V.-C. K. 1865 LEEDS Leeds Banking Company to them, of which bills they were holders. The first bill was a three months' bill for £564, dated the 4th BANKING Co. of August, 1864, drawn by Messrs. Watts & Co., and accepted by Messrs. Early, Smith, & Co., payable at the London and County Bank to the order of Messrs. Watts & Co. This bill was indorsed by Messrs. Watts & Co., to the Leeds Banking Company, and by the Leeds Banking Company to Messrs. Prange with the special indorsement, "in need, at Messrs. Smith, Payne, & Smith." This bill became due on the 7th of November, 1864, when it was presented by Messrs. Prange's agent at the London and County Bank, the place at which it was made payable by the acceptor, On the 8th of November it was returned dishonoured; and on the same day it was presented at Messrs. Smith, Payne, & Smith's, and returned by them dishonoured on the same day; and on the 16th of November notice of the dishonour was given to the official liquidator of the Leeds Banking Company, which was being wound up. The second bill was also a three months' bill, and dated the 10th of August, 1864, for £500. It was made between the same parties, and passed through the same hands as the first bill. It fell due on the 12th of November, 1864, and was presented on the same day at the London and County Bank, and returned dishonoured on Monday, the 14th of November; on the same day it was presented at Messrs. Smith, Payne, & Smith's, and returned by them dishonoured on the same day; and on the 16th of November notice of the dishonour was sent to the official liquidator by Messrs. Prange, and this notice the official liquidator received on the 17th of November. The delay of a day was occasioned by Messrs. Prange's agent in London sending the bill from London to Messrs. Prange at Liverpool. When the official liquidator received notice of the dishonour of the two bills, he repudiated the liability of the company, on the ground that proper notice of the dishonour had not been given to him. It appeared that before the bills became due, the drawer and acceptor, who were both customers of the Leeds Banking Company, became bankrupt. Mr. Druce for Messrs. Prange: Messrs. Prange are entitled to be admitted to prove in respect of these two bills. They were presented when they fell due at Messrs. Smith, Payne, & Smith's, the persons notified by the indorsement, and notice to them was notice to the indorser. "In need," means in case of need, or if occasion should require; and of that the holders of the bills are the persons to judge. Such an indorsement is analogous to an acceptance of a bill payable at a specified banking house, and in such cases it has been held that presentation at the bankers' is notice to the acceptor. Pearse v. Pemberthy (1), Smith v. Thatcher (2), Treacher v. Hinton (3), Bayley on Bills (4). The notice to Messrs. Smith, Payne, & Smith includes notice of the dishonour by the acceptor of the bills, as otherwise the bills would never have been presented at the bank notified by the indorsers. Moreover, the Leeds Banking Company must have had notice of the dishonour by the acceptors, as both the drawers and acceptors who were customers of the Leeds Banking Company became bankrupt before the bills fell due. If notice to Messrs. Smith, Payne, & Smith was not sufficient, it is admitted that as to the first bill there has been no sufficient notice. But as to the second bill notice of the dishonour was given in due time to the official liquidator. As between parties to a bill one day is allowed for each step in presenting and giving notice of dishonour; and where, as in the present case, a day is required for communication between the agent of the holder of a bill and such holder, the same rule allows one day for that purpose. Mr. Glasse, Q.C., and Mr. Cotton for the official liquidator : We admit the cases cited on the other side, but they do not apply to the present case. There is no such custom as contended that presentation to parties named in indorsement "in need" is presentation to the indorser; and there is no analogy between such a case and a case where the bill is made compulsorily payable at a particular banking house. The fact that Messrs. Smith, Payne, & Smith were named in the indorsement "in need," only constituted them agents of the V.-C. K. 1865 LEEDS BANKING Co. (1) 3 Camp. 261. (3) Ibid. 413. V.-C. K. 1865 LEEDS Leeds Banking Company for payment, and not their agents generally for the purposes of notice; and assuming that presentation at Messrs. Smith, Payne, & Smith's, was presentation to the Leeds BANKING CO. Banking Company, there has been no notice at all given of the dishonour by the acceptors. The notice of dishonour must be a formal notice of the fact, and implied notice is not sufficient. The notice given to the official liquidator by Messrs. Prange was too late even as to the second bill. Admitting that a day is allowed for each step as between the parties to a bill, that rule does not extend to allowing a day as between the agent of the holder of the bill and the holder. They referred to Leonard v. Wilson (1) as explaining indorsement in need; and to 1 & 2 Geo. IV. c. 78; 6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 58; and Byles on Bills (2). Mr. Druce, in reply. Nov. 14. SIR R. T. KINDERSLEY, V.C.:— It is contended on the part of Messrs. Prange with respect to both the bills, first, that it was not necessary to give to the indorser any notice of dishonour; or, secondly, that if it was necessary, the presentation of the bills to Messrs. Smith, Payne, & Smith for payment, operated as a sufficient notice to the indorser. It is admitted that for the first proposition there is no direct authority; but it was argued that as it has been decided that when an acceptor, by the terms of his acceptance, refers to a particular banker for payment, it is unnecessary to give the acceptor notice of non-payment by that banker; so, by analogy, it ought to be held that it is unnecessary to give the indorser notice of dishonour when, as in the present case, he has, by the terms of his indorsement, referred to a banker for payment. But whatever analogy there may be between the two cases, it cannot go beyond this, that it is unnecessary to give the indorser notice of the non-payment by his own banker; and it cannot lead to the conclusion, that it is unnecessary to give him notice of the bill having been dishonoured by the acceptor V.-C. K. 1865 LEEDS On the second point it was contended that, as by the terms of the indorsement the reference to Smith, Payne, & Smith was "in need," the presentation of the bill to them for payment operated as notice to them of dishonour by the acceptor; because there BANKING CO. could be no occasion to present the bill to them for payment, unless it had been already dishonoured by the acceptor, and that notice to them was notice to the indorser, whose agents, as it is contended, they were. It is not very clear to my mind what is the use or efficacy of the words "in need," or "in case of need," in such an indorsement. It has been suggested that they may mean "in case it is necessary to resort to the indorser," or that they may mean, "in case the holder finds it for his convenience to apply to Smith, Payne, & Smith for payment." Of the two I should think the former is the more probable meaning. But whatever may be the meaning of those words in an indorsement, I am of opinion that the presentation of the bill to Smith, Payne, & Smith for payment, cannot operate as notice of dishonour to the indorser for two reasons : First, that the reference to Smith, Payne, & Smith by the indorsement, assuming that it constituted them the indorser's agents for payment of the bill, did not constitute them the indorser's agents to receive on his behalf notice of dishonour by the acceptor; so that, even if formal notice of dishonour by the acceptor had been given by Messrs. Prange to Smith, Payne, & Smith, that would not have been good notice to the indorser. Secondly, that the mere presenting the bill for payment, even if it had been presented to the indorser himself, would not, per se, have been sufficient notice of dishonour by the acceptor. To constitute notice of dishonour of a bill, there must be a notification, whether verbal or written, from the holder to the indorser, which conveys to the latter the information of the fact of the dishonour, though it is not necessary that such notification should be in any prescribed form. Notice of dishonour to the indorser means something more than that the indorser has knowledge of the dishonour; that knowledge must be conveyed to him by a notification from the holder.. Besides, the effect of the presentation to the indorser, or his agent, is not to give him positive knowledge of the dishonour, but only to lead him to infer it by reason of the improba 5 V.-C. K. 1865 LEEDS BANKING CO. bility that it would be so presented, unless payment had been previously refused by the acceptor. And such inferential knowledge of the fact does not constitute notice of dishonour. The remaining question. relates only to the second bill; for as to the first bill, if notice of dishonour was necessary, and if the presentation to Smith, Payne, & Smith did not operate as such notice, it is admitted that there was no actual notice within the time prescribed by the law. But it is contended that as to the second bill there was actual notice within the proper time. Messrs. Prange's agent in London, who presented the bill for payment, received notice of dishonour by the acceptor on the 14th of November. If on that day, or even perhaps on the 15th, he had sent notice of dishonour to the indorser, so that the latter had received it on the 16th, the notice would have been good. But a day was lost by the agent sending the notice to Messrs. Prange at Liverpool, and Messrs. Prange sending the notice to the indorser at Leeds, so that the indorser did not receive it till the 17th. It is admitted that the law allows one day in each step for communication between the parties to a bill, and the question is whether it allows an additional day for the communication from the holder's agent to the holder. I have searched in vain for any authority for the affirmative, and I am of opinion that there is no such rule. The claims must therefore be disallowed, but there will be no costs. V.-C. K. 1865 Nov. 4, 6. TALBOT v. MARSHFIELD. An application for liberty to seal up or not to deposit documents, possession of which is admitted by the affidavit of a Defendant who has not been required to answer as to documents, need not be made on the original summons for production, but will be granted on summons by such Defendant, after he has filed his affidavit, without his being required to pay the costs of his summons. THIS was an adjourned summons, taken out by the Defendants. The usual order had been made on summons for an affidavit as to documents and production, by the Defendants. In their affidavit |