Under this act, a letter carrier whose salary is $1,000 a year, and who is employed, in a period of a little more than two months, one hundred and sixtyfive hours and nine minutes more than eight hours a day, is not required to deduct therefrom the deficit of less than eight hours a day worked by him on Sundays and holidays. (United States Supreme Court, 1893, United States v. Gates, 148 U. S., 134.)

ACTS OF 1887-88, CHAPTER 1015.—Exclusion of Chinese laborers. (a)

Section 13 of this act did not depend upon the ratification of the treaty with China but became effective from the date of approval of the act. (United States District Court, District of Washington, Northern Division, 1891, United States v. Jim, 47 Federal Reporter, 431; United States District Court, District of Vermont, 1891, In re Mah Wong Gee et al., 47 Federal Reporter, 433.)

While the restrictions of sections 1, 2, and 4 were postponed until the treaty with China should be ratified, the other provisions of the act went into effect immediately. (United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, 1891, United States v. Chong Sam, 47 Federal Reporter, 878.)

This act has a field of operation despite the nonratification of the proposed treaty of March 12, 1888, between the United States and China, and is now in force excepting sections 2, 3, 4, and 15. (United States District Court, Southern District of Alabama, 1892, United States v. Long Hop, 55 Federal Reporter, 58.)

This act, having been passed subject to the ratification of a treaty then pending between the United States and the Emperor of China, which was never ratified, is not in force, except section 13 thereof. (United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 1892, United States v. Gee Lee, 7 U.S. Cir. Ct. App., 183.)

Under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States the acts of Congress known as the Chinese restriction laws are inapplicable to a person born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction of its Government, although his parents were Chinese persons not citizens of the United States nor entitled to become citizens under the naturalization laws. (United States Circuit Court of Appeals, 1893, Gee Fook Sing v. United States, 7 U.S. Cir. Ct. App., 27.) A restaurant proprietor, who keeps a place for serving meals and provides, prepares and cooks raw materials to suit the tastes of his patrons, is a laborer, and is not privileged to enter the United States as a merchant. (United States District Court, District of Washington, N. D., 1894, In re Ah Yow, 59 Federal Reporter, 561.) This act, section 12 of which provides that the decision of the collector as to the right of any Chinese passenger to enter the United States should be subject to review only by the Secretary of the Treasury, was never in force, having been enacted subject to the ratification of a treaty then pending between the United States and China, which was never ratified, and therefore the right of a Chinese person to enter the United States may be tried in proceedings of arrest, though the collector has previously decided that he was entitled to enter. The right of a Chinaman to readmission to the United States on the ground that he has already been engaged as a merchant therein is governed by act of November 3, 1893 [chap. 301, acts of 1893-94], though he departed from the country before that act was passed. (United States District Court, Southern District of California, 1895, United States v. Loo Way, 68 Federal Reporter, 475.)

ACTS OF 1887-88, CHAPTER 1064.-Exclusion of Chinese laborers. (b)

This act, excluding Chinese laborers from the United States, was a constitutional exercise of legislative power, and, so far as it conflicted with existing treaties between the United States and China, it operated to that extent to abrogate them as a part of the municipal law of the United States. A certificate issued to a Chinese laborer under the fourth and fifth sections of the act of May 6, 1882, as amended July 5, 1884, conferred upon him no right to return to the United States of which he could not be deprived by a subsequent act of Congress. (United States Supreme Court, 1889, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S., 581.)

The result of the legislation respecting the Chinese would seem to be this, that no laborers of that race shall hereafter be permitted to enter the United States, or even to return after having departed from the country, though they may have b See Law, page 1237.

a See Law, page 1234.

previously resided therein and have left with a view of returning; and that all other persons of that race, except those connected with the diplomatic service, must produce a certificate from the authorities of the Chinese Government, or of such other foreign government as they may at the time be subjects of, showing that they are not laborers, and have the permission of that government to enter the United States, which certificate is to be vised by a representative of the Government of the United States. (United States Supreme Court, 1890, Won Shing v. United States, 140 U. S., 424.)

[See also cases of Gee Fook Sing v. United States and In re Ah Yow, page 1352, ante.]

ACTS OF 1889-90, CHAPTER 647.-Antitrust act. (a)

This act does not authorize the bringing of injunction suits or suits in equity by any parties except the Government. (United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 1893, Blindel et al. v. Hagan, 54 Federal Reporter, 40.)

Where an injunction is asked against the interference with interstate commerce by combinations of striking workmen, the fact that the strike is ended and labor resumed since the filing of the bill is no ground for refusing the injunction. The invasion of rights, especially where the lawfulness of the invasion is not disclaimed, authorizes the injunction. This act (antitrust act, above) applies to combinations of laborers as well as of capitalists. The fact that a combination of men is in its origin and general purposes innocent and lawful is no ground of defense when the combination is turned to the unlawful purpose of restraining interstate and foreign commerce. A combination of men to secure or compel the employment of none but union men becomes a combination in restraint of interstate commerce, within the meaning of this act, when, in order to gain its ends, it seeks to enforce, and does enforce, by violence and intimidation, a discontinuance of labor in all departments of business, including the transportation of goods from State to State, and to and from foreign nations. (United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 1893, United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 Federal Reporter, 994.)

Rule 12 of an association of locomotive engineers, styled the "Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers," which provides "that hereafter, when an issue has been sustained by the grand chief, and carried into effect by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, it shall be recognized as a violation of obligations if a member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers who may be employed on a railroad run in connection with or adjacent to said road, to handle the property belonging to said railroad or system in any way that may benefit said company with which the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers are at issue, until the grievances or issues or differences of any kind or nature have been amicably settled," is plainly a rule or agreement in restraint of trade or commerce, and violative of section 1 of this act. (United States Circuit Court, Western District of Georgia, S. D., 1893, Waterhouse v. Comer, 55 Federal Reporter, 149.)

A combination by railroad employees to prevent all railroads of a large city engaged in carrying the United States mails and in interstate commerce, from carrying freight and passengers, hauling cars, and securing the services of persons other than strikers, and to induce persons to leave the service of such railroads is illegal, under section 1 of the act, and acts threatened in pursuance of such combination may be restrained by injunction under section 4 of the act.

Under section 5 of the act, an injunction order in an action to enjoin an illegal conspiracy against interstate commerce may provide that it shall be in force on defendants not named in the bill, but who are within the terms of the order, where it also provides that it is operative on all persons acting in concert with the designated conspirators, though not named in the writ, after the commission of some act by them in furtherance of the conspiracy, and service of the writ on them. (United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Missouri, 1894, United States v. Elliot et al., 62 Federal Reporter, 801, and Same v. Same, 64 Federal Reporter, 27.) Any willful attempt, with knowledge that a railroad is in the hands of the court, to prevent or impede the receiver thereof appointed by the court from complying with the order of the court in running the road, which, is unlawful, and which, as between private individuals, would give a right of action for damages, is a contempt of the order of the court. Maliciously inciting employees of a receiver,

a See Law, page 1238.

who is operating a railroad under order of the court, to leave his employ, in pursuance of an unlawful combination to prevent the operation of the road, thereby inflicting injuries on its business, for which damages would be recoverable if it were operated by a private corporation, is a contempt of the court. Such inciting to carry out an unlawful conspiracy is not protected by constitutional guaranties of the right of assembly and free speech, and is not less a contempt because effected by words only, if the obstruction to the operation of the road by the receiver is unlawful and malicious. A combination to inflict pecuniary injury on the owner of cars, operated by railway companies under contracts with him, by compelling them to give up using his cars, in violation of their contracts, and, on their refusal, to inflict pecuniary injury on them by inciting their employees to quit their service, and thus paralyze their business, the existence of the contracts being known to the parties so combining, is an unlawful conspiracy. A combination by employees of railway companies to injure in his business the owner of cars operated by the companies, by compelling them to cease using his cars by threats of quitting and by actually quitting their service, thereby inflicting on them great injury, when the relation between him and the companies is mutually profitable, and has no effect whatever on the character or reward of the services of the employees so combining, is a boycott, and an unlawful conspiracy at common law. A combination to incite the employees of all the railways in the country to suddenly quit their service, without any dissatisfaction with the terms of their employment, thus paralyzing utterly all railway traffic, in order to starve the railway companies and the public into compelling an owner of cars used in operating the roads to pay his employees more wages, they having no lawful right to so compel him, is an unlawful conspiracy by reason of its purpose, whether such purpose is effected by means usually lawful or otherwise. Such combination, its purpose being to paralyze the interstate commerce of the country, is an unlawful conspiracy, within this act. (United States Circuit Court, Southern District of Ohio, W. D., 1894, Thomas v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Company, In re Phelan, 62 Federal Reporter, 803.)

Under the provision of this act, conferring jurisdiction on United States circuit courts to prevent and restrain its violation, the court has jurisdiction to issue an injunction to restrain such violation. (United States Circuit Court, District of Indiana, 1894, United States v. Agler, 62 Federal Reporter, 824.)

A railroad which is a link in a through line of road by which passengers and freight are carried into a State from other States and thence to other States, is engaged in interstate commerce, within this statute declaring every combination or conspiracy in restraint of such commerce to be an offense. Though a railroad company engaged in interstate commerce must, unless prevented by circumstances beyond its control, run trains in a reasonable manner, and as often as the ordinary business of commerce requires, yet, where the composition of its trains, as ordinarily made up, is reasonable and appropriate to the service required, it is not obliged, on the refusal of its employees to move the trains so long as certain cars are thereon, to leave off such cars and run the rest of the train. (United States District Court, Southern District of California, 1894, In re Grand Jury, 62 Federal Reporter, 834.)

A combination or conspiracy on the part of any class of men who by violence and intimidation prevent the passage of railroad trains engaged in interstate commerce is in violation of this act, declaring illegal every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the States. (United States District Court, Northern District of California, 1894, În re Grand Jury, 62 Federal Reporter, 840.)

This act is not aimed at capital merely and combinations of a contractual nature, which by force of the title. "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," are limited to such as the courts have declared unlawful, the words “in restraint of trade" having, in connection with the words "contract" and "combination," their common-law significance, but the term "conspiracy" is used in its well-settled legal meaning, so that any restraint of trade or commerce, if to be accomplished by conspiracy, is unlawful.

The construction of the statute is not affected by the use of the phrase "in restraint of trade," rather than one of the phrases "to injure trade” or “to restrain trade."

The word "commerce" in the statute is not synonymous with "trade" as used in the common-law phrase "restraint of trade," but has the meaning of the word in that clause of the Constitution which grants to Congress power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.

The provision for forfeiture, in section 6 of this act does not imply that only cases in which property shall be found subject to forfeiture shall be deemed within the scope of the act.

The power given by this act to circuit courts "to prevent and restrain violations" of the act, is not an invasion of the right of trial by jury, as the jurisdiction so given by equity will be deemed to be limited to such cases only as are of equitable cognizance.

Where defendants, directors and general officers of the American Railway Union, in combination with members of the Union, engaged in a conspiracy to boycott Pullman cars, in use on railroads, and for that purpose entered into a conspiracy to restrain and hinder interstate commerce in general, and, in furtherance of their design, those actively engaged in the strike used threats, violence, and other unlawful means of interference with the operations of the roads, and, instead of respecting an injunction commanding them to desist, persisted in their purpose, without essential change of conduct, they were guilty of contempt.

Any improper interference with the management of a railroad in the hands of receivers is a contempt of the court's authority in making the order appointing the receivers, and enjoining interference with their control. (United States Circuit Court, Northern District of Illinois, 1894, United States v. Debs et al., 64 Federal Reporter, 724.)

[See also case of United States v. Cassidy et al., pages 1345 and 1346, ante.]

ACTS OF 1890-91, CHAPTER 551.-Regulation of immigration. (a) This act, forbidding certain classes of alien immigrants to land in the United States, is constitutional and valid. The decision of an inspector of immigration, appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, within the authority conferred upon him by said act, that an alien immigrant shall not be permitted to land, because within one of the classes specified in that act, is final and conclusive against his right to land, except upon appeal to the commissioner of immigration and the Secretary of the Treasury, and can not be reviewed on habeas corpus, even if it is not shown that the inspector took or recorded any evidence on the question. (United States Supreme Court, 1891, Nishimura Ekin v. United States, 142 U. S., 651.)

This act makes it the duty of the superintendent of immigration, upon the arrival of an immigrant in this country, to take the oath of the immigrant, or of some other person, as to any facts tending to show prima facie that the immigrant belongs to one of the excluded classes. But thereafter the immigrant has the right to demand a special inquiry, and at such inquiry to show affirmatively, by any competent testimony, that he does not belong to any of the excluded classes. When such inquiry has been had, the decision of the inspection officers is conclusive upon the courts. The remedy, if the decision is wrong, is by an appeal to the superintendent of immigration, and then to the Secretary of the Treasury. (United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, 1891, In re Hirsch Berjanski, 47 Federal Reporter, 445.)

The Federal courts have no power to pass upon the acts of the commissioners of immigration when in the exercise of the right of excluding an alien upon the ground that said alien would, because of poverty and lack of opportunity to obtain employment, become a charge upon the civil authorities.

Congress has the right to vest in certain officers, exclusive of the courts, the Federal authority to determine whether a person, not a citizen or inhabitant of the United States, shall be excluded from admission to this country. (United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1895, United States ex rel. Goldstein v. Rogers, 65 Federal Reporter, 787.)

The statutes of the United States relating to the exclusion of contract laborers, including the act of March 3, 1891 [chap. 551, acts of 1890-91], making the decision of the immigration officers final as to the right of such laborers to land, are directed solely against alien immigrants, not against alien residents returning after a temporary absence; and the courts therefore have power, upon habeas corpus, to inquire whether one who is refused admission to the country by the immigra tion officers is or is not an immigrant, and so within the jurisdiction of such officers. An unmarried man, who has immigrated to the United States in 1892, with the intention of making his home there: has remained about two years, working at his trade; and then, being taken ill, has returned to his native country,

a See Law, page 1240.

remained about ten months, doing no work; and then, in 1895, returns to the United States, is not an immigrant on his return, in 1895. (United States Circuit Court, Southern District of New York, 1895, In re Maiola, 67 Federal Reporter, 114.)

[See also cases of United States v. Arteago et al. and United States v. Amor et al., page 1351, ante.]

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ACTS OF 1891-92, CHAPTER 60, AND ACTS OF 1893, EXTRA SESSION, AMENDATORY, CHAPTER 14.-Exclusion of Chinese laborers. (a)

The right to exclude or expel aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, is an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation.

In the United States, the power to exclude or to expel aliens is vested in the political departments of the National Government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established, except so far as the judicial department is authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the Constitution to intervene.

The power of Congress to expel, like the power to exclude, aliens, or any specified class of aliens, from the country, may be exercised entirely through executive officers; or Congress may call in the aid of the judiciary to ascertain any contested facts on which an alien's right to remain in the country has been made by Congress to depend.

Congress has the right to provide a system of registration and identification of any class of aliens within the country, and to take all proper means to carry out that system.

The provisions of an act of Congress, passed in the exercise of its constitutional authority, must, if clear and explicit, be upheld by the courts, even in contravention of stipulations of an earlier treaty. Section 6 of this act is constitutional and valid. (United States Supreme Court, 1892, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S., 698.)

The provisions of this act throwing upon a Chinese person accused of being unlawfully in the United States the burden of proof, is not in conflict with the Federal Constitution. (United States District Court, Western District of Michigan, 1893, In re Sing Lee, 54 Federal Reporter, 334; United States District Court. Southern District of California, 1893, United States v. Wong Dep Ken, 57 Federal Reporter, 206.)

The deportation under this act of a Chinese person adjudged by a commission to be unlawfully in the United States, is not a punishment for crime, within the meaning of the provisions of the Federal Constitution, securing to persons accused of crime certain rights, including trial by jury. Imprisonment at hard labor is a punishment rendering the crime for which it is inflicted "infamous" within the meaning of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury. So much of this act as provides for imprisonment at hard labor of all Chinese persons adjudged by a commissioner to be unlawfully in the United States, is void, Article III, section 2. paragraph 3, and the fifth and sixth amendments to the Constitution of the United States securing the right of trial by jury and other rights to persons criminally prosecuted by the United States. (United States District Court, Southern District of California, 1893, United States v. Wong Dep Ken, 57 Federal Reporter, 206.)

A Chinese person who, during his residence in the United States, was engaged in business as a member of a firm of dealers in fancy goods, but occasionally, during a year previous to his departure for a temporary visit, worked for short periods as a house servant, in order to accommodate an old employer at times when he was without a servant, was engaged in manual labor within the meaning of section 2 of this act. This act applies to Chinese persons formerly residing in the United States, who left the country before the passage of the act, and afterwards seek to return. (United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, California, 1895, Lew Jim v. United States, 66 Federal Reporter, 953.)

A Chinese person who, during half his time, is engaged in cutting and sewing garments for sale by a firm of which he is a member, is not a merchant, within the meaning of section 2 of this act, known as the "McCreary act." This act

a See Laws, pages 1243 and 1244.