total of $3,883,800. The number of cases disposed of during the year was 1,600. Those still pending amount to 4,802. The amount expended by the department of justice was $3,031,000.

Information in relation to other branches falling under the department is given, concluding with an account of the suits brought by the United States against the Union Pacific Railroad Company and the Credit Mobilier. Judge Hunt, having filed an opinion in which he holds and decides not only that there is no right of action in the United States for the causes specified in the act of congress to recover, but that congress cannot give to the United States the right to recover upon said causes of action. The decision, in effect, renders nugatory the law under which the suit was brought. Therefore, the attorney-general considers it to be his duty to appeal from this decision to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Costs.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

ASSIGNEE.

After the commencement of proceedings to enforce a mechanics' lien, the claimant assigned his claim to H. & W., creditors, to collect and apply the proceeds in payment of a debt he owed them, the surplus, if any, to be returned to him. The proceedings were determined in favor of defendant, who moved that H. & W., the alleged assignees and owners of the demand in controversy, should pay the costs of the defense. This motion was denied, and the order thereon affirmed by the general term, and an appeal taken to this court. The chief question raised was, as to whether H. & W., after the assignment, had conducted or carried on the suit or aided therein.

Held, that they had not; that under § 321 of the Code, an assignee of a cause of action, assigned after suit brought, is liable for the costs therein, irrespective of the question as to whether or not he, subsequent to the assignment, took any substantial part in the prosecution of the action; but, that as the assignment here was simply as collateral security, H. & W. were not liable for the costs. In re lien of Dowling v. Premises of Bucking. Opinion by Peckham, J.

COMMON CARRIER.

1. This action was brought to recover the value of certain goods shipped by defendant's boat from New Haven to New York, which were burned after their arrival in New York, and after being unloaded on defendant's wharf. This case has been in this court upon a former appeal, and is reported in 50 N. Y. 121.

Held, that from the fact that plaintiff had been in the habit of shipping its goods daily, by defendant, to the agent in New York, for sale, and it had been the long established habit of the consignee to call daily and receive the goods upon their arrival without notice, it was not necessary to give notice to the consignee of the arrival of any consignment, but that when the goods were unloaded at the accustomed place, and the consignee had had time to remove them, defendant was discharged. J. R. M'fg Co. v. N. H. Steamboat Co. Opinion by Folger, J.

2. Where the usage has been for the consignee not to receive or remove goods arriving upon a holiday, if any arrived on such a day, the ordinary rule would apply, and defendant, to relieve itself from liability as a carrier, would be obliged to notify the consignee, and give him a reasonable time to remove the goods; otherwise, the liability attaches until after a reasonable time for

the removal of the goods upon the next day (D. C. 50 N. Y. 121)-explained. Ib.

CONTRACT.

Contract for sale of land-dower.-M, plaintiff's testator, agreed to sell his interest in certain real and personal estate to defendant, the deed to be delivered the first of February thereafter, or if M had not then returned from a contemplated journey, as soon as it could be done after his return, defendant was to pay $4,000 down, $6,000 on or before the delivery of the deed, and to give a bond and mortgage for the balance, bearing interest from the date of the contract. Defendant paid the $6,000 prior to February 1st. M tendered a deed on that day, to which, after examination by his attorney, defendant objected. M tendered another deed February 24th, which was also objected to. March 10th, M wrote to defendant that unless he accepted the deed offered, he would proceed to enforce the contract, and thereupon commenced an action to restrain defendant from selling the personal property, and to require an account therefor. April 4th, defendant offered to accept the last deed, and tendered a bond and mortgage according to the contract. M refused to deliver the deed, or to accept the bond and mortgage. Defendant then answered, setting up the facts as a counter-claim, and asking for specific performance. M served an amended complaint, claiming to rescind the contract, because of defendant's failure to perform. Defendant answered, tendering performance, and asking for a specific performance. After the joining of issue, M died, leaving a will, by which he left all his property to plaintiff, his wife. After trial, upon the settlement of the case, plaintiff claimed her dower in the premises.

Held, that time was not of the essence of the contract; that defendant could not be barred of his rights, without notice, requiring performance in a specified, reasonable time, or, in default, that his rights should be deemed abandoned, and no such notice having been served, he was entitled to a specific performance. Also, held, that plaintiff was not entitled to dower, no such claim having been made on the trial; if it had been made, the court would, doubtless, in allowing it, have deducted its value from the unpaid purchase-money. Plaintiff being the sole devisee and legatee, the allowance would have been of no benefit. Myers v. DeMier. Opinion by Grover, J.

CONVERSION.

Affirmance of contract: príncipal and agent.— Action to recover for the alleged conversion of thirty-one sacks of wool, part of a lot of fifty sacks, placed by G. & J. in the hands of R. & Co., for sale on commission. R. & Co. were induced by fraud to sell the goods on credit to a purchaser who proved to be insolvent. The purchaser transferred them, with other property in trust, for the payment of antecedent debts. Upon discovering the fraud, R. & Co. accepted as security for the purchase-money, a written assignment of the purchaser's claim, to any surplus remaining after payment of the debts. The assignment contained a clause, declaring that the acceptance thereof shall not preclude R. & Co. from claiming and commencing proceedings to recover the goods.

Held, that the acceptance of the assignment was an unequivocal affirmance of the sale and subsequent transfer, and an abandonment of the right to reclaim the goods, and the insertion of the clause declaring that R. & Co. were not precluded from recovering for the

goods, did not change the nature of the instrument. That such clause is repugnant to the other parts of the instrument, and is inoperative. Also, held, that R. & Co. having been induced by fraud to part with the goods, and having acted in good faith in taking the security for the price of the goods, were acting within their powers, and their principal was bound. Joslin v. Cowee. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

COSTS.

1. Extra allowance: injunction.-In an action to determine the title to a $10,000 bond, a temporary injunction was obtained by plaintiff, restraining the disposition thereof during the pendency of the action. Defendants moved to dissolve the injunction. The motion was denied, the court declining to look into the merits, and ordered a reference of the issues in the action. Upon the trial the complaint was dismissed. Defendants were granted an extra allowance of $500. The order therefor stated, "This is intended to cover all allowance of extra costs to be made in any event in this action to defendants." This order was accepted and defendants' attorneys received the extra allowance. Upon a reference to determine the damages upon the injunction, the referee allowed counsel fees upon motion to dissolve, also counsel fees upon trial and upon appeal and the taxable costs in the action. Held, that defendants were only entitled to the expenses of the motion to dissolve the injunction, and were not entitled to that here, that it appeared by the order granting the extra allowance that it was intended to embrace them. Disbrow v. Garcia et al. Opinion by Folger, J.

2. This case differs from Andrews, Rec'r, etc., v. Glenville Woolen Co., 50 N. Y. 282; there the trial was necessary principally to dispose of the injunction; here the title to the bond was the prominent question upon the trial, and the expenses then incurred were not occasioned solely or principally in consequence of the injunction, but would have been required had there been none. Ib.

OFFICE.

1. Constitutional law: statutory construction: tax collector.- Action in the nature of a quo warranto to test the title to the office of collector of the town of Flatbush, Kings county. April 5, 1870, defendant was elected, at a meeting held in said town, collector of said town, and took and filed an oath of office as such collector, April 22, 1870. The legislature passed an act for the extension of the term of office of the collector of taxes in the several towns of Kings county (ch. 374, Laws of 1870). April 4, 1871, a town meeting was held in the town of Flatbush, at which votes were given for the office of collector of taxes, and relator received all the votes cast for said office, and was declared elected to said oflice. He never took or filed any oath, nor did he execute a bond to the supervisor of the town. No notice was served upon him of the amount of taxes. The board of supervisors ordered the warrant for the collection of taxes for 1871 to be made out in defendant's name, and to be delivered to him on November 4, 1871; said warrant was so delivered, and defendant has since acted as collector. A verdict for defendant was directed by the court. Held, that chapter 374, Laws of 1870, which provides that said collectors shall hold their office for the term of three years, was not intended to extend the term of those then in office, but simply that of their successors. That the election held in 1871 was proper, and that

relator was entitled to the office. People v. Batchellor, 23 N. Y. 138, overruled. Until the town collector elect has taken and subscribed the oath of office required by the constitution (art. 12) the incumbent to the office is entitled to hold over (1 R. S. 347, § 30). Allen, J., dissenting. If such oath is taken at any time before the office is forfeited by reason of the neglect of the person elected to execute the bond required by the statute, it is sufficient and entitles him to the office.

Under the provisions of 1 R. S. 346, §§ 19, 26, which require the person elected collector, within eight days after notice of the amount of taxes to be collected, to execute a bond as prescribed, and declare that a neglect to do so shall be deemed a refusal to serve, actual notice must be given to the officer of the board of supervisors or the supervisor of the town, before he can be put in default. He is not bound to take notice of the proceedings of said board in fixing the amount of the tax. People ex rel. Williamson v. McKinney. Opinion by Andrews, J.

2. The constitution does not provide for the election or appointment of town collectors, and under Const., art. 10, § 2, that office can only be filled by the electors of the town, or by appointment by the local authorities of the town. Ib.

3. An act of the legislature extending the time of incumbents of the office of collector is an attempt to exercise the power of appointment, and is in conflict with the constitution. Ib.

4. The legislature has power to extend the term of office of those thereafter to be elected. Ib.

PRACTICE.

1. It is the policy of the Code to restrict the jurisdiction of this court to questions of law, and to limit the review of facts to the special and general terms. There is an exception where the general term reverses a judgment rendered upon a trial by the court or a referee upon the facts, and it is so certified in the order of reversal. This court is not authorized to examine and review questions of fact in an equity action. (Allen and Rapallo, JJ., dissenting.) Vermilyea, Admr., etc. v. Palmer, Exr., etc. Opinion by Church, Ch. J.

2. Where, under § 72 of the Code, an order for the trial by jury of specific questions of fact in an equity action is made, the findings have no more force or effect than the findings in the old procedure by feigned issue, for which this is a substitute. The findings of the jury are auxiliary to the judgment of the court, and the trial of the issue is by the latter. It may set aside the verdict and order a new trial, or find the fact itself, or it may qualify or alter the findings. If approved they become, by adoption, the findings of the court. The introduction of this procedure does not therefore withdraw the case in other respects from the application of the other provisions of the Code, and the mode of review is the same as in other actions tried by the court. It seems that the old chancery rule is applicable in this court in reviewing, upon appeal from the judgment, questions of law raised upon the trial by the jury-e. g., that the court will not regard exceptions not affecting the merits. So if the jury be misled by an erroneous charge of the court upon the law, the error, if vital or important, may be available in this court without an exception. (Church, Ch. J.) Ib.

3. Remittitur.-On February 11, 1873, the judgment of the court below in this action was affirmed, and the remittitur received by defendants' attorney February 13, 1873. On the same day an order was granted by one of the judges of this court, staying the filing of the

remittitur until March 4th. Plaintiff's attorney received this order February 15th, and on that day it was served on the deputy clerk, in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court, whose duty it was to file remittiturs. The managing clerk of defendants' attorney swears that he handed the remittitur to the Upon deputy for filing just prior to such service. service of the order, the deputy refused to file the remittitur, and offered it back to the clerk who declined to receive it, claiming it had been filed. The order was served on defendants' attorney November 17th; notice of motion accompanied it. On that day an order was entered, making the judgment of this court the judgment of the Supreme Court. Subsequent to February there had been no filing of the remittitur, a judgment was subsequently entered thereon. Held, that this court has control over its own remittitur, in whosesoever hands it may be, until it is actually and regularly filed in the court below, and an order of any one of the judges temporarily staying the filing thereof is valid and operative, although unaccompanied by motion papers or notice of motion. Rule 16 of this court does not apply to such a case, but refers to regular stays in causes pending here. The handing of the remittitur to the clerk was not, under the circumstances, a filing, and therefore this court had not lost jurisdiction of the case. Cushman et al., Exrs., etc. v. Hatfield et al. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

Proceedings were instituted to acquire title to lands for Washington Park, Albany, under the provisions of the act amending "An act in relation to a public park in the city of Albany" (§ 2, chap. 45, Laws of 1872), which requires, that the real estate sought to be taken shall be fully described in the petition, and that the names and places of residence of those owning or claiming an interest in the lands shall be stated therein. The real estate was described in the body of the provision as "hereinafter fully described and set forth," and the petition stated, that "hereafter is stated the names and places of residence of the parties who own," etc.; schedules were annexed and firmly attached, giving full descriptions of the several parcels of the real estate sought to be taken, with the names and places of residence of the owners and claimants, and also a notice, addressed to each and all the owners and claimants by name, stating the time and place when the petition would be presented, etc., all folded and indorsed "Petition, description, notice," etc. Held, that the schedules formed part of the petition, and that there was a sufficient compliance with the provisions of the statute, and a substantial compliance was sufficient. Also, held, that a paper, so referred to in a written instrument that it may be identified beyond a reasonable doubt, is thereby made a part of the instrument, the same as if it was incorporated therein. No particular mode of reference is necessary for that purpose, any language indicating the intent that the two shall make one instrument, or a physical annexation of the one to the other, in a manner or under circumstances showing clearly such intent, is sufficient.

A provision in an act authorizing the taking of lands for a public park, which in terms gives power to the commissioners to sell such parts of the land thus vested in them, or which they shall thereafter acquire, does not render the whole act unconstitutional, or detract from the power conferred to take lands required for the park. If an intent can be spelled out fairly

from the words of a statute, although it is inartificially drawn, effect will be given to it. In re application Board of Commissioners of Washington Park of Albany. Opinion by Allen, J.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

This action was for the conversion of four bonds. The defense was a general denial, and the statute of limitations. There was evidence showing that plaintiff's assignor asked defendant several times for the bonds, and was put off by evasive answers. In June, 1861, a formal demand was made, when defendant, for the first time, absolutely refused to give them up. The action was commenced within six years thereafter.

Held, that until such refusal, no conversion was shown. That the cause of action arose there, and, therefore, the statute of limitations had not run Roberts v. Berdell. Opinion by Allen, J.

GENERAL TERM ABSTRACT.

FOURTH DEPARTMENT-OCTOBER TERM.

ADMINISTRATORS- ACCOUNTING.

In 1864, one C. N. Mead entered into partnership with the defendant, for the purpose of manufacturing lumber in the State of Pennsylvania. The firm owned a large tract of land and some saw-mills. The firm name was C. N. Mead & Co. Mead died in 1865, leaving certain heirs at law. On Mead's death, his son, under a certain agreement with defendant, continued the partnership with defendant until 1867, when the effects of the partnership passed into the hands of defendant. Plaintiff, as the administrator of the estate of C. N. Mead, brings this action for the appointment of a receiver and an accounting.

Held, that on the death of Mead, the copartnership was dissolved, and the arrangement between defendant and the son was unauthorized, and plaintiff's rights, as representative, must be determined as of the death of Mead. The continuance of the business was at the risk of defendant.

That plaintiff, as representative, is entitled to maintain an action for an accounting, and it is not necessary to show that there will be something found due the estate on such accounting; it would be impossible to ascertain this until an accounting is had. For the purposes of an accounting, the heirs are not necessary parties in the first instance. But, if a sale of the land is necessary, application can be made to bring in the heirs, and thus render a conveyance of the fee of the land.

This action was referred, and the referee orders the appointment of a receiver and an accounting. The defendant appeals from the referee's report.

Held error; there should have been a motion at

general term for a new trial. Judgment affirmed. Cheeseman v. Wiggins. Opinion by Mullen, P J.

BEQUEST.

Law of domicile.- One T died leaving a will, and by which he gave and bequeathed to the town of Palmer, Hampshire county, State of Massachusetts, the sum of $1,000, to be kept invested by the proper authorities of the town, and the interest thereof paid for the support of the poor of said town.

Held, that the town of Palmer having capacity to take the bequest by the laws of Massachusetts, the bequest is valid. That the validity of a bequest is to be

governed by the law of the domicile of the legatee, and not by that of the testator. That, although if we assume the bequest in this case void, on the ground that it created a perpetuity under the law of this State, if not void under the laws of Massachusetts, it must be upheld. That the bequest took effect immediately on the death of the testator, and the title vested absolutely in the corporation, and the direction as to the mode of management of the principal after that, did not affect the validity of the bequest. It did not create a perpetuity. Judgment affirmed. Kennedy v. The Town of Palmer. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

Tender.-On default in the payment of an installment, due on a chattel mortgage, as in default in the payment of the whole debt, the mortgagee's title to mortgaged property becomes so instanti absolute at law, and the equity of redemption is barred by a sale; and, in order to redeem, the mortgagor must, before sale, pay or tender the whole debt. The tender of the installment due is not sufficient. The proper damages in a case like this would be the value of the canal boat at the time of the sale, and the value of the use prior thereto. The defendant sold the boat to one H, but H afterward re-sold back to defendant, and some time after defendant sold to H and D.

Held, that although the sale to H was fraudulent, on the re-sale, defendant still held the title and plaintiff could have redeemed, but plaintiff relied on his tender. The sale to H and D barred plaintiff's right of redemption, and a court of equity only can relieve plaintiff. Judgment reversed. Halsted v. Swartz. Opinion by Muilin, P. J.

EVIDENCE.

1. Where commissioners were appointed to assess the damages of an owner, on account of laying gas pipes through his land.

Held, that although it was incompetent for a witness to give his opinion as to the amount of the owner's damages, it may be competent for a witness to give the value of certain materials of work and labor, etc., for the information of the commissioners; such evidence does not substitute the witness in the place of the commissioner; it simply furnishes them with the data, to enable them to fix the amount of compensation.

Held, that the evidence in relation to the effect of escaping gas on vegetation was proper, on cross-examination of the petitioner's witnesses. They had testified that laying the pipes did not injure the land, and it was competent for the owner to inquire whether they took into account injury from escaping gas, etc. Report affirmed. In the Matter of Calkings. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

2. This was a proceeding before the surrogate of Cattaraugus county, for the settlement and distribution of the estate of one C. On the hearing before the surrogate, the question arose as to the legitimacy of certain children of C's by two different women, with whom he lived, one woman named Effie, the other, Sally.

The counsel for the appellants offered to prove the admissions of Effie, that "she was the wife of said C, and that Simon (appellant's intestate) was the fruit of that marriage, and other admissions. The evidence was objected to, and the surrogate rejected it, and found in favor of the legitimacy of the children of Sally.

Held, that the admissions of said Effie were competent, or at least they should have been received contingently, and acted upon or rejected as other facts should or should not be found. Decree of the surrogate reversed. Alexander v. Chamberlain. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

LICENSE-ESTOPPEL.

The plaintiff is the owner of a farm in the county of Monroe. The defendant is a gas company, authorized to convey gas from a natural gas well, in Ontario county, to the city of Rochester and other places, and is authorized to acquire land by commissioners, etc. The said company constructed its ditch for its pipes along the land of the plaintiff, but no right to lay the pipes and construct the ditch on plaintiff's land, had ever been required by the company, their only right was founded on a license as claimed from plaintiff, and is founded on the following evidence.

The defendant's servants entered upon the plaintiff's land and commenced to dig the ditch in which to lay the pipes. They had dug some forty or fifty rods before plaintiff learned of it; one of the defendant's servants went to plaintiff and inquired what the workmen should do with certain rails belonging to plaintiff, in a fence, and plaintiff told them to put them in a pile near the road-side, and after the ditch was dug to put them up again in the fence. Plaintiff also said that if they filled the ditch right up so he could get across, they need not put the rails up, as he would draw them away with his team. On one or two occasions plaintiff consented that the filling up of the trench, at the crossing, might be delayed for a while. Plaintiff told one of the servants of defendant that all he wanted was a passage to get into his orchard. These conversations constitute the license insisted on by defendant.

Plaintiff brings this action for an injunction to restrain the construction of said work.

Held, that there was no license from plaintiff to construct this work. The conversations above stated did not constitute a license. The plaintiff was not estopped from asserting his title and restraining the construction of the trench. It is one of the essential elements of an estoppel in pais, that the party insisting on the estoppel would be misled to his injury, if the other party should be permitted to admit the right or deny the admission as to which the estoppel is insisted upon. A party cannot be misled when he knows the truth as fully as the party sought to be estopped.

Held, the act of the defendant in laying the pipe and digging the trench was a trespass, and was known to be so by the defendant, and plaintiff's silence did not mislead defendant. The evidence does not prove a license.

Held, that the fee of the land in the highway being in the plaintiff, the defendant had no right, under the act of the legislature, to enter on and appropriate part of plaintiff's land, without making compensation therefor. The public have a right of passage merely. The defendant had no right to lay his pipes without compensating the owner. Judgment affirmed. Calkings v. The B. & R. National Gas Company. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

the absence of any proof to the contrary the $5 bonus must be held to be in lieu of interest. Judgment affirmed. Hines v. Strong. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS.

One Johnson is the owner of a house in the city of Syracuse, which he rents. There being a default in the payment of rent summary proceedings were instituted. The affidavit on which the proceedings were instituted was made by the agent of said Johnson, and did not state the fact of the agency in any form. Held, that the fact of agency, if an agent makes the affidavit, it must be stated affirmatively in it. It is not enough to state it by way of recital. An appearance by a party for the sole purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the officer, or the regularity of the proceedings, does not waive the defects in the proceedings preliminary to such appearance. Proceedings reversed. Weyman v. Johnson. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

TOWN BONDING.

Non-residents. This is a certiorari to review the proceedings of the county judge of Yates county, allowing the prayer of a petition to bond the town of Italy in said county. On the petition were the names of forty-one persons assessed on the assessment roll of said town as non-residents. The assessments on the roll are in the names of the non-residents, and the land is described as "swamp," or by the use of certain letters, as "ss," or "bsep," etc., and the number of acres is then given, and the tax. There was no other description. The description required by statute was not followed.

Held, that in order to entitle the non-residents to be counted as petitioners, their land must be assessed as non-resident land; that the assessment as to nonresidents in this case was defective, and, therefore, void, and the non-residents who signed the petition cannot be counted; that the non-residents on the roll must be counted in ascertaining the number of tax payers. The statute makes them tax payers and the record discloses the number. Had the non-resident land been properly assessed the record would not have shown the number of owners, except by the number of lots, and as one person might have owned several lots, resort to evidence would be necessary; and there is none in this case, except as to the forty-one on the petition. In ascertaining the amount of taxable property in a town it is not necessary that the assessment should be legally binding on the persons assessed. It is sufficient if it appear that the property is taxable in the town. The aggregate valuation of the taxable property can be arrived at in no other way. The People ex rel. Clark v. Oliver. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

WITNESS.

Cross-examination - The defendant's counsel commenced the cross-examination of a witness, and after continuing it some time suspended, and he told the witness in open court, and in the hearing of the plaintiff's attorney, that he desired the witness to be present on the morrow, as he wished to further cross-examine him. After this, other witnesses were called, and the trial proceeded. On the next day the defendant's counsel desired to continue the cross-examination of the witness, the witness was called, but did not appear, the defendant's counsel then moved to strike out the direct examination of the witness, but the court refused to strike it out, and defendant's counsel excepted.

Held, that if a party desiring to cross-examine a witness does so, and he is not prevented by the plaintiff or by the adjournment of the court, from completing it, and if he defer it to another day for his own convenience, the opposite party is not obliged to detain the witness, and if the latter absent himself, it is not the fault of the party calling him.

To entitle the party to have evidence on the direct examination stricken out, because the witness does not appear to be cross-examined, the loss must be chargeable in some way to the misconduct or neglect of the party calling him, and unless it is, the other party is not entitled to relief. Judgment affirmed. Burden v. Pratt. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

CORRESPONDENCE.

AN ANSWER TO AN ANSWER.

To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Permit me to say that I am greatly astonished at the "Answer" of the Hon. Judge Joachimsen to my articles on Jewish Law (see A. L. J., page 325). I believe every unbiased reader will bear me witness that my articles were free from all personalities; that, on the contrary, whenever I alluded to the author of the "Desultory Remarks" I spoke of him with the utmost regard and politeness. And yet, in his "Answer," he descended to vulgar ideas and vulgar modes of expressing himself. Is the judge infallible? Is it a crime against the majesty of the judge to say politely, that he made erroneous statements, and to correct them in a gentlemanly manner? I will not follow him into the arena selected by him. If he thinks to strengthen his position by his undignified manner of throwing dirt at me, and if he can persuade himself that he thereby has demolished me, all right! Let him proceed. It may afford him pleasure, and I am not hurt thereby.

The honorable judge charges me explicitly with plagiarism. Believe me, dear sir, that the fact that Rev. Dr. Hübsch, of New York, published some articles on Jewish divorce more than four years ago in a New York weekly had been totally forgotten by me, and after so long a time I cannot recall to my mind any thing of those articles. About the same time I published my views on divorce in the Jewish Times, and I am certain that the views there expressed by me are fully coincident with those lately forwarded by me in your journal. But suppose I should also coincide with the statements of Dr. Hübsch, what then? I said lately to a child that twice two is four. Let now the judge desultorily remark: This saying bears closest resemblance to a statement made by my learned friend H. when he went to an infant school. He is welcome to such pettifogging.

I could have further analyzed the indissoluble muddle in which the judge's mind is to be found whenever he attempts to speak of Talmudical law, his false analogies, his misunderstood quotations, and so forth. But after the coarse and overbearing tone the judge has seen fit to assume, he has lost the right to a respectful answer. Moreover, his puerile articles on Jewish law do hardly deserve any consideration. My task with the Hon. Judge Joachimsen is ended.

To the readers, however, I owe a few words more. First, in regard to divorce. About three years ago I had quite a lengthy correspondence with a Rabbi in a Prussian town, not far from the Polish frontier. I had