Watson, in support of his rule. It was the sheriff's duty to pay the rent. [Jervis, C. J. Suppose the interpleader act had not passed; and suppose the sheriff, under an execution against A., enters A.'s house, and seizes goods which B. asserts to be his, and, upon an action brought against the sheriff by B., it turns out that the goods are B.'s goods; is B. to recover the value of the goods minus the rent which the sheriff has thought fit to pay?] The sheriff's act depriving the landlord of his right to distrain, the law applies the remedy. Forster v. Cookson is in point: there, in case against the sheriff, under the statute 8 Ann. c. 14, s. 1, for taking "by virtue of a fi. fa. against S.," goods which were on premises demised by the plaintiff to I., and for which premises a quarter's rent was due, and removing the goods after notice, without paying the rent, the defendant pleaded that he did not take, modo et formâ. It appeared that the goods taken were not the property of S.; and the sheriff accounted for them to the owner: and it was held, that, on this issue, the plaintiff was nevertheless entitled to the verdict. [Jervis, C. J. That does not touch this case at all. Williams, J. How can the sheriff be said to sell under the fi. fa., where he sells the claimant's goods?] The execution and the judge's order combined gave him power to sell. The sheriff has acted bonâ fide; and the court is at liberty to make such rule as it may deem just under the circumstances. The sale is equivalent to a removal: Cocker v. Musgrove, 9 Q. B. 234; Wintle v. Freeman, 11 Ad. & E. 539, 1 Gale & D. 93. [Williams, J. The point decided in Cocker v. Musgrove, was, that the sheriff was not bound to move until one of the execution creditors paid the rent.] The dicta there bear out the proposition contended for here. [Jervis, C. J. The court confirm Smallman v. Pollard.] 1853. WHITE BINSTEAD. 1853. WHITE v. BINSTEAD. JERVIS, C. J. I am of opinion that this rule must be discharged. The sheriffs, having seized goods, obtained an order under the interpleader act, directing an issue to be tried between the claimant and the execution-creditor. Until that issue was determined, it was uncertain whether execution was executed or not; for, if it turned out that the sheriffs had seized the goods of a third person, there was no execution to justify them in selling them, or to entitle the landlord to the rent. After the interpleader order, the landlord made his claim for rent. It is unnecessary to say how the matter would have stood, if the sheriffs had obeyed the interpleader order, and brought all the money into court. They have not done so, but have taken upon themselves to pay 251. to the landlord; and now they complain of my Brother Cresswell's order, which merely seeks to place the parties in the same position as they would have been in if the sheriffs had done their duty. It seems to me that the order was perfectly right. The right of the claimant is not at all affected by the interpleader act, even if that act does interfere with the rights of landlords under the statute of Anne, which however I think it does not. If there had been no interpleader, the case would have been perfectly plain. Where the sheriff seizes the goods of A. under an execution against B., it may be that the sheriff is estopped from saying, in an action upon the statute, that he did not seize them under the writ. But, if A. brings an action for the wrongful taking of his goods, he is entitled to their full value; and it is not competent to the sheriff to say, as to part of it, "I have paid rent," and thus deprive the party of the real value of his goods. The other point also affords an answer to the rule. The goods not having been removed, the statute does not apply it only attaches where the landlord is by the act of the sheriff deprived of the power of distraining for the rent due. Upon both grounds, therefore, I think the rule ought to be discharged. WILLIAMS, J. I am of the same opinion. It is enough to say that the order of my Brother Erle remains entire, and that the order of my Brother Cresswell does no more than carry the former order into effect. CRESSWELL, J., and TALFOURD, J., concurring, Rule discharged. 1853. WHITE v. BINSTEAD. In the Matter of a Plaint in the County-Court of Yorkshire, holden at Leeds, between JAMES TAYLOR, Plaintiff, and JOHN ADDYMAN, Defendant. Jan. 21. courts have A PLAINT was levied between the above parties, The countyon the 9th of December, 1852, in the county-court of jurisdiction,Yorkshire, holden at Leeds, the particulars of the plaintiff's demand in which, as originally delivered, were as follows : "This action was brought to recover one petty-cash book, one receipt-book, one collecting-book, one accountbook, and the several other books, accounts, and documents, of the value of 50%., the property of the said plaintiff, and which you the said defendant unlawfully detain from him: And take notice that you are required to produce, upon the trial of the said action, all the said books, accounts, and documents, and all other books, letters, accounts, papers, and writings in your possession or power relating to the matters in question in this case." under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, and 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, in actions of detinue. 1853. TAYLOR v. ADDYMAN. Upon the hearing of the cause, before the judge of the county-court and a jury summoned at the instance of the defendant, on the 22nd of December last, it was contended, on the part of the defendant, that, this being an action of "detinue," the county-court had no jurisdiction. Whereupon the judge amended the particulars of demand, by striking out the words in italics, and substituting the following words,-" refuse to give up to the plaintiff, and have converted to your own use, whereby the plaintiff has sustained damages to the amount of 501." And at the close of the case, the jury having found for the plaintiff, an order was made in the following form: "In the county-court of Yorkshire, holden at Leeds. 66 Between, &c. "Upon hearing this cause at a court holden at the County-Court House in Leeds, in the county of York, on the 22nd day of December, 1852, it is adjudged, that the plaintiff do recover against the defendant the sum of 501. for his debt, and 77. 9s. 2d. for costs of suit, amounting together to the sum of 571. 9s. 2d. And it is ordered that the defendant do pay the same to the clerk of the court, at his office at the County-Court House in Leeds aforesaid, on or before the 23rd day of December, 1852." Indorsed upon this order was the following memorandum," Execution to be suspended, on the books being given up, and the costs paid, on the 23rd of December instant." On the 30th, an order was made by Martin, B., that a writ of prohibition should issue, to prohibit the countycourt from further proceedings in the said plaint, and from carrying into execution or otherwise giving effect to the judgment therein, on the ground that the countycourt had no jurisdiction: and, on the 1st of January, instant, a writ of prohibition issued accordingly. The order was obtained ex parte, upon an affidavit which stated, amongst other things, that, at the hearing of the plaint, the counsel for the defendant objected to the jurisdiction of the county-court to try the said action, the same being an action of detinue; that the judge of the county-court thereupon stated that he had the power to, and should, alter or amend the summons and particulars to any other form of action which he might think proper; that the defendant's counsel objected to the summons and particulars being in any manner altered or amended, as the county-court had not any jurisdiction in the action whatever, and therefore could not alter or amend; that the judge, however, determined to, and did, amend the summons (a) and particulars, as above stated; that the judge then directed the case to be proceeded with, and the same was proceeded with, notwithstanding the objection; that the judge, in summing up the case, directed the jury to find for the damages, without in any manner finding the value of the several books claimed; that the defendant's counsel thereupon objected to the judge's direction in that behalf, but the judge notwithstanding did direct, that, if the jury found for the plaintiff, they were merely to fix the amount of damages, and not refer to the books being delivered up; that the jury thereupon consulted, and, during such consultation, the judge stated to them that he (the judge) had power to stay execution, and that he should order execution to be stayed, if the books were given up; that thereupon the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, damages 501., accompanied with a request, that, if the books were given up, the damages should not be claimed; that the jury were not required to find the respective values of the books and (a) This is a mistake: the summons, which was merely, "to answer to a claim the par ticulars whereof are hereto an- 1853. TAYLOR v. ADDYMAN, |