1853. SHEEHY C. THE LIFEASSURANCE COMPANY. tice is founded, are very fully discussed by Chief Baron Brady in Phelan v. Johnson. Matters so standing, the legislature passed the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 18. It is said PROFESSIONAL that the 8th section of that act does not apply to corporations but the interpretation clause, s. 51, enacts "that the words 'party and person' shall extend to and include any corporation or other public body; and that any words importing the singular number or the masculine gender only, shall be understood to include several matters as well as one matter, and several persons as well as one person, and females as well as males, aud bodies corporate as well as individuals, unless it be otherwise provided, or there be something in the subject or context repugnant to such construction." [Cresswell, J. That clause does not say that the word "defendant" shall include a corporation. Maule, J. One would certainly expect, that, in an interpretation clause, the subject-matter of which is words, the words which are to be interpreted would be mentioned in it.] There can be no more reason for excluding corporations from the operation of the act, than there would be for holding that a corporation shall only be sued in the country where it exists. [Maule, J. There are many instances in the books, of foreign incorporated companies suing and being sued here: see The Bank of St. Charles v. De Bernales, 1 C. & P. 569, R. & M. 190.] So, in the case of The Dutch East India Company v. Henriques, Sir G. Cooke's Rep. (temp. 1 G. 2) 44, and in The Dutch West India Company v. Van Moses, 2 Lord Raym. 1532, 1 Stra. 612. The service, it is submitted, was in conformity with the statute. The plea, at all events, is bad. Knowledge in the defendant is not essential to the validity of the process: see the cases collected in King v. Simmonds, 7 Q. B. 289. In Reynolds v. Fenton, antè, Vol. III, p. 187, in assumpsit on a judgment or decree of the Tribunal of Commerce at Brussels, the defendant pleaded 1853. SHEEHY v. THE LIFEASSURANCE COMPANY. that he was not at any time served with any process issuing out of that court at the suit of the plaintiffs, for the cause of action upon which the said judgment or decree was obtained, nor had he at any time notice of any PROFESSIONAL such process, nor did he appear in the said court to answer the plaintiffs; and it was held, that the plea was bad, inasmuch as it did not shew that the proceedings against the defendant in the Belgian court were so conducted as to deprive the defendant of the opportunity of defending himself therein. Maule, J., there says: "If the plea had alleged that the defendant never was served with any process, or summoned, so as to be able to defend, it might have been good. But here the defendant merely says that the plaintiff did not in the Belgian court adopt a particular course of proceeding. Can we say that it is contrary to natural justice, that a party shall be fixed with a judgment in a foreign court who has never been served with process? or, in other words, can we hold that the issuing of process out of a foreign court is essential to natural justice?" The plaintiff here adopted the proper course under the practice of the Irish court. The defendants must have had some notice; for they applied to the court to set aside the process. Byles, Serjt., in reply. The distinction between the proceedings in the Irish and the Belgian courts is taken by Maule, J., in Reynolds v. Fenton,-that, in the former, the courts here will take judicial notice that the law of Ireland is the same as that of this country with regard to the commencement of the suit by process; but, for anything we know, in the Belgian court a verbal summons may be sufficient. Besides, there are two acts of parliament, the 43 G. 3, c. 53, and 13 & 14 Vict. c. 18, which shew that the writ of summons is the mode of commencing personal actions in Ireland. Neither of the Irish cases cited on the other side was the case of a 1853. SHEEHY v. THE LIFEASSURANCE corporation: they therefore leave altogether untouched the question whether the 8th section of the 43 G. 3, c. 53, or the 9th section of the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 18, applies to PROFESSIONAL Corporations. There is no provision in the former statute in respect of service of process upon corporations: .COMPANY. and it would clearly be repugnant to the context to read "defendant" in s. 9 of the latter act as including corporations. That section manifestly applies to persons who can be served personally. [Maule, J. Personal service may comprehend a service which the 8th section of the 43 G. 3, c. 53, calls substituted service, viz. a service on the agent or officer of the corporation.] It sufficiently appears here that the defendants had no known or responsible agent in Ireland; therefore, upon the whole record, it is manifest that the court had no jurisdiction. JERVIS, C. J. I am of opinion that the second plea in this case is a bad plea. It states that the judgment declared on was obtained against the defendants when they were not within the jurisdiction of the court, and had not been served with any summons or other process to appear therein. It is quite consistent with that statement, that the defendants may have had full knowledge of the issuing of the summons. Even assuming, therefore, that the statement that the judgment was signed "behind the back of the defendants," is equivalent to an allegation that it was without their knowledge, the plea is no answer to the action. MAULE, J. The plea is clearly bad. We cannot infer from it the non-appearance of the defendants in the Irish court. It is perfectly consistent with the plea, that the process in that action came to the knowledge of the defendants, and that they duly appeared thereto. I am disposed to infer that, from the absence of any allegation in the plea to the contrary. CRESSWELL, J., and TALFOURD, J., concurring, Judgment for the plaintiff. Finlason, for the plaintiff, on a subsequent day, obtained a rule nisi, to rescind an order which had been made by Maule, J., under the 80th section (a) of the common law procedure act, 1852,-15 & 16 Vict. c. 76,-giving the defendants leave both to traverse and demur to the surrejoinder, and directing that the demurrer should be first disposed of,-and to strike out the joinder of issue on the surrejoinder. He submitted that, the court having held the plea bad, if the issue were allowed to remain, the plaintiff might be driven to move for judgment non obstante veredicto. do it Byles, Serjt., contrà, submitted that the court had no power to do what was prayed, and would not if they had the power,-seeing that the defendants had a right to have the decision of a court of error upon the record as at present framed. Finlason, in support of his rule. There can be no doubt that the court has power to deal with any order (a) Which enacts that "Either party may, by leave of the court or a judge, plead and demur to the same pleading at the same time, upon an affidavit by such party, or his attorney, if required by the court or judge, to the effect that he is advised and believes that he has just ground to traverse the several matters proposed to be traversed by him, and that the several matters sought to be pleaded as afore- cretion of the court or a judge 1853. SHEEHY v. THE PROFESSIONAL LIFEASSURANCE COMPANY. June 13. After judgment for the plaintiff' on a demurrer to a surrejoinder, on the ground that the plea was bad, the court declined, at the plaintiff's in stance, to re scind a judge's the defendants order allowing to traverse and demur to the surrejoinder, under the 80th section of the common law procedure act, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76. 1853. SHEEHY v. THE LIFE ASSURANCE which it may deem to be inconsistent with the rights of the parties and the substantial justice of the case. The 80th section of the recent statute, which for the PROFESSIONAL first time enables a party to plead and demur at the same time to the same pleading, gives the judge the power to determine whether the issue of fact or of law shall be first disposed of; thus depriving the party of the option he formerly had of electing which he would try first. (a) [Cresswell, J. Suppose it should turn out that the plea and rejoinder are good in point of law, and that the surrejoinder is false in fact, the defendants would be entitled to judgment. The object of the 80th section of the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, was, to relieve parties from the difficulty in which they were formerly placed by demurring only, and thereby admitting the facts.] The court will not assume that its judgment is erro neous. JERVIS, C. J. I am of opinion that the rule to rescind my Brother Maule's order must be discharged. If we could be absolutely certain that the plea is bad, no injustice would be done by ordering that the traverse of the surrejoinder be struck out. But we cannot deprive the defendants of their writ of error. And it may turn out that the plea is good, and that the surrejoinder also is good, but not true. The rest of the court concurring, (a) Subject to the discretion of the court: see Crucknell v. Truman, 9 M. & W. 684, where the reason is thus given by Alderson, B.,-"After trial, the court cannot amend on demurrer. The case of Mortimer v. M'Callan, 7 M. & W. 20, 9 Rule discharged. M. & W. 636, went to a court of error simply because the demurrer was argued after verdict, for, the declaration was clearly amendable." But see the 222nd section of the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76. |