Exch. of Pleas, defendant coroner for the borough, in derogation of the 1841. RUTTER v. CHAPMAN. right of the county coroner, unless by virtue of the powers conferred by statute upon the town council. The first question therefore is, whether, upon this point, there has been any misdirection of the learned Judge, by reason of which the bill of exceptions ought to prevail. The only averments of the plea which are denied by the replication, are the averments that the inhabitant householders of the borough of Manchester petitioned her Majesty to grant to them a charter of incorporation; and that the charter granted by her Majesty was accepted by them. All the other allegations of the plea, as to the reference of the petition to the Privy Council, their adjudication thereon, the grant of the charter and the elections. under it, the grant of the sessions, &c., are admitted on the record. Nor is it denied that the defendant was duly elected and appointed coroner by the town council, provided they had authority by law so to do. Further, it is clear, and was not disputed at the trial, that the charter was accepted by the inhabitant householders of the borough to whom it was granted. The only question of fact which remains in issue therefore is, whether the inhabitant householders of the borough of Manchester did or did not petition the Crown to grant to them a charter of incorporation. Now, except the counter petition, no evidence was adduced or tendered on the part of the plaintiff: and unless the Crown were prevented, after a petition lodged in favour of a charter, by the presenting of a counter petition more numerously signed, but not signed by a majority of those to whom the charter is addressed, from acting upon the advice of the Privy Council, and granting a charter upon the first petition; unless the Privy Council had no jurisdiction under such circumstances, and their office were merely ministerial, to tell the amount of signatures to each petition, without any means of verifying their genuineness, or the qualifications of the petitioners, then it is submitted that the 1841. RUTTER v. CHAPMAN. evidence of the counter petition could not affect the power Exch. of Pleas, of the Crown to grant a charter with the powers conferred by the statute. [The learned counsel here read the evidence for the defendant, as stated in the bill of exceptions.] Now what better means could be taken than those which the defendant proved to have been adopted, for the purpose of ascertaining the general wish of the majority of the inhabitant householders of the borough? Can it then be said, that an absolute majority of the whole inhabitant householders of the borough-which would require 24,000 at least should be petitioners? And if not, can it be contended that the mere fact of a counter petition, signed by one individual more than the original petition, after its being lodged in the Council Office, was sufficient to tie up the hands of the Crown, and prevent the grant of a charter? The direction of the learned Judge, to which exception is made, was no more than this-"that the Crown had the power of granting the charter notwithstanding the counter petition ;"-it being left to the jury, upon the whole of the evidence, to say whether there had been a petition by the inhabitant householders of the borough, praying that a charter might be granted. The case for the plaintiff is, that the presentment of the counter petition was, in point of law, an answer to the defendant's case, shewing that the Crown had no power to grant the charter on the first petition, and upon which the Judge was bound to direct a verdict for the plaintiff. Now it is submitted, that, upon the proper construction of the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 141, or of the 1 Vict. c. 78, s. 49, the counter petition had no such effect in point of law. [Bosanquet, J.-The evidence for the plaintiff leaves it uncertain whether the counter petition was presented to the Crown after the reference of the first petition to the Privy Council, or not.] That is so. Now it is insisted for the plaintiff, that the act of Parliament ought to be rigidly construed, inasmuch as it is of a penal nature, 1841. RUTTER v. CHAPMAN. Exch. of Pleas, giving the power to impose burthens on the subject. But the borough rate is for the benefit and protection of the inhabitants; and abundant guards are provided against the abuse of the power of taxation. The statute is in truth altogether remedial: it was intended by the legislature for the benefit of those who were to be governed under the new system of municipal administration; and the Court will endeavour to give full effect to the intention of the legislature, and, if necessary, for this purpose rather to put a liberal than a strict construction upon the statute. And the question now is only this, whether the counter petition was in itself an absolute bar to the power of the Crown to carry into effect the intention of the legislature. The argument must go to this extent, that it would be an absolute bar if it had only a single signature more than the original petition. Now the provision of the sta tute amounts to this-that if the Crown shall be pleased, in the exercise of its common-law prerogative, to grant a charter on the petition of the inhabitant householders, then the Crown shall have the statutable power of conferring upon the inhabitants the powers granted by this act of Parliament, which cannot be granted by the prerogative. The petition of the inhabitant householders is undoubtedly a condition precedent to the exercise of the statutable power of conferring the additional authority. The common-law charter, upon which the statutable power is to be superinduced, must be granted upon the petition of the inhabitants, and by the advice of the Privy Council. These are the only conditions imposed by the statute: there is no proviso, that in case of a counter petition being signed by a greater number, the Crown shall have no such power. It might be, that between the time of the presenting of the original and the counter petition, there might be an influx of inhabitants into the town, so that, although the original petition was at the time the petition of the actual majority, at the time of the counter 1841. RUTTER v. CHAPMAN. petition that number had ceased to be the majority: Exch. of Pleas, can it be said that in such case the Crown would be barred of its power thereby? But it is said (assuming it to be open on this bill of exceptions), that the defendant has not made out even a primâ facie case for considering the original petition to be the petition of the inhabitant householders of the borough, it being signed only by 4000 out of 48,000. But is there any ground for saying, that it must be signed by an actual majority? Is it even necessary that it should be signed at all? Suppose there had been a meeting of all the inhabitant householders, who had unanimously agreed on the desirableness of a charter, and instructed the chairman to sign a petition for it to the Crown in their name; that charter having being granted, accepted, and acted upon, could it be contended that all the acts done under it were unlawful and void, because the petition was only so signed? If this objection can be made by the defendant, it may be made by any rate payer, and at any distance of time. But if a majority must sign, of whom must it consist? Are women, minors, paupers, convicts, to sign? And how are the Privy Council to know the absolute population of the borough? They are upon their responsibility to advise the Crown, whether the petition in favour of the charter is really and bonâ fide to be considered the petition of the inhabitant householders of the borough. It is very doubtful, whether, in point of law, a majority is necessary even for accepting a charter; but, at all events, it is clear that a majority need not join in the act of acceptance: R. v. Amery (a) ; R. v. Hughes (b); Vin. Abr. Corporation (G). No doubt, the Crown cannot force a charter upon the inhabitants of a town; and when granted upon a petition, it may be refused: but here the charter was accepted, and has been acted upon for several years. And even if the petition of a majority were necessary, yet after the Privy Council have advised the grant, (a) 1 T. R. 588. (b) 7 B. & C. 708; 1 Man. & Ryl. 625. 1841. RUTTER v. CHAPMAN. Exch. of Pleas, and the charter has been granted and accepted, it is too late to object that the petition was insufficiently signed. But further, if the objection could now be made, there was abundant proof from which the jury might come to the conclusion that the majority of the inhabitant householders of the borough did concur in the petition. There was a public meeting convened by advertisement issued by the authorities of the town, a resolution by a large majority of those assembled, and a petition presented signed by 4000 persons, and subsequently an acceptance of the charter granted thereupon. If, as is contended, a charter must be accepted by a majority, such acceptance is cogent evidence from which a jury might infer that a majority concurred in petitioning for it. If it be otherwise, then, notwithstanding that acceptance, there is no valid town council, no valid grant of quarter sessions, no good borough rate, and all the acts of the several functionaries of the borough may be questioned and invalided at any distance. of time; nay, every felon transported by any Recorder of Manchester may sue him for trespass and false imprisonment, and shew that all the proceedings were coram non judice, because there was not a majority of the inhabitant householders who joined in the petition for the charter. It never could have been the intention of the legislature that that question should be, toties quoties, on every such occasion, submitted to juries, who might come to different conclusions in different cases, it being necessary, moreover, in every case to enter upon a complete scrutiny of the signatures on both sides, which would occupy months and even years. It is submitted, therefore, that after the grant of a charter upon a petition of the inhabitant householders, duly referred to the Privy Council, who have adjudicated upon it, and after the acceptance of the charter granted thereon, it is no longer open to any party to enter into the relative numbers of those who signed that and the counter petition, and to contend that the petition upon which the |