HOWELL'S ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 1882, EDITION OF 1883, CHAPTER 95, SECTIONS 3557 AND 3559.-Street railway companies-Liability of stockholders for debts due employees. (a)

The liability of a stockholder in a street railway company, under section 3557, is not affected by a sale and transfer of his stock after the labor has been performed, and before a suit is brought against the company to recover for the same. The recovery of a judgment before a justice of the peace against a street railway company for labor performed for the company, and the return of an execution issued thereon unsatisfied, will support an action against a stockholder, under section 3559. (Supreme Court, 1893, Voight v. Dregge, 97 Mich., 322.)

HOWELL'S ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 1882, EDITION OF 1883, CHAPTER 122, SECTION 4017.-Mining and manufacturing companies—Liability of stockholders for debts due employees. (b)

This section does not make stockholders primarily liable for the labor debts of the corporation. They stand in the position of sureties for the debt, and their liability is only collateral to that of the company. (Supreme Court, 1877, Hanson v. Donkersly, 37 Mich., 186; Supreme Court, 1878, Powell v. Eldred, 39 Mich., 552; Supreme Court, 1880, Ex rel. Arno v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 42 Mich., 362.)

A mercantile firm delivered goods to the laborers of a mining corporation upon orders drawn in the following form: " [Date and number.] Due John Dacey, sr., for labor, from the Marquette and Pacific Rolling Mill Company, four dollars, in goods, at the store of E. H. Mead & Co. $4.00. W. W. Wheaton, Treasurer, by C. S. W. Rice;" and on delivery of goods to the amount so called for, the firm stamped on each order Paid.' It was apparently understood that the firm should receive and honor the orders of the corporation, and that the latter should settle with it every month and pay the amount of the orders taken by it. The firm became insolvent and had among its assets a large number of these orders, on which suits were brought as for labor debts, and for the use of the persons to whom the orders were drawn, against one of the stockholders of the corporation. Held, that these actions would not lie; that the orders could not be treated as having been merely assigned to the firm by those in whose favor they were drawn; and that the use of the words "for labor" in the orders was simply to indicate the nature of the service for which they were given, and not to keep them alive as against stockholders. (Supreme Court, 1881, Beecher v. Dacey, 45 Mich., 92.) HOWELL'S ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 1882, EDITION OF 1883, CHAPTER 123, SECTION 4110.-Mining and smelting companies-Liability of stockholders for debts due employees. (b)

An action may be maintained under this section against the corporation alone, or against the company and stockholders jointly, but not against stockholders alone; and a judgment against the company is a bar to a subsequent action against stockholders for the same debt. (Supreme Court, 1880, Thompson v. Jewell, 43 Mich., 240; Supreme Court, 1880, Milroy v. Spurr Mountain Iron Mining Company, 43 Mich., 231.)

Under this act the property of a corporation is made primarily liable for labor debts, and the individual property of stockholders secondarily liable, and the stockholders' property can not be taken until the corporate property is exhausted. (Supreme Court, 1880, Milroy v. Spurr Mountain Iron Mining Company, 43 Mich., 231.)

Individual stockholders can not be made joint defendants with their corporation in an action upon a labor debt brought by an assignee thereof, though they may be in an action brought by the original creditor, under this section. (Supreme Court, 1884, Connors v. Carp River Iron Company, 54 Mich., 168.)

ACTS OF 1883, ACT No. 174.-Railroads-Blocking of frogs, switches, and guard rails. (c)

The failure of a railroad company to comply with the provisions of said act will render it liable to an employee who is thereby injured, in a case where the law applies, if he is not himself guilty of negligence. (Supreme Court, 1890, Grand v. Railroad Company, 83 Mich., 564.)

a See Law, page 486.

2352- -82

b See Law, page 488.

c See Law, page 497.

Plaintiff was employed as a switchman in defendant's yard, and was injured by reason of catching his foot in an unblocked frog while attempting to uncouple cars in a moving train. In affirming a judgment for $6,000, rendered in his favor, the court held as follows:

This law (section 122 of act No. 174, laws of 1883) was passed upon the urgent demand of the people that such measures be taken to save the constantly recurring danger to life and limb from open frogs. By this legislation, an open frog in a railroad yard was recognized as a constant source of danger and of menace to human life; and to keep such frogs unfilled or unblocked was considered by this statute criminal negligence, to be punished by a penalty. To permit this frog by which plaintiff was injured to remain unfilled or unblocked, with the knowledge of the defendant, or for such a length of time that knowledge or neglect of duty would be presumed under the law, would certainly be actionable negligence, and render the defendant liable to one who, without fault on his part was injured thereby. And the duty of keeping these frogs filled or blocked in the yard of the defendant was one it could not delegate to any of its employees, so as to relieve itself from the obligation that the law imposed upon it in this respect. With this statute in force, it was the duty of the defendant to keep its yard reasonably safe in this respect; and it is such a duty that the person or persons to whom it is intrusted will stand in the place of the master, and their neglect will be its neglect. (Supreme Court, 1892, Ashman v. Railroad Company, 90 Mich., 567.)

By the method used by the defendant, in blocking the switches, the flanges of the car wheels in a few days would wear the blocking so that it would be 2 inches below the rail. There were other systems of blocking in common use, which prevented the wheels from wearing down the blocking. Held, that the system used was not a compliance with the statute, and rendered defendant liable to an employee who was injured by having his foot caught in the switch by reason of the defective blocking. (Supreme Court, 1894, Eastman v. Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, 60 Northwestern Reporter, 309.)

ACTS OF 1885, ACT No. 14, SECTION 5.-Security for costs in suits for wages. (a)

This section providing that in actions for labor performed the court shall not order security for costs where the plaintiff shall make affidavit that he has a meritorious cause of action, and is unable to procure such security, is not unconstitu tional, as giving special advantages to one class at the expense of another. (Supreme Court, 1895, Jones v. Shiawassee Circuit Judge, 63 Northwestern Reporter, 976.)

ACTS OF 1885, Act No. 137.-Hours of labor. (b)

When plaintiff contracted with knowledge of and with reference to the invariable custom and rule of defendant, and the limitation of authority given to defend ant's officers and his contract was therefore to work without reference to the number of hours constituting a day's work and having made no claim for extra time but has acknowledged full satisfaction therefor in his receipts, he could not recover extra compensation for time worked over ten hours per day. (Supreme Court, 1890, Bartlett v. The Street Railway Company of Grands Rapids, 82 Mich., 658.)

This act does not apply to a contract with an expert in taking, finishing, and retouching photographs, or to service or employment under a hiring by the week, month, or year. (Supreme Court, 1891, Schurr v. Savigny and Christmas, 85 Mich., 144.)

ACTS OF 1885, ACT No. 232.-Manufacturing corporations—Liability of stock

holders for debts due employees. (c)

This statute, making stockholders of manufacturing corporations "individually liable for all labor performed for such corporations." which liability may be enforced against any stockholder at any time after execution against the corpora tion is returned unsatisfied, does not make a stockholder liable for labor performed before he became a stockholder. (Supreme Court, 1895, Kamp v. Wintermute. 65 Northwestern Reporter, 570.)

a See Law, page 497.

b See Law, page 498.

c See Law, page 500.

MINNESOTA.

GENERAL STATUTES OF 1894, CHAPTER 34, SECTION 2701.-Liability of railroad companies for injuries of employees. (a)

A person employed as a boiler maker's helper in the shops of a railway company was directed by the boiler maker to pick up some rubbish lying near a dead locomotive then standing on a track which ran into the boiler shop. While so engaged, the smokestack of the locomotive (which two men were engaged in removing) fell upon him, inflicting injuries of which he died. Held, that the railway company was not liable under this section, which applies only to employees engaged in operating railroads, and necessarily exposed to the hazards attending that business, and does not take in the case of all employees of a railroad company, without regard to the kind of work in which they are engaged. (Supreme Court, 1889, Lavallee v. St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Company, 40 Minn., 249.)

Plaintiff injured by negligence of coemployee, while operating an engine hauling cars on a temporary track, for the purpose of filling in low land. Held, that this case was not within the proviso to section 1 [2701] of this chapter, exempting a new road, or part thereof, not open to public travel or use, from liability to an employee for injuries sustained through the negligence of a coemployee. (Supreme Court, 1889, Schneider v. Chicago, Burlington and Northern Railway Company, 42 Minn., 68.)

This section applies only to employees of railroad corporations exposed to the peculiar hazards connected with the use and operation of the road. (Supreme Court, 1890, Johnson v. St. Paul and Duluth Railway Company, 43 Minn., 222.) It is not a necessary condition of the applicability of this section that the employment of the servant injured, and of the servant whose negligence produces the injury should be of the same kind. There is nothing in the act to suggest that such was the intention of the legislature. (Supreme Court, 1890, Smith v. St. Paul and Duluth Railway Company, 44 Minn., 17.)

Under this section, a railroad section hand whose duties require the use of a hand car, and who is injured through the negligence of a fellow-servant in operating it, may recover from the railroad company. (Supreme Court, 1891, Steffenson v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company, 45 Minn., 355.)

A crew of section men, of which the plaintiff was one, was engaged in loading railroad iron from the ground upon a flat car, when some of the crew negligently let one of the iron rails fall upon plaintiff's arm. Held, that the injury was not the result of any danger peculiar to or directly connected with the use and operation of the railroad, and hence not within the provisions of this section. (Supreme Court, 1891, Pearson v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company, 47 Minn., 9.)

This section does not change the rule as to the burden of proof of contributory negligence, but leaves it on the defendant. (Supreme Court, 1892, Lorimer v. St. Paul City Railway Company, 48 Minn., 391.)

A railroad company operating a line composed of the lines or tracks of several different companies comes within the provisions of this act.

Work done in constructing a yard with tracks in it, to be used in connection with and as a part of a line of railroad already open to the public, does not come within the proviso to the act. (Supreme Court, 1892, Moran v. Eastern Railway Company of Minnesota, 48 Minn., 46.)

Owing to the negligence of a fellow-servant, a section man was struck and injured while attempting to remove a hand car from the railroad track in front of a freight train running at excessive speed. Held, under this section, that such negligence might constitute a ground for recovery against the railroad company. (Supreme Court, 1893, Slette v. Great Northern Railway Company, 53 Minn., 341.) Under the provisions of this act, the negligence of a fellow-servant constitutes no defense in an action for damages brought by an employee against a railroad company. (United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1893, Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Behling, 12 United States Appeals, 662.)

a See Law, page 537.

The plaintiff was employed by the defendant railroad company as a wiper in its roundhouse, and was called by the foreman to assist in straightening a wire cable used to pull a plow in unloading gravel from flat cars in repairing the road. The cable was being pulled by a locomotive engine, to which one end of it was attached, while the other end was attached to a fixed object. The cable caught on the end of a tie and became taut. A fellow-servant pulled it off the end of the tie, when it swung with great force against plaintiff, and broke his leg. Held, that the plaintiff was injured by reason of exposure to hazards peculiar to the repair and oper ation of railroads, and under this section, the railroad company is liable for the negligence of its other servants, if plaintiff was injured by reason of such negligence. (Supreme Court, 1895, Nichols v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company, 62 Northwestern Reporter, 386.)

Through the Territorial and State legislation of Minnesota, the term “railroad" has acquired a definite and well-understood meaning, and it has never been understood to include street railways. It is usually applied to the ordinary steam railroad of commerce; and when there has been legislation in regard to street railways, they have been so designated. If it should be held that the term "railroad" in this statute applied to street railways because the word is broad enough to cover all roads constructed of iron or steel rails for wheels of cars to run upon, there is no reason why it should not be so construed whenever found in other legislation of the State. This would require street railways to build depots and waiting rooms for passengers, for there is just as much reason to make the word "railroad" applicable in this respect as to personal-injury cases. To so construe the word, in such a case would lead to confusion and be a palpable violation of the legislative intent. It is held that this law, which provides that every railroad corporation owning and operating a railroad in this State shall be liable for damages sustained by an agent or servant by reason of the negligence of any other agent or servant, is not applicable to a street railway corporation. (Supreme Court, 1895, Funk v. St. Paul City Railway Company, 63 Northwestern Reporter, 1099.)

A receiver operating a railroad under the appointment and direction of a court of equity is within the provisions of this statute, known as the "fellow-servant act," and is liable for injuries sustained by a wiper in a roundhouse, while assisting in coaling an engine, by the negligent moving of the engine by a coemployee, the injury having occurred by reason of exposure to the hazards peculiar to the operation of railroads. (Supreme Court, 1895, Mikkelson v. Truesdale, 65 Northwestern Reporter, 260.)

The plaintiff was employed in defendant's stock yards. When a stock train arrived, his duty was to step from a high platform upon the top of the cars as they drew up opposite the platform, and pull bundles of hay from the platform upon the top of the cars. The conductor of the train negligently ordered him to step from the platform upon the top of a passing car while it was going at too great a rate of speed to enable him to do so with safety-a fact which was unknown to the plaintiff. Owing to the dangerous rate of speed of the car, plaintiff, while stepping upon it, was thrown to the ground, and his arm run over by the wheels of a passing car. Held, that he was injured by reason of exposure to hazards peculiar to the operation of railroads, and that section 2701 of the general statutes of 1894 making railroad companies liable to their servants for injuries caused by the negligence of their fellow-servants, applied. (Supreme Court, 1895, Leier r. Minnesota Belt Line Railway and Transfer Company, 65 Northwestern Reporter, 269.)

This statute applies, not to all railroad employees, but only to those exposed to and injured by the dangers peculiar to the use and operation of railroads. A car cleaner who, while at work inside a coach on a side track, was injured by another coach being kicked against it at an unusual and dangerous rate of speed was exposed to the hazards and dangers of railroading and is entitled to recover under this statute. (United States Circuit Court, District of Minnesota, Fifth Division, 1895, Mitchell . Northern Pacific Railroad Company, 70 Federal Reporter, 15.) GENERAL STATUTES OF 1894, CHAPTER 34, SECTIONS 2767 TO 2770.-Protection of employees of street railway companies from inclemency of the weather. (a) This law is constitutional and not void as being class legislation. (Supreme Court, 1894, State v. Haskins and State v. Smith, 59 Northwestern Reporter, 545.) a See Law, page 538.

GENERAL STATUTES OF 1894, CHAPTER 67, SECTION 5499.-Recovery of costs in actions for price of labor. (a)

The costs allowed upon the recovery of the price or value of labor or services by this section may be recovered by an assignee of the person rendering the labor or services. (Supreme Court, 1893, Clifford v. Northern Pacific Railway Company, 55 Minn., 150.)

[The following decision was not rendered under any law published in this volume, but, being of interest, is here included:]

Any man (unless under contract obligation, or unless his employment charges him with some public duty) has a right to refuse to work for or deal with any man or class of men, as he sees fit; and this right, which one man may exercise singly, any number may agree to exercise jointly. (Supreme Court, 1893, Bohn Manufacturing Company v. Hollis et al., 54 Minn., 223.)

MISSISSIPPI.

CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 7, SECTION 193.-Liability of railroad companies for injuries of employees. (b)

A fireman on the locomotive and a telegraph operator at one of the company's stations are engaged in different departments of labor, or "about a different piece of work" within the meaning of this section, and the railroad company is liable for the injury to or death of the fireman by a collision, resulting from the negligence of the operator. For injuries to an employee resulting in death, an action against a railroad company, based on this section, as to fellow-servants, must be brought by "the legal or personal representative;"—that is, by the executor or administrator of the decedent. (Supreme Court, 1892, Illinois Central Railway Company v. Hunter et al., 70 Miss., 471.)

A brakeman who is hurt in uncoupling a car without using a stick, in violation of a rule of the company, can not recover, even though he acted in obedience to an order of the conductor, "a person having the right to control or direct" his services under this section. (Supreme Court, 1894, Richmond and Danville Railroad Company v. Rush, 15 Southern Reporter, 133.)

Under this section a railroad company is not liable for injury to a brakeman resulting from negligence of the engineer, who, after signaling for brakes, caused a sudden start of the train, while the brakeman was applying the brakes in obedience to the signal. While thus engaged in their routine duties in the operation of the train, the engineer is not "the superior agent or officer" or "person having the right to control or direct the services" of the brakeman, within the meaning of the section. (Supreme Court, 1893, Evans v. Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Railway Company, 70 Miss., 527.)

This section abolishes the defense of contributory negligence in actions against railroad companies by employees for injuries, unless the negligence of the employee be willful or reckless. (Supreme Court, 1892, Welsh v. Alabama and Vicksburg Railway Company, 70 Miss., 20.)

This section, in providing that knowledge by an employee of defects in machinery shall not bar a recovery by him for injuries caused by such defects, does not preclude such knowledge, as a fact controlling the degree of care to be exercised by the employee under the circumstances, from being admissible to show contributory negligence. The lessor of a railroad and appliance is not liable for injuries to an employee of the lessee caused by defects in the appliances. (Supreme Court, 1895, Buckner v. Richmond and Danville Railroad Company et al., 18 Southern Reporter, 449.)

REVISED CODE OF 1892, CHAPTER 45, SECTION 1963.-Exemption from execution, etc.-Personal property. (c)

Subdivision 10a of this section exempts from seizure under legal process "the wages of every laborer or person working for wages, being the head of a family, to the amount of $100." Held, that on the first of each month, or whenever, by a

a See Law, page 543.

b See Law, page 567.

c See Law, page 570.