On Morality, its origin and nature.

The doctrine of morality-Ethics-is the most interesting subject which can come under our views. Ethics embraces all that is loved in God and in man, the notions of good and evil, of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, of merit and demerit, of moral liberty and responsibility.

The majority of every existing community require to be conducted by regulations which must even be imposed upon them in a dogmatic way. A very few only are capable of understanding the concatenation of causes and effects; and even the natural laws will be incomprehensible dogmas to the great mass of mankind. Belief in, at least submission to, the true laws is quite indispensable to the well being of man, and hence obligatory upon all, but specially upon those who know them.

It is remarkable that hitherto all nations have adopted their religion, and a part of their moral laws, from revelation. We may therefore easily conceive that the priesthood will continue to estimate their services highly, to keep religious notions stationary, and to make their own interpretations pass as the revealed will of God.

All positive laws are imposed, but the obligation of bowing to them is no proof of their being what they ought to be. Indeed the most opposite rules of conduct have, at different times, been enjoined even as divine and infallible, and it has not generally appeared singular that divine laws have varied according to persons, localities and circumstances. I cannot, however, help saying that my esteem is not great for a legislator who is constantly in contradiction with himself, who desires moral good, but who notwithstanding his omnipotence corrects only by exterminating, who punishes the innocent on account of the guilty. My intention here is only to show that belief, or the necessity of obeying, does not prove the perfection of positive laws.

Some actions in the Christian doctrine are styled good, and others bad or sinful, and whilst the first are commanded, the last are forbidden. Good actions are farther stated to be done after

the spirit, and sins after the flesh, though the flesh is allowed not to be evil in itself. But if actions be not specified, how can we know which are good and which are bad? Is there no standard, according to which they may be judged universally?

In every branch of natural science positive and exact knowledge is sought after. I think that the same ought to be done in regard to the morality of human actions. Mere faith in religious opinions will no longer suffice, the reign of positive truth should begin. The moral nature of man ought to be examined, with observation as a guide, and reduced to principles capable of general and constant application. Invention in the knowledge of man cannot be permitted, and arbitrary interpretations must give place to invariable laws; actions done in conformity with which will be declared as good, and those not in conformity as bad. Morality must become a science.

The nature of every being is regulated by laws, and the human body is evidently so. The laws of propagation and nutrition cannot be changed, and from analogy we may conclude that the moral nature of man is not left to the guidance of chance. But in what do the moral laws consist, or how are they to be determined? Shall it be by force, by a majority of votes? or are they to be sought from among the works and decrees of the Creator?

It is of the highest importance to be convinced that human nature is governed by natural laws. Many philosophers have acknowledged the existence of natural laws of morality as well as of organization. In the opinion of Confucius law is that which is conformable to nature.' Cicero thinks that the law cannot vary, but that it is the same for every nation; and that no injustice, whatever name is given to it, can be considered as law, though a whole nation may submit to its infliction. Lord Bacon calls the laws of nature the law of laws. Charron says, that wise men conduct themselves, that nature is their guide, and that the laws are at the bottom of their hearts. Montesquieu observes, that to say there is neither justice nor injustice except that which is so declared by positive laws, is to say that the radii of a circle are not equal before

it is traced. Nevertheless this writer allowed governments the power of determining or making the law; his comparison, however, proves that the law exists prior to governments, which are established merely to watch over its execution; the number of governors is here a secondary point, the object remains invariably the same, viz. the enforcement of the natural law. St. Paul speaks in the most decisive manner of natural morality, in stating that some persons without the law do things ordered by the law, since this is written in their hearts.

'Man,' says Volney, like the whole world of which he is a part, is ruled by natural laws, which are invariable in their essence, regular in their application, consequent in their effects, and the common cause both of good and evil. They are not written in the stars, nor hidden in mysterious ideas; but inherent in human nature, and identified with man's existence. They act on his senses, advertise his intelligence, and bring with every action penalty or reward. Let man learn these laws, let him understand his own and the nature of things around him, and he will know the cause of his griefs and the remedy.'

Volney believed in the existence of natural laws; but he did not, in my opinion, understand the basis of natural morality, when he conceived that it was self preservation. In his hypothesis, animals should have a moral nature; but from what I have already said, and from what I shall still say, it follows that neither personal interest nor selfishness of any kind can be recognised as the foundation of morality.

From the great influence of the natural laws upon the condition of mankind it follows that it is exceedingly important not to err in their determination. To elucidate the natural laws in general, and those of morality in particular, I make the following remarks.

In examining the origin of morality we find that the greater number of persons derive the moral sense from revelation; that some philosophers consider it as innate; whilst others ascribe it to intelligence, or even to personal interest.

* Ruins, ch. v.

The ancient doctrine that revelation is the only cause of morality must be given up, since the moral feelings are innate independently of religion, and since revelation can only direct the innate sentiments in their functions. On the other hand it is also certain, that neither the moral nor any other feelings can be derived from intellect. This may guide the functions of the feelings, but cannot produce them. The details of these propositions are found in the first volume of this work, where I treat of the moral powers of man. I therefore here confine myself to the consideration of personal interest as the cause of morality.

Man, say the partisans of selfishness, acts by interest; he does that which gives him the greatest pleasure, or seems the most advantageous. Egotism, continue they, is not confined to the search after the pleasures of the body or of sense, but extends over all internal sensations, and all moral and intellectual enjoyments. To act, in order to experience pleasure in the moment of action, or to obtain reward either in this life or in that which is to come, is still to act from self-interest.

I grant that man is eminently selfish, and that selfishness in union with pride makes him believe what he likes. We may admit with Benjamin Franklin, that he who for giving a draught of water to a thirsty person should expect to be paid with a good plantation, would be modest in his demands, compared with those who think they deserve heaven for the little good they do on earth. The basis of morality founded on selfishness, indeed, is unworthy, ignoble, and uncertain at the same time. Wherever it prevails man will be unhappy; and agreement, in regard to that which is morally good, impossible. Individual inclinations of legislators will determine the laws; and their self-satisfaction be the principal motive of their regulations. This is the law of the strongest, assisted by intelligence. It advises governments to treat subjects with benevolence and justice, because in this they find their own advantage; to keep the community in ignorance, as it is easier to persuade and arbitrarily to guide ignorant people than to convince those with cultivated understandings; and to foster superstition,

since it is an excellent means of effecting whatever seems convenient.

The insufficiency of this morality has been felt, and therefore it has been deemed necessary to add, that every one has a title to satisfy his selfish desires, provided he does not trench on the rights of others. This is the doctrine which moralists of modern times endeavor to establish. It is certainly far superior to the vile system founded on the right of the strongest, which, for so many centuries, has desolated the world. Self-love, which undoubtedly exists in man, is here combined with love of others, also an inherent principle in human nature.

This doctrine, if followed, will put an end to many abuses, and prevent numerous disorders; in many respects it will also promote general happiness. Whoever loves humanity must therefore desire to see it propagated. Nevertheless, the doctrine is founded on the inferior motive of personal interest; and it is what neither Nature nor Christianity teaches.

Other philosophers, still considering self-interest and intelligence together as the cause of morality, say that the strong govern the weak; and that if the weak occasionally become the strong, they throw off the yoke, and impose their own will in turn. Thus it is always the strong who govern. In these circumstances one fears another, and then both agree upon what shall be considered as law. This system, therefore, is founded on convention or agreement between the governors and the governed, for their common advantage.

Let it be understood that no sentiment results from any other, nor from intelligence. Fear then cannot produce the moral sense. Animals are sensible to fear, and yet are ruled by the right of the strongest. Fear, it is true, may become a motive to act and to make laws; but it conceives neither the necessity nor the justice of making laws.

Positive facts and reasoning prove, that the basis of morality is inherent in human nature; but those who treat of justice and virtue and admit this innateness, do not always attach the same meaning