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steamer Meteor, at and from Philadelphia to New York. The defenses were lack of insurable interest; that the vessel was unseaworthy; that it deviated from the voyage described; that it was not lost by any peril insured against. It appeared that the vessel was stopped at Chester, on the river Delaware, to have a crack in the steam chimney repaired; that the engineer left her that night and returned to Philadelphia, and the next morning found the vessel burned. This crack was known to the parties, and the inspectors had refused a certificate until repairs were made. Held, that these statements being undisputed, it was mere question of law whether there had been a deviation. The cases of Fernandez v. Great Western Insurance Company (48 N. Y. 571), and Stevens v. Commercial Ins. Co. (id. 402), show clearly that it was a deviation. The stoppage at Chester may also be said to have led to the occurrences which aided in the destruction of the vessel by allowing the officers to leave her. Verdict below in favor of plaintiff set aside. Audenried v. The Mercantile Mutual Ins. Co. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J.

JUDGMENTS.

Lien of judgments: sales thereunder after death of judgment debtor: executions. —Appeal from judgment in favor of defendant. The question involved is, whether one Coe or the defendant is vested with the title to certain real property in New York city. Both claim under one J., who died November 10, 1852, being seized of the fee of the property. On November 19, 1851, M. recorded and docketed a judgment against J., and issued execution on the same day. On July 23, 1852, B. recovered and docketed a judgment against J., and in like manner, before J.'s death, issued execution. On April 6, 1853, the sheriff sold said real estate to one S., and issued his certificate. In February, 1855, the sheriff executed a deed thereof to Coe, the assignee of the certificate of S. On October 3, 1851, the Bowery Bank recovered and docketed a judgment against J. On September 25, 1861, the surrogate, on the petition of defendant, made an ex parte order granting leave to issue execution on the judgment of the bank. On the execution, pursuant to this order, on January 14, 1862, the sheriff sold the real estate to defendant, and thereafter executed to him a deed for the same. Held, that Coe's title seems to be established. It is only when a debtor dies after judgment, and before execution, that the statute applies which stays in execution for a year. The referee, therefore, erred in holding the sale of real estate could not be made under the M. and B. executions. The lien of the judgment of the Bowery Bank had ceased by the expiration of ten years. Under the Act of 1850 the surrogate cannot grant leave to issue execution without notice to all parties interested, which includes personal representatives. This act is in addition to § 376 of the Code (49 N. Y. 161, cited). Although the bank was the senior judgment creditor, its precedent claim was not enforced in time, or in the proper manner. The M. and D. executions had not become dormant. That doctrine does not apply to real estate, the lien upon which depends upon the docketing of the judgment, and not on the execution or levy (7 Barb. 341, cited). Judgment reversed. Goodrich v. Haskins. Opinion by Brady, J. LEASES. See Contracts.

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— Appeal from an order of Special Term denying the motion of the purchaser, at the sale under the judgment of foreclosure, in this action to be relieved from such purchase. He asks this relief on several grounds, most of which are held by the General Term to be of no weight, for the reason that by the terms of the sale the incumbrances alleged, if they existed, were to be allowed by the referee out of the purchase-money. The principal ground assigned by the purchaser is, that during the pendency of the action, and before judgment, three petitions in bankruptcy against the owners of the equity of redemption were filed in the United States Courts, and were pending undetermined at the time of the sale and purchase. No assignee in baukruptcy has been appointed, and it does not appear that any will be. The United States Court, upon the application of plaintiffs in this action, modified the injunction in those proceedings so as to allow the action of foreclosure to proceed to judgment and sale. Held, the case of Wilson v. Clark (47 N. Y. 261) does not govern this case, for this has proceeded to final judgment and sale, without an assignee in esse, who could be made a party. An assignee, appointed after a completed foreclosure, would be held bound by the judgment, and a fortiori, where the injunction has been modified as here (Marshall v. Knox, U. S. Supreme Court, cited). Order affirmed. Lenihan v. Hamann et al. Opinion by Davis, J.

2. Relation back of assignments in involuntary bankruptcies: construction of statutes.-The fourteenth section of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1867, applies to voluntary cases of bankruptcy, and the forty-second section of the same act does not give the effect to the assignment in involuntary cases as is provided by the 14th section. The courts of bankruptcy having power, by injunction, to prevent injustice, are in no need of the rule of relation in involuntary proceedings, that the statute gives in voluntary bankruptcies. Ib.

NAVIGATION.

Duties of towing and towed boats.-Plaintiffs were insurers of certain corn in course of transportation by canal boat from Buffalo to New York. Defendant undertook the towing of the boats down the Hudson river, and, opposite West Point, the corn was lost, or injured, by the alleged fault of defendant. Plaintiff paid the loss and took an assignment of the claim against the Tow Boat Company, and bring this action. It has been previously argued (see 54 Barb. 559). On the second trial the judge charged the jury: "If you find that the captain of the tug is the captain of the canal boat (in other words, that the canal boat is subject to the orders of the captain of the tug boat), and, as such, omitted to take the proper precautions which he should have taken for safe navigation and for the safe delivery of freights, such, for example, as directing and insisting upon a light being put out, the plaintiff would be entitled to your verdict, and you need not consider any other question in the case.' Held, that this charge was erroneous, and too narrow. It did not follow the ruling in 54 Barb., supra. It was not sufficient to stop with the question, whether the captain of the tug boat had a right to give and enforce orders in respect to the keeping out of lights, but it was also proper to inquire whether, if orders were given, they were not negligently disobeyed, or, if not given, whether a due care and caution to protect his own property should not have required the captain of the canal boat to put out a light without any explicit

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1. Partnership: payment of joint indebtedness by note of one of the copartners after dissolution. -The question arising on the pleadings in this case was, whether the plaintiffs had accepted the individual note of the defendant Smith in discharge or in payment of the indebtedness of the defendants, who, as former copartners, were their joint debtors. On somewhat conflicting testimony the jury found that it was not such a payment. Held, no presumption of payment arises upon the delivery and acceptance of the note of a third person in reference to a pre-existing indebtedness, and the burden of proving its acceptance in discharge of the debt rests upon the person seeking to give it that effect. 13 N. Y. 167. The acceptance of the individual note of one partner after dissolution of his firm, in settlement of a partnership indebtedness, that is, in payment of the debt by agreement thereto, is an extinguishment of the joint obligation. 40 N. Y. 583. But whether such an agreement was made or not is a question of fact to be determined by proof. Millerd et al. v. Thorn et al. Opinion by Brady, J.

2. Relations between members of a dissolved partnership and their creditors: principal and surety. The relation of principal and surety exists inter sese after the dissolution of the firm and the assumption of the debts of the partnership by one partner, and the other partner will be protected in the application of the joint property to such relation. 4 Comst. 604; 1 Hill, 623. The creditor, after knowledge of a dissolution and of the assumption of the debts by one partner, cannot contract personally with the latter upon the firm assets as a basis, and have them applied to the payment of such individual obligation. They are primarily applicable to the joint debts, but beyond that he is not affected by any arrangement between the partners, unless with full notice of their relations to each other he acts to the prejudice of the other in reference to the joint property. Ib.

PRACTICE. See Appeal.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

1. Representations of agent to bind principal.—Plaintiff, through his broker (Scott), intrusted the defendant, who was also a broker, with the business of selling for his account, at the best market rate, $110,000 railroad bonds. The defendant, through his agent (Thomas), undertook the business, and he and Thomas contracted to sell the bonds for seventy-five per cent. Defendant then sent Thomas to plaintiff's agent, and told Scott that sixty per cent was the best bid he could get. Plaintiff, on the faith of this representation, accepted the offer and delivered the bonds to defendant at that price. Plaintiff subsequently discovered that the statement that sixty per cent was the best bid obtainable was false, and that defendant, when he made that statement, had actually, in connection with Thomas, contracted to sell the bonds for seventy-five per cent. Plaintiff brings this action to recover the difference. Held, that the evidence shows that Thomas was defendant's agent, and Scott had a right to presume that the statement was made as such agent. In any case, he availed himself of the benefit of the misrepresentations, and cannot be allowed to retain the property.

The fraudulent element which pervades the transaction destroys all minor considerations. Conkey v. Bond, 34 Barb. 276; 3 Abb. N. S. 415, cited. The statement was legitimately within the authority of the agent. Judgment below in favor of defendant reversed. Taylor v. Guest. Opinion by Brady, J.

2. Liability of agent to third party for misfeasance. — Appeal from judgment in favor of defendants, dismissing complaint on the ground of want of privity between plaintiff and defendants, entitling plaintiff to any legal remedy. Plaintiff contracted with one Stout, by which the latter gave up to him the right to redeem certain stock given as collateral security for the balance of an indebtedness to one Van Dyke, a creditor of Stout. Plaintiff constituted Stout his agent to negotiate with Van Dyke, and the latter agreed to transfer the stock to plaintiff upon his paying the amount of his claim against Stout, and at the request of Stout he transmitted the stock to defendant Onderdonk, to be given to plaintiff on his paying the sum due. Onderdonk, without the knowledge of any of the other parties, transferred the stock to himself and to his sister, the defendant Field, and on the same day wrote to Van Dyke informing him of the same. Van Dyke wrote in reply that his taking the stock was satisfactory to him, provided it was assented to by Stout. Stout did not assent, but in behalf of plaintiff at once tendered to defendant the money he had paid Van Dyke, and demanded the stock, but defendant Onderdonk refused the tender and claimed that he had become owner of the stock. Held, that the plaintiff acquired title to the stock in the character of the assignee of the right of redemption, the equitable interest in a chose in action passing, without an assignment in writing, for a valuable consideration. An agent, for non-feasance or omission of duty, is not liable except to his principal, but the rule is otherwise in case of misfeasance. Judgment reversed. Crane v. Onderdonk et al. Opinion by Brady, J.

REPRESENTATIONS. See Principal and Agent.

STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

1. Chapter 853, Laws 1858, construed, and its constitutionality examined: New York city.- Chapter 853, Laws of 1858, authorized not only the removal of snow and ice from Broadway, but also such additional work as should be considered necessary beyond that required by existing contracts, etc. It gives almost unlimited discretion as to what work was necessary. This section of the statute is not unconstitutional within the case of Huber v. The People (44 How. 375; 6 A. L. G. p. 419), or otherwise. No purpose is more properly connected with the government of the city, for which the act proposed to provide, than what is necessary to be done in cleaning and keeping in order its streets. Leverich v. The Mayor, etc., of New York. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J.

2. Chapter 488, Laws 1872, and chapter 293, Laws 1855, construed: district courts of New York city.- Chapter 488 of Laws of 1872 provides for the appointment of assistant clerks in the district courts of the city of New York. The statute of 1851, chapter 516, continued by act of 1855, chapter 293, directs the appointment of clerks of the courts, who are to hold their offices for the same period as the justices to be elected thereunder. In the former act, upon the construction of which this appeal rests, the language used was that the clerks and assistant clerks appointed should "hold office, perform the same duties, and possess the same powers as now

prescribed by law."
lature was by this to provide for two clerks for each
court, who were in all respects equal as to office, pow-
ers and duties. The salary was made the same, and
upon no ground could the term of these two offices,
differing only in name, be held to be different. People
ex rel. Dolan v. Lane et al. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J.
Also, see Mortgages.

Held, that the intent of the legis- ern Liberties v. Davis, 6 Watts & Serg. 288; Cowden
v. Reynolds, 12 Serg. & Rawle, 283; 1 Greenl. Ev.,
§ 444. Flynn v. The People. Opinion by P. Potter, J.

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1. Trusts created in foreign State.- Action to restrain defendant, a resident of Philadelphia, from selling certain premises in New York held by him as trustee, appointed by the orphans' court in Pennsylvania, under a certain post-nuptial contract made in that State in 1833. The referee assumed that the contract was wholly void under our statute, and the legal and equitable estate in the premises was vested in the plaintiff; that defendant might be made liable for a breach of trust, if not allowed to sell and take the proceeds to Pennsylvania; that equity will intervene for defendant's protection, and treating his ignorance of the law of this State as a mistake of fact will compel the plaintiff to unite in a conveyance of the premises. It is conceded that the trust deed is valid in Pennsylvania, where it was created, and where the trust estate was situated at the time of its creation. The investment here was made at plaintiff's solicitation. Held, that the order should be affirmed, unless the plaintiff apply within thirty days to the proper authority in Pennsylvania for an order on the subject of this controversy. The courts of that State will exercise control over the trustee and the estate, and can set at rest all questions as to his personal responsibility. Chase v. Chase, 2 Allen, 104; Bingham's Appeal, 64 Penn. 346, cited. Hull v. Mitcheson. Opinion by Brady, J. See Evidence. WAIVER.

USURY.

Conversion: brokers. - On the 21st of December, 1869, plaintiffs, who were stock-brokers, sold certain Virginia bonds of defendants without authority. On December 28th plaintiffs wrote defendants of this sale, and further notified them that unless the bonds were paid for by January 6th, they would be sold at the Exchange for plaintiffs' account, in default of proper margin. That notice was received by defendants on 31st December. On January 6th plaintiffs sold the bonds and realized two per cent more than at the first sale, which had gone to defendants' credit. Held, the sale of December 21st would have been a conversion within Markham v. Jaudon (41 N. Y. 235), but for the facts subsequently occurring. Defendants should either have accepted or repudiated the sale. They did neither, though they were bound to take their ground at the time. The case is within Stewart v. Drake, 46 N. Y. 449. Hoyt et al. v. Cubbidge et al. Opinion by Davis, J.

Also, see Evidence.

THIRD DEPARTMENT, SEPTEMBER TERM, 1873.

EVIDENCE.

It is in the discretion of the court to permit a witness to be interrogated, by the party calling him, as to occurrences or transactions had, or statements made by him on former occasions, with a view to refreshing his recollection. 2 Phil. Ev. 891; Reg. v. Murphy, 8 C. & P. 306; Reg. v. Chapman, id. 558; Bank of North

INSURANCE.

Plaintiff's wife, two days after their marriage, in consideration of her indebtedness to him before their marriage, executed to him the following paper: "I do hereby certify that I owe to John Rohrback the sum of $700, and also $25 for each and every month from August 14, 1863, and for every month he may live with me henceforth without any deduction whatever, which amount shall be a lien upon property." The wife owned a house; plaintiff effected an insurance upon the house, showing the above paper to the agent. The wife died, and afterward the house was destroyed by fire. In a suit upon a policy, plaintiff had a verdict. Held, by the general term, that the wife's prior indebtedness was not extinguished by their marriage, but formed a sufficient equitable consideration for her obligation, and that plaintiff had an insurable interest. Lucena v. Crawford, 3 B. & P. 301; Chase v. Washington Mutual Ins. Co., 12 Barb. 600; Elna Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 16 W. R. 385; McGivney v. Phænix Fire Ins. Co., 1 id. 85; De Frest v. Fulton Fire Ins. Co., 1 Hall, 84; 2 Sandf. 495; Wells v. Phil. Fire Ins. Co., 9 Serg. & Rawle, 103; Carpenter v. Providence Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 495-501; Russell v. Union Ins. Co., 4 Dallas, 421; Phillips on Ins., §§ 290, 292, 181; Grevemyer v. Southern Ins. Co., 62 Penn. St. 340; Ruth's Appeal, 4 P. F. Smith, 173; Seymour v. Can. & N. F. R. R. Co., 25 Barb. 284; Herkimer v. Rice, 27 N. Y. 173; Lyon v. Brockway, 2 J. C. R. 51. Judgment affirmed. Rohrback v. Ætna Ins. Co. Opinion by P. Potter, J., Miller, P. J., and Parker, J., concurring.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

Action after dismissal from employment by the defendant, a national bank, to recover salary for the unexpired term of such employment. Plaintiff had a verdict, and the exceptions were ordered to be heard in the first instance at the general term.

Held, by the general term that a servant may be dismissed by his master, for misconduct, before the expiration of the time for which he was hired, although the discharge is not made at the precise time of the misconduct nor the grounds stated. Rithwins v. Steinner, 11 Mees. & Wels. 161; Ridgway v. Hungerford Market Co., 3 A. & E. 171; 4 Nev. & Man. 797; Bailie v. Kelb, 4 Bing. 651, that a national bank cannot hire one of its officers for a specified time; that knowledge, without objection, by defendants' directors; that plaintiff was acting in its employ was not a ratification of the details of a contract by its president for his employment, unless they knew of such details. New trial ordered, costs to abide event. Harrington v. First National Bank of Chittenango. Opinion by P. Potter, J., Miller, P. J., and Parker, J., coucurring in the result.

NEGLIGENCE.

Action for damages for causing death of plaintiff's intestate. One L had entered into a contract with defendant to build a brick arch 150 feet long, by the terms of which defendant was to furnish materials, centers, etc. The centers were frames of wood, four feet high and fifteen feet long, used to support the arch while building, and until the mortar had set. Defendant furnished four centers. The brick work was built upon them, and then they were moved on

for use elsewhere.

Plaintiff's intestate was in the employ of defendant, and, under the personal direction of its head carpenter, was engaged in removing one of the centers, over which the brick work had been built, partially, on that day, when the bricks fell upon him and killed him. There was evidence tending to show that it fell because the mortar was not sufficiently set. A similar arch had been built before with these centers, but that was of new brick, while those furnished in this case by defendant were partly old brick, upon which the mortar requires longer to set. The center was being taken out because it was wanted elsewhere. The day before L had applied to defendant for more centers, but they had not been furnished, though they were afterward. Plaintiff had a verdict, and the exceptions were ordered to be heard, in the first instance, at the general term.

Held, by the general term, that there was evidence of defendant's negligence to go to the jury. Bricker v. N. Y. C. & L. R. R. Co., 2 Lans. 506; Laning v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 521. Judgment on the verdict, with costs. Hoffnagle v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. Opinion by P. Potter, J., Miller, P. J., and Parker, J., concurring.

SCHOOL DISTRICTS.

1. A county school commissioner, desiring to make an alteration in school districts Nos. 5 and 7, in town of T., and No. 13 in town of B., made an order accordingly with the consent of the trustees of districts 7 and 13, but without the consent of trustee of No. 5to take effect immediately as to districts 7 and 13, but not for four months as to No. 5. Fourteen days after another order was made reciting that "at request of the trustee of No. 5," the supervisor and town clerk of the town of T. met the school commissioner to consider the propriety of making the proposed alterations, and, after hearing both parties, that such alterations be made. The supervisor and town clerk of the town of B., and the trustees of Nos. 7 and 13, were not notified and did not attend. The trustee of No. 5 did not have a week's notice, but he attended. The alteration, if valid, transferred plaintiffs from No. 5 to No. 13. On an action by them against a trustee of No. 13, elected subsequent to the alleged alteration, to recover a tax assessed against them as residents of No. 13, they had a judgment in the court of a justice of the peace. This was reversed by the county court on appeal.

Held, by the general term, that the orders, if irregular, could not be impeached in a collateral action. Laws 1864, p. 1237; Williams v. Larkins, 3 Den. 114; Bennett v. Bender, 1 id. 141; 8 N. Y. 58; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Den. 252; 25 W. R. 693; 6 Hill, 646; Jackson v. Young, 5 Coun.; Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill, 24; People | v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 89; Dwarris on Statutes, Amer. ed. p. 222. Judgment affirmed with costs. Rawson v. Van Riper. Opinion by P. Potter, J.

2. The statute requiring a school trustee to make an assessment within thirty days after the tax is voted, is directory, and an assesment may be legally made after the expiration of that period. Thomas v. Clap, 20 Barb. 165. Ib.

WITNESS.

One named as executor in a will may be a witness before the surrogate at its probate; and one to whom a legacy is left thereby may also be a witness. Harper v. Harper. Opinion by P. Potter, J., Miller, P. J., and Parker, J., concurring.

STOCK EXCHANGE CASES IN ENGLAND. The Stock Exchange has ever since the downfall of Overend, Gurney & Co. (limited) usurped a large share of judicial attention. Previous to "Black Friday" the cases in the books on the sale and transfer of stocks and shares, on the relative positions of seller and buyer, of broker and jobber, of broker and principal, were few, and the doctrines taught in those cases covered but a small portion of the daily and hourly transactions of capel court. Now the pages of our reports exhibit as in a mirror the dealings, customs, rules, and even the "slang" of that mart, which is the true practical realization of El Dorado. The latest installments of legal instruction on the relations of broker and principal appear in the October number of the Law Journal reports; and as one of the cases to which we refer was before the Lords Justices, and the other before the Court of Exchequer Chamber, the authority of the decisions is beyond dispute. The case before the Lords Justices (Lacy v. Hill, Scrimgeour's claim, 42 Law J. Rep. [N. S.] Chanc. 657) arose out of the disastrous speculations of the late Sir Robert Harvey. Such a case as this affords a terrible revelation of the dangers which beset all customers of private banks; for such persons are at the mercy of a man who, being to all outward appearance, an honest man of business, may indulge behind the scenes in a class of gambling compared with which the turf and the table are child's play. Thus, we find that Sir Robert Harvey, some short time before the fatal July 15, 1870, was speculating through his brokers on the Stock Exchange, to an extent which, if known in Norwich, would have driven every customer off the bank books in twenty-four hours. He had, before July 15, become the purchaser of £150,000 Italian stock, and £204,000 Spanish stock; of course, in the desperate hope of retrieving at one grand coup his previous losses. These stocks had been bought for him by Messrs. Scrimgeour and had been paid for by the latter firm. As the market was not favorable for a sale, these transactions were "continued; that is to say, the brokers found the money, and the stocks were considered as the property of the brokers until the transactious should be closed. The brokers, in this instance, had borrowed the necessary funds for this purpose of their own bankers, and had deposited the stocks in the usual way as security for the loan. In the ordinary course of things, if nothing had occurred to call for a different line of action, the brokers would have kept the transactions open to the next account day, July 28. But Sir Robert died on July 15, and the banking firm of Harveys & Hudsons closed its doors on July 16. Thereupon the brokers proceeded to dispose of the stocks as rapidly as they could, and succeeded, on July 16, 18 and 19, in selling the whole quantity on hand. By the account day the stocks had fallen below the prices at which Messrs. Scrimgeour had sold. The prices at which the stocks were actually sold were, of course, less than the prices at which they had been bought, and Messrs. Scrimgeour claimed the differences as against the estate of Sir Robert Harvey. Evidence was given that, according to the rules of the Stock Exchange, a broker is at liberty to close his principal's account when, upon the death or insolvency of the principal, no one appears to take up the responsibility of pending transactions by selling or buying equivalent stocks, as the case may be. This rule is manifestly just and reasonable, and was pronounced so to be by Lord Justice Mellish. But, independently of any Stock Exchange rule, the claim was good, because,

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as a simple case of principal and agent, the principal was bound to indemnify the agent on these transactions. Indeed, the only contention against the claim rested on the theory of an absolute contract between the parties to purchase for the particular account day, and of non-performance of such contract. But the lords justices were clearly of opinion that it was a case of principal and agent, and not of such a contract as was suggested. If the stocks had suddenly risen after the sales, and before the account day, the claim of the brokers would have been liable to be defeated pro tanto by a set-off. But as in this instance the stocks continued to fall, no such counter-claim could be made.

The other case to which we would refer is Duncan and another v. Hill, Same v. Beeson, 42 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Exch. 179. In that case for although there were two actions, the point in the two was precisely the same, and arose out of the same incident - the defendants had employed the plaintiffs as brokers to carry over certain transactions on the Stock Exchange from July 15 to the account day, July 27. On a day intermediate between these two dates, namely, on July 18, the plaintiffs, owing not to any default on the part of the defendants, but by the failure of third parties, strangers to the defendants, to carry out their engagements, became and were proclaimed in the customary way "defaulters" on the Stock Exchange. Thereupon the official assignees, appointed under the Stock Exchange rules, "fixed the prices" at which the several transactions of the defaulting brokers should be closed, and the result of closing the transactions of the two defendants was, that as against the defendant Hill there was a deficit of upwards of 4,000l., and as against Beeson of 4251.; and it was to recover these amounts that the actions were respectively brought by the plaintiffs. The Court of Exchequer was of opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled to succeed; but in the Court of Exchequer Chamber this judgment was reversed. Now, as was explained in the Chancery case of Lacey v. Hill, on which we have commented, such actions or claims as these are in contemplation of law founded upon allegations that the agents have suffered loss by reason of having acted as such for their principals, and should be indemnified accordingly. Applying this principle, can we say that the brokers in this instance were subjected to loss by reason of the transactions which they had entered into for and on behalf of their principals? Surely not. The loss was occasioned by a default of their own; that is to say, by reason of their inability to meet other obligations, in consequence of which inability they were compelled to submit to the premature closing of all their transactions. As the court said, it was content with the facts of the case that the brokers would have become insolvent at the precise time at which they did, if they had never done business at all for the defendants. In point of date the judgment in Duncan v. Hill was delivered by the Court of Exchequer Chamber some few days before that of the Lords Justices concerning the claim of Messrs. Scrimgeour, and was approved by the Lords Justices. But it is obvious that the logical order of the cases was inversely as their order in point of time, and that both become more intelligible by the transposition which we have ventured to make.-Law Journal.

Hon. W. K. McAllister, Associate Judge of the Supreme Court of Illinois, has resigned his position to accept the office of Corporation Counsel of Chicago.

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. The following decisions were announced in the court of appeals on the 25th inst.:

Judgment affirmed with costs-Mitchell v. West, Zogbaum v. Parker, Pope v. Cole, Falkenam v. Fargo, Fabbri v. The Phoenix Insurance Co., Wells v. Blair, Cook v. Whipple, Emmons v. Bames. Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide eventPutnam v. The Broadway and Seventh Avenue R. R. Co. Judgment of supreme court reversed and proceedings and order of county judge affirmed - The People ex rel. Green v. Smith. Judgment affirmed

Boyce v. The People. Order affirmed, except as to the extra allowance, and so much of the order as grants the respondent an extra allowance of $1,000, reversed, without costs of this appeal to either party — In the matter of the Rensselaer and Saratoga Railroad Co. v. Davis. Order reversed and motion denied, with costs-Mills v. Bliss. Appeal dismissed with costs- Scroggs v. Palmer.

LEGAL NEWS.

Yale College Law School has forty-five students, an increase of nine since last year.

Richmond is the only county in this State which gave a majority in favor of appointing the judges. Miss Artie Wallace has been appointed deputy circuit clerk of Boone county, Ky.

The annual report of Attorney-General Williams is nearly completed, and will be in type in a few days.

On Wednesday last the Court of Appeals adjourned to the 2d of December.

Ex-President Woolsey is lecturing on international law before the Yale College Law School.

The New Jersey Constitutional Commission has concluded its work, and adjourned until the fourth Tuesday in December for final revision.

Hon. James S. Fraser, of Indiana, late of the Mixed Commission under the Treaty of Washington, has been appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury to aid in the adjustment and decision of claims for payment for cotton arising under the act of Congress of May 18, 1872.

The Freetown correspondent of the Times refers to a singular and objectionable practice prevalent there. It appears that many of the large mercantile houses and wealthier residents are in the habit of retaining all the barristers in the settlement. The local bar accept a yearly retaining fee of £10. For this sum they are bound not to appear against those who retain them in any suit or action that may be brought against them during the entire year, although in any particular case no brief may have been sent to them by those who have retained them. A native who may have suffered some serious wrong from an European, when he endeavors to obtain redress finds that it is impossible to obtain an advocate. If he is rash enough to try and himself obtain justice in the supreme court, a demurrer or a motion to set aside his declaration, or to do something or other which is absolutely unintelligible to him, soon convinces him that if he believes justice is open to all in an English settlement he is greatly mistaken.- Solicitors' Journal.

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