foreman's principal duty was superintendence, it appeared that another person was employed as general superintendent, who was not present at the accident, that the foreman was foreman of the gang, had authority to hire and discharge men, and frequently had charge of jobs, including the one mentioned in the suit, a finding that the foreman's principal duty was superintendence was proper. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1895. McPhee v. Scully, 39 Northeastern Reporter, 1007.)

The fact that during the building of a wall, a stone was allowed to remain on a scaffold for three days, with such a portion thereof projecting as to make it liable to fall if it was hit or the scaffold jarred, will not, in an action by an employee on whom the stone fell, justify a finding that the foreman was negligent, where the scaffold was not a place where he had occasion to go, and he had no actual notice that the stone had been placed thereon.

The presence of a stone on a scaffold is not a defect in the ways, works, or machinery within the meaning of section 1 of this chapter. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1895, Carroll v. Wilcutt, 39 Northeastern Reporter, 1016.)

An experienced freight handler, who has been in the employ of a railroad for several years, a part of whose duty has been to hook up the doors of grain cars preparatory to loading them, assumes the risk of injury by falling of a door through an obvious defect therein which would cause it to fall when a heavy load was emptied into the car. The ruling as to the assumption of the risk by an employee is the same whether the action is brought at common law or under the statute of 1887, chapter 270, regulating the liability of employers to employees. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1895, Cassaday v. Boston and Albany Railroad Company, 41 Northeastern Reporter, 129.)

The plaintiff was sent by a foreman in charge of a roundhouse and of such repairs as are made there to repair an engine therein, by grinding in a check. While doing so, he was injured by the blowing down of the engine by the engineer. It was held that the foreman was not negligent in failing to give notice to the engineer, who knew that some one would be sent, that the plaintiff had been sent, or to the plaintiff of the dangers incident to the work, he being acquainted with them. It was also held that an engine in a roundhouse for repairs is not on a railroad track, within the meaning of this statute, which makes the employer liable for injury to an employee from negligence of an employee in charge or control of an engine or train "upon a railroad." (Supreme Judicial Court, 1895, Perry v. Old Colony Railroad Company, 41 Northeastern Reporter, 289.)

One whose duty it was to superintend blasting in a quarry, but who spent most of his time in attending to the fires under the boilers, in sharpening tools, and doing other acts of manual labor, is not a person whose sole or principal duty was that of superintendence, within the meaning of the second clause of section 1 of this chapter. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1895, O'Neil v. O'Leary and Earley v. O'Leary, 41 Northeastern Reporter, 662.)

A manufacturing company employed a carpenter under a continuing contract to make all repairs and alterations which it determined upon to its works, he to furnish tools, and the company the materials, at $2.50 per day for his own services and 25 cents profit on each man employed by him. The carpenter hired, paid, superintended, and discharged the men employed by him, but the company directed how the work was to be done. The court held that a man hired by the carpenter was an employee of the carpenter, and not of the company, within this chapter. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1895, Dane v. Cochrane Chemical Company, 41 Northeastern Reporter, 678.)

Under section 2 of this chapter, a daughter to whom her father paid over all his wages, and who managed the household, and received board money from her brothers, without accounting to her father, may maintain an action for negligence in causing her father's death. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1895, Houlihan v. Connecticut River Railroad Company, 42 Northeastern Reporter, 108.)

A number of cars coupled together, and moving from one point to another from an impetus imparted by a locomotive which had been detached, is a "train" under clause 3 of section 1 of this chapter, so as to entitle an employee of the railway company to recover for injuries due to the negligence of the person in charge or control thereof. Brakemen on cars which are moving from the impetus imparted by a locomotive shortly detached therefrom have not charge or control" of the cars under this chapter, so as to entitle employees injured by their negligence to recover therefor from the railroad company. The foreman of a switching gang, who merely points out to the conductor of the switching train where he wishes the cars

placed, has not charge or control" of the train within the meaning of this chap(Supreme Judicial Court, 1895, Caron v. Boston and Albany Railroad Company, 42 Northeastern Reporter, 112.)

ter.

ACTS OF 1894, CHAPTER 481.-Inspection of factories, workshops, etc. (a)

[The following decisions were rendered in cases arising under section 14 of chapter 104 of the Public Statutes of 1882, which was repealed by chapter 481 of the acts of 1894; sections 41 and 42 of said chapter 481 correspond in terms exactly with said repealed section 14, and the principles involved in these decisions are equally applicable thereto:]

An employee can not maintain an action against his employer for an injury caused by a violation of section 14 of this act [sections 41 and 42 of chapter 481 above], unless at the time he was injured he was in the exercise of due care. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1887, Taylor v. Carew Manufacturing Company, 143 Mass., 470.)

Section 14 of this chapter [sections 41 and 42 of chapter 481, above does not make the owner of a building, who does not comply with its provisions, liable to a person injured by falling down an elevator well, in the absence of evidence that the act has been accepted by the city in which the building is located. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1887, Handyside v. Powers, 145 Mass., 123.)

Section 14 [sections 41 and 42 of chapter 481, above] of this chapter, providing that "all elevator cabs or cars, whether used for freight or passengers, shall be provided with some suitable mechanical device, to be approved by " the inspectors of factories and public buildings, "whereby the cabs or cars will be securely held in the event of accident to the shipper rope, or hoisting machinery, or from any similar cause," requires that an elevator be provided with some suitable mechanical device, to be approved by the inspectors, designed for the purpose of securely holding the elevator in the event of an accident, and does not impose the duty of having such a mechanical device attached to the elevator as will surely and securely, under all circumstances, hold it in the event of an accident. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1893, Bourgo v. White, 159 Mass., 216.)

ACTS OF 1894, CHAPTER 508.-Employment of labor. (b)

[The following decisions were rendered in cases arising under sections 2 and 4 of chapter 74 of the Public Statutes of 1882, which were repealed by chapter 508 of the acts of 1894; sections 2 and 11 of said chapter 508 correspond in terms exactly with said repealed sections 2 and 4, respectively, and the principles involved in these decisions are equally applicable thereto:]

Section 4 of this chapter [section 11 of chapter 508, above], prohibiting the employment of all persons under the age of 18, and of all women, in laboring in any manufacturing establishment more than sixty hours per week, violates no contract of the Commonwealth implied in the granting of a charter to a manufacturing company, and violates no right reserved under the constitution to any individual citizen, and may be maintained as a health or police regulation.

A law, which merely prohibits a woman being employed in any manufacturing establishment more than a certain number of hours per day or week, does not violate her right to labor as many hours per day or week as she may see fit, and is within the power of the legislature to enact. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1876, Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manufacturing Company, 120 Mass., 383.)

Section 4 of this chapter [section 11 of chapter 508, above], regulating the hours of labor of minors and women "employed in laboring" in a manufacturing establishment, and requiring the posting of a printed notice, in a conspicuous place in every room where such persons are employed, stating the number of hours' work required of them on each day of the week, applies only to such persons as are permanently employed; and a complaint for failure to post the notice, which alleges that a woman was employed, without alleging a permanent employment, is defective. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1880, Commonwealth v. Osborn Mill, 130 Mass., 33.)

The case finds that the defendants entered, with others, into a scheme, by threats and intimidation, to prevent persons in the employment of the plaintiffs from continuing in such employment, and to prevent others from entering into such employment; that banners with inscriptions thereon were used by the defendants a See Law, page 466.

a See Law, page 460.

as part of the scheme; and that the plaintiffs were thereby injured in their busiLess and property. The act of displaying banners with devices as a means of threats and intimidation to prevent persons from entering into or continuing in the employment of plaintiffs, was injurious to the plaintiffs and illegal at common law and under section 2 of this chapter [section 2 of chapter 508, above]. The injury was to the plaintiffs' business, and adequate remedy could not be given by damages in a suit at law. Maintaining the banner was a continuous unlawful act, injurious to the plaintiffs' business and property, and was a nuisance such as a court of equity will grant relief against. The plaintiffs are not restricted to their remedy by an action at law, but are entitled to relief by injunction. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1888, Sherry et al. v. Perkins and another, 147 Msss., 212.)

ACTS OF 1895, CHAPTER 438.-Weekly payment of wages. (a)

By resolution of the house of representatives, the supreme judicial court were required to give their opinion upon the following important question of law: Is it within the constitutional power of the legislature to extend the application of the present law, relative to the weekly payment of wages by corporations [acts of 1894, chapter 508, sections 51 to 54, inclusive] to private individuals and partnerships? The court rendered an opinion in effect as follows: Under the constitution, part 2, chapter 1, section 1, article 4, providing that full power and authority shall be given to the general court [the legislature] to make and ordain all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, so that the same shall not be repugnant or contrary to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good of the Commonwealth, the legislature has power to extend the application of the present law, relative to the weekly payment of wages by corporations to private individuals and partnerships, and such legislation is not in conflict with the declaration of rights, articles 1 and 12, declaring that "all men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness;" and that "no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land;" nor is it in conflict with the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that "No State shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (Supreme Judicial Court, 1895, In re House bill No. 1230, 40 Northeastern Reporter, 713.)

[The five following decisions were not rendered under any law published in this volume, but, being of interest, are here included:]

To constitute an indictable conspiracy under the common law, there must be a combination of two or more persons, by some concerted action to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose; or to accomplish some purpose, not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means. An association, the object of which is to adopt measures that have a tendency to impoverish a person-that is, to diminish his gains and profits-is lawful or unlawful, as the means, by which that object is to be effected, are lawful or unlawful.

It is shown in evidence that defendants, being journeymen bootmakers, confederated and formed themselves into a club, and agreed together not to work for any master bootmaker or other person, who should employ any journeyman, or other workman, who should not be a member of said club, or who, having broken any of their by-laws, should refuse to pay to said club such sums as should be agreed upon as a penalty for the breach of such by-laws, after notice given to such master or other person to discharge such workman; that by means of such conspiracy they obliged a master cordwainer to turn out of his employ a journeyman bootmaker and thereby deprived said journeyman from following his trade, from getting his livelihood and support thereby and did greatly impoverish him. Held, that this state of facts showed no unlawful purpose or means and was not therefore an indictable conspiracy. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1842, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metcalf, 111.)

A labor association voted that a master mechanic should pay to the association $500 as a penalty imposed on him because he had sent some of his work to be

a See Law, page 480.

done out of the State. Upon his refusal to pay said amount all his workmen left his services in a body agreeably to said vote and the rules of the association. Several days after said workmen left him, said master mechanic, as he could get no workmen to do his work, paid the amount demanded to the association and thereupon his workmen returned to his employment. Held, that a conspiracy to obtain from a master mechanic, whose business requires the employment of workmen, money which he is under no legal liability to pay, by inducing or threatening to induce workmen to leave his employment, and deterring or threatening to deter others from entering it, so as to render him reasonably apprehensive that he can not carry on business without making the payment, is illegal; and in an action of tort he may recover the sum so paid, and damages for the injury of his business by the acts of the conspirators. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1870, Carew v. Rutherford et al., 106 Mass., 1.)

In the relations existing between labor and capital, the attempt by cooperation to increase wages by dimishing competition, is within certain limits lawful and proper. It ceases to be so when unlawful coercion is employed to control the freedom of the individual in disposing of his labor. It is not illegal for workmen to form and act as an association for the purpose of protecting themselves against the "encroachments" of their employers. Members of a trade have a perfect right to instruct whom they choose in the mysteries of their trade, and to use all lawful and proper means, without attempting coercion, to induce employers from employing others than those skilled in the trade. (Supreme Judicial Court. 1873, Snow . Wheeler, 113 Mass., 179.)

If a voluntary association of workmen, embracing many members, has adopted for use upon boxes containing articles made by the members a label indicating that the articles were made by some of its members, but not by whom, the right to use which belongs equally to all of them, and continues only while they remain members, a bill in equity can not be maintained by individual members or officers of the association to restrain an infringement of the label as a trade-mark. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1890, Weener v. Brayton, 152 Mass., 101.)

A petition set forth that the petitioners, employees of a mill corporation, left work upon the refusal of their demand for higher wages; that the treasurer and superintendent of the corporation sent the names of the petitioners to the officers of other corporations in the same city on a list called a black list, which informed the officers that the petitioners had left the mill on a strike; and that thereupon the treasurer and superintendent conspired together and with the officers of other mills, and agreed not to employ the petitioners, with intent to compel them either to go without work in the city, or to go back to work for the mill corporation at such wages as that corporation should see fit to pay them. It did not appear by the petition that any of the petitioners had existing contracts for labor with which the treasurer and superintendent interfered. The prayer was that the respondents, the treasurer and superintendent, be restrained from annoying the petitioners and interfering with their rights to earn their livelihood at their trade, and that they be enjoined to withdraw and destroy all black lists or other devices issued by them or their orders mentioning the names of the petitioners. Held, that if the injury constituted a cause of action, the remedy was by an action of tort to be brought by each petitioner separately. Held, also, that the only grievance alleged continuing in its nature was the conspiracy not to employ the petitioners, and that there were no approved precedents in equity for enjoining the defendants from continuing such a conspiracy, or for compelling the defendants either to employ the petitioners or to procure employment for them with other persons. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1892, Worthington et al. v. Waring et al., 157 Mass., 421.)

MICHIGAN.

CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 15, SECTION 7.-Corporations-Liability of stockholders for debts due employees. (a)

An assistant chief engineer of a railroad company is not a "laborer" within the meaning of this section. (Supreme Court, 1878, Brockway . Innes, 39 Mich., 47.)

The liability of stockholders for labor debts of a corporation under this section could only be enforced in equity, if it could be enforced at all without legislation.

a See Law, page 483.

A contractor is not a laborer within the meaning of this section. (Supreme Court, 1878, Peck v. Miller, 39 Mich., 594.)

The individual liability for labor debts imposed on stockholders by this section means a liability beyond that of members of the corporation and does not refer to their several liabilities. While the legislature can not relieve the stockholder from the liability imposed by the constitution, yet it may point out and regulate the manner or method of enforcing the same. (Supreme Court, 1880, Milroy ε. Spurr Mountain Iron Mining Company, 43 Mich., 231.)

Under this section a stockholder is not liable as for a labor debt for money due under a contract with the corporation, whereby the contractor is to carry on certain quarrying operations at his own expense and for a period of years, in a quarry owned by the corporation, and deliver rock to the corporation at certain rates. (Supreme Court, 1882, Taylor v. Mainwaring, 48 Mich., 171.)

A traveling salesman employed by a corporation is not a laborer within the meaning of this section. (Supreme Court, 1883, Jones v. Avery, 50 Mich., 326.) CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 18, SECTION 3.-Convict labor-Mechanical trades in state prison. (a)

Under this section, and the statute regulating the state prison, it is for the agent of the prison to determine the question of what trades are within the spirit of this section. There is no court to which jurisdiction to make the inquiry is given, and no process for instituting it. This court will not, therefore, interfere by mandamus to control the agent in the exercise of this discretion. (Supreme Court, 1856, People ex rel. Russell v. The Inspectors and Agent of the State Prison, 4 Mich., 187.) HOWELL'S ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 1882, EDITION OF 1883, CHAPTER 91, SECTION 3385.-Railroad companies-Liability of stockholders for debts due employees. (b)

An assistant chief of a railroad company is not a laborer within the meaning of this section. (Supreme Court, 1878, Brockway v. Innes, 39 Mich., 47.)

A contractor for preparing and completing the roadbed of a railroad is not a laborer within the meaning of this section. (Supreme Court, 1878, Peck v. Miller, 39 Mich., 594.)

HOWELL'S ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 1882, EDITION OF 1883, CHAPTER 92, SECTIONS 3423 TO 3425.—Protection of wages of railroad employees. (b)

A contractor for preparing and completing the roadbed of a railroad is not a “laborer" within the meaning of section 3423. (Supreme Court, 1878, Peck r. Miller, 39 Mich., 594.)

Contractors and subcontractors are not "laborers "within section 3423. (Supreme Court, 1880, Chicago and Northeastern Railway Company v. Sturgis, 44 Mich., 538, and Supreme Court, 1886, Martin v. Michigan and Ohio Railway Company, 62 Mich., 458.)

The true intent of these sections is to protect laborers and persons furnishing material for the construction and repairs of railroads, which protection is limited to the amount due from the railroad company to its contractor at the time the bill of items of the labor and material furnished is furnished to the company. The labor covered by the statute applies to manual labor of persons employed, and does not extend to teams used upon the work, and the material referred to does not include feed furnished such teams, or clothing or board of the laborers so employed. (Supreme Court, 1887, Dudly v. Toledo, Ann Arbor and North Michigan Railway Company, 65 Mich., 655.)

A notice of a claim against a railroad company for labor performed for a subcontractor, given under section 3423, which fails to show on its face whether the work charged for is the claimant's personal labor or team work, or to state the kind of labor performed, the dates when performed, and the rate per day, and the amount of payments made thereon, can not be held to be the bill of items, together with the amount claimed," required by the statute. (Supreme Court, 1892, Quackenbush v. Railway Company, 91 Mich., 308.)

a See Law, page 484.

b See Law, page 485.