band liable for the wrongs inflicted on others by the wife? It is on the supposition that, as long as the marriage lasts, he has a control over her; and, as he has a control over her, says the law, we must make him exercise it or pay the penalty. In other words, under pretence of his having a control over her, the law gives her a control over him, for it puts him completely in her power.

We do not assert, however, that, where the wife has a separate estate, it is not possible to make her responsible for her wrongs as well as for her contracts. But observe upon what this depends. Both husband and wife must be sued together; they must be co-defendants. If the wife has committed the offence in question, as by the supposition she has done, judgment is given against both. But the plaintiff may issue execution against both or either. He may, therefore, require the husband to pay the whole of the damages and the costs on both sides, and he may enforce this by execution against his person or against his property. And he may do this although the husband is very poor and the wife is possessed of large separate estate. As regards the wife, her separate estate could not be taken in execution, for in the eye of the courts of common law-of which kind would be the court in which this action would be brought-the property does not belong to her but to her trustee, and one person's property is not to be made answerable for a judgment against another person. All that could be done, therefore, would be to lock up the wife until she paid. It will, therefore, be seen that if the wife has committed a wrong it always depends on the caprice of the successful plaintiff whether she shall be made to suffer for it or not; while if-to take a step further— we choose to imagine the wife conspiring with the plaintiff, the ruin of the husband may be reduced to a certainty.

We have now considered the civil irresponsibilities of the wife, first for contracts which she has entered into, and then for wrongs which she has committed; and we have considered these in the two cases of her having no separate property in the hands of a trustee, and in the case of her having such property. There only remains to be understood her impunity for her crimes. Now here we see, more clearly perhaps than before, because the illustration is more important, what complete omnipotence the law insists on imputing to the man, and what utter insignificance, both moral and physical, it insists on ascribing to the woman. The rule is that, whatever offences, other than treason, murder, or manslaughter, a woman does in the presence of her husband she is not responsible for them; she has complete immunity

from

Impunity for Offences.

99

from the consequences. The wife may commit burglary, cutting and wounding, robbery or larceny, with the utmost freedom, so long as her husband is with her. The reason of this is that the very presence of the husband is presumed to amount to coercion; a presumption which the law regards with such tenderness and affection as scarcely to allow it to be rebutted. And the difficulty of rebutting it, and the limited number of cases in which that is possible, may be collected from the fact that the examples given in the books are 'where the husband is crippled or bedridden!' The law, therefore, regards the wife as having no will of her own-a position which our male and female readers both know to be untrue-and, being weak and irresponsible, as being therefore unpunishable. A child is considered as having a will of his own, and so is a servant. A child, who is docile, subservient, and dependent by his years and education, is as much responsible for a criminal act committed at the bidding, and even in the presence of his natural guide, as if he had done it of his own accord. A servant, who occupies a position of subordination, and whose will, by contract and by habit, becomes subjected to that of his master, is as much liable for what he does by his master's direction, and even in his presence, as if the act were committed in defiance of the strictest orders. The wife alone is regarded as having no mind, no will, no conscience apart from the head of the family.

Now, to any one who complains of this state of things, it may perhaps be answered that these extremes of legal folly with regard to wrongs and crimes are seldom actually experienced in practice; that husbands and wives, though they often quarrel, still preserve a fair practical unanimity as to worldly interests from a knowledge that what injures the one cannot be beneficial to the other. To this we reply that this is fortunately true, or society could not hold together for a single day; but the above remarks are directed against an evil which may still continue although society is not dissolved. That which is complained of is that the law, which is with us a very powerful moral teacher, takes a great deal of trouble and uses a great many absurd fictions, to avoid teaching the simple lesson that every adult and sane woman must be held responsible for the wrongs, whether civil or criminal, which she knowingly commits against her neighbour.

Upon a view of the whole action of the law concerning women, as well as from the remarkable reasons which, here as elsewhere, the law, unluckily for its own reputation, has consented to give, it will appear that, while a single woman is capable of exercising nearly all the rights and of incurring

nearly

nearly all the liabilities which may be exercised or incurred by a man, the married woman is regarded as a weak, irresponsible being, who requires protection and is beneath punishment. In treatises and statutes, when we come to that part which speaks of disabilities, we find the married woman placed in unflattering contiguity with 'infants, idiots, and persons of unsound mind.' With the married woman, as with these others, protection and disabilities go hand in hand. They both of them indicate, on the part of the legislator, whether senatorial or judicial-for law is not all made in Parliamenta sort of contemptuous kindness for the person who is thus dealt with. Let us suppose a married woman explaining to the Genius of English law that she was still, morally speaking, a free agent, and that she desired to continue in the rights and was ready to accept the responsibilities which were hers when she was single; that, if the law would permit her to use her industry, and buy and sell, and hold property, she would not shrink from the necessity of answering, in purse or person, or both, for whatever injuries she might inflict on her fellow

creatures.

To this the Genius would answer: 'Madam, you know not how well off you are. It is true you cannot earn a penny because you cannot sue, but then neither can you be sued; and there are many of our sex, madam, who would be glad to be in the same position. And then, why should you wish to be able to make bargains, and to enforce them? It is your husband's business to support you; the law casts that duty upon him: confine yourself to your domestic work. You say you have no family, and your husband is abroad about his business, and has been unfortunate. Well, we never take into consideration these exceptional cases; besides which, the going abroad was his own act, and if, when the law considered you as having a will of your own, you consented to marry a husband who was likely to go abroad, you have nobody to blame but yourself. Though you are forbidden from acting or having a will of your own since your marriage, yet your marriage itself was your own act. Anyhow, wherever your husband is, the duty of supporting you is upon him; and, if I were you, I would leave it there, and, if he does not perform it, so much the worse for him; but your conscience will be clear though your purse may be empty. Then, again, what can be more absurd than to want to be amenable to actions for assaulting, or libelling, or running over people? Many men wish they could do these things with impunity! See the advantage which this power gives you over your husband! When once he has married you he has indeed

Demoralizing Effects of the Law.

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given hostages to fortune-that is to law. Forego in future the curtain lecture, and hint gently at the libel, or the assault. You will see astonishment and fear, softly blending into admiration, diffuse themselves over the male countenance, and thenceforth your smallest wish will be attended to. Your husband will be your slave for life. If you desire a separation, you can command any terms you please. It is unnecessary to apply to the Divorce Court. The same gentle suggestion will produce all that you require. Your husband will never be beyond your power till he has packed up his carpet-bag, and fled from the country. As long as he lives here he cannot free himself except by killing you, and for that you know, madam, we can hang him. I may mention, however, as a caution to you, that we probably only catch one murderer out of five, and, out of every five whom we do catch, we only hang one; so that you must not presume too far on his fear of being hanged. As for your desire to be punishable for indictable offences as if you had a will of your own, I must warn you that this is an evidence of your insanity, which you had better keep to yourself, or your husband may get rid of you by a commission de lunatico inquirendo. Go, then, madam; be thankful for your happy lot: all the immunities and disabilities of innocent childhood are yours.'

We are well aware that there are many other sanctions which have an operation on the mind besides the legal ones. Nevertheless the law, by the constancy of its operation, and by the fact that its lessons are practical, visible and immediate, has a more powerful effect on many minds than either religion or positive morality. And there are certain cases in which the teachings of religion are so little wont to be applied, and the doctrines of positive morality are so wanting in force and distinctness, that the law is suffered to take the place of these; for the law, whether right or wrong, is definite, constant, and abounding in examples. Thus the maxims of the law become a code of morality binding upon minds which other systems do not reach, and even in all minds giving a tone to thoughts concerning matters which are regarded as unaffected by the other sanctions. When, therefore, at all times, and in every one of its provisions concerning married women, the law indicates that it regards them in the light of children, can it be expected that this opinion, constantly expressed and acted on, can fail to have a depressing and demoralizing effect on the class who are the subjects of it, and, through them, upon the whole sex of which they are the most honoured members? Can it have any other effect than to lessen the feeling of selfrespect, to lower the sense of responsibility, and to invalidate

the

the moral safeguards of conduct? And, as regards the male sex, must it not serve to stereotype their opinions in the mould in which they were fashionod at the time when woman was considered as in the manus of her husband, or, still later, when her incapacity to perform the military feudal services rendered her of no account?

Let the advocates of the entire freedom of women before the law rely less upon their hopeful announcements of the intended achievements of the sex, and turn their attention to this question of protections and immunities; for they will find it a weak joint in the adversary's armour.

ART. II. THE SECOND REPORT OF THE CHILDREN'S EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION.

Children's Employment Commission (1862). Second Report of the Commissioners, with Appendix, presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. London: George Edward Eyre and Wm. Spottiswoode. 1864.

FOLLOWING up their first report, which served as the

basis of an article in the sixth volume of 'Meliora,' the Royal Commissioners on the Employment of Children presented to Parliament, by command of the Queen, a second report full of information on the occupation and condition of a large number of the young people in Her Majesty's dominions. When we state that the recommendations in this second report apply, on the whole, to a population of at least 956,000, mostly young persons and children, whilst under the existing Factory Acts not more than some 825,600 are protected, it will be evident that the scope of the report is very extensive, and that it behoves Parliament to take into early and serious consideration recommendations applying to so large a number of our youthful population.

The manufactures falling within the compass of the second report, are those of lace, hosiery, straw plait, Irish lace and embroidery, hand-loom products and hosiery in Ireland and Scotland, paper-tubes or spools, and wearing apparel.

The evidence as to the state of the lace and hosiery manufacturers, not yet under regulation, was supplied in the appendix to the first report; the comments of the Royal Commissioners were not there given, but are contained in the report now before us.

The