been a member of the Prince Albert Lodge of the Order of Druids, applied to the Bench for an order upon the representatives of that lodge for the payment of £5 8s., being 12 weeks sick pay, which, as he alleged, had been wrongfully withheld.-Mr. Watson appeared for Sharples, and Mr. Edelston represented the lodge authorities.-The circumstances under which the claim was made were of a somewhat peculiar nature. One of the rules of the lodge, the 29th, provides that when a member is sick and unable to follow his employment, he shall obtain a certificate to that effect signed by the doctor, which must be delivered within a stated period to the secretary. The latter having satisfied himself that the member is financial, reports accordingly, and what is termed a “sick form" is supplied, by means of which the incapacitated member obtains his pay. The rule further requires that the sick form shall be retained by the member until he is again fit for employment. Then, signed by him and the doctor, it must be returned to the Noble Grand Arch within twenty-four hours, the penalty for non-compliance with this regulation being sixpence per day so long as the form is retained beyond the period stated. In the latter part of 1873 Sharples was unwell and incapacitated for his employment, and, in accordance with the rule above mentioned, he obtained a sick form. At that time, however, there was a dispute between him and the lodge in reference to a grant of £15 from the accident fund. The sick form soon after it was obtained by Sharples was handed over to a gentleman named Joynson, who had been deputed to represent his interests in the dispute referred to. On the 24th January, 1874, Sharples applied to the lodge for the sick pay that was then due to him, and he was told to produce the sick form. He applied to Mr. Joynson for it, but that gentleman refused to give it up, and the assistant secretary paid to Sharples, as Mr. Edelston said, under protest, the sum of £2 10s. 10d. Immediately afterwards sick payments to all the members were entirely suspended for twelve months. Sharples, therefore, the following week, when offered 2s. 6d. by the assistant secretary, refused to take it, not, as he said, because not sick, but because the payments had been generally suspended. Up to this time the sick form which had been supplied to him remained in the possession of Mr. Joynson, and it had never been signed by the doctor as the rule required. The case in reference to the grant from the accident compensation fund was afterwards carried before the General Board of Management in Manchester, and during those proceedings the sick form was tendered in evidence and given up by Mr. Joynson. The decision of the Board in that case was against Sharples, and a subsequent action brought by him in the Manchester County Court failed to alter the position of affairs. Thus the matter stood until early in the present year, when he was again thrown upon the sick funds of the lodge. He had paid his contributions, equal to 6d. per week, up to December last, but when he applied for sick pay he was told that a sum of £7 18s. 6d. was debited against him." This, it appeared, was the amount of fines for non-delivery of the sick forms that had previously been supplied to him, being at the rate of 6d. per day from the time when he ceased to receive pay to the day when it was delivered up to the General Board. As this had been owing a longer period than the rules permitted, Sharples was suspended, and, as a consequence, declared ineligible for sick pay. Being dissatisfied with the statement, he appealed to the district representatives, who decided in his favour. The lodge, however, again appealed to the General Board of Management in Manchester, and there the decision of district committee was reversed. Strange to say, however, on the occasion he was when the matter was before the General Board, the case was heard and decided without Sharples being examined. Although he was in attendance, and prepared to explain his position, he never was given an opportunity of doing so, and the decision was, in point of fact, arrived at behind his back. It was under these circumstances that he carried the case before the justices, and he asked now, in accordance with the Friendly Societies Act, for an order upon the lodge representatives for the payment of £5 8s., being the amount of 12 weeks pay at 9s. per week up to the 8th April last. The fine that had been charged against him he declared had been illegally levied, inasmuch as he had never been in a position to return the sick form to the lodge authorities. Sharples, in cross-examination, admitted that he had been told thirteen or fourteen months ago that this fine was standing in the books against him, and the minute books were produced, from which it appeared that he had attended various meetings of the lodge and asked for time to pay. This, however, he to some extent denied.-Mr. Edelston contended, in the first place, that the Bench had no jurisdiction, inasmuch as Sharples had himself acknowledged the authority of the domestic tribunal by appealing to the district committee. Moreover, he should urge, if that point failed, that the man had been fined by the lodge, and that that fine remained unpaid. After the matter had been argued at some length, it was decided, on the advice of the magistrates, with consent of the solicitors on both sides, that the case should be re-heard by the Board of Management, Sharples himself to have a fair hearing.-The case was adjourned for two months to admit of this being done, and Mr. Birley expressed the opinion of the magistrates that the man's case was deserving of careful consideration at the hands of the Board. TUNSTALL COUNTY COURT, 1892, June 10. HIGH COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH POLLOCK, BARON. CASE 18. HEATH . THE TRUSTEES OF THE LOYAL OAK LODGE, M.U.I.O.O.F. Friendly Societies Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vic., cap. 60, sec. 22-Disputes-Claim for Sick Pay Arbitration-Jurisdiction. Held, on appeal, that the County Court Judge had no jurisdiction, and a writ of prohibition directed to issue. William Heath, a member of the Loyal Oak Lodge, of the Pottery and Newcastle District, Independent Order of Oddfellows Manchester Unity Friendly Society, Harriseahead, sued the Trustees of the Lodge to recover the sum of £11 4s. for 69 weeks sick pay, at 4s. per week, from the 24th January, 1891, to the 21st of May, 1892, less £2 12s. received by him on January 2nd, 1892. When the action was called on, the plaintiff appeared in person, and Mr. Hollinshead, solicitor, appeared for the defendants, and at once took the objection that the court had no jurisdiction to try the case, upon the ground that the rules of the lodge and the general rules of the society provide for arbitration in case of dispute, that the dispute in question had already been arbitrated upon, and that the plaintiff's remedy, when he was dissatisfied with the decision of the arbitrators, was by appeal, as provided by the rules. The learned judge stated that he did not consider he had jurisdiction, but adjourned the case, in order that the plaintiff might be legally represented. On July 15th, 1892, the date to which the case stood adjourned, the plaintiff was represented by Mr. Richardson, barrister-at-law, and Mr. Hollinshead, solicitor, appeared for the defendants. Mr. Hollinshead again raised the objection which he had made on June 10th, on behalf of the defendants, to the jurisdiction of the court. The judge, after hearing the plaintiff's counsel and the plaintiff, gave a verdict in his favour, upon the ground that the arbitration committee had decided that the plaintiff was permanently incapacitated, and, therefore, the court had jurisdiction. It may be mentioned that the plaintiff brought a precisely similar action against the defendants in the same County Court for arrears of sick pay from the 9th October, 1890, to the 14th March, 1891, amounting to £4 3s. 10d., and claiming an order re-instating him as a member of the lodge, and that upon the hearing on the 10th of April, 1891, the learned judge decided, on the same objection as stated above being taken, that he had no jurisdiction, and nonsuited the plaintiff. By the instruction of the society, Messrs. Cobbett, Wheeler, and Cobbett, solicitors, Manchester, at once filed an affidavit setting out the facts, and applied through Mr. E. M. Pollock, to the Lord Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Cave, sitting in the Divisional Court, for an order for a summons to issue to show cause why a Writ of Prohibition should not be issued, directed to the learned judge and the plaintiff, to prohibit them from further proceeding in the action. Their lordships ordered the summons to issue, and directed that proceedings should be stayed until the hearing. On the 8th day of August, 1892, the matter came on for hearing before Mr. Baron Pollock. The society were represented by Mr. E. M. Pollock, instructed by Messrs. Collis and Mallam, agents for Messrs. Cobbett and Co., and the plaintiff was represented by Messrs. Firth and Co., the London agents for Mr. G. H. Hunt, of Hanley, the plaintiff's solicitor. On the application of Messrs. Firth and Co., the matter was adjourned till the 27th of October to enable the plaintiff to file an affidavit in opposition to those filed on behalf of the defendants, the proceedings in the meantime being stayed. On the 27th of October, 1892, the matter came on for hearing before Mr. Justice Charles. The society were again represented by Mr. E. M. Pollock, and counsel appeared for the plaintiff instructed by Messrs. Firth and Co. Mr. Pollock referred to the Act of Parliament and the various rules, and contended that where there was a dispute no member could bring an action against the lodge, and such action could only be brought where there was default in payment of an admitted claim. Counsel then went into the rather complicated facts to show that there was a dispute and no claim admitted, and consequently the court had no jurisdiction. The plaintiff's counsel attempted to show that the plaintiff had done everything to entitle him to sick pay and that there was an admitted claim and that there was no dispute. The judge decided that there was clearly a dispute and the order for prohibition must be made absolute. A writ was afterwards issued directed to the plaintiff and the County Court Judge which sets forth that the County Court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the said action and prohibits the learned judge and the plaintiff from further proceeding in the action. N.B.-See Friendly Societies Act, 1896, 59 & 60 Vic., cap. 25, sec. 68. WREXHAM CASE 19. TRUSTEES OF THE LOYAL PRINCE OF WREXHAM DISTRICT. OF THE Friendly Societies Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vic., cap. 60, sec. 22-Arbitrators' Award-Action to enforceJurisdiction. Held that the court had no jurisdiction to enforce award between two societies. In this case the plaintiffs claimed "that the Wrexham District should carry out, fulfil, and obey the award of the Committee of Management of the Grand United Order of Oddfellows, duly made on the 11th day of November, 1884, in the matter of an appeal of the said Loyal Prince of Wales Lodge against the said Wrexham District touching a certain dispute that had arisen between the said lodge and the said district, and which award determined and directed that the treasurer of the Wrexham District was bound to receive the amount due from the lodge when it was tendered to him, subject to any deduction on payment of such amount as might be due from the Wrexham District to the said lodge, and the Committee directed that immediate steps be taken to settle the dispute in accordance with such resolution. The Prince of Wales Lodge have agreed to pay any such amount as may be found due from them to the Wrexham District, and have applied to the said district to receive the same, and to fulfil and obey the said award, which the said Wrexham District refuse and neglect to do." Mr. Bennion Acton appeared for the plaintiffs, and Mr. Jno. Jones for the defendants. Mr. Jno. Jones, at the outset, contended that his Honour had no jurisdiction, the rules providing that disputes between members and officials of the Order should be settled by arbitration, pursuant to 38 & 39 Vic., c. 60, s. 22. Mr. Acton said there had been an arbitration in this matter, and his clients came to that court to have the award enforced, as the defendants refused to carry it out. The defendants were the trustees of the Wrexham District, consisting of 21 lodges, and the plaintiffs were the trustees of one of the 21 lodges. The Order was governed by the Grand rules, the District rules, and the Lodge rules; and if the District and Lodge rules differed from the Grand rules, in any respect, they were ultra vires. The Grand rules must prevail in the case of any conflict. His Honour said he did not think this was one of those actions provided for by the Act of Parliament that he could hear. The 22nd section of the Act expressly stated that every dispute between a member, or person claiming through a member, and the society, or an official thereof, or under the rules, should be settled by arbitration. He always looked upon this as meaning disputes between individual members and a society, and not between two societies. Mr. Acton said he was instructed by the Secretary to the Grand Order (Mr. Livesey, of Manchester), that the Executive Committee always understood the meaning of the Act to be "every dispute under the rules," and that the words "between a member, &c., were a mere surplusage. He submitted that the awards of the Committee of Management could be enforced in the County Court. He could find no other machinery, in fact, for enforcing an award under the rules except the County Court. His Honour could not agree with Mr. Acton that the words "a member or person claiming through a member," &c., were mere surplusage; but he thought, on the contrary, that by putting them into the Act and making them prominent, the legislature attached importance to them. He was of opinion that the Act simply contemplated a member or a person claiming on the one side and a society or one of its officials on the other, and that this was the only kind of dispute that he had any power to deal with. It had never occurred to him to doubt section 22 before to-day, as applying to anything else but to a member on the one side and the officers of a society on the other. Perhaps they would like to have the case adjourned. Mr. Acton said this point was a matter of very great consequence. His Honour: I don't think this is a dispute within section 22. Therefore I don't think this court has any jurisdiction to entertain it. After some further legal argument the case was adjourned to the next court. Mr. Jno. Jones applied for costs. Honour said he should not entertain the question of costs then. however, Mr. Acton did not satisfy him at the next court that he (the judge) was wrong, then he thought he must saddle him with the costs. Mr. Acton: Very well, sir. I fancy the Grand Order will be very much surprised. At the adjourned sitting of the court on Wednesday, January 25th, Mr. Acton, on behalf of the plaintiffs, stated that the point raised by his Honour had been considered, and he was afraid his Honour's view of the section was irresistible. At the head quarters of the Order this point had taken them entirely by surprise, but they saw no way of getting over his Honour's ruling. The matter was of the utmost importance to them, and they would probably apply to the legislature for a short Act to amend the section quoted. The plaintiff's were nonsuited, with costs. His N.B.-See Friendly Societies Act, 1896, 59 & 60 Vic., cap. 25, sec. 68. |