up. D. gave his policy to defendant as his agent, and instructed him to surrender the same for cancellation. Defendant surrendered the policy, but before the notes had been canceled or surrendered applied to have the policy renewed for the benefit of himself and G. D. D. The agent thereupon returned the notes to the company with a statement that D. wished to renew, and that defendant and G. D. D. were to help him. A renewal policy was then issued for the benefit of defendant and G. D. D. The premiums were thereafter paid by defendant and G. D. D., as were also D.'s premium notes, less the amount of dividends credited thereon. G. D. D. assigned his interest, and upon the death of D. defendant collected the amount of the policy. Held (Grover, J., dissenting), that by accepting the renewal policy defendant must be deemed to have adopted the instrumentalities by which it was obtained, and was bound by the representations of the agent to the company, that aside from this defendant, while acting as agent, having acquired, by departing from his instructions, a benefit, a part of the consideration for which proceeded from his principal, plaintiff had a right to adopt his acts, and to call him to account for the profits derived from the transaction. It seems that if defendant had asked and obtained the consent of his principal, in the absence of collusion or fraud, defendant might have been discharged from his obligations as agent, and might have acquired a beneficial interest in the policy. Dutton, Adm'x, etc., v. Willner. Opinion by Rapallo, J. PRACTICE. Pleadings counter-claim in answer.- Action upon two promissory notes. The defendant's answer alleged substantially that the notes were given in part payment of a farm sold to defendant by plaintiff's testator; that defendant was induced to purchase by means of false and fraudulent representations, as to the territorial extent of the farm; that the land falsely represented to form a part of the farm, would have enhanced its value $5,000, and defendant had sustained damage to that amount. No reply was interposed, and upon the trial defendant moved for judgment upon the pleadings. No objection was made of want of proof of damages. Judgment was directed for plaintiff. Held, error; that the answer set up matter constituting a counterclaim, which plaintiff admitted by the failure to reply. That there having been no objection, and the decision of the court not being placed on the ground of want of proof of damages, it must be deemed to have decided that the answer did not set forth a counter-claim (Church, Ch. J., and Grover, J., dissenting). The rule applicable to motions for a nonsuit, which requires the defendant to specify objections, which, if specified, could be obviated by proof, if equally applicable where the defendant becomes the actor in seeking to enforce a counter-claim. Isham, Ex'rix, etc. v. Davidson. Opinion by Rapallo, J. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. Married women.- Action upon an award in favor of plaintiff's testatrix, made and published August 31, 1857, by which defendant was decreed to pay her $2,000, and interest from May 1, 1854. The testatrix was a married woman, and so continued until her death, February 4, 1862. This action was commenced February 11, 1867. The defense was the statute of limitations. Held, that the action was barred. That under the provisions of the Code, limiting the time for the commencment of actions, as amended in 1851, the disability of marriage declared thereby, which pre Pendency of another action: when not a bar: cause of action. The only cause of action stated in the complaint is that the defendant had brought actions of ejectment in the superior court for recovery of certain real estate, and had afterward commenced summary proceedings to recover possession of the same premises for rent then due. That the proceedings of defendant in procuring such summons are injurious to plaintiffs, and an abuse of the proceedings under the statute. Appeal from order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint. Held, that no good cause of action is stated. It is no ground for an injunction that the proceedings are injurious to a party, if such proceeding is proper. If it is not legal for the party to take such remedy, it should be defended on showing such illegality in the proceeding sought to be enjoined. Success in either of these proceedings can be pleaded to defeat the other. Order affirmed. Guissler et al. v. Stuyvesant. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J. See case under same title, 12 Abb. N. S., p. 6; also, 8 Alb. L. J., pp. 207, 216. ALLOWANCE. See Costs. BILLS, NOTES, ETC. Checks given under special agreement: when they cannot be enforced: consideration: composition agreements.- Appeal from judgment in favor of defendant. This action is brought upon a check given to plaintiffs by defendant. It appeared that the check was placed in plaintiffs' possession to be held subject to the drafts of defendant in favor of those of the creditors of one Landman, who should release him from his indebtedness. An attempt was made to procure the releases, but was not successful, except with a few, including the plaintiffs. Defendant then demanded the check and stopped its payment. Held, that the plaintiff had no right of action on the check. They could obtain no title till the defendant had made drafts on them for some portion of its amount. If the plaintiffs had any claim upon the defendant upon the composition paper, it should be enforced on the agreement therefor. And the agreement, even if it was enforceable against defendant as a compromise, was void as to plaintiffs, for they had agreed to receive a larger sum than stated in the agreement. Judgment affirmed. Claflin et al. v. Fisher. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J. CASES REVIEWED. See Insurance. COMPOSITION AGREEMENTS. See Bills, etc. See Insurance. CONSIDERATION. See Bills, etc. CONTRACTS. See Bills, etc.; Insurance and Real Estate. COSTS. When allowance cannot be given.- Appeal from an order granting an allowance. The only relief sought was an injunction, for a limited period, to restrain the prosecution of certain summary proceedings. No money was sought to be recovered, and no property was the subject-matter of the action. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained. Held, the value of the right to prosecute the summary proceedings cannot be estimated. The question raised did not involve the recovery of any lands nor of the rent alleged to be due. The decision did not affect the right to the rents nor to the lands. The remedy of defendant for his expenses and damages should be had allowance on the amount recovered or claimed, or the on the injunction undertaking. The statute gives an subject-matter involved. In the latter case such value is to be ascertained by the court. There was nothing in this case on which an allowance could be estimated, nothing recovered, and no money or property claimed. Order reversed. Guissler et al. v. Stuyvesant. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J. See same case under "Action Pending," supra. 1. Fire insurance: evidence as to value of property destroyed: representations of insured: rules of recovery on policy.- Appeal from judgment in favor of plaintiff. This action is brought to recover upon a policy of insurance against fire, issued by defendant to plaintiff. Several exceptions were taken below to the admission or exclusion of evidence which we reviewed in the opinion of the learned presiding justice. Held, first. That the evidence on part of plaintiff as to what it would cost to replace the mill and machinery destroyed, was improperly admitted. It involved an obligation on the part of the company to substitute a new building for an old one, and the error is apparent when it was shown the whole property, including land and water, had cost plaintiff $4,000, and the cost of a new mill and machinery was estimated at $8,000 and over. Second. The questions put to witnesses as to the value of the building on the 14th May, 1860, six days before the fire, were improperly excluded. It is not to be expected that witnesses can be produced to prove the value from examinations made on the day of the fire. A knowledge of the building six days before was amply sufficient to enable them to testify on that question. The law would presume the same state of things to continue until the fire, and if any alterations or improvements were made to increase the value, the plaintiff could have shown it. One of the conditions of the policy requires proof to be given of the cash value of the building. Third. One of the representations in the policy was, whether the supply of water was sufficient. The answer was," sufficient with proper arrangements." Evidence was offered to show a scarcity of water so that the mill could not run. Whether there was any deficiency or not was a question which, if considered as a warranty, should have been submitted to the jury, and the questions on that subject were improperly excluded. (Le Roy v. Market Fire Ins. Co., 39 N. Y. 90; Le Roy v. Park Fire Ins. Co., id. 57; and 45 N. Y. 80, cited.) Judgment reversed. Steward v. Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. Opinion by Ingraham, P, J. 2. Rule of damages on a fire insurance policy: value, how proved.-On a fire insurance policy the insured can, in no event, recover more than the actual loss at the time of the fire. The contract is one of mere indemnity. Propositions to estimate the difference in value between a new and old building, and to give the difference in damages, and to give the cost of erecting anew the building as damages have both been rejected (1 Metc. 195, cited). The actual value of the building at the time of the fire is to be ascertained from the opinions of persons conversant with it before its destruction. A reasonable time previous within which the witnesses have seen the building would qualify them to speak of its value, if they were otherwise experts in such matters. Ib. 3. Policy of fire insurance: when reformed: contracts: mutual mistake: conflict of testimony.- Appeal from judgment in favor of plaintiffs. This action is brought to reform a policy of fire insurance issued to plaintiffs by defendant, and to recover the amount of insurance. The property insured was a mill. The defense is that the property was insured on the understanding that the mill should be run and operated in the day only, whereas it was operated by night, the risk thereby increased, and the fire caused during the night. Plaintiff testified that defendant's agent agreed to give permission to run the mill at night, and that defendant "would write" in the same form as another company granting that privilege; that plaintiff took the policy of the other company to the agent and received defendant's policy; that plaintiff did not discover till after the fire that the permission to run at night was not in the policy. Defendant's agent testified that no such privilege was requested from or agreed to by him. The case was tried before Mr. Justice Barnard, of the second department, who found that by mutual mistake of both parties and their agents the permission was not inserted in the policy, and that the mistake was not discovered till after the fire. He rendered judgment directing the policy to be reformed by inserting the permission, and then rendered judgment for plaintiffs for the amount of the loss. On appeal the case was sent to this department. Held, to reform a contract it must appear that such mistake was made by both parties. If one party was mistaken and the other was not, no such judgment can be rendered. This is to be settled like any other question of fact, by the jury or by the court if tried without a jury, and where the evidence is conflicting the finding at the trial is conclusive on both parties. There being such a conflict here, the judgment below is conclusive. Judgment affirmed. Van Tuyl v. Westchester Fire Insurance Company. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J. 4. Ib.: cases reviewed. The case of Salms v. Rutgers' Ins. Co., 8 Bosw. 578, is urged as authority for the position that the policy cannot be reformed after the loss has occurred. That case was reversed in court of appeals, 3 Keyes, 416; also see Bidwell v. Astor Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. 263. Ib. MANDAMUS. 1. When mandamus will not be allowed. Cases against municipal officers - Appeal from an order refusing to grant a mandamus against the defendant, the comptroller of the city of New York. Defendant denies the validity of the contract, and charges that it was illegally made, and that the prices charged are excessive. Held, that these questions should be tried in an action against the city upon the contract. A mandamus is proper in cases against the city, arising from the re fusal of some officer to do his part of the duty necessary to pay, if the claim is not disputed, or in cases in which some duty is to be performed other than the mere payment of a debt, or where the remedy by action is inappropriate. This case is not within these exceptions. Order affirmed. People ex rel. Gindet v. Green, Comptroller, etc. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J. 2. Ib. Neither in England nor in this State has a mandamus been allowed where there was a remedy by action, and a reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim, or any conclusion that it should be examined by due process of law. Ib. Opinion by Brady J. MISTAKE. See Insurance. REAL ESTATE. Description of premises: encroachments: contracts.This action was brought to rescind a contract for the purchase of real property, and obtain the return to plaintiff of a ten per centum deposit made at time of its execution. Upon somewhat conflicting evidence the court below found that, at the time of the sale, its terms were read by the auctioneer, "which described said premises as lot 45, Crosby street, east side, twentyfive feet more or less, front and rear, by 100 feet deep on each side," and that after the premises were struck off to plaintiff he signed a memorandum of his purchase with the same words of description; that defendant was ready and able to give a good title, free and clear, of the premises, and tendered the same, but plaintiff refused to take said conveyance and pay the balance due on the contract of purchase. It is then found as a matter of law, that defendants are entitled to judgment for the residue of the purchase-money on the delivery of a deed, free from incumbrance, of premises described "as commencing at the point where the house, on 45 Crosby street, meets that street; thence easterly one hundred feet, more or less, to the north-easterly corner of another building on said lot; thence southerly twenty-five feet, more or less, to the south-easterly corner of the last-named building; thence westerly to the northerly wall of the building known as 43 Crosby street, as the same now stands, to the easterly side of Crosby street; and thence northerly along the same twenty-four feet and two inches, more or less, to the place of beginning. The evidence was, that the northerly wall of No. 43 encroached on the premises in question ten inches in front, which encroachment increased to sixteen inches at a distance of thirty feet from the street, and for thirty feet further it was two inches. The deed was declined by plaintiff on the ground of such encroachment. Defendant admits that there had been such an "inadvertent" encroachment, but alleges that it had been admitted by the owner of the adjoining lot, and its removal promised, and that it is therefore no incumbrance. The judgment follows the conclusion of law above stated. On appeal: Held, that the law makes no such conclusion as above stated from the finding of fact. The plaintiff would at least be entitled to a conveyance, that would give him the whole of No. 45, so that whenever the "inadvertent encroachment" was removed, he would take the entire lot. The judgment excludes him from all right to the part encroached upon, and obliges him to take an irregular line, such as neither party could have contemplated at the sale. The plaintiff bought the whole lot, "twenty-five feet front more or less," and not a lot reduced by such an intrusion as defendants claim this to be. It is not a question whether the lot is really more or less than twenty-five feet, but whether the purchaser is entitled to it without an encroachment, which embarrasses the title to a part and impairs the value of the whole. Judgment reversed. King v. Knapp et al. Opinion by Davis, J. REPRESENTATIONS. See Insurance. LAWYERS IN FRANCE. There is, in each court or tribunal, a certain number of solicitors whom the suitors are obliged to employ; their duties are to make all actes de procedure (acts of proceedings) necessary to lead and manage an affair up to the day of the pleading; the solicitor draws up the summons and conclusions, and directs, therefore, the lawsuit, the barrister not being at liberty to plead any other facts or arguments than those mentioned in the conclusions or summons; it is consequently the solicitor who makes out the brief which is remitted to the barrister when the cause is ready to be heard. The solicitor is in direct communication with the client, gives instructions to the bailiff, and prepares the means and grounds of pleading of the barrister, whom he is generally at liberty to choose in all affairs of no great importance; however, the client can consult his barrister whenever he may think proper, without the interference of the solicitor; and generally in affairs of great importance it is the barrister who is consulted first, and who leads the cause; but in such cases the barristers respect the clients of each solicitor, for being in connection with the solicitors, and receiving from them the briefs of little importance, they would compromise their own clients by acting otherwise. It is only barristers of eminence who are independent of solicitors; as regards the young barristers, out of one hundred briefs ninety-five come from solicitors. The solicitors can only practice in the tribunal where they are admitted; they cannot under any pretext interfere with any commercial, county court, or other affairs, such as to draw up deeds, manage property, collect debts, etc. They are not at liberty, as in London, to draw up any deeds whatsoever, such as wills, marriage settlements, liquidation of partnerships, deeds of partnership, leases, deeds of mortgage, sale of immovable property, sale of furniture, etc., which devolve on the notaries or "agents d'affaires " (agents). The solicitors are paid for every thing drawn up by them, and for each attendance at the tribunal, in conformity with a tariff made in 1804. In the offices of solicitors of the civil tribunal of Paris, each brief is charged at the rate of 100 fr. (£4) on an average, in the country from £2 to £2 10s., but the solicitor's expenses are increased by the stamp and registering duties; so that in a note of charges of £8 the solicitor does not receive more than £3, or £3 10s., the rest is for the government, The solicitor's and bailiff's expenses are always to be paid by the suitor who loses the case. In the note of charges of a solicitor appears a sum of 12s. for the pleading of the barrister, in conformity with the tariff of 1804, but the 12s. are always kept by the solicitor, who, of course, could not offer them to the barrister. The solicitors are not entitled to any fee but that granted to them by the tariff; but in important cases, and when the solicitor is a man of talent, he always receives from his client an extra fee, which does not appear on the note of charges. Solicitors are not required in a criminal cause; when they appear before a tribunal correctionnel (court for the trial of misdemeanors), or a cour d'assise (courts of assize), it is only as mere mandataires (attorneys), and in such a case their fee is always paid by their client. When one of the parties is sentenced to pay the costs, the solicitor of the opposite party obtains from the tribunal a judgment called executoire, which authorizes him to receive his charges before his client, so that the first installments paid by the suitor who has lost the case are employed in paying the charges of the solicitors and bailiffs. The solicitors of each tribunal are, like the bailiffs, constituted a corporation, and have a chambre syndicale (syndic), elected as aforesaid, and having the duties hereinbefore mentioned. The successors are presented, and the practices are sold in like manner as we have already mentioned in reference to the bailiffs, but we have omitted to add that such sales are made by acts under private signatures and registered, and that the government, after having received information from the chambre des avowes (syndic of the solicitors), can lower the price of purchase, notwithstanding the agreement of the parties; such price is generally equivalent to the proceeds or produce of five years. We have mentioned the conditions required to be a solicitor; the barristers and the bailiffs who possess such qualities can, after having left their first practice, purchase a solicitor's practice, but they cannot hold two at the same time; however, up to 1820, solicitors used to plead as barristers, and now, in certain little towns where business is not important enough to require a "college" (corporation) of barristers, the solicitors attend at the same time to the duties of barrister and solicitor. The solicitors having generally the same university degrees, and the same experience as the barrister, are in a position to plead. It has been proposed many times to suppress the solicitors, and to give their duties to barristers, and vice versa; such amendment has been postponed by the difficulty for the government to re-imburse the value of the practice. Formerly, when the solicitors had only the degree of capax, or that of bachelor at law, the barrister, whose legal studies were more complete, and who possessed the degree of licenciate, or doctor, was indispensable, and his employment was also a better guarantee for the suitors; but now, the solicitors having the same knowledge and degrees as the barristers, it is to the interest of the suitor to pay one person only in lieu of two. Besides, the solicitor who leads the cause from the beginning, and who is constantly in connection with the client, is more acquainted with the brief than the barrister, to whom the same is remitted a few days only before the hearing. Therefore, in that respect, an amendment will certainly be useful, but what is more urgent and pressing is a reform of the judicial expenses and of the proceedings, which would have been done by the imperial government if it had lasted longer. In the present state of things, solicitors, like bailiffs, are paid for every act done by them and each attendance, and are not entitled to extra fees. The result is, that the interest of the solicitor and bailiffs is to have as many lawsuits and make them last as long as possible, which is very prejudicial for the public, a bad transaction or compromise being preferable to a good lawsuit. Then it happens sometimes that, during the course of the proceedings, the debtor becomes insolvent, and when the suit is finished you cannot even |