[The four following decisions were not rendered under any law published in this volume, but, being of interest, are here included:]

Where employees of a railroad company in the hands of a receiver appointed by the court are dissatisfied with the wages paid by the receiver, they may abandon the employment, and by persuasion or argument induce other employees to do the same; but if they resort to threats or violence to induce the others to leave, or accomplish their purpose, without actual violence, by overawing the others by preconcerted demonstrations of force, and thus prevent the receiver from operating the road, they are guilty of a contempt of court, and may be punished for their unlawful acts. (United States Circuit Court, District of Colorado, 1885, United States v. Kane, 23 Federal Reporter, 748.)

A railroad company organized a relief department among its employees for the purpose of giving pecuniary aid to those who might be injured or sick. The funds of said department were provided by contributions from the members, the company agreeing to make up any deficiency which might occur in any year. The rates of contribution by the members were such that a deficiency would seldom occur, and in fact was a very rare occurrence. In the application for membership in the relief department and in the contract of insurance a clause was inserted providing that, in consideration of the payments by the company, the acceptance of benefits by a member should operate as a release of all claims for damages against the company. Plaintiff, who was a member of the relief department, received injuries in consequence of the negligence of the railway company, and thereafter accepted benefits as a member of the relief department. Held, That plaintiff's right of action against the railroad company to recover damages for such injury was not barred by the acceptance of such benefits. (United States Circuit Court, District of Colorado, 1894, Miller v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Company, 65 Federal Reporter, 305.)

In response to an inquiry submitted by the house of representatives of Colorado to the supreme court of the State as to the constitutionality and legality of proposed legislation providing that "eight hours shall constitute a day's labor in all mines, factories, and smelters in this State," the court returned the following opinion:

"It is not competent for the legislature to single out the mining, manufacturing, and smelting industries of the State, and impose upon them restrictions, with reference to the hours of their employees, from which other employers of labor are exempt. An act such as proposed would be manifestly in violation of the constitutional inhibition against class legislation. The bill submitted also violates the right of parties to make their own contracts, a right guaranteed by our bill of rights and protected by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States." (Supreme Court, 1895, 39 Pacific Reporter, 329.)

In response to an inquiry submitted by the house of representatives of Colorado to the supreme court of the State as to the constitutionality of proposed legislation regulating the weighing of coal at mines, the court returned an opinion to the effect that in so far as the proposed legislation attempts to deprive persons of the right to fix by contract the manner of ascertaining compensation for mining coal it is in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and of article 2, section 25 of the Colorado bill of rights, which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." (Supreme Court, 1895, 39 Pacific Reporter, 431.)

CONNECTICUT.

GENERAL STATUTES OF 1888, CHAPTER 99, SECTION 1518.-Intimidation of employers and employees. (a)

The defendants conspired to intimidate the publishers of a certain newspaper called the Journal and Courier, to compel them to discharge against their will certain of their workmen and to employ the defendants and such persons as they should name. Held to fall within the prohibition of this section. The defendants' purpose was to deprive the publishing company of its liberty to carry on its business in its own way, although in doing so it interfered with no right of the defendants. The motive was to gain an advantage unjustly and at the expense of others, and therefore the act was legally corrupt. As a means of accomplishing the purpose the parties intended to harm the publishing company, and there

a See Law, page 177.

fore it was malicious. It was also a crime for the defendants to seek to injure other workmen of the publishing company by depriving them of their employment. These workmen had just as good a right to work for the publishing company as the defendants had, and their right is entitled to the same consideration and protection. The defendants attempted not merely to injure the publishing company, but all persons who should patronize that company by subscribing for their paper or advertising in it. Held that such conduct must be regarded as prima facie malicious and corrupt. If two or more persons combine to commit a crime or misdemeanor, such combination is itself a crime. And when the end sought is in itself lawful, a combination to use criminal means to accomplish it is a crime. (Supreme Court of Errors, 1887, State v. Glidden et al., 55 Conn., 46.) GENERAL STATUTES OF 1888, CHAPTER 106, SECTIONS 1748 TO 1752.-Payment of wages. (a)

Section 1748 provides that any person who shall withhold any part of the wages of an employee "because of an agreement requiring notice before leaving the employment," shall forfeit $50. The plaintiff worked for the defendant under an agree ment that if the defendant should dismiss him he would give him two weeks' notice, and if the plaintiff should leave the defendant's employment he should give him two weeks' notice, and either failing to give such notice was to forfeit to the other the amount of two weeks' wages. The plaintiff left the defendant's employ without giving any notice and without good cause. In a suit by the plaintiff for two weeks' wages unpaid the defendant in his answer set up the agreement and claimed that the two weeks' wages claimed by plaintiff were the same two weeks' wages forfeited under the agreement. Held, that if the suit were defended solely on the ground of a broken agreement to give notice it would be difficult to deliver the case from the operation of the statutes. But the agreement was more extensive. It was coupled with a like agreement by the defendant. Each party made precisely the same agreement. Each party agreed to give the same notice, and in case of failure to submit to the same forfeiture. In this there was nothing oppressive, one-sided, unfair, or unreasonable. Presumptively it was mutually advantageous. Whatever may be said of a unilateral obligation by an employee, it can hardly be said that the legislature intended to prohibit a fair and reasonable agreement in which both parties assume the same obligation. Even if it be conceded that such legislation would be constitutional, we should expect to find the intent expressed in direct and unequivocal language. We can not give language of doubtful import any such effect by implication or construction. This case is not within the statute. (Supreme Court of Errors, 1889, Pierce v. Whittlesey, 58 Conn., 104.)

[The following decision was not rendered under any law published in this volume, but, being of interest, is here included:]

The complainant has been employed for two years in the freight yard of the New Haven and North Hampton Railroad Company. He voluntarily left his employment, in a proper manner, but without the approval of Opdyke, one of the defendants, who was the superintendent of the company. He obtained employment in the same line of business in the freight yard of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, and after working for a few days, was ordered to stop work by Wallace, another of the defendants, and assistant superintendent of the last-named company, not because he was unsatisfactory as a workman, but solely because there was a mutual agreement between the defendants that a man not approved by one should not be employed by their respective companies, so far as they had control. It appeared that Opdyke had communicated to Wallace that the complainant had left his former employment in what he considered "a mean way." The defendants were before the courts on a charge of conspiracy. The court held that the defendants had a common design to hinder the complainant from doing his work and earning his pay; not for good reasons connected with his immediate employment, but for reasons originating "from excessive courtesy" between them, and which would not have been put into operation except for said mutual understanding, which was to all intents and purposes a "boycott" upon the individual who was the subject of the conspiracy. The court said: "It is wellsettled law that any conspiracy to injure a man in his person or character is highly criminal at common law, and although recent events have developed conspiracies in new forms for new purposes bearing upon the varied business interests of this and other States, the court is clearly of the opinion that such conspiracies

a See Law, page 177.

designed to directly prevent the carrying on of any lawful business or indirectly to injure the business of any dealer in or producer of goods, wares, and merchandise, by preventing those who would be customers for such goods, wares, and merchandise from purchasing the same, by intimidation, persuasion, or any means, other than by lawful competition, is also criminal at common law. The court is equally satisfied that any conspiracy to prevent, obstruct, or hinder any man from putting his labor on the market when, where, and for such compensation as he may agree for, if the same be lawful, is also highly criminal at common law and more disastrous in effect than any other form of conspiracy except that to take life. By law every man's labor, skill, and industry are his own property, and with a great majority of men, they are his all and precious to him next to his life. They stand in place of property, real and personal. His manhood, as well as the prosperity and comfort of him and his, are dependent upon his right to exercise these powers, gifts, and qualities with the same freedom with which more fortunate men bestow their goods and estates, and any prevention, restriction or hindrance in his lawful exercise of such freedom, by the common design and united action of any organized society, order or club, or by any organized combination of two or more persons, whether they are employees seeking self-protection, or employers intending to be courteous to each other, is in violation of rights established by the constitution and laws of the State. With this view of the law in the case, the court finds the complaint charged the accused in a proper manner with the offense named.' (State v. Opdyke et al., Wright on Criminal Conspiracy, and American Cases by Carson, published in 1887, page 176.)

[NOTE. The above case is not contained in any of the reports, and the court and year in which the decision was rendered is not stated in the work from which the above report was obtained. Mr. Carson, in his American Cases on Conspiracy, appended to Wright on Criminal Conspiracy and published in 1887, speaks of this case as another recent Connecticut case."]

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

ACTS OF 1891-92, CHAPTER 352.-Hours of labor-Public works. (a)

To render one amenable to this law he must be an officer or agent of the United States, or a contractor or subcontractor whose duty it is to employ, direct, or control laborers or mechanics upon some of the public works of the United States, and he must have intentionally required or permitted such laborers or mechanics to work more than eight hours in any calendar day. This law does not apply to the case of a man who, entirely at his own risk and cost, although under Government inspection, builds barges which United States engineers agreed to purchase on completion for Government use if found to conform to certain prescribed specifications. (United States District Court, Southern District of Alabama, 1893, United States v. Ollinger, 55 Federal Reporter, 959.)

FLORIDA.

REVISED STATUTES OF 1892, APPENDIX, PAGE 1008.-Liability of railroad companies for injuries of employees. (b)

[The following decision was rendered in a case arising under section 2 of chapter 3744 of the acts of 1887, which was repealed by act of May 4, 1891; as the present law is substantially the same as the repealed act, the principles involved in this decision appear to be equally applicable thereto:]

Under section 2 of chapter 3744 of the acts of 1887, one employee of a railroad company can recover of the employing company for injury sustained through the negligence or carelessness of another employee of the same company, provided he be without fault. To entitle the injured employee to a recovery in such a case he must himself be entirely free from fault or negligence.

Under this provision of the statute an employee of a railroad company can not recover damages from such company for injuries sustained by him on account of the negligence or carelessness of another employee unless wholly without fault himself, even though in performing the act that resulted in the injury he was acting under the orders of a superior.

a See Law, page 205.

b See Law, page 211.

Where an employee of a railroad company uses defective and dangerous tools and appliances, with knowledge of their defectiveness and dangerousness, and is injured thereby, he can not be said to be without fault, and can not recover of the company under this statute even though his use of them was by the direct command of a superior officer who was also an employee of the same company. (Supreme Court, 1894, Duval v. Hunt et al., 34 Fla., 85.)

[The following decision was not rendered under any law published in this volume, but, being of interest, is here included:]

An action lies in behalf of an employee against a person who has maliciously procured the employer to discharge such employee from employment in which he is engaged under a legal contract, for a certain period, provided damage result to the employee from such discharge. An action will also lie where the period for which the employment is to continue is not certain, if damage result from the discharge, even though, from inability to ascertain the amount of the damage, a verdict for nominal damages only should result. The fact that no contract, nor any legal right of the employee as against the employer, is violated by the employer, or that no action can be maintained by the employee against the employer for such discharge, does not prevent a recovery against the third person who has maliciously procured the discharge, and which discharge would not have occurred but for such procurement. An act done or attempt made by a third party with the malicious intent to procure such a discharge, but not successful in procuring it, will not support an action brought for maliciously procuring the discharge. The actual procurement of the discharge is an essential to such an action. An absence from the agreement or contract of service of any stipulation for a certain amount of wages or compensation will not defeat a recovery. If the value of the compensation to be paid can be ascertained in any legal way it is sufficient. A discharge by an employer is essential to a recovery. If the employee was not discharged, but voluntarily left the employment on account of the conduct of the party charged with having procured his discharge, the action can not be maintained. (Supreme Court, 1887, Cnipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla., 206.)

GEORGIA.

CODE OF 1882, PART II, SECTIONS 2083 AND 3036.—Liability of railroad companies for injuries of employees. (a)

Before an employee can recover from a railroad company he must be free from fault; and if he is killed while in disobedience of a rule of the company, or an order of the conductor given him while he is under the command of that officer, his widow can not recover, unless it appear that such disobedience did not, directly or indirectly, contribute in any degree to the injury. If the deceased, immediately or remotely, directly or indirectly, caused the injury or any part of it, or contributed to it at all, his wife could not recover under section 3036. (Supreme Court, 1866, Rowland v. Cannon, 35 Ga., 105; 1888, Prather v. Richmond and Danville Railroad Company, 80 Ga., 427.)

When an employee of a railroad company, by special written contract, at the time he was employed, and in consideration thereof, agreed to take upon himself all risks connected with or incident to his position on the road, and that he would in no case hold the company liable for any damage he might sustain by accidents or collisions on the trains or road, or which may result from the negligence or carelessness, or misconduct of himself or other employee or person connected with such road, or in the service of the company”: Held, that such a contract, so far as it does not waive any criminal neglect of the company or its principal officers, is a legal contract and binding upon the employee. (Supreme Court, 1873, Western and Atlantic Railroad Company v. Bishop, 50 Ga., 465.)

Under the statutes of this State, a railroad company is liable for injuries to the person of an employee caused by the negligence or misconduct of other employees of the company, without negligence on his part, whether such injuries are connected with the running of trains or not. The fact that a rule of liability not applied to other classes of employers is thus imposed upon railroad companies does not render these statutes obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as denying to such companies the equal protection of the

a See Law, page 219.

2352- -80

laws. (Supreme Court, 1875, Thompson v. Central Railroad and Banking Company, 54 Ga., 509; 1884, Georgia Railroad v. Ivey, 73 Ga., 499; 1890, Georgia Railroad and Banking Company v. Brown, 86 Ga., 320; 1892, Georgia Railroad and Banking Company v. Miller, 90 Ga., 571.)

An employee can not recover damages from a railroad company for injuries sustained by him on account of the negligence of a coemployee, unless without fault himself, even though in performing the act which resulted in the injury he was acting under the orders of a superior. (Supreme Court, 1875, Western and Atlantic Railroad Company v. Adams, 55 Ga., 279.)

In a suit by a widow against a railroad company for the homicide of her husband who was an engineer in its employment, two things are necessary to a recovery under section 3036: First, absence of negligence on his part contributing to the occasion or cause of his death; and second, negligence on the part of the company or some other agent or employee. When it is shown that the deceased was without fault, the presumption of negligence on the part of the road arises. It may, however, be rebutted by proof. If neither the company nor the employees were negligent, there can be no recovery. (Supreme Court, 1877, Central Railroad and Banking Company v. Kenney, 58 Ga., 485; 1880, Central Railroad and Banking Company v. Roach, 64 Ga., 635.)

A fireman, or wood passer, having been killed while engaged in his business on the train, and his death having resulted from striking his head against some part of the fixtures of a water tank situated on the roadside, his widow can not recover damages of the railroad company for the homicide, if her husband, though the fixture projected too far, could have passed it in safety by using due diligence on his part in the manner of prosecuting the business in which he was engaged. If his own negligence contributed substantially to the injury, there can be no recovery. The doctrine of apportionment of damages on account of contributory negligence does not apply in such a case, but the principle of section 3036 is applicable, which section demands that the employee shall be free from fault or negligence. (Supreme Court, 1878, Atlanta and West Point Railroad Company v. Webb, 61 Ga., 586.)

A railroad company is under obligation to observe all ordinary and reasonable precautions to keep its road in such condition that its employees engaged in running the trains may safely discharge their duty to the company; and if, by neglect of the company or other employees, the road becomes unsafe, the employee who is injured by such neglect, unmixed with fault in himself, may recover. (Supreme Court, 1879, Central Railroad Company v. Mitchell, 63 Ga., 173.)

If an employee of a railroad company be injured, without fault or negligence on his part, through the negligence of another employee, he may recover, under section 3036.

It is the duty of a railroad company to furnish its employees reasonably safe tools and materials for their use in its service, but an employee who is aware of the dangerous condition of any particular tool or implement, and nevertheless uses it, can not have redress for an injury resulting therefrom. Nor will the fact that an employee knowingly undertook to use a dangerously defective tool under the immediate command of a superior employee, give him a right to recover. (Supreme Court, 1882, Baker v. Western and Atlantic Railroad Company, 68 Ga., 699.)

The failure of a railroad employee to extricate himself from a perilous situation brought on by the negligence of a coemployee, when he could do so by the use of ordinary care, will bar his right to recover under section 3036. (Supreme Court, 1889, Parker v. Georgia Pacific Railway Company, 83 Ga., 539.)

The servant of a railroad company, injured by the negligence of fellow-servants. must, to recover damages from the company under section 3036, show that he was in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence and without fault or negligence; that he did nothing to contribute to the injury, and neglected to do nothing to prevent the consequence of the negligence of the other servants. (Supreme Court, 1889, Central Railroad and Banking Company v. Lanier, 83 Ga., 587.)

When, in an action brought by an employee of a railroad company under these sections to recover damages for injuries caused by the negligence of other employees, the defense of contributory negligence is set up, the plaintiff is entitled to have the question submitted to the jury unless no recovery could be had upon any view which could be properly taken of the facts which the evidence tended to establish. (United States Supreme Court, 1889, Dunlap v. Northeastern Railroad Company, 130 U. S., 649.)