2. The proceeds of sale of mortgaged premises, sold under the power of sale in a mortgage deed by the trustees of the mortgagee, were paid into Court in a suit for the administration of the mortgagee's estate; and there being nearly twenty years' arrears of interest due on the mortgage, exceeding in amount the fund in Court, the trustees petitioned for payment out of the fund to satisfy such arrears, and the assignee of the mortgagor was served with the Petition:

Held, that the Petition was not a suit to recover arrears of interest within the 42nd section of the statute, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27; and, therefore, that the mortgagee's trustees were entitled to more than six years' arrears of interest, and the fund was ordered to be paid

over to them.

The decision in Mason v. Broadbent (33 Beav. 296) questioned. Edmunds v. Waugh. 418

STATUS.

See LEGITIMACY.

STAY OF EXECUTION.

Where a Plaintiff had obtained a decree, ordering him to be let into possession of real estate; on motion by the Defendant, who was about to appeal, the Plaintiff declining to give security to refund the rents in the event of the decree being reversed, execution of the decree was ordered to be stayed till further order; the Defen

SUBSTITUTED SERVICE.

dant giving security for what should be found due from him in respect of past rents the future rents to be paid into Court, with liberty to the Plaintiff to apply in Chambers as to maintenance, and for costs of the appeal. Barrs v. Fewkes. 392

STOCK.

See SHARES, BEQUEST OF, 1.

STOCK, SALE OF.

See APPORTIONMENT, 1.

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

Goods were shipped by the vendor on board of a general ship, belonging to a firm of which the purchaser was a member, and registered in the purchaser's name.

Three parts of the bill of lading (by which the goods were deliverable at Goole to the purchaser or assigns) were handed to the vendor, and the fourth part retained by the master:

Held, that the delivery on board was not delivery to the purchaser, so as to preclude stoppage in transitu before the delivery of the goods at Goole.

The goods having been delivered into a warehouse to the purchaser's order, after the dishonour of a bill by the purchaser, and after notice to the master and the warehousemen of the stoppage in transitu, and some of the goods having since been parted with:

Held, that damages were recoverable in respect thereof under Sir H. Cairns's Act. Schotsmans v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company. 349

SUBSTITUTED GIFT.

See VESTING, TIME OF.

SUBSTITUTED SERVICE. Substituted service ordered on a solicitor who had acted for certain Defendants in transactions connected

SUCCESSION DUTY ACT (16 & 17 VICT. c. 51, ss. 8, 51). Where trustees for sale under a will, who have entered into a contract with a purchaser, and paid legacy duty on the amount of the purchase-money, afterwards vest the estate in the person to whom (subject to the trust), the land is devised, whereby he becomes the proper party to convey, such legacy duty is properly paid, and no new contract is created whereby succession duty becomes payable.

A certificate from the Inland Revenue Office, that the duty is paid in respect of the land contracted to be sold, discharges a purchaser, and no particular form of certificate can be required by a purchaser under the Succession Duty Act, 1853, c. 51 s. 51. Earl Howe v. Earl of Lichfield. 641

SUCCESSION DUTY.

See SUCCESSION DUTY ACT.
TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDER-
MAN.

SURETY.

See COMPOSITION.

238

TENANT FOR LIFE, &c. 739

SURRENDER.

See ATTORNMENT.
BEST RENT.
ENFRANCHISEMENT.

SURVIVOR.

See GIFT TO SEVERAL OR SUCH AS SURVIVE A.

SURVIVORS.

See DISTRIBUTION, PERIOD OF.

SURVIVORSHIP.

See ACCRUER.

NEXT OF KIN.

VESTING, TIME OF.

TENANT FOR LIFE AND
REMAINDERMAN.

On a case submitted to the Court by trustees as to certain questions arising between the equitable tenant for life and the remainderman in the management of the estate :

Held, that the produce of the sale of underwood and of timber cut periodically, in the regular course of thinning, was to be treated as income, and that of timber not cut in the regular course, but to improve the growth of the remaining trees, as capital:

Held, also, that the produce of the sale of gravel on the waste lands, and likewise the fines payable on grants of waste lands made by the trustees, and moneys payable in consideration of the waiver by the trustees of restrictive conditions in grants made by them (but not where the grants were made liminary fines paid to the trustees as by the testator), and likewise pre

ment of copyholds by persons admitted lords of the manor on the enfranchiseto the Copyhold Act, 1852, were rebefore the 1st of July, 1853, pursuant spectively to be treated as income:

Held, also, that the expense of fencing waste lands granted to a trustee for the benefit of the estate must be paid out of capital; and that the costs of rendering accounts for the succession duty payable for the first

TRANSFER OF SHARES.

TRADE, COVENANT AGAINST. See COVENANT AGAINST PARTICULAR TRADE.

WAIVER OF COVENANT.

TRADE MARK.

The Plaintiff being a thread manufacturer of repute, the Defendant bought in the market thread, wound on spools, not made by the Plaintiff, of inferior quality, and cheaper than his, and not bearing his name, but marked with the name of a firm of winders of thread who were known to be accustomed to purchase of the Plaintiff thread in the hank for the purpose of winding, and selling it when wound. Defendant sold the goods to a wholesale customer, with the assurance (given, as he said, without knowledge of any misrepresentation) that they were of the Plaintiff's make, and invoiced them to the customer under the description of certain numbers, which the Plaintiff had adopted and exclusively used in order to designate his particular manufacture. The customer attached the Plaintiff's name and numbers to the spools of thread, and retailed it to the public as of the Plaintiff's make :

:

Held, that there was not such a degree of wilful misrepresentation on the part of the Defendant as would justify the Court in granting an injunction, and bill dismissed, but without costs.

The name of a manufacturer, or a system of numbers adopted and used by him in order to designate goods of his make, may be the subject of the same protection in equity as an ordinary trade-mark. Ainsworth v. Walmsley. 518

See DAMAGE, MEASURE OF.

TRANSFER OF SHARES.

By the deed of settlement of a banking company it was declared that no person should be entitled to become a

A debtor made a conveyance of all his property in trust for his creditors, by a deed in the form in schedule D to the Bankruptcy Act, 1861. The deed was executed by the debtor and the trustees and duly registered, but was not assented to by the proportion of creditors required by section 192. The trustees got in and converted the estate, and deposited the proceeds in their joint names in a bank. Four months after the date of the deed the debtor was adjudicated bankrupt on a judgment-debtor summons for nonpayment of a judgment debt due before the date of the deed :

Held, upon a bill filed by the assignee in bankruptcy, and one of the trustees of the composition deed, against the other trustee, to compel payment to

A company was incorporated in the first place for "the working, preparation, and sale of porcelain clay," with power, if it should be deemed expedient, after the original business had become developed, to combine " mining operations" with the original business.

By the company's deed it was provided that it should be competent for any extraordinary general meeting, by a majority of two-thirds in number of the shareholders, to empower and require the directors to bind the company and every shareholder thereof, to any act, deed, matter, or thing whatsoever, which the company, by virtue of its corporate capacity, or otherwise, or all the shareholders together, would be enabled to make, do, or execute, if the consent of every shareholder were given thereto. Also, that the directors should have power to make contracts, and in case it should be doubtful whether it was in the competence of the directors to conclude any contract, the same might be submitted to an extraordinary general meeting, and if sanctioned, should be binding upon every shareholder, whether under incapacity or not, in like manner as if every shareholder were sui juris and had consented.

The company obtained leases of land for ninety-nine years, commenced business in 1852, and paid one dividend, and no other, the undertaking not turning out successful:—

Held, that, after a period of nine