when the injury occasioned is by cutting off communication on the Sect. 3. county side with a ferry over the river, the ferry being appurtenant to the land in the city, the boundary being in the midst of the river. Reg. v. Great Northern Railway Company, 14 Q. B. 25. "Justices."-The teritorial jurisdiction of justices is limited to the area, or place for which their commission is issued. Judicial duties cannot be exercised outside such place or area, but ministerial duties, such as administering oaths for affidavits, can be so exercised. See Kerr v. Ailsa, 1 Macq. H. L. 736. “Who shall not be interested in the matter."-The general principle is nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa. Any direct pecuniary interest, however small, will disqualify. Thus, where justices who were shareholders in a railway company, convicted a man for travelling with a wrong ticket on that railway, they were held to be disqualified. R. v. Hammond, 9 L. T. 423, and see Reg. v. Commissioners of Sewers for Fobbing, 11 App. Cases. 450; Reg. v. Lee, 9 Q. B. D. 394; Reg. v. Gaisford (1892), 1 Q. B. 381. The pecuniary interest must be direct, and, if indirect, it will not disqualify unless likelihood of bias is shown; thus an interest, depending upon the completion of a parliamentary arrangement between certain companies is too remote. Reg. v. Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company, L. R. 2 Q. B. 336, and see Reg. v. Rand, L. R. 1 Q. B. 230. The fact that justices are shareholders in shipping companies, the ships of which were insured by associations that were members of a confederation to which the prosecutor was agent is not sufficient to disqualify. Reg. v. Mackenzie [1892], 2 Q. B. 519. If the magistrate has no pecuniary interest he will be disqualified, if he has such a substantial interest, other than pecuniary in the result of the hearing as to make it likely he will have a bias but not otherwise. The mere fact that he has been subpoenaed as a witness, and has advised a settlement will not disqualify. Reg. v. Farrant, 20 Q. B. D. 58; Reg. v. Tooke, 32 W. R. 753. By certain statutes, justices are expressly given power to hear and determine certain matters, although they have an interest in the result. In these cases the pecuniary interest is small, as, for example, the justice may be a ratepayer in the parish in connection with which a question is raised. See Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, s. 158, sub-sect. (2). But notwithstanding such acts, the justices will be disqualified if there is unmistakable bias shown, as for example, by taking active part in proceedings prior to the trial. R. v. Harrison, 1 Q. B. 174; Reg. v. Allen, 33 L. J. M. C. 98; Reg. v. Henley [1892], 1 Q. B. 504; Reg. v. London County Council [1892], 1 Q. B. 190; Reg. v. Lee, 9 Q. B. D. 394; Reg. v. St. Albans, 9 Q. B. D. 454. If there is strong probability of bias, as where the justice is an appellant against a rate, he is disqualified from hearing other appeals of a similar nature. R. v. Justices of Yarmouth, 31 L. J. M. C. 39. The disqualification of a justice on the ground of interest may be waived by the parties, as the proviso that he shall not be interested is merely declaratory of the common law, and not obligatory, and at Sect. 3. common law, the objection could always be waived. Such waiver will be presumed if after knowledge of interest the parties either request the justice to act, or acquiesce in his acting, and in order to disturb his ruling the party applying must fully deny knowledge of such interest. Wakefield Local Board v. West Riding and Grimsby Railway Company, L. R. 1 Q. B. 84, upon the same words in the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act (8 Vict. c. 20), s. 3, and see as to the common law, R. v. Richmond JJ., 8 Cox C. C. 314; R. v. Kent JJ., 44 J. P. 298, and "Stone's Justices' Manual," pp. 728, et seq., 26th edit. Short title of the Act. Form in which por If the parties acquiesce under a misunderstanding as to his interest, the order will be quashed if the conduct of the justice shows real bias. Thus a justice at a railway rating appeal was not objected to, as he was believed to be merely an ex officio member of the board of guardians, but it was afterwards discovered that he had been actively engaged at meetings defending the appeal. The order was set aside on the ground of probability of bias. R. v Cumberland JJ., 58 L. T. 491. Two Justices.-Any one of the magistrates of the metropolitan police courts, and every stipendiary magistrate for any county, borough or place, have power to do alone what may be done by two justices of the peace (21 & 22 Vict. c. 73, s. 1; 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 16; and 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 20, sub-sect. (10)). The expression two justices means at least two, and the proceedings are not vitiated by there being more than two present. Reg. v. Rochdale Improvement Commissioners, 2 Jur. (N.s.) 861. "Owner."-The persons who are enabled to sell and convey lands are stated in section 7. 4. [And be it enacted, That] (a) in citing this Act in other Acts of Parliament, and in legal instruments, it shall be sufficient to use the expression "The Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845." (a) Repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Viet. c. 67), s. 1, and sched. By the Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 63), s. 23, it is provided that in any Act, public, local and personal, or private passed after the 1st January, 1890, unless the contrary intention appears, the expression "Lands Clauses Acts" shall mean As respects England and Wales, the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 18), the Lands Clauses Consolidation Acts Amendment Act, 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 106), the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 18), and the Lands Clauses (Umpire) Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 15), and any Acts for the time being in force amending the same. "In legal Instruments."-Section 35 of the Interpretation Act, 1889, extends this to "in any Act, instrument or document." 5. And whereas it may be convenient in some cases to tions of incorporate with Acts of Parliament hereafter to be passed Acts. some portion only of the provisions of this Act; be it there- Sect. 5. fore enacted, that, for the purpose of making any such incor- this Act poration, it shall be sufficient in any such Act to enact that may be incorporated the clauses of this Act with respect to the matter so proposed with other to be incorporated (describing such matter as it is described in this Act in the words introductory to the enactment with respect to such matter), shall be incorporated with such Act, and thereupon all the clauses and provisions of this Act with respect to the matter so incorporated shall, save so far as they shall be expressly varied or excepted by such Act, form part of such Act, and such Act shall be construed as if the substance of such clauses and provisions were set forth therein with reference to the matter to which such Act shall relate. By the Interpretation Act, 1889, it is enacted that in any Act passed after the 1st January, 1890, a description or citation of a portion of another Act shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be construed as including the word section, or other part mentioned or referred to as forming the beginning and as forming the end of the portion comprised in the description or citation. 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, s. 35, sub-sect. (3). "WORDS INTRODUCTORY TO THE ENACTMENT WITH RESPECT TO SUCH MATTER." The different headings with the clauses under them are as follows:— SECTS. 615. The purchase of lands by agreement. 16 68. 69 80. The purchase and taking of lands otherwise than by agree ment. The purchase money or compensation coming to parties 81-83. The conveyances of land. 84 91. The entry upon lands by the promoters of the undertaking. 92. As to selling part of a house. 93-94. Small portions of intersected land. 95 98. Copyhold lands. 99-107. Copyhold lands, being common or waste lands. 108-114. Lands subject to mortgage. 115-118. Lands charged with any rent service, rentcharge, or chief or 119-122. other rent, or other payment or incumbrance not herein- Lands subject to leases. 123. Limit of time for compulsory purchase. 124-126. Interests in land which have by mistake been omitted to be purchased. Sect. 5. SECTS. 127-132. 133. 134. 135. 136-149. 150-151. Lands acquired by the promoters of the undertaking under the provisions of this or the special Act, or any Act incorporated therewith, but which shall not be required for the purposes thereof. Land tax and poor's rate to be made good. Service of notices upon company. Tender of amends. The recovery of forfeitures, penalties, and costs. The provision to be made for affording access to the special The clauses relating to the different subjects were thus grouped If the words of the heading are used in the special Act either to include or exclude the enactments dealing with any matter, all the sections under that heading must be deemed to be included or excluded, as the case may be. Thus, an Act which incorporates the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, but excludes the provisions of that Act "relating to the purchase and taking of lands otherwise than by agreement," thereby excludes all the sections from and to and including sections 16-68; compensation, therefore, for the injurious affecting of lands cannot be recovered on the basis that section 68 is incorporated. Ferrar v. Commissioners of Sewers in the City of London, L. R. 4 Exch. 227, followed in Dungey v. Mayor of London, 38 L. J. C. P. 298. The same principle was laid down R. v. Lord Mayor of London, L. R. 2 Q. B. 292, where it was held that an Act, excepting provisions in the same manner as in the above cases, excluded only sections 16—68, and that the other clauses which relate to the purchase of land otherwise than by agreement not coming under that heading were not excepted. If, however, the local Act does not use the words of the heading, the same rule does not apply; thus, an Act which excepts so much of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, as relates exclusively to the purchase and taking of lands by compulsion does not thereby except section 68, as that section, although inserted among the clauses which relate to the taking of lands by compulsion, does not relate exclusively to the taking of lands by compulsion. See per Lord CRANWORTH in Broadbent v. Imperial Gas Light Company, 7 De G. M. & G. 436, 447; S. C. in the Lords, 9 H. L. Cases, 600, where the point was not taken. Construction. Much diversity of opinion has existed as to the effect to be given to these introductory headings in construing the clauses under them. The general result is that they are to be regarded as something more than marginal notes, being in the nature of preambles, but their effect would appear to be a matter of construction in each particular case. In Hammersmith Railway Company v. Brand, L. R. 4 H. L. 171, Lord CHELMSFORD (p. 203), speaking of the headings in the Railway Clauses Act, said that they "may be usefully referred to, to determine the sense of any doubtful expression in a section ranged under a Sect. 5. particular heading." But in the same case, Lord CAIRNS (p. 216), said that "the framing of the Lands Clauses Act shows that it is even dangerous to trust to the headings which occur at the commencement of these fasciculi of clauses, for the purpose of restraining or confining the natural operations of the words which you find in the various clauses under these headings." In the Eastern Counties Railway Company v. Marriage, 9 H. L. Cas. 32, the subject was fully discussed. The opinions of the common law judges were taken by the lords, and there was much diversity as to the effect to be given to these headings. The point at issue was as to whether the words "such lands" in section 94 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, referred to the lands mentioned in the previous section or in the heading to the two sections. In the result, it was held that the lands referred to were those in the heading on the ground that such reading gave the more reasonable construction, but no general principle was laid down. See as to headings of this kind in other statutes. Bryan v. Child, 5 Ex. 368, 374; Latham v. Lafone, L. R. 2 Ex. 115, 119; Lang v. Kerr, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 529, 536. As to incorporation and construction, see section 1. And with respect to the purchase of lands by agreement, be it enacted as follows: purchase ment. 6. Subject to the provisions of this and the special Act it Power to shall be lawful for the promoters of the undertaking to agree Lands by with the owners of any lands by the special Act authorized Agreeto be taken, and which shall be required for the purposes of such Act, and with all parties having any estate or interest in such lands, or by this or the special Act enabled to sell and convey the same, for the absolute purchase, for a consideration in money, of any such lands, or such parts thereof as they shall think proper, and of all estates and interests in such lands of what kind soever. "Purchase of Lands by Agreement."-This heading includes sections 6-15. As to effect of heading, see note to section 5. "The Promoters of the Undertaking."-See definition in section 5. They are the parties empowered by the special Act to execute the undertaking. Sometimes agreements for the purchase of lands are made by the promoters of the company prior to its incorporation. At common law such agreements are not binding on the company, and the company cannot ratify them so as to pass the liability from the promoters (Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 175), but the company could of course enter into a new contract on the same terms as the old and in substitution for it with the consent of the parties. |