petition, requesting that their names should be struck from the petition, as not consenting to the same. The parties who signed this paper, appeared before the judge and requested that their names should be struck from the petition, which the judge declined to do. Without the names of these persons the petition would have been insufficient. The judge decided that the petitioners were a majority of the tax payers of the town and represented a majority of the taxable property of the town, and appointed commissioners as prescribed by the act.

Held, error; that petitioners have a right to withdraw their names from the petition, at any time prior to the final submission of the case to the county judge, and that upon such withdrawal their names and taxable property must be excluded from the calculation on the part of the applicants. People ex rel. Irwin et al. v. Sawyer, County Judge, etc. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

TURNPIKES AND PLANKROADS.

-

1. Inspectors: toll penalties. — Action to recover penalties alleged to have been incurred by taking toll at the gate of a plankroad company, organized under chap. 210, laws of 1847, after notice from the inspectors of turnpikes, appointed under chap. 43, laws of 1848, to open the gate. Held, that under the provisions of 1 R. S., §§ 44, 586, in reference to turnpike corporations, which imposes a penalty of $10 upon every keeper of a toll gate ordered to be thrown open by the inspectors, who shall not immediately obey such order, the aggrieved party is not limited to one penalty, but may recover the same for each and every offense. Foster v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 46 N. Y. 644, and Washburn v. McInvoy, 7 J. R. 135, distinguished. (Grover, J., dissenting.) Suydam v. Smith. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

2. Inspectors of turnpikes, formerly appointed under the Revised Statutes, and now under the act of 1848, providing for such appointment (chap. 45, laws 1848), are the proper officers to inspect toll roads, upon complaint that they are out of repair, and to serve notice to discontinue all tolls in case of failure to repair. Ib.

3. The inspectors mentioned in the act of 1847, providing for the incorporation of plankroad and turnpike road companies (§ 33, chap. 210, laws 1847), are confined to a preliminary inspection of toll roads before the companies are allowed to exact toll thereon. They have no power to act upon complaints for want of repair. Ib.

WILL.

This was a case submitted under § 372 of the Code, to obtain the construction of the will of H., the provisions of which were substantially as follows: 1st. It directed the executors to sell all his real and personal estate. 2d. It gave to his wife an annuity of $175, payable yearly out of the rents and income of his estate, so long as she remained his widow, provided she accepted the same in lieu of dower. 3d. It gave one-seventh of the residue of the balance of the rents and income to B. upon certain trusts; and 4th, it directed all the balance of the rents and income to be equally divided among six legatees named. Held, that by the first clause the whole estate was equitably converted into personalty; that the last clause was an absolute gift of one-sixth of the remainder of the estate to each of the legatees named, and that the acceptance of the annuity only barred the widow's claim to be endowed of the real estate, and did not affect her right to the personal property. Hatch v. Bassett. Opinion by Grover, J.

GENERAL TERM ABSTRACT.

SUPREME COURT-FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ATTACHMENT. See Undertakings. ATTORNEYS. See Specific Performance. BILLS, NOTES, ETC.

1. Consideration. This action is upon a promissory note. The defenses are a want of consideration, and that the note is an accommodation note. Appeal from a judgment entered on referee's report in favor of plaintiff. It appeared that plaintiff and defendants, Hartshorn and Brand, entered into a contract together with one McKendrick for the purchase of malt. McKendrick paid for his one-third share thereof. Hartshorn and Brand could not pay for their share, and plaintiff proposed to use their note to raise money for that purpose. They accordingly gave their note to plaintiff for $8,864, and he had the same discounted, and with the proceeds paid for the malt. When the note was nearly due Hartshorn told plaintiff they could not pay the note, and thereupon plaintiff agreed to advance them $6,000 on receiving from them $8,000 in four notes. Accordingly he advanced them $6,000, and they took up their first note when it became due, by paying it with this money and $2,864 of their own funds. During this time the malt was stored in the house of Hartshorn and Brand, but previous to the time when the four notes became due plaintiff, upon an order from them, obtained his share and took it into his possession.

Held, that the only sum due plaintiff from defendants was $1,593.06, as the only amount of consideration which plaintiff in reality had paid on the notes, together with interest, from the day of payment of the malt by plaintiff, this being the difference between $2,864, the amount paid by defendants on account of the first note out of their own funds, and $4,457.06 the amount they should have paid originally for their third of the malt. As plaintiff took up the notes when they became due they were only securities for the $6,000 he advanced thereon, and, as between defendants and himself, subject to his third of the malt. The value of the malt subsequently delivered could not have been the subject of a counter-claim, as it always belonged to plaintiff, and was held on storage by defendants. Its delivery showed that the notes were not an advance on that property. It is unnecessary for the defendants to be put to another action to recover back the amount overpaid by them. The judgment should be reversed unless the plaintiff consent to reduce the judgment to $1,593.06, and interest from 17th September, 1870, in which case the judgment is affirmed for that sum. Gordon v. Titus et al. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J.

2. Ib. The delivery of the malt to plaintiff by defendants Hartshorn and Brand was at the suggestion of the latter, to break up the joint contract and accept the share, which met with no objection on the part of plaintiff. If the plaintiff could have met the testimony to that effect, and shown outstanding equities in relation to the joint contract, he would have been awarded the benefit arising therefrom. The present constitution of the courts permit the application of legal and equitable maxims in every case, and plaintiff cannot equitably recover more than the proofs show him entitled to. Ib. Opinion by Brady, J., concurring.

3. Ib. Dissenting opinion.—The learned judge, in dissent, says: An action was brought on another of the

four notes in the common pleas, and that and the present action were tried before the same referee, whose report in both actions was in favor of plaintiff. On appeal to the general term of the common pleas the judgment was affirmed. (Gordon v. Boffe et al.) That litigation being on substantially the same question, and between substantially the same parties, that decision should now be followed. The rights of the parties under a final settlement of the joint purchase are matters of affirmative defense, by way of counterclaim, or payment or the like, and they have not been so set up. The matter of the purchase cannot be satisfactorily disposed of in this action. Ib. Opinion by Learned, J., dissentiente.

1. Interpretation of contracts: certificate of surveyor, when conclusive: evidence of usage. — Plaintiff seeks to recover the amount of a verdict rendered in the Circuit, where exceptions were taken and ordered to be heard in the first instance at General Term. The claim is made for work under a contract with the defendants in regulating and grading a portion of First avenue, in New York city. Plaintiff was paid for all the work except for rock excavated outside the perpendicular lines of the avenue, and it is said that this is not within the contract. The learned judge examines the provisions of the contract, and holds: That no provision is made for this work. The evidence that rock slopes were necessary is only to the effect, that it was impossible to do the work without slopes, "unless you cut with hammer and chisel." This evidence only proves that it was easier and cheaper to do the work with slopes. The work done falls within the provision, "that, in case any other work is required to be done in order to carry out the provisions of the agreement," the contractor "will do the same without any claim for extra compensation therefor." The plaintiff is also bound by the provisions of the contract, that the return of the City Surveyor shall be the account by which the work done shall be computed, and that plaintiff shall not be entitled to receive payment without proper certificate of the surveyor. In the absence of evidence of fraud, collusion or unreasonable refusal, this certificate is a condition precedent to any right of the plaintiff to recover. If given in good faith, it concludes the rights of both parties. (3 Den. 73; 44 N. Y. 144; 4 Duer. 308; 24 Wend. 449, cited.) If a certificate is fraudulently or unreasonably refused, the plaintiff, on proof of such facts, may recover on a quantum meruit. (17 N. Y. 176; 9 Peters, 319, 375; 26 N. Y. 33, cited.) No such refusal was shown here. There being nothing ambiguous in the contract, nor any intention respecting it which remains to be supplied, proof of an alleged custom among contractors to include rock slopes is inadmissable. It was competent for the parties to make the contract, as the surveyor testifies they did, "different from ordinary contracts." Whenever the terms of a contract indicate an intention different from the usage in similar cases, the terms must prevail. (34 N. Y. 422, and other cases cited.) Verdict set aside. Voorhis v. Mayor, etc., of New York. Opinion by Fancher, J.

2. Waiver: interpretation of contracts: principal and

agent. Action to recover for alleged breach of contract. The written contract was as follows: "Daniel L. Sturgis, Hemp Broker, &c. New York, May 19, 1870. Sold for account of 'plaintiffs to defendants' 431 bales jute hemp, to arrive from London per ship 'Robena,' in good order, free from damage, at 5% cents per pound, gold, cash, payable fifteen days from delivery along side of vessel-purchaser to advance gold sufficient to pay duties." Signed by D. L. S., Broker, and accepted by defendants. When the "Robena" arrived she brought only 343 bales. The remainder arrived about a month later by another ship. On the arrival of the "Robena " the plaintiffs delivered to Sturgis an order for the delivery of 344 bales to defendants. By means of this order Sturgis procured the delivery of the jute to him, and stored it, in his name, in a public store. On the arrival of the "Robena " the defendant Furnwal examined the jute on the dock, and told Sturgis that it was not the hemp he had agreed to purchase, and refused to take it on that ground, assigning no other reason. He had no knowledge that the whole number of bales contracted for had not then arrived. The referee further finds, that neither the whole or any part of the jute was ever offered or tendered to defendants by plaintiffs. He finds that the jute was merchantable. Appeal from judgment in favor of defendants. Held, that it is apparent that Sturgis was not the agent of the defendants, and, therefore, none of his acts constituted a delivery to or acceptance by them. This was an executory contract to deliver certain goods to arrive by a designated vessel, and, to recover thereon, plaintiffs must show the delivery, or a readiness and offer to deliver, the whole quantity. (Baker v. Higgins, 21 N. Y. 397, cited.) As defendants did not know that but a part had arrived, they waived nothing. Plaintiffs were not then in a condition to perform, and unless defendants knowingly waived the inability, plaintiffs cannot insist that the defendants should carry out a contract, that they cannot. The findings of fact of the referee being on a conflict of testimony cannot now be disturbed. Judgment affirmed. Newberry et al. v. Furnwal et al. Opinion by Learned, J.

3. Evidence: reason of the rule for the exclusion of evidence of collateral facts. On cross-examination of Sturgis, one of plaintiffs' witnesses, he testified that he told one of defendants that plaintiffs could not deliver the full number of bales at the agreed time. Defendant was afterward called, and contradicted this statement. It was urged that this was error, within Crounse v. Fitch, 6 Abb. N. S. 185, etc. The reason of the rule preventing the contradiction of a statement made by a witness, as to a collateral matter, on crossexamination, is not that the party cross-examining has made the witness his own, but to prevent the trial of numerous collateral issues such as the opposite party could not have expected to try. The matter here, however, was material, as there could have been no waiver, unless the defendant had knowledge of plaintiffs' inability. Ib.

4. Right of parties to surrender a note and sue upon the original contract: effect of alteration of instruments: usury.-Appeal from judgment in favor of plaintiff. This action is brought to recover the last of three payments upon a contract. Upon a previous appeal to the general term it was decided that a certain note given under the contract might be surrendered, and plaintiff might recover on the original agreement. Held, the effect of the previous holding herein was that the alter

ation of the note, although it made the note void, did not operate to destroy the original contract, which could be enforced without using the note as evidence of the same. If the note had been the note of a third party, or had other names on it than the original parties to the contract, it could not be surrendered under such circumstances, because such surrender would not place the parties in the same condition they were in before the note was given. Here, however, the note never was of any value beyond the original contract. Its surrender at any time was of no moment in changing the rights and liabilities of the parties. The destruction of the note in any way, whether voluntary or involuntary, might be shown, and the right to recover on the original contract would be perfect. The alteration of the note may or may not have been a criminal act, but that would have no effect on the original contract. A case similar in its relations is where a note is given for a pre-existing debt, and the holder takes usurious interest for the extension of the time of payment. Such note, although void for the usury, does not destroy the original cause of action. Farmers and Mechanics' Bank v. Joslyn, 37 N. Y. 353; Winsted Bank v. Webb, 39 N. Y. 325, cited. There can be no doubt of the right of the plaintiff to recover on the original security if the note had been surrendered without any alteration. That right is not taken away by the supposed alteration of the note. Judgment affirmed. Meyer v. Huneke. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J.

5. Recission of contracts-defined: right of party to recover back deposit on contract of sale. — Plaintiff had a contract to purchase land of defendant, on which he made a payment. When the time fixed for delivering the deed arrived the plaintiff objected to take it on account of an assessment upon the property, but said he was willing to take the same when the defendants could give a deed according to the contract. The assessment was paid and the deed tendered on the next day. Plaintiff refused again to take the title on account of leases which he said were on the property. The justice found that such leases were known to plaintiff at the time of the purchase. Held, that the tender of performance by the defendant, and refusal of plaintiff to accept the deed, terminated the contract on the part of the defendant if there were no incumbrances on the property at the time. It was not a recission of the contract on their part which required a repayment of the purchase-money to make such recission valid. It was a discharge by the plaintiff of the defendant's obligation, and did not entitle him to a repayment of the money paid on making of the contract. If neither party seeks to enforce the contract on the day fixed for performance equity will give relief afterward; but where the vendor tenders the deed and demands performance on the day, and the vendee refuses, he cannot afterward seek in equity to be relieved from his own voluntary refusal to perform his contract. Ketchum v. Eversen, 13 J. R. 359, cited. Judgment in favor of defendants affirmed. Page v. McDonnell et al. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J.

Also see Evidence and Specific Performance.
DAMAGES. See Statutes, construction of.
EQUITY PRACTICE. See Specific Performance.
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION. See Mortgages.

EVIDENCE.

Contracts of service: evidence of accounts: testimony to vary written contract: costs. This action is to recover for services rendered by the plaintiff as attorney

and counselor, and for money advanced. The answer sets up the rendering of accounts by plaintiff from time, and that prior to this action defendant had a full settlement and paid all claims against him. Several objections to the admission or rejection of evidence were taken on the trial, and are reviewed in the opinion of the general term. Appeal from judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered upon the report of the referee. Held, the plaintiff's evidence consisted mainly of testimony as to the various suits, and services rendered in each. He testified to disbursements in going to Washington for defendant. This was objected to because the items were not furnished before defendant was compelled to pay the account. There was no objection to stating the amount of the disbursements. Defendant had the right on crossexamination to inquire into the items. There is no rule which requires the items of an account to be furnished before plaintiff can bring his action to compel payment. There was no objection to plaintiffs stating what the taxable costs would have been in an action, as a piece of evidence, from which with other matters a judgment might be formed of the value of the services rendered. It was also proper to allow plaintiff to state what a certain receipt produced was for, and the statements of the defendant when it was given to him. Where a party gives parol testimony as to a written contract, he cannot prevent the other party from making a similar statement because it varied the contract. Judgment affirmed. Foster v. Newbrough. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J.

Also see Contracts; Landlord and Tenant and Specific Performance.

Surrender of premises must be completed: evidence: rights of sub-tenants.- Appeal from judgment in favor of defendants. This action is brought to recover rent from defendants as assignees of a certain lease. Defendants allege that the premises were rendered untenantable by fire, and the surrender thereof. Held, that it was incumbent on the defendants to show a a substantial surrender of the whole of the premises. They failed to show that one Osborn, who had an office in the building, for which he had paid the rent for six months in advance to defendants, had ever surrendered to them or to the landlord, or consented that defendants might surrender his term, as well as their own, to the landlord. Osborn's tenancy had not expired when the repairs to the building were completed, and there was nothing to hinder him from claiming and enjoying the remainder of his term. New trial ordered. Smith v. Sonnekold et al. Opinion by Davis, J. See Mortgages.

LIENS.

MORTGAGES.

1. Effect of tender on the mortgage lien: who may make tender: cases reviewed: rights of owner of equity of redemption. This is an action for the foreclosure of two bonds and mortgages executed in 1858 by the defendant Poillon. Poillon subsequently conveyed the mortgaged premises to the defendant Jex. The conveyance was expressly subject to the mortgages, but Jex did not personally assume them. Jex and wife alone defended. The defense proved was, that before the commencement of the action Jex tendered the amount due, in legal tender notes. Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff, that he was entitled to the

amount of the mortgages in gold coin, and for a sale of the premises to raise enough to pay the gold coin and premium. Subsequently the plaintiff remitted the part of the judgment giving him the premium, and consented to a reduction thereof accordingly. Held, that the case of Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 343, should not be pressed beyond its strict limits. The familiar doctrine upon which it rests, that the bond is the principal and the mortgage the collateral, has been met with a contrary view in the common understanding. It is the security on the land and not the responsibility of the debtor to which men look in takingʼmortgages. To hold that a mere tender, without actual payment, is a discharge of the lien may sometimes operate very unjustly, as in transfers of mortgages the original mortgagor is frequently ignored, and the land alone regarded as of real value. The learned judge then inquires who has the right to make a tender which shall have the effect to discharge the mortgage lien. He examines the cases of Jackson v. Crafts, 18 Johns. 110; Merritt v. Lambert, 7 Paige, 344; Edwards v. Loan Co., 21 Wend. 467; 26 id. 541; Arnot v. Post, 6 Hill, 65 (reversed 2 Denio, 344), and Kortright v. Cady, supra, and concludes therefrom that a tender cannot be made by a mere stranger to the contract so as to oblige the creditor to accept it. The reasoning in the cases cited is based on the right of the mortgagor to pay his debt; and in Kortright v. Cady, it does not appear whether the holder of the equity of redemption had assumed a personal liability to pay the debt. The owner of the equity of redemption who has not assumed the debt, can redeem the land from the mortgage lien not by a mere tender which is not kept good, but by actual payment or by bringing the money into court for the purpose of payment. There is no debt from him, and his mere tender does not discharge the mortgage lien. In the case at bar, Jex took the land subject to the mortgages, and in doing so probably deducted their amount from the price agreed on. The land is then primarily liable for the debt, and Poillon has a right to insist upon the collection of the debt first out of the land. Now if Jex's mere tender has discharged the lien, all the rights of the mortgagee seem to have gone. He cannot sue Jex, for Jex never assumed the debt. He cannot enforce the lien for that, by the supposition is discharged. He cannot sue Poillon for by the discharge of the primary fund, Poillon, who has become a quasi surety must be released. Such a result ought not be reached save on the clearest legal principles. Judgment in favor of plaintiff affirmed. Harris v. Jex et al. Opinion by Learned, J.

2. At the time of the tender, the United States supreme court had declared that such a contract as the one in question was payable in gold. It would be unjust that plaintiff should suffer for following the law as it was then declared to be. Parties are only required to know the law as it exists at the time, not as it may be declared afterward. Ib.

NEW YORK CITY. See Statutes-construction of.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. See Contracts.
Quantum Meruit. See Specific Performance.
REAL ESTATE. See Contracts.

Specific performance: special issue to try quantum meruit in equitable action. - Action by an attorney at law for a specific performance of an agreement in writing, executed by the defendant to convey to the plaintiff, who is therein described as defendant's attorney in certain actions, and as having "incurred

responsibilities in the employment of additional counsel in said suits," "one-third of all property or money recovered" in said actions, the consideration as stated in the agreement being "the services of said B. (the plaintiff), rendered and to be rendered, and to enable him to discharge said responsibility to counsel and others." The evidence shows that after the agreement plaintiff called upon defendant for money, and she paid him $625, part of which he applied toward his own compensation. And that when the cases were settled the sum of $1,200 was paid by defendant to counsel therein employed by plaintiff. Held, This was withdrawing from the defendant all benefit of the agreement, superseding its mutuality, and ignoring it altogether, so far as the plaintiff's obligations were concerned. Equity would say that if the defendant must, under the agreement, surrender one-third of the property she acquired in the settlement, she should have back the $625 which the plaintiff received; and should also have allowed to her the $1,500 which the plaintiff was to provide for, but did not. These sums are of the consideration of the agreement.

In order to invoke the aid of a court of equity to enforce an agreement, plaintiff must show that he has fully and particularly performed the agreement on his part, which was the consideration supporting the agreement.

This the plaintiff failed in this case to show.

2. Another question remains. Has the plaintiff been reasonably compensated for his services? That he rendered valuable services is proved. Several witnesses whose professional experience and intelligence qualified them to speak on the subject, were asked as to the value of the plaintiff's services, but the court excluded their testimony. This was error. The plaintiff is entitled to present his evidence on that point, and to have the judgment pronounced on that evidence.

Although this was an action in equity for specific performance which was refused, yet the case may be retained to do complete justice, and by an assessment of damages to inquire whether any further compensation is due plaintiff.

Judgment of special term, so far as specific performance was refused, should be affirmed, in all other respects reversed, and a special issue directed to be tried at the circuit as to whether, on a quantum meruit, the plaintiff is entitled to further compensation. Burling v. King. Opinion by Fancher, J.

SURETIES. See Undertakings. SURRENDER. See Contracts and Landlord and Tenant.

STATUTES- CONSTRUCTION OF.

1. Act of April 9, 1813, and chap. 196, laws 1818, construed: New York city: interest on damages awarded for property taken in opening streets. — Appeal from judgment in favor of plaintiffs. In pursuance of a petition to this court in March, 1865, commissioners were appointed to assess the damages sustained by the owners of the land taken in the widening of Church street in New York city. They assessed plaintiffs' damages at $93,180. Their report was confirmed on 30th December, 1867. On 7th December, 1868, plaintiffs petitioned the common council to pay said damages, with interest from 7th January, 1868, the day on which the report was filed. On 12th June, 1869, the damages were paid, but the defendants refused to pay interest. This action is brought to recover the same. Held, the effect of the act of 1813 (April 9th), and chap. 196, laws 1818, taken together, is that the corporation, after the con

ed time proceedings are suspended, and the fee and right of possession are taken subject to such suspension and the restrictions it imposes. The requirement of the act of 1813, to pay within four months from the confirmation of the report, is changed to an obligation to pay four months after the expiration of the time appointed for carrying the improvement into effect. Until the arrival of the time appointed, or the expiration of the fifteen months, the possession and enjoyment of the lands remain undisturbed in the former owner and his tenants. There is no constitutional difficulty in this system. Strang v. The New York Rubber Co., 1 Sweeney, 78; Detmold v. Drake, 46 N. Y. 318. The presumption that these statutes make, that the continued use is equal in value to the interest on the award is more just, than a rule, which makes the city pay interest on an award for premises of which, during the time claimed for, the owner has the undisturbed enjoyment and possession. Judgment reversed. Hammersley et al. v. The Mayor, etc.. of New York. Opinion by Davis, J. Affirmed by court of appeals. See 8 A. L. J., p. 256.

2. Ib. Though there is some difficulty in reconciling the two acts, equity will not permit the plaintiffs to have the land and the fruits of its possession, under the act of 1818, and at the same time receive interest after the four months named in the act of 1813, as if no act of 1818 existed. They waived any objection to the constitutionality of the latter act, by collecting rents from their tenants for some time subsequent to the confirmation of the commissioner's report. They cannot stand upon both statutes and claim the benefits of both, for the two positions are inconsistent and incompatible with justice. Judgment should be reversed. lb. Opinion by Fancher, J.

3. Ib. Dissenting opinion. The learned judge, in dissenting, says that the suspension must be made by an affirmative and definite action of the common council, within four months from the confirmation of the report. If not then done the owner may demand and sue for his damages. In this case it cannot be inquired whether the plaintiffs were in possession, or received the rents down to the time of the payment of the award. lb. Opinion by Mullin, J., dissentiente.

STREETS. See Statutes, construction of.
TENDER. See Mortgages.

UNDERTAKINGS.

Liability of sureties on undertaking to discharge attachment. - Appeal from judgment in favor of defendants. The question presented on this appeal is whether an action can be maintained against sureties on an undertaking given to discharge an attachment which provided for the payment of the judgment, which may be recovered against the defendants, when the judgment recorded is against some of them only. The undertaking was given under §§ 240, 241 of Code. Held, the case of Kifling v. Turner, 5 B. & Ald. 261, is decisive of this question. The persons are described by character. The obligation is to pay the judgment in the action in which the undertaking was given, and two of them against whom the judgment was rendered, are of that character. Although the question is not free from doubt, the failure to recover against all the defendants does not, from the nature and object of the agreement, seem an indispensable prerequisite to the liability of

The New York Supreme Court Reports: October, 1873, vol. 1, part 1. Albany; John D. Parsons, Jr.

That the reporting of the decisions of the Supreme Court of this State has, for sometime, been hopelessly bad, is very generally conceded. Wherein it has failed to meet the reasonable requirements of the profession, we have too often pointed out to justify a repetition of it at this time. The object of the new series is to do what the reporters, neither separately nor collectively, have heretofore done, that is, to report the decisions of the General Terms of the Supreme Court, promptly, accurately and completely.

The first part contains, either in brief or in full, a report of all the cases in which opinions were delivered. determined at the June terms in the third and fourth Departments. There are in this first part of some two hundred and fifty pages, fifty-six cases reported in full, and abstracts of eleven others, the opinions in which were not of sufficient importance to require publication in extenso. None of the cases are of any great importance, excepting, perhaps, two or three relating to bonding towns in aid of railroads, but the fact that all cases are reported in one form or another, is an assurance that we shall find in it whatever important cases the court shall decide. The next part will contain the decisions of the September terms, there being no general terms either in July or August. As there are only eighteen General Terms per year in the State, and as this part contains the decisions of two of them, quite as important and heavy as the average, and as three of the parts are expected to make a volume, it is more than probable that three volumes a year will be sufficient to include all the work of our general terms. It might be found advantageous and useful to include the more important decisions of the special terms.

The cases are well reported, and the number is excellent in mechanical execution.

Titles to Real Estate in the State of New York. A Digested Treatise and Compendium of Law, applicable to Titles to Real Estate in the State of New York. By James W. Gerard, Jr. Second edition. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1873.

This is an amplification of the author's useful little work on the same subject published several years ago. The author's aim in its compilation "has been the exposition of the principal features of the real estate law of this State in a practical shape, under clearly distinguishing heads, and within the compass of a single volume." Among the subjects treated more or less fully are: Eminent domain; what persons may hold and convey land; the various estates in land; uses and trusts in realty; powers; joint interests; title by descent, devise, deed, possession, dedication, prescription, easement, etc., through partition proceedings, escheat and forfeiture, sale on execution, etc; assignments and transfers under the insolvent law and under the bankrupt law; lien of judgments; ejectment and summary proceedings; lien of taxes and assessments; mechanics' lien, etc., etc. To enable the author to include in one volume all the subjects per