particular £2,000, but to divide £2,000 of the property of the society amongst the members of the lodge; and from dividing amongst the members of the lodge, or of otherwise dealing with in contravention of the rules of the lodge, a sum of £2,000, or other assets of the lodge." It seems the next part of the injunction was obtained from the vacation judge, on the 12th day of October last, restraining the division for a week, and giving leave to serve notice of motion. This motion came on on the 19th October, and the order made was: "On motion for injunction this day made, upon hearing counsel for defendant, and upon reading the order of the 12th October, 1881, and certain affidavits, and counsel on both sides consenting, that the said motion should be treated as a motion for judgment, this court doth, by consent of all parties, order that the defendants, Thomas Andrews, Affifi Lely, and John Bartlet Mogg, be perpetuaily restrained from dividing amongst the members of the Loyal Brunswick Lodge of the Independent Order of Oddfellows, Manchester Unity, Friendly Society, the £2,000 in the endorsement on the writ in this action mentioned, or otherwise dealing therewith in contravention of the rules of the lodge.' Then it was ordered that it should be referred to the taxing master to tax the costs of the plaintiff, and these defendants were ordered to pay these costs on being so taxed. Now, what took place was this: On the 19th October, that order being dated the same day, it is sworn that these three defendants were present at a meeting of the society, and that a letter from the solicitor was then read advising the society to consent to a perpetual injunction. I suppose it was upon that advice that the order was taken in the form it was. Therefore, I start with this, that it was at any rate notorious in the society that such an order had been made. Moreover, it is said that in the local newspaper there was a full account of these proceedings published. Well, after what took place on the 2nd November, these three trustees retire from being trustees, and on the 16th November, whilst this matter must have been fresh in the minds of every member of this society who attended in the least to its affairs, three other gentlemen, who are respondents to this motionThomas Hemming, Joseph Heath, and William Unett-were appointed trustees. That is to say, there being an injunction against three gentlemen in their character of trustees, to prevent their doing a certain act, they immediately upon that injunction retire, and three other members of the society step into their shoes, in their places, in the character of trustees. That was on the 16th November. On the 11th January next following a resolution was again passed by the same society, who had been advised by their solicitor to consent to a perpetual injunction, and had done so in the names of their trustees, to divide £2,000 amongst the members. At that meeting Mogg-one of the old trustees was present ail the time; another of the old trusteesAndrews-says he was there in the beginning, but was called away, and denies he knew what was going to be done, and he says he did not go back to the meeting. On the 12th, the three new trustees-Hemming, Heath, and Unett-went to the bankers of the society and asked for a loan of £2,000. The bank, for some reason or other-I assume it was not because of the injunction, but because it had some doubt of their power of borrowing - refused the application. Upon that they took away the balance from the bank, took away the deeds from the bank to another bank, and from the new bank obtained £2,000, and divided the £2,000 among the members of the society. Mogg and the other trustees received their shares of the division the other old trustees, I mean, Mogg, Andrews, and Lely; and Mogg, it is sworn, assisted in the

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division. The three new trustees have since repaid the amounts they severally received to the society. Now, I am asked to enforce this injunction by committal against the whole of these gentlemen-the old trustees as well as the new ones. There is no doubt about the jurisdiction of the court. If anybody, though not a person actually named in the injunction, chooses to step into the place of the man who was named, and to do the act which he was enjoined from doing, he has committed a very gross contempt of this court. One does not need any authority to say that. Here were three trustees, against whom an injunction had been granted-who had, indeed, consented to it, it appears, with the sanction of the society for which they were trustees; and immediately after they retire three new trustees take their places; and these three new trustees directly or, at all events, a very short time after-proceed to do that very act which, in the person of the three former trustees, the society had consented to an injunction of this court restraining them from doing it. I have no doubt myself what the whole of this transaction was. It was an attempt, I cannot for a moment doubt, if the matter stopped there, on the part of the members of the society, and on the part of the three new trustees and of the old trustees, to avoid the order of this court; and, supposing the court's arm was not long enough to reach the new trustees, to attempt, by putting new persons in the place of those against whom the order had been obtained, to carry out, in spite of the order of the court, that which the court had prohibited. I have attended with great care to what all these gentlemen have stated in their affidavits. Lely was not present when the resolution was passed; Andrews says he was there, but did not know there was to be such a resolution proposed, and left before it came on. Mogg was present all the time, there is no doubt about that. On the part of the three new trustees, I find they made a joint affidavit, and in paragraph 4 they say, in fact, that the old trustees did not retire, and they were not put in their places, for the purpose of doing this: and then they say "We have not had in our possession, or seen, any order of this court granting an interim injunction of this order, or any order making such interim injunction perpetual, or any copies of such orders respectively, and we were not, and have not been, aware of the contents of such orders, or either order." There their evidence on that point stops, and there is an utter absence of any denial on their part that they were perfectly well aware of the effect of the order which the court had made. I think I am bound to treat them as to all intents and purposes perfectly well informed of the order; and, after reading their affidavits, I remain of the opinion which I should have formed without them that they perfectly well knew what the order of the court was, and that this was a device, to which they lent their names and active cooperation, to disobey the order of the court. Now, I cannot allow that state of things to exist. It is very necessary that the orders of this court should be observed implicitly, and if people are so foolish as to imagine that they can in this way, by a ruse, avoid and get rid of an order made by this court, it is time that this delusion should be put an end to. I do not think that, as to Andrews and Lely, I should be justified in imprisoning them; but as to all the other gentlemen, I commit them at once to prison, and I order all the costs of this motion to be paid by them all, including Andrews and Lely. If they want to make their submission to the court, and to escape from the punishment which this act has brought upon them, I advise them to arrange that the £2,000 shall be replaced.

Mr. Cozens Hardy, Q.C., and Mr. Chadwick Healey were for the plaintiff.

Mr. Ince, Q.C., Mr. Methold were for Andrews, Lely and Mogg.

Mr. Romer, Q.C., appeared for the new trustees, Hemming, Heath and Unett.

HIGH COURT of
JUSTICE.

QUEEN'S BENCH
DIVISION.

DIVISIONAL COURT.

1891. Jan. 27th.

Before POLLOCK, BARON,

AND

CHARLES, J.

CASE 102.

STOOKE v. MUTUAL PROVIDENT
ALLIANCE.

Friendly Society-Claim for Sick Pay-RulesContract by Member to abide by present rules and regulations of the society, and by any others hereafter certified by the Registrar of Friendly Societies -After he had been for a long time in receipt of benefit the society passed a rule, the effect of which excluded him from further benefit.

Held that as the contract expressly provided that the members should be bound by rules made from time to time it could not be said that the new rules were ultra vires, and that therefore the plaintiff was bound by them.

This case raised a question of great importance to the members of friendly or benefit societies, whether they are bound by the rules existing when they became members, or are also bound by any new rules from time to time duly made and certified, even though they may reduce or diminish the benefits to which they would be entitled under the rules existing when they joined. The defendants are a friendly society duly enrolled under the Friendly Societies Acts, 1829-1889. In September, 1861, the plaintiff became a member and received a policy which certified that he was entitled to the following benefits: -"10s. weekly in sickness up to the age of 65, for which he was to pay ls. 7d. a month; medical attendance and medicine, for which he was to pay a week; weekly annuity commencing at £10, at death, premiums ceasing at death, 5d. a week." The policy was granted on a proposal in which he agreed to abide by the present rules and regulations of the society and by any others that may hereafter be made and certified by the Registrar of Friendly Societies." In 1885 the plaintiff had a letter from the secretary informing him that his case as a member of the sickness fund of the society having been medically reported to be of a permanent character rule 83 would govern his future claims for sick pay.

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4d.

"Any member assuring for a weekly sum in sickness shall, during the continuance of any sickness certified to be of a permanent character, after a month's notice to be placed on full pay for such further period as shall allow to such member twenty-six weeks of full pay in the whole, reckoning from the commencement of such sickness, and such month's notice, next after on half-pay for thirteen further consecutive weeks,

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and thence after during the continuance of such sickness on consecutive quarter-pay." Pursuant, therefore, to this rule, your future pay will be at half-pay for the next ensuing four weeks, and from and after April 25, 1885, at quarter-pay for the remainder of the sickness."

The plaintiff duly continued to make the proper monthly payments to the society, and continued to receive the "quarter-pay" up to March, 1890, when he received another letter from the secretary containing "revised rules," by which he was deprived of all further sickness allowance ::

"I am desired to direct your attention to the rule 76, which limits the duration of quarter-pay to twenty-six weeks. I find, on reference to your case that you have now received quarter-pay for 260 weeks, and that during the 28 years of your membership you have received £102 7s. 6d. and have paid in £27 1s. 6d. The Board desires to administer the new rule as considerately as possible, and therefore, though your sickness benefit has already exceeded the term, and is liable to immediate cessation, I am authorised to permit its continuance during the present month, after which it must necessarily cease. The Board desires to assure you that this change of rule has been necessitated by the past sickness experience of the society in order that all the members who are entitled to relief in time of sickness may have a fair and equal claim, in case of sickness, upon the funds of the society." The plaintiff (who is under 65) refused to assent to this, and, to test the question, brought an action in the County Court to recover £1 as quartermoney" for the month ending May 2, 1890. It was admitted that if he was bound by the altered rule he had received all he was entitled to, but that otherwise he would be entitled to recover the sum for which he sued. The County Court Judge gave judgment for the plaintiff, but, on the application of the society, gave them leave to appeal on the condition that the costs of the appeal should be paid by the society in any event. They accordingly appealed.

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Mr. A'Beckett Terrell appeared on the part of the society in support of their appeal, observing that the appeal was of far more importance to them than to the plaintiff, the sum at issue in the particular case being so small, though the question involved was of immense importance to these societies. The question was whether members of such societies are bound by alterations in the rules, though reducing the benefits to which they would have been otherwise entitled. He cited the case of Norfolk Permanent Building Society (1 Chan. Div., 481) and Gardner v. Lucas (3 Q.B.D.). It was a fundamental rule and principle of these societies that members are to be bound not only by the rules existing when they join, but by any subsequent rules made from time to time. It was true that in 1864 Lord Selborne (then Sir Roundell Palmer, Attorney-General) gave an opinion that "the altered rules will be binding upon the members admitted before the new rules were made except as to any relief or other benefit from the funds of the society of which any member may then be in the actual receipt or entitled to the actual receipt under the existing rules." But that opinion was given in a particular case. And in the present case the rules expressly provide for altering the rules and increasing the subscriptions.

Mr. Neish, for the plaintiff, contended that the directors had no power to alter the rules so as to deprive him of any of the benefits to which he was entitled under the contract entered into with him by the society.

One party to a contract cannot alter it to the prejudice of the other. He cited Auld v. Glasgow Working Men's Benefit Society (12 Appeal Cases). Mr. Baron Pollock: There was no power in that case to alter the rules so as to affect the contract. But here the contract is to be subject to the existing rules and any rules afterwards to be made.] But not so as to affect the benefits stipulated for. [Mr. Baron Pollock: But there being a special stipulation of that character, where is the injustice of it?] Then the members may be deprived of all the benefits they have contracted for. [Mr. Justice Charles: You must admit that the subscriptions may be raised; and, if so the benefit of the sick pay would be counterbalanced and virtually reduced.] Not necessarily so; it might or might not be so.

The court came to the conclusion that as the contract expressly provided that the members should be bound by rules made from time to time it could not be said that the new rules were ultra vires, and that therefore the plaintiff was bound by them. The judgment of the County Court Judge, therefore, was wrong, and must be reversed.

Judgment accordingly.

COURT OF
COMMON
PLEAS.

1840.

CASE 103.

TYRRELL v. WOOLLEY AND ROTHWELL.

Friendly Society-Statute 10 Geo. IV., cap. 36-Contract Nov. 19, 22. with sick member contrary to rules—Invalid.

By one of the rules of a benefit society the committee were to meet "for the purpose of examining candidates for admission and to settle and determine any matter relating to the breach or non-observance of the articles of the society by any of its members, and their exclusion in consequence thereof, and to settle and determine any other matter or thing relating to the society, subject nevertheless to the confirmation of the society at their next quarterly meeting."

Held that the latter words were to be considered in conjunction with, and as qualified by, the preceding portion of the rule; and that they did not authorise the committee to enter into a contract which was in violation of the other rules of the society, dubitante Maule, J.

The other rules established a graduated scale of allowance to sick members, regulated by the state of the funds of the society, and by the period that the members continued a charge upon it, and prohibited them from working while they received such allowance; and also provided for the payment of certain sums on the death of a member, or of a member's wife.

Held that the committee were not authorised in making a contract with a sick member (who had met with an accident which disabled him from working at his trade) allowing him a fixed weekly sum for life,