1907.

MARSH

The Act of 1889 having amended sec. 47 sub-sec. (iii.) by the H. C. of A. addition of the word "price," must be taken as an indication that before that word was inserted the sub-section meant something different from what it means now. An amending Act is intended, WILLIAMS. prima facie, to alter the law, not to declare it: The Queen v. Buttle (1). [They referred also to Walker v. Walker (2).]

C. B. Stephen K.C. and Delohery, for the respondent, were not called upon.

GRIFFITH C.J. This is an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court, in which the question is raised whether under the Crown Lands Act 1884, before the amendment of 1889, conditional purchasers acquiring land without the condition of residence were bound to pay an increased price per acre for the land.

Since 1889 no such question can arise, because in that year an Act was passed which puts an end to all doubt. The question depends upon the words of sec. 47, sub-sec. (iii.), of the Act of 1884, but before reading that sub-section it will be convenient to refer to two earlier sections.

The scheme of conditional purchases prescribed by the Act is well known in New South Wales. The purchaser was allowed to make application for the area of land he desired, and the payment was made by instalments, various conditions being attached before the purchaser was entitled to the grant.

Sec. 26 provides that applications for conditional purchases shall be made in a prescribed manner, and that with the application there shall be lodged with the Land Agent a deposit at the rate of two shillings per acre of the area applied for. Then the application comes before the local Land Board for confirmation.

Sec. 35 provides that every conditional purchaser at the end of the third year after the date of the confirmation of his application, or within three months thereafter, shall pay to the Land Agent an instalment on his purchase at the rate of one shilling per acre, and thereafter shall pay in like manner a like instalment annually until the balance of seventeen shillings per acre, together

(1) L.R. 1 C.C.R., 248.

(2) (1901) I S.R. (N.S. W.), 70.

V.

1907.

MARSH

v.

WILLIAMS.

Griffith C.J.

H. C. OF A. with interest, shall have been paid. The absolute price at which the land is sold is not expressly mentioned, but it seems to have been taken for granted that the price of country land was to be twenty shillings per acre. That is the necessary inference from the fact that a balance of seventeen shillings remains after payment of the deposit of two shillings and the first instalment of one shilling. Under ordinary circumstances, therefore, the price of the land conditionally purchased was twenty shillings per acre. Referring now to sec. 24, it bears indications of having been inserted at a later stage of the Bill. It provides that the Governor in Council may by proclamation reserve what are called special areas within which it will not be lawful to purchase conditionally more than one hundred and sixty acres (the ordinary area being larger), and at such prices, (not being less than thirty shillings per acre), deposits and instalments as shall be notified in the proclamation.

Now I come to sec. 47, which provides that Crown lands open to conditional purchase may be purchased without conditions of residence, subject to certain qualifications, of which I will refer to the following: first, the maximum area is limited to three hundred and twenty acres; second, a person who takes advantage of this provision shall not be allowed to take up another conditional purchase under the Act, and a person who has made a conditional purchase under any of the Crown Lands Acts may not take up or hold one under this section. Onerous conditions of improvement are imposed, more onerous than those imposed in other cases, and then comes the provision out of which arises the question we have to determine. Sub-sec. (iii.) is as follows:"The deposit and all subsequent instalments shall be double those respectively prescribed on ordinary conditional purchases and shall be paid to the like persons at the like periods." The question is, what is meant by "the like periods." For the Crown it is contended that these words are equivalent to saying

by the like or by corresponding periodical payments," meaning that the number of payments is to be the same but the amounts are to be double. For the appellant it is contended that it means merely what it says, that the deposit shall be double, and that each of the subsequent instalments shall be double. If it is not

1907.

a special area the deposit will be four shillings, and the instal- H. C. of A. ments two shillings per acre, and that will be continued until the total amount of £1 per acre has been paid.

The words are probably capable of both constructions. The deposit and instalments together make up the price. It is not expressly stated that the price shall be double, but the deposit is to be double, and the instalments are "to be paid to the like persons at the like periods." Bearing in mind the intention of the legislature, plainly expressed on the face of the Statute, that residence-actual occupation of the land by a resident occupierwas in their minds, and that they were disposed rather to discourage than to encourage purchasers of country land who were not prepared to live upon it, the inference should, I think, be drawn that, prima facie, it was not intended to grant them any favour not expressly stated. On the other hand, a burden cannot be imposed except by clear words.

I have come to the conclusion that the words "at the like periods" mean by the same number of periodical payments, that is, double the money, and that these periodical payments will continue just as long as they would have continued if they had been made at the ordinary rate. The result is that in the end double price must be paid. That has been the contention of the Crown, and it has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Walker v. Walker (1) to be the right view, and I do not see any reason to dissent from that conclusion.

The appeal must therefore be dismissed.

O'CONNOR J., ISAACS J., and HIGGINS J. concurred.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Solicitor, for the appellant, J. Robinson (Forbes), by S. M. Raff. Solicitor, for the respondent, The Crown Solicitor of New South Wales.

MARSH

v.

WILLIAMS.

Griffith C.J.

C. A. W.

(1) (1901) S.R. (N.S. W.), 70.

H. C. OF A. Special leave to appeal-Gaming-Police Offences Act 1890 (Vict.) (No. 1126), sec. 51.

1907.

MELBOURNE,
May 28.

Griffith C.J.
O'Connor,
Isaacs and

Higgins JJ.

Special leave to appeal from decision of Supreme Court (Knox v. Bible, (1907) V. L. R., 485; 29 A.L.T., 23), refused.

APPLICATION for special leave to appeal.

Orders nisi to review two convictions of Thomas Bible for gaming offences under sec. 51 of the Police Offences Act 1890, upon grounds depending on the sufficiency of the evidence, the wrongful reception of evidence, and the question whether the two offences charged were parts of one continuous offence, were discharged by Cussen J.: Knox v. Bible (1).

Application was now made on behalf of the defendant for special leave to appeal in both cases.

H. I. Cohen in support.

The application was refused.

Solicitors for appellant, Reynolds & Larkin, Melbourne, for R. W. Shellard, Daylesford.

B. L.

(1) (1907) V.L.R., 485; 29 A.L.T., 23.

H. C. of A.

1907.

Commonwealth Electoral Acts (1902-5), secs. 110, 111, 118 (a), 119, (b), (c), (e), 134, 147, 158, (b), (d), 161 (a), 199, 200-Schedule-Forms-Statutory Rules 1906, No. 78-Electoral Regulations 22, 23, 25, 28-Ordering recount after destruction of ballot-papers-Election-Method of voting, mandatory or directory-Writing ADELAIDE, and marks on ballot-papers-Identification of voter-Defective authentication of May 2, 3, 4, 27, 28, 30; ballot-papers-Official default-Avoidance of election—Amendment of petition.

The fact that, in an election for the Federal Senate the returning officer for the State directed, under sec. 161 (a) of the Commonwealth Electoral Acts 1902-5, a recount of all the ballot-papers before the declaration of the poll, does not debar the Court of Disputed Returns from ordering a further recount under the control of the Court.

A case for a recount having been otherwise established, the fact that the ballot-papers of one of the electoral divisions of the State had been accidentally destroyed is not sufficient to deprive the petitioner of his right to a recount. An ordinary ballot-paper which has been initialled on the front, instead of the back, will not be thereby invalidated, if it appears that the paper was so folded that the presiding officer could see his initials without disclosure of the voting for candidates. An absentee ballot-paper which has been initialled on the front, instead of the back, is not thereby invalidated, as the counterfoil is sufficient for authentication; but absentee or postal ballot-papers which have not been initialled at all are invalid. In considering the validity of ballot-papers marked by voters not strictly in accordance with the Act, the Court will give effect to the intention of the voter wherever it is clearly indicated by the necessary crosses, except where the Act has expressly

June 1.

Barton J.