first payment shall be made at the expiration of a year next after that event. But if a sum of money be directed by the will to be placed out to produce an annuity, whether that is to be considered as a legacy payable at the end of the year as an annuity payable from the testator's death, seems to be a doubtful point. (p)

An annuity however, given by will, with a direction that it shall be paid monthly, the first payment is to be made at the end of a month after the testator's death. (q)

If an annuity be given by will, or if directions are given to lay out as much money as will produce a certain annual interest, the annuitant is not to suffer a diminution of income by the conversion of the five per cents into four per cents, but the deficiency is to be made good out of the testator's estate in the hands of the executor, or by sale from time to time of portions of the stock invested. (q9)

If a portion of the testator's estate not required for the payment of debts and legacies be invested at the time of his death upon securities carrying interest, the tenant for life of the residue is entitled to such interest from the time of the death of the testator. (r)

Although the interest of residue goes with the capital, that of particular legacies does not, even supposing it be the payment, and not the vesting, that is postponed. Therefore where no direction is given as to surplus interest, and the capital is made payable at a future time, the surplus interest falls into the residue. (s) And where legacies are given upon trust to accumulate the interest and dividends, such accumulated interest and dividends will not pass by a gift over of the principal sums, unless the court is satisfied by a reference to other clauses of the will, that the interest and dividends were omitted in the gift over by clerical mistake. (ss)

(p) Gibson v. Bott, 7 Ves. jun. 96, 97.

(q) Houghton v. Franklin, 1 Sim. & Stu. 390.

(99) Davies v. Wattier, 1 Sim. & Stu. 463. May v. Bennett, 1

Russ. 370.

(r) Angerstein v. Martin, 1 Turn. 232. Hewitt v. Morris, ib. 241. (s) Leake v. Robinson, 2 Meriv. Rep. 384.

(ss) Harvey v. Cooke, 4 Russ. 34.

[325] If a legacy, whether vested or not, be payable on a certain day, and the will be silent in respect to interest, it is a general rule, that the interest shall commence only from that time: for it is given for delay of payment, and, consequently, till the day of payment arrives, no interest can accrue to the legatee. (t) Hence, as we have seen, (u) if a legacy be left to A. to be paid at twenty-one, and he die before, his representative shall wait till he would have attained that age, unless it were made payable with interest. Nor is it, in such cases, a question of construction, as whether the payment is suspended on account of the imbecility of the party, or with a view to the benefit of the estate. The rule I have just stated is technical, established in the ecclesiastical court, and adopted by the Court of Chancery in numerous adjudications. (v) If legacies are given to A. and B., each to be paid to them at their respective ages of twenty-three years, and if they should die before that time, then their respective legacies to sink into the residue of the testator's personal estate, such legacies do not carry interest, and no maintenance can be allowed to the legatees. (w) But if a legacy be given to A. to be paid at twenty-one, and if he should die before attaining that age, then to B., and A. die before twenty-one, several years after the testator, B., is entitled to interest on the legacy from the death of A.; for though in such case it were objected that this being as a new substantive legacy to B., the executor ought to have a year's time for the payment of it; yet the court held, that must be intended to be from the death of the testator, whereas in that case the testator had been dead much longer. (x)

But the principle does not extend to all cases: It does not

(t) Heath v. Perry, 3 Atk. 102. Hearle v. Greenbank, 716. S. C. 1 Vez. 307. Smell v. Dee, 2 Salk. 415, pl. 2. 2 P. Wms. 481, note 1. Green v. Pigot, 1 Bro. Ch. Rep. 105. Ashburner v. M'Guire, 2 Bro. Ch. Rep. 113. Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Ves. jun. 10. Tyrrell v.

Tyrrell. 4 Ves. jun. 1.

(u) Supra, 171, 313.

(v) Tyrrell v. Tyrrell, 4 Ves. jun. 3, 4, 5.

(w) Descrambes v. Tomkins, 1 Cox's Rep. 133.

(x) Laundy v. Williams, 2 P. Wms. 481..

apply where the legatee was the child of the testator: There the court will not postpone the payment of interest, even till a year after the death of the parent, but will order it immediately; since, by the law of nature, he was obliged to provide not only a future but a present maintenance for his child, and shall not be presumed to have meant to leave him destitute. (y) And where a testator devised the residue of his real and personal estate, to such of his children as should attain twenty-one, or marry under that age, with consent, all the children were held entitled, although their interests were contingent, to have allowances out of the residue for their maintenance during minority. (yy) But if a father gives a legacy to a child payable at a future day, and makes an express provision for maintenance out of another fund, the legacy shall not carry interest until the time of payment. (~)

So where a testator directed his executors, as soon as they should think proper after his decease, to sell as much stock as would produce 12,000l., and invest the same in land, upon trust to receive the rents of the land when purchased, and the interest and dividend of the 12,000l. until the estate was purchased, and pay the same in equal moieties between his two daughters for their lives, with remainder over; the court held, that the daughters were not to take the interest until the 12,000l. was raised by a sale of the stock, and that this being to be done, as soon as the executors should think proper after his decease," amounted to the same thing as a direction to raise and pay a legacy as soon as the executors should find it convenient. That the court adopted a year as the rule of convenience, and that the legacy therefore could not be raised till the end of the year. (a)

(y) Butler v. Butler, 3 Atk. 60. Heath v. Perry, 102. Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Ves. jun. 13. See Chambers v. Goldwin, 11 Ves. jun. 1.

(yy) Brown v. Temperley, 3 Russ. 263, and see Incledon v. North

66

cote, 3 Atk. 433, and Mills v. Robarts, 1 Russ. & Myl. 555.

(2) Wynch v. Wynch, 1 Cox's Rep. 433.

(a) Benson v. Maude, 6 Madd. Rep. 15.

And where the testator devised estates in Jamaica to trustees and their heirs, in trust to maintain and educate his sons during their minority, and his daughter until the age of twenty-one years, or day of marriage, which should first happen, and subject thereto, devised the estates to his sons, charged with the payment of 10,000l. to his daughter, in case she should live to attain her age of twenty-one years, the same to carry interest from the time of her attaining such age of twenty-one, at the rate of 67. per cent., and to be paid by instalments, the first payment to be made when and if she should attain twenty-one; and the daughter married at the age of eighteen years: Lord Eldon held, that the testator having expressly given interest from the period of the daughter's majority to the time when the legacy was to be paid, could not mean that the child should have nothing during the interval between her marriage and her attaining the age of twenty-one years, and therefore decreed her a reasonable maintenance out of the assets for that period. (b)

And where a testator gave a legacy to his daughter, to be paid to her at twenty-one or marriage, without interest for the same in the meantime, but if she died before twenty-one or marriage, then the legacy was not to be raised, but was to sink into the residue of his personal estate, and he directed that out of the interest of the legacy certain sums of money should be applied for the maintenance of his daughter: it was held that the interest of the legacy beyond the maintenance was vested in the daughter, and must accumulate for her benefit. (bb)

[326] Whether a legatee, if a natural child, be also comprised within the exception, is not so clear. Lord Hardwicke, C. expressed an opinion in the negative, as well on the principle of law which recognises no relationship in such child, as also on the general policy of encouraging marriage, and discountenancing immorality. (c) In a recent case, the (b) Chambers v. Goldwin, 11 Rep. 243. Ves. jun. 1.

(bb) Carey v. Askew, 1 Cox's

(c) Hearle v. Greenbank, 1 Vez.

310.

Master of the Rolls intimated, that illegitimate children were to be admitted to the same benefit. (d) But in a subsequent case, the Court of Exchequer held that they are not. (e) If, however, it can be applied from the wording of the will that the testator intended it, interest will be allowed from the testator's death. (ƒ)

Whether a grandchild shall be thus favoured, is a point likewise on which there has been a difference of opinion: such advantage has been, in several instances denied to him. (g) But his Honor, in the case just alluded to, appears to have considered him as on the same footing with a child: And that opinion has been confirmed by subsequent adjudications. (h) The widow of the testator will not be entitled to interest from the time of his death. (i) A legacy to a nephew, payable at twenty-one, is clearly comprehended under the general rule, and shall carry interest only from the time of payment. (k) And a legacy to the wife of a nephew, expressly given for the maintenance of herself and children, she being separated from her husband, shall only carry interest from the end of the year after the testator's death; and the court considered it would be introducing a new rule, particularly as the legatee was an adult, if it were held otherwise. (1) But the rule is not applicable to a bequest of a residue, subject to be divested on a contingency; for it would be absurd to say the testator meant to die intestate as to the produce, when he has given a vested interest in the capital. (m) If a legacy be left to an infant payable at twenty

(d) Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Ves. jun. 12.

(e) Lowndes v. Lowndes, 15 Ves. jun. 301.

(f) Hill v. Hill, 3 Ves. & Bea. 183. Newman v. Bateson, 3 Swanst. 689. Dowling v. Tyrrell, 2 Russ. & Myl. 343.

(g) Haughton v. Harrison, 2 Atk. 330. Butler v. Butler, 3 Atk. 59. 4 Bro. Ch. Rep. 149, in note, and Descrambes v. Tomkins, 1 Cox's Rep. 133.

(h) Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Ves.

jun. 12. 5 Ves. jun. 194, 195, in note. Collins v. Blackburn, 9 Ves. jun. 470, and see Hill v. Hill, 3 Ves. & Bea. 183.

(i) Lowndes v. Lowndes, 15 Ves. jun. 301. Stent v. Robinson, 12 Ves. jun. 461.

(k) Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Ves. jun. 12.

(1) Raven v. White, 1 Swans. Rep. 553. S C. J Wils. 204.

* (m) Nichols v. Osborn, 2 P. Wms. 420. Vide Tyrrell v. Tyrrell, 4 Ves. jun. 4.