Of temporal conditions having av joined to some temporal particle (DTE, ES, etc.) and the subjunctive mood in the protasis, there were found in Romans three, one of which is a quotation-and therefore not to be taken into account; while in Hebrews only two were noted, of which one was a quotation. The ratio of occurrence in Romans, then, is one to every thirteen pages; in Hebrews, one to twenty-one pages.

Of indefinite relatives joined to av and the subjunctive, in Romans four exist, of which three are quotations, while in Hebrews no example was noted. The indications thus far, it will be seen, are exceedingly slight, and alone can form no basis for argument.

Of the "vivid future" form of condition. Romans contains eleven instances, three of which are quotations: Hebrews affords only six instances, four of them quotations. Here the evidence is more decisive, since Romans contains one such condition properly chargeable to the author for every three pages, while Hebrews has only one to each ten pages.

Romans contains seven cases of the "present general supposition," none of which are quoted; Hebrews has only three, one a quotation. The ratio here is, for Romans one to every four pages; for Hebrews, one for every ten. It is therefore noticeable that St. Paul has a fondness for the subjunctive which is displayed in a much less marked degree by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

The next form to come under examination is the "particular supposition," as Professor Goodwin has termed it, or the "logical," as others have named it. It is a form especially frequent in Pauline writings, occurring more often than all others put together. Romans contains thirty-three cases, while only eight are found in Hebrews. This seems to the writer to be a very marked difference, especially in view of the fact mentioned above, that this form of condition is so frequently used by St. Paul. None of the above are quotations, and so are indicative of a real difference in style of argumentation.

It seemed worth while to note also the occurrence of ei μh (verb omitted) with the meaning "but." Romans has this five times and Hebrews once, the ratio of frequency being about four to one.

The last form to call for attention is the "impliedly unfulfilled." Romans has of this only two examples, one of which is a quotation; while Hebrews has four, none quoted. Ratio: Romans, one to twenty-six pages; Hebrews, one to every five pages.

But the difference in frequency of occurrence is not the most significant feature in connection with this form of condition in the two writings. An examination of Romans vii. 7 will show that the av which should appear in an apodosis of this form is missing. In all the Pauline Epistles this kind of condition occurs only six times, once as a quotation, and in two of the five chargeable to St. Paul, av of the apodosis is missing. This omission is striking and unusual, as it is the classic mark of this particular form of hypothesis. It will be noted that, in contrast to this departure by St. Paul from classic models, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews always writes

the full form of the conclusion. This is in accord with what has been noted by the commentators of the carefulness of construction shown by the writer to the Hebrews.

The general result may be presented to the eye thus:

It will thus be seen that there is a difference in style, sometimes very slight, but still existing, all along the line. In some of the forms of condition the divergence is so slight that from them alone no case could be made But when a difference in the forms is seen to exist, each case adds its weight to the rest, and the whole makes what seems to the writer strong testimony corroborative of the general opinion reached on other grounds of a non-Pauline authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

out.

III.

THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES.

BY THE REV. GEORGE W. GILMORE.

ALTHOUGH the authorship of the Acts of the Apostles is now generally conceded to the author of the third Gospel, it may not be amiss to note one or two confirmatory indications gathered in the course of grammatical studies of the New Testament, which peculiarities I have not seen remarked on. These are connected with the use of ews, and are noteworthy as occurring only in these two books.

In two passages (Luke iv. 42 and Acts ix. 38) we find us employed with the genitive of person after verbs of motion, where in classic Greek we should have s with the accusative. So far as I can discover, these are the only instances of such a use in the New Testament, and the occurrence of such a construction once in each book and nowhere else seems to me strong evidence of sameness of origin.

Another finger pointing in the same direction is the employment in Luke and Acts of εws before and in conjunction with a preposition. The passages in question are Luke xxiv. 50 (πpós); Acts xxvi. 11 (ɛiç); and xvii. 14 (έ). It is remarkable that peculiarities of style so marked should be found in these books and no others of the New Testament, if they are not the work of the same author.

above is the employment of iwc See Luke ii. 15 and Acts xiii. before indeclinable numerals,

One other singular usage going with the as a preposition before indeclinable nouns. Matthew (chap. xviii. 21-22) uses ews but no other writer of the New Testament employs it with indeclinable

20.

nouns.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN. Origin of Human Faculty. By George John Romanes, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., author of Animal Intelligence," Mental Evolution in Animals." New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1889. (pp. viii. 452. 67x4.)

As has long been recognized, all thorough-going theories of evolution meet with what seem to the larger part of mankind insuperable difficulties at three points : 1. In the origin of matter, which must have been miraculous if it is not permitted to take refuge in pure pantheism. 2. In the origin of life, since spontaneous generation has so far utterly failed of receiving any proof, and the two kingdoms of the not-living and the living to all appearance are separated by a gulf which cannot be crossed by any conceivable natural means. 3. The origin of the higher faculties of the human soul.

We do not know just how Mr. Romanes, who counts himself a thoroughgoing evolutionist, would account for the origin of matter with all its congeries of forces and its ordained lines of development. From some of his more fugitive utterances we understand that he disclaims the principles of materialism, and seeks relief in a spiritualistic monism, and would regard matter as but a form of mind, and would press the doctrine of the divine immanence to its extreme limits. But upon this point he says nothing in the present volume, and we will not stop to discuss the difficulties and inconsistencies in which the evolutionist is involved on this theory. Nor does the author, in this volume, express himself with regard to the transition in nature from the mechanical to the vital forces. Indeed he could not say much upon this point, except to admit that it is a subject at present beyond the domain of science, and that the bridge supposed to span the chasm was broken down so long ago that no vestiges of it at the present time remain.

But supposing himself safely past these critical places, and assuming that the reader will readily grant the evolution of matter from the original mind of the universe, and the evolution of life from the material forces of nature, Mr. Romanes concentrates his attention upon the question of the natural evolution of the higher faculties of the human mind. He does this, supposing, with good reason, that if he can overcome the objections at this point it will go far toward removing objections at other points. In discussing this part of the problem of evolution, Mr. Romanes is now pre-eminent

both in the pains he has taken to prepare himself for the task and in the ability and fairness with which he conducts it. As a part of his scheme he has already published, besides the present volume, works upon "Animal Intelligence" and "Mental Evolution of Animals," and proposes to publish volumes in the future dealing with the origin of the intellect, emotions, volition, morals, and religion. From this it will be seen that the most difficult portion of his work remains to be done, especially in the realms of volition, morals, and religion. But the present undertaking in the volume on "The Origin of Human Faculty" is not without its difficulties, and has drawn heavily upon the abundant resources of the writer, putting him upon his mettle at every point.

Mr. Romanes supposes that he traces a significant parallelism between the intellectual development in the ascending orders of animals and that in the infant of the human species in the first few months of its development. To animals he ascribes a series both of emotional and intellectual activities, reaching as high in the order of complexity as those attained by the child at the age of fifteen months. He believes that the echinodermata exercise memory; that the larvae of insects possess primary instincts and exhibit surprise and fear; that mollusks exercise association by contiguity; that insects and spiders recognize their offspring, have some parental affection and social feeling, exercise pugnacity, industry, and curiosity; that reptiles and cephalopods recognize their friends and their enemies; that the hymenoptera are able to communicate their ideas and to feel the bond of sympathy; that birds recognize pictures, understand words, and dream, and have the emotions connected with emulation, pride, resentment, aesthetic love of ornament, and terror; that the carnivora, rodents, and ruminants appreciate to some extent the construction of machinery, and experience the emotions connected with grief, hate, cruelty, and benevolence; that monkeys and elephants use tools to some extent, and are moved with the feelings of revenge and rage; and finally that anthropoid apes and dogs have a rudimentary conscience and an indefinite idea of morality, and exhibit the feelings associated with shame, remorse, deceitfulness, and whatever is ludicrous. This is as high a point of development, our author contends, as is attained by the child at the age of fifteen months. According, therefore, to the argument from gradual approach, he maintains that we cannot in logical consistency refuse to supply the other rounds in the ladder which by some adverse fate are acknowledged to be absent, and so maintain the solidarity of the animal creation and a true brotherhood between man and the lower animals.

In the present volume a large part of the author's effort is spent in endeavoring to answer the arguments urged against his theory by Max Müller and others from the phenomena of language; and he is led boldly to take the position that the reason why the child after the age of fifteen months is enabled to part company with the parrot, who can talk, and the dog, who can reason, is that the parrot cannot "perceive the resemblance of images and pictures to the objects which they are intended to represent ;"