em

A railway company were powered by their special Act to widen a branch of their railway passing through London, and to build additional stations. In conformity with the powers so given, they proceeded to erect a station on their land by the side of a highway, within the distance required to be left between buildings and highways in London, by the Metropolis Local Management Act, which had passed shortly after the special Act of the company :-Held, that the powers conferred on the company by their special Act were not controlled by the later statute, and that the company were authorised so to build their station.

By a statute passed prior to the Railway Act, the trustees of the particular highway had power to

STAT. 1 & 2 VICT. c. 110.

prevent any building being erected so near to the road as the station

was being built. The Metropolis Local Management Act repealed this statute, and vested this authority in the managing body thereby constituted:-Held, that the trustees of the road must be taken to have been present at the passing of the Railway Act, as well as of the Metropolis Act, and, therefore, the powers given by the Railway Act must prevail. The London and Blackwall Railway Company v. The Board of Works for the Limehouse District, 123

STAT. 13 ELIZ. c. 5. See CREDITORS, 1. SETTLEMENT, FRAUDULENT, 1.

STAT. 27 ELIZ. c. 4. See SETTLEMENT, VOLUNTARY, 1.

STAT. 9, GEO. 2, c. 36.
See CHARITY.
WILL, 21.

STAT. 3 & 4 WILL. 4, c. 27, s. 6. See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

STAT. 3 & 4 WILL. 4, c. 104. See WILL, 14.

STAT. 4 & 5 WILL. 4, c. 22. See APPORTIONMENT.

STAT. 1 & 2 VICT. c. 42. See FOREST OF DEAN.

STAT. 1 & 2 VICT. c. 110.

See CREDITORS, 1.

STAT. 5 & 6 VICT. c. 45.

STAT. 5 & 6 VICT. c. 45, ss. 23, AND 26.

See COPYRIGHT, 2.

STAT. 6 & 7 VICT. c. 73, s. 37. See SOLICITOR AND CLIENT.

STAT. 8 VICT. c. 16, s. 97. See COMPANY INCORPORATED BY ACT OF PARLIAMENT, 2.

STAT. 8 VICT. c. 18, ss. 76, 77, 79. See LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1.

ID. s. 79.

See PRACTICE, 3.

STAT. 10 & 11 VICT. c. 69. See SOLICITOR AND CLIENT.

STAT. 10 & 11 VICT. c. 96. See TRUSTEES, 1.

STAT. 13 & 14 VICT. c. 60,
ss. 2, 15.

In consideration of money lent, real estate was conveyed to the lender, his heirs and assigns, upon trust, in case the principal money and interest should be repaid by a given day, for the borrower, his heirs or assigns; but, in case default should be made, then upon trusts for sale; and the trusts of the purchase money were declared to be for payment of the principal money, interest, and costs, and subject thereto for the borrower, "his executors, administrators, or assigns." Default having been made-Held, that the trust of the surplus being for the

borrower, "his executors, administrators, or assigns," and not for him, "his heirs or assigns," the deed operated to convert the property as between his real and personal representatives. It was, therefore, more than "merely a security for money" -more, that is, than a "mortgage" as defined by the 2nd section of the Trustee Act, 1850 (13 & 14 Vict. c. 60): it was a deed of "trust" within the meaning of the 15th section of the Act; and the lender having died intestate, and it being impossible to find his heir, the Court had power to make a vesting order under that section. In re Underwood, 745

STAT. 15 & 16 VICT. c. 86, s. 54. See TRUSTEES, 3.

STAT. 17 & 18 VICT. c. 104, ss. 504, 514.

See SHIPPING, 2.

STAT. 17 & 18 VICT. c. 125. See ARBITRATION. JURISDICTION, 3.

STAT. 19 & 20 VICT. c. 47, s. 25. See COMPANY, JOINT STOCK.

STOCK.

1. Where an intestate had executed transfers of railway shares and stock to a fictitious person, the Court, on a bill filed by his administrator, declared that the intestate used the fictitious name as another designation of himself, and that the Plaintiff, as his administrator, was entitled to transfer the shares and stock, and to receive the dividends thereof. Arthur v. The Midland

K.J.

There is no property in a trade mark; but a person who has been in the habit of using a particular mark, may prevent other persons from fraudulently taking advantage of the reputation which his goods have acquired, by using his mark in order to pass off their goods as his, to his injury.

A foreign manufacturer has a remedy by suit in this country for an injunction and account of profits against a manufacturer here, who has committed a fraud upon him by using his trade mark, for the purpose of inducing the public to believe that the goods so marked were manufactured by the foreigner.

This relief is founded upon the personal injury caused to the Plaintiff by the Defendant's fraud, and exists, although the Plaintiff resides and carries on his business in another country, and has no establishment here, and does not even sell his goods in this country. The Collins Company v. Brown; Same Company v. Cohen, 423, 428

TRANSFER.

See STOCK, 1.

agent, to collect the rents :-Held, that he could not be allowed any commission out of the rents. Nicholson v. Tutin (No. 2), 159

3. Lord Eldon's rule, that, in order to obtain an inquiry as to wilful neglect and default against an executor or a trustee, the Plaintiff must allege and prove at least one act of wilful neglect or default, is still the rule of this Court, and was not intended to be relaxed by Coope v. Carter (2 De G. M'N. & G. 297, 298)

Dicta in that case, from which the contrary has been inferred, explained.

Shortly after a testator's death, in 1825, an inventory and appraisement was made by his executors, or one of them, of all and singular the goods and chattels, rights, and credits of the testator, showing that the same were of the value of £28,665 odd. Upon bill filed in 1856 for an account, and for an inquiry as to wilful neglect and default, in case the estimated amount had not been realised, the Defendants failed, as to a large portion of the estimated amount, to show that it had been realised:Held, nevertheless, that the Plaintiff was not entitled, at the hearing, either to an inquiry expressly directed to wilful neglect or default, or even to a preliminary order of the kind indicated in Coope v. Carter, viz., an inquiry short of wilful neglect and default, but upon which a new order, expressly so directed, might be founded at a future stage: the Court being of opinion, first, that upon the pleadings, the fact of wilful neglect and default could not be treated as in issue between the parties; and, secondly, that, even if it could be so treated, there was no evidence upon it.

Accounts, recorded in the Court of Chancery in Jamaica in a suit instituted against executors who had

4. Lands devised to three trustees, upon trust for sale, were sold, and the purchase-money paid to one of them, who was a solicitor, and acted in the matter of the sale as solicitor for himself and the other trustees.

The money having been retained by him and lost :-Held, after his decease, that it must be taken to have been received by him not in his capacity of solicitor, it being no part of his duty in that capacity to receive it, but in his capacity of trustee; and that the survivor of the three could not, upon a common decree for an account, be held liable for its loss. In re Fryer; Martindale v. Picquot,

317

5. Trustees who have paid a fund into court under the Trustee Relief Act, cannot prevent its being paid out to the cestui que trust absolutely entitled to it, on the ground that he is about to file a bill against them to take the accounts of the trust.

Trustees have a right to some sort of discharge from their cestuis que trust, not, perhaps, a release, unless the instrument creating the trust was under seal; and trustees, between whom and their several cestuis que trust disputes have arisen as to the amounts actually due to them respectively, are justified in paying into court, to the separate account of each cestui que trust, the sum to which they believe him to be entitled, and may have their costs of making such payment out of the respective funds. In the matter of

6. Devise upon trust that the trustees and the survivors and survivor of them, his heirs and assigns, should, at such time as they should think most advisable, sell, and give receipts, which should be good discharges; with a power for the trustees or the survivor to appoint new trustees, in the usual form. The surviving trustee devised his trust estates :-Held, that his devisees could make a good title; and semble the word "assigns" would have been sufficient for this purpose, without the power to appoint new trustees. Hall v. May,

See FOREST of Dean.

FRAUD, 1.
SHIPPING, 1.
WILL, 18, 19.

TRUSTEES, COSTS OF. See COSTS, 4.

TRUST FOR CHILDREN.

See CREDITORS, 1.

UNCERTAINTY.

See WILL, 21.

585

"UNMARRIED," CONSTRUC

TION OF.

See SETTLEMENT, 2.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

1. A purchaser of real property, the title to which is derived under a