The appeal is taken upon the point that the conviction was made upon the evidence of the complainant, without the corroboration required by s. 1002 Cr. Code, as re-enacted, by which it is provided, inter alia, that "no person accused of an offence . . . shall be convicted upon the evidence of one witness, unless such witness is corroborated in some material particular by evidence implicating the accused."

The complainant's story is as follows. She left her home near Lockport, which is eighteen miles from Winnipeg, and situate on a country road, at 9 o'clock Monday morning, September 20, last, to walk to the post office, two miles distant, to mail a letter. She had proceeded but a short distance, when the accused in an automobile overtook her and offered her a lift. She did not know him and had never seen him before. She got in the car. On coming to a cross-road, he turned into it, and on her remonstrating that she wanted to go to the post office, he said he was going but a short way, and that then he would take her there. After driving about four miles further on, he made an indecent proposal. She commenced to cry. He let her out of the car and followed her, when he pushed her to the ground, pulled down her bloomers, and committed the act complained of. In removing the bloomers the accused tore them. The tear was shown at the trial. On the complainant refusing to re-enter the car the accused drove away. She at once wrote on the letter she was carrying the licence number of the car, 20-245. She then went to the post office, made a call at her grandmother's, and returned home about twelve o'clock (noon) when she told her elder sister, a girl of fifteen, what had happened. The mother was then absent. The story was told to her later in the day.

The number of the car was given to the police, when its owner, the prisoner, a resident of Winnipeg, was arrested. On the prisoner being brought into a room at police headquarters and paraded with a number of men, he was identified by the complainant. The complainant pointed out the car, when taken to a general garage. Her reasons for identifying it are given in the following evidence:

"Q. How did you pick out the car? A. Pointed it out. Q. What made you pick out this car that you did pick out? A. Well, I saw the licence number and saw how the car looked.

Q. Was there anything particular? A. The cushion. Q. Now, can you describe the cushion; what sort of a cushion was it! A. A little round one, on one side was black plush. Q. What color was the other side? A. A kind of sand color. Q. Where was this cushion in the car? A. Just at the back of his seat. Q. Of which seat? A. Of the driver's seat. Q. Now, I show you a cushion here; what do you say as to that? A. It was turned over this way. Q. And you saw the black part? A. Yes. Q. Is that cushion like the one you saw in the accused's car? A. Yes. Q. When did you notice the cushion first of all! A. When I got into the car. Q. That is when he met you on the road? A. Yes."

The elder sister gave evidence of the story told to her by the complainant at noon of the day in question, and identified the tear in the bloomers which the complainant had then shown her.

The complainant was examined on September 23 by a medical practitioner. He found injury or abrasion of recent origin to the vagina, which could have been caused by sexual intercourse.

On September 24, the accused was arrested. The constable read the charge to him and gave him the usual caution. He was then taken to an office of the Provincial police, when he was identified by the complainant. Upon the complainant's withdrawal the accused made two statements to the constable which were taken down in writing and signed by the accused. The first statement is as follows:-"On Monday 20th I was home till 9 a.m. After that I went straight to the Seymour Hotel. I talked to Mr. Lott, the pool marker for maybe 10 or 15 minutes, and from there I went and got my car in front of block (his residence). I went to the City Dray Garage on Rupert Street (West) and talked to Karl, the mechanic. Stopped about 1⁄2 hour, then went home, about 10.30 a.m. I walked to the Seymour Hotel and back, then drove my own car No. 20-245 to the City Dray Garage. I left car in front of garage. I asked Karl what I could do to fix the tail-light, but he had no time, as he was working on another car. I stayed home till about 12.30 and went back to the Seymour Hotel, walked and played pool with Lott till about 1.00 p.m. or 1.15 p.m. I then played with Bert Davey. I think he lives on the East side of Central Park, Carleton Street. I stayed at the Seymour Hotel all after

noon and then Davey and I went to my home for supper. On Sunday, I left home for Beausejour with my wife, between 9 and 10 o'clock. Left Beausejour and got back about 7.30 p.m. Slept home Sunday night."

The following is the second statement, which was made immediately after the first was given:-"On Monday 20th, I left my home at 9 a.m. and went to the Seymour Hotel. I talked with Lott, the pool marker till 9.30 a.m. and then walked back to the block, then drove my car, McLaughlin coupe No. 20-245 to my mother's place, 368 Ritchot Street, St. Boniface, staying there till about 10.30 a.m. I went to Des Meurons Street, to my sister's, Mrs. Rougeau, and she came with me back to my mother's. Stayed there about 15 minutes, and went back home, arriving about 12 noon. I went to Karl at the City Dray Garage and asked him what was the matter with my car lights. He was too busy to attend to me so I went back to the block. On Sunday the 19th inst., I went to Beausejour with my wife, starting from the block about 9 a.m. and returning about 7.30 same day. I slept at home Sunday night. I don't think I ever saw that little girl before, at least not to talk to. I might have seen her before, but I don't know."

In Rex v. Baskerville, [1916] 2 K.B. 658, at p. 667, the Court of Criminal Appeal, per Lord Reading, C.J., said: "We hold that evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect. him with the crime. In other words, it must be evidence which implicates him, that is, which confirms in some material particular not only the evidence that the crime has been committed, but also that the prisoner committed it. The test applicable to determine the nature and extent of the corroboration is thus the same whether the case falls within the rule of practice at common law or within that class of offences for which corroboration is required by statute. The language of the statute [Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 (Imp.), c. 69, ss. 2 & 3], 'implicates [implicating] the accused,' compendiously incorporates the test applicable at common law in the rule of practice. The nature of the corroboration will necessarily vary according to the particular circumstances of the offence charged. It would be in high degree dangerous to attempt to formulate the kind of evidence which would be regarded as corroboration

The corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime; it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime."

No one on the evidence which I have above detailed can reasonably have any view other than that the prisoner is guilty. That some one had carnal knowledge of the complainant is corroboratively shown. The theory that the complainant seeks to connect the prisoner, a person she did not know and never saw before, with the commission of the act, in order to shield another person, is too barren to have a moment's consideration. She gave not only the number of the car-something it is true she could have got from any passing car driven by an unknown man, if there would have been the slightest sense or object in doing it but she shows through her familiarity with the cushion at the back of the driver's seat that she had been in the car. This is a detail it is likely she would not have given if her story was an invention. If the prisoner's statement is true that during the whole of the forenoon of the 20th he was not at Lockport because he was elsewhere, then the number was a fictitious one invented for no earthly reason, and which on investigation by the police might be found not to belong to anyone or to belong to a person who weeks before had left the country. The conclusion, in my opinion, is unavoidable that the car was at Lockport on the 20th and that the complainant was in it. It is pointless to suggest that the complainant could have got the number from the car when it passed her or on some former occasion. If she got it on the 20th then the prisoner is shown to be lying and her story is corroborated. If it was not at Lockport on that date, then the incredible supposition is made that before the act in question was committed, the complainant in anticipation that the act would be committed on the 20th, and to protect the person who was to commit it, obtained the number of the car at an earlier date for the purpose of fastening the crime on the prisoner, a person she did not know, and who, if her story was to hold together, she had to assume would be in Lockport on the 20th.

It is obvious, therefore, that the car is a piece of independent, circumstantial evidence corroborative of the complainant's story and connecting the prisoner with the offence. Had her evidence been given in a different order; had she first identified

the prisoner, and then given the number of his car and a description of the cushion, the corroborative quality of the latter evidence would be evident. Its nature differs from cumulative or supporting statements resting solely upon the veracity of the complainant. It relates to facts she was powerless to invent.

Corroboration is found elsewhere. The charge which was read to him from the warrant when he was arrested on the 24th was that on the 20th he carnally knew the complainant. Upon his arrest he was taken to police headquarters when he was identified by the girl. He then made the statements which I have above quoted. These statements carry nothing but conviction that they are a tissue of lies. Each completely contradicts and refutes the other. It is not necessary to examine or compare them in detail. In the first statement there is no mention of visits to his mother and sister, to whom, with his wife, the proof of the alibi is left by the second statement. That both statements are false I have no doubt. That one is assuredly false need alone be stated. A further feature of the second statement has a significance which cannot be overlooked. When faced by the complainant, who identified him, and when he had knowledge that he was charged with carnally knowing her four days before, he said: "I don't think I ever saw that little girl before; at least not to talk to. I might have seen her before, but I don't know." These weak and quibbling words are not the stand of an innocent man, but of a guilty man who fears to commit himself too much lest there is evidence that he was seen with her.

The rule upon which this Court acted in Bartley v. Gall, [1925] 3 D.L.R. 585, applies to the circumstances here. There it was held that where the evidence of the accused and a witness for him contradicted the evidence for the prosecution in a material particular, the conclusion which it was open to the convicting Magistrate to come to that the accused was lying, was corroboration of the complainant's story. (See also Rex v. Gray (1904), 68 J.P. 327; the observation of Lord Atkinson in Christie v. The King, [1914] A.C. 545, at p. 554; Rex v. Stevens (1913), 9 Cr. App. R. 132; Rex v. Wakelyn (1913), 10 D.L.R. 455, 21 Can. C.C. 111, 5 Alta. L.R. 464; Rex v. Nash (1914), 17 D.L.R. 725, 23 Can. C.C. 38, 7 Alta. L.R. 449; Rex v. Burr (1906), 12 Can. C.C. 103, 13 O.L.R. 485; Rex v. Daun (1906),