Exch. of Pleas, breach was that the defendant did not appear at the County 1841. JACKSON v. HANSON. Court next after the giving of the bond, according to the condition, and did not then and there, or in any manner, or at any time or place, prosecute his suit with effect. The Court said the breach assigned was for not appearing. In Com. Dig., "Pleader" (C 48), it is said, "it is sufficient that the breach be assigned in the words of the covenant, promise, &c.:" also "covenant by an apprentice for not finding victuals et alia necessaria, in the words of the covenant, is sufficient." If the party is bound to do all, then the word 'and' may be used, but otherwise if not bound to do all.-[Parke, B.-This breach is not good, unless the meaning of the condition be that all shall be done at the first County Court.] Gray, in reply.-It is not contended that the breach is bad for duplicity. The plaintiff has not assigned as distinct breaches that the defendant did not appear at the next County Court, and that he did not prosecute with effect, but the substance of the breach is, that he did not prosecute with effect at the next County Court. It is not inconsistent with the breach as worded, that the defendant may have appeared at the next Court, and then taken some steps in the suit, and if so, the condition required by the statute would not be broken, the suit being still pending. The suit may have subsequently been prosecuted with effect. Cur. adv. vult. The judgment of the Court was now delivered by PARKE, B.-(His Lordship stated the pleadings, and continued:) The difficulty in this case has arisen from the improper form in which the condition of the replevin bond has been drawn; viz., to appear at the then next County 1841. JACKSON v. HANSON, Court, and then and there to prosecute his suit with effect. Exch. of Pleas, The form of the condition should have pursued the words of the act, 11 Geo. 2, and should have been for the defendant John Hanson to appear at the then next County Court, and prosecute his suit with effect and without delay. Upon the condition of the bond in the form in which it is drawn, the question first arises, what is its meaning? If it be that the defendant is to appear at the then next Court, and at that Court prosecute his suit to a not unsuccessful termination (which is the true import of the term "with effect"), the breach is properly assigned, and that Mr. Gray, who argued very ably for the defendant, admitted. If, however, the true meaning of the condition is that he shall appear at the next County Court, and then and there prosecute his suit, that is, begin to prosecute it, and afterwards prosecute it with effect, then the breach is improperly assigned, for it is consistent with the averments in that breach, that the suit may have been begun at the first County Court, and though not terminated at that Court, may still continue; and then the condition has not been broken. And we think that such is the true meaning of the condition: for if we do not so construe it, the consequence would be, that the bond would, under ordinary circumstances, certainly be forfeited on the day after the first County Court should be held, as it would be impossible for the defendant, according to the course of the County Court to levy his plaint, issue a summons, and make it returnable, and proceed to trial or judgment in one day, or at one Court; and though there is a bare possibility of the penalty being saved by the death of either party before the first Court, or the abatement of the suit on the same day that the first Court should be held after the plaint levied, we think that the condition is to be construed with reference to the ordinary course of a suit, and not with a view to such remote contingencies; the object of the bond. Exch. of Pleas, being, that the question whether the goods were rightly 1841. JACKSON V. HANSON. taken should be properly litigated, in the ordinary way, but with reasonable speed. The condition, therefore, ought to be construed in the sense last attributed to it, and consequently our judgment should be for the defendant. But as the form of declaration adopted in this case is the one given in the late Mr. Chitty's Pleadings, Vol. 2, p. 173, and the plaintiff may have been misled by it, we think that he may amend on payment of costs. Leave to amend accordingly. June 3. A licence is not implied by law to the purchaser of goods, WILLIAMS v. JOHN MORRIS, DAVID DAVIES, TRESPASS for breaking and entering the plaintiff's house, barn, stable, and two closes called the rickyard and the foldyard, breaking to pieces locks and doors, &c., and seizing and carrying away the plaintiff's cattle and goods. tion or distress,) There were two counts in the declaration, the first for a (though sold under an execu to enter upon the premises of trespass on the 1st November, 1839, the second for a simi the former own er and take them lar trespass on the 5th February, 1840. away, although they have remained there with his assent. To support a plea of leave and licence to an action of trespass for taking away goods under such circum Pleas, first, not guilty; secondly, a general plea of leave and licence; thirdly, to the first count, that the dwellinghouse, barn, stable, closes, doors, &c., cattle, goods, and chattels in that count mentioned were not, nor was any of them, nor was any part thereof, the dwelling-house, &c. &c. of the plaintiff, modo et formâ: fourthly; a similar plea to the second count. The plaintiff joined issue on must be proof the first, third, and fourth pleas, and to the second replied de injuriâ, on which also issue was joined. stances, there of an express agreement that the purchaser should enter on the premises and take the goods. Quære, whe At the trial before Williams, J., at the last Denbighshire assizes, the following facts appeared : The plaintiff, who occupied a small farm in the parish of ther there can be an irrevocable licence to enter upon land, without its amounting to an interest in land, which therefore can pass only by deed. 1841. WILLIAMS v. MORRIS. Abergele, in Denbighshire, being indebted to one Roberts Exch. of Pleas, in a sum of about 80%., was sued by him to judgment, and in November, 1839, a fieri facias issued against him, under which the cattle, corn, hay, &c., and other goods on his premises, were taken in execution. The sheriff being about to proceed to a sale, the plaintiff applied to the defendants Morris and Davies, who were farmers in the neighbourhood, to befriend him by buying in goods at the sale, and giving him a short time for the repayment of the money advanced for that purpose. The defendants accordingly attended at the sale, on the 6th and 7th of December, 1839, and bought in their own names, Morris to the amount of 721. 9s. 11d., and Davies to the amount of 91. 9s. 5d., making together 817. 19s. 4d.; the whole proceeds of the sale being 1007. 1s. 4d. One of the conditions of the sale was, that the property purchased was to be paid for immediately, and taken off the premises, but if left there, to be at the risk of the purchaser. Evidence was given of statements made by both these defendants at the time of the sale, that they were buying for the plaintiff, in consequence of which several persons refrained from bidding for some of the articles put up to sale. All the cattle and goods so bought by the defendants remained on the premises, and in the possession of the plaintiff, but the defendants disposed of several quantities of corn and beans, and a few other articles, to different purchasers, who paid the defendants for them. About a week after the sale, the defendants Morris and Davies came to the plaintiff's house, telling him they wanted some understanding about the property bought in at the sale; that they wanted no profit, but he ought to pay them interest on the amount they had purchased for him. The plaintiff promised that they should have the money in two months from the time of the sale, with which they expressed themselves satisfied. A short time afterwards, an account was drawn out as between the defendant Morris and the plaintiff, on the debit 1841. WILLIAMS V. MORRIS. Exch. of Pleas, side of which were placed the sums paid by Morris and Davies at the sale, together with an item of 17. for interest to the 7th February, 1840, and on the credit side different sums received by them for the corn, beans, &c., sold subsequently to the sale, and shewing a balance of upwards of 251. due from the plaintiff to the defendants. At the same time, the articles bought by the defendants which still remained on the premises, were marked with their names in the plaintiff's presence. On the 23d January, 1840, the same two defendants came again to the plaintiff's house, when the account was read over, and the defendants required that the plaintiff should find sureties for the repayment of the money, and on his stating that he was unable to do so, said they should take the goods away: and after considerable discussion and negotiation, they accordingly, assisted by the other defendants, broke open several of the farm gates, and the barn door, and took away the horses from the stable, together with several carts and harrows, some hay, vetches, &c. On the 5th February, they came again to the premises, broke open the door of the house, which the plaintiff had bolted against them, and took away all the rest of the cattle and goods left from the sale. Some evidence was given to shew that certain articles of small value were also carried away by the defendants, which had not been put up at the sale. For the defendants, it was contended that the goods were bonâ fide purchased by them, subject only to an agreement that the plaintiff might repurchase them within a reasenable time, and that under the circumstances the defendants were entitled to enter and retake them. The learned Judge, in summing up, left it to the jury to say, first, whether the goods were bought by the defendants out and out, so that the property in them passed out of the plaintiff; and secondly, whether any articles were taken away by the defendants which were not included in the sale: and with respect to the plea of leave and licence, he expressed his |