to occupy so much of the land as they may consider necessary for a reservoir or reservoirs, or for any appendages to the same, or for repairing, improving, enlarging or maintaining the same, and to construct a dam or dams for such reservoir purposes and to overflow all the land that they may require for such purposes. Also reserving to the said party of the first part, their successors or assigns, the right at all times hereafter freely and without charge to have, take and use from the land or premises hereby conveyed to the parties of the second part, all the stones, earth, brush or other material of any kind whatsoever requisite or convenient for constructing, improving, altering, repairing, enlarging or maintaining the said reservoir and its appendages. There were on the lands conveyed two ponds, one enlarged by a dam; these ponds the grantor utilised until it discontinued operations as a canal company. It then executed a conveyance to C. of all its interests in the lands in question, which it had as a consequence of the exception in the original conveyance. B.'s interests were now vested in the plaintiffs; the interests under the deed to C. were now vested in the defendant, a water company, which was in possession of the ponds. This action was brought to recover possession thereof. Justice Potter in speaking of the clause in question, said : 66 · The first question thus brought squarely before us for determination is whether the clause in the deeds under consideration constitutes a reservation or an exception. The trial judge held that it was an exception. In the recent case of Sheffield Water Company v. Tanning Company (225 Pa. 614), our brother Stewart said (p. 619): The essential characteristic of a reservation as distinguished from an exception is, that its subject is something that did not exist before but is created by and grows out of the transaction. An exception applies only where the subject already exists.' In the opinion in that case it is further shown, that in the deed then under consideration, nothing was excepted out of the general grant; the deed invested the grantee with the legal title to the whole of the premises described in the grant; it conveyed to the grantee every inch of land falling within the description, whether occupied by dam, reservoir, pipes, tannery or otherwise howsoever, subject only to the right of the grantors, their heirs and assigns, to do those things upon the premises which the grantors had expressly reserved the right to do.' "This language seems to apply precisely to the terms of the present grant. The entire fee is conveyed by the deeds, and only certain rights are reserved to the grantors. The reservation is of 'the absolute and unqualified right to occupy so much of the land as may be necessary for reservoirs and dams, and the right at all times hereafter freely and without charge to have, take and use from the land or premises hereby conveyed' stones, earth, brush or other material necessary for the construction and repair of these reservoirs, &c. No part of the thing granted is excepted from the effect of the grant, but a new right or interest in the grantors is created, which they retain. It is something which did not before exist apart from the ownership of the land. "Our examination of the clause satisfies us that the effect of the language was to create something new out of what was granted. That is, it created the right to maintain reservoirs upon the land conveyed, and to repair, improve and enlarge them, and to construct dams, and overflow all the land the grantor might require for that purpose, and to enter upon the land and take from it stone, earth, brush and other material requisite or convenient for construction or repair of the reservoirs. This right, as a thing separate and apart from the ownership of the land, was created by and grew out of the transaction between the parties to the deeds, and it did not exist before. The new right in this respect thus created by the transaction was from that time forth to be enjoyed apart from, and in no way dependent upon the ownership of the land. As it was not in existence prior to the making of the deeds, it could not be made the subject of an exception, which must always be of something in existence at the time, as part of the whole of the grant, from which it is excepted." This reasoning, when analysed, seems to embrace two conceptions. The first is this: Some thing was conveyed by this deed, and no part of that thing was excepted, and the only purpose for which an exception can be used is to cut out part of the thing from the operation of the deed-as witness these phrases, an exception applies only when the subject already exists "it [the deed] conveyed to the grantee every inch of land ; "No part of the thing granted is excepted from the effect of the grant"; "an exception must always be of something in existence at the time." The objections to this proposition have already been sufficiently dealt with. A thing is never conveyed and never excepted; it is always a group of legal rights that forms the subject-matter of the conveyance or is excepted from the operation of the conveyance. The difference between an exception of the land occupied by the pond and an exception of a right to flood a certain amount of land is in the number of rights retained. In the first case we group them more or less loosely under the generic term ownership or property" or "title"; in the second we group them under the term " easement." A striking difference in them as a matter of exact statement is that in the first case the grantor, usually, at any rate, still has multital rights against any intrusion upon the physical soil regardless of damage; while in the second case he has multital rights only in so far as they are necessary for 66 the protection of the privileges that he has retained with regard to the soil in question. The second proposition that underlies the court's conclusion is that the grantors had the right before the conveyance to build reservoirs upon the land in question, but they had it because they owned the land; now the land is owned by another person, and hence their right to build a reservoir there is a new and different right and came into being only as a consequence of the conveyance. The first objection to this reasoning is that it seems to regard ownership as a unit, with the consequence that if that unit, the ownership of any given area, has passed to B., the result must be that any right that A. then has in that tract must be derived from B. As has been pointed out in the extract from Professor Hohfeld, such is far from being the case. Ownership is a congeries of various rights, powers, privileges, and immunities. Blackacre, the physical thing, may remain the same, but, because of restrictions imposed by the State upon its use and control, or incumbrances or servitudes imposed upon it by the act of A., or by the law, the aggregate of A.'s legal relations to the land may amount to much less than full and complete ownership, though he is still regarded both by lawyers and laymen as owner. For example, D., the owner of Blueacre in State X., may be the full and unencumbered and practically unrestricted master of that tract, while E., the owner of Greenacre in State Y., just across the line from Blueacre, may be subject to onerous restrictions imposed by the State upon his use of the land, may have granted to F. the right to cross the land with a burdensome traffic, to G. the right to take coal, oil, and gas from the land, to H. the right to foul the air which passes over the land, and to I. a heavy mortgage upon the land. In addition, J., by legal process, may have secured a mechanic's lien upon the land, and K. the lien of a judgment. These are, of course, only a few of the numerous subtractions which might conceivably be made from the full and complete ownership of the land. Yet we might still speak of E. as the owner " of Greenacre, but the name would deceive no well-advised person. The real question would be, has E. all of the incidents of full and complete ownership, and, if he has fewer than all, which ones are lacking? If it is possible to identify the lacking incidents by examination of the gap which they leave when they are lacking, it is equally possible to identify them even when they are not lacking, but remain in their normal places in the aggregate which makes up complete legal ownership. 66 66 The second objection to the court's idea is that even though, for the sake of argument, it may be admitted that there is a group of rights, the exact size of which is uncertain, that can be called the title, the court's conclusion does not follow. The court's contention in this regard, put in different language, would seem to be this : Before the conveyance the grantor, i.e., the canal company, had an indefinitely large number of privileges with regard to this land, as well as the other rights that go to make up ownership, including the privilege of building a reservoir, and B. had few privileges or rights with regard to this land. After the conveyance the grantee has such a preponderance of the rights, privileges, powers, and immunities with regard to this soil that he would be called the owner of it. The consequence of this is that A.'s privilege of building a reservoir, which he had before the conveyance and which he purported to keep out of the operation of the conveyance, has, nevertheless, disappeared, and now what A. has is a new privilege to do the very thing which he had the privilege to do before the conveyance The natural question seems to be, "Why is this so?" If A. had attempted to enumerate in his conveyance the rights with respect to this land that he was conveying to B., and after ten pages of enumeration he had said, " and all other rights of all kinds except the privilege of building a reservoir and that I do not convey to you but retain in myself," would A. have had a new privilege or the same one after the delivery of the deed to B.? It is clear that he would have had, after the conveyance, the same privilege and the same rights against B., so far as the exercise of this privilege is concerned, as he had before. It is true that before the conveyance this right is merely one of so many other incidents of ownership, that it is of itself practically unimportant, particularly if never in fact exercised by A., while, after the conveyance, it is the most pronounced right which A. claims in Blackacre; and since all the other incidents of ownership are in B., the right which A. claims is brought into sharp relief and becomes legally important. But this does not give any support to the position of the Pennsylvania court that the preivilege excepted is a different one, and it is submitted that the foregoing analysis has shown its unsoundness. Before we leave this part of the discussion, however, there is one difference between the use of the exception as laid down by Coke and the general language of the decisions and the use here made of it, to which attention should be called. The difference is that with them the exception seems to be used only when the so called " possessory rights with regard to the area excepted are kept out of the operation of the conveyance. This is what seems to be back of the phrase that an exception can be only of a thing in being. But while this distinction exists, it is clear that the keeping by A. of a right of way in a given strip in land granted by him to B. differs merely in degree from the so-called exception of the strip itself; whereas the difference between this and the grant to A. of a right of way over B.'s land Greenacre, or the reservation by A. of rights that before had no existence, is one of kind. Consequently the decisions of those courts which hold that an easement can be made the subject of an exception, or of a reservation where the word is used in the sense of exception, would seem justified as a matter of analogy, and desirable as a matter of accomplishing the intent of the parties. The decisions of some courts, that the easement may be excepted only if it has had a de facto user while the land was owned by the grantor, would seem a half-way position without any support in principle. A totally different question is presented where A. attempts in his conveyance to B. to create in himself new rights or privileges that were no part of the group of rights embodied in his title to the land. No attempt is made in the present paper to deal with this aspect of the problem. There are, however, certain incidental aspects of the problem that we have been discussing and the conclusion at which we have arrived to which attention may briefly be called. When A. conveys Blackacre to B. excepting a right of way along the east 10ft. of Blackacre, we have said that the effect of that exception is to keep in A. the privilege that he already had as owner. While this form of statement has been sufficiently accurate for our purposes up to here, it now requires a more careful examination. When A. was the owner of Blackacre, his privilege of crossing Blackacre was unlimited; he could walk over this 10ft. entirely irrespective of what his reasons were for going over it, whence he came, or whither he was going. When A. in his conveyance to B. excepts a right of way, he may mean to except his privilege to the full extent outlined above, or he may mean to except that privilege only to the extent that he shall wish to make use of it in certain qualified fashions. Whether he does the one or the other is a question to be settled by all the circumstances of the case that may legally be taken into consideration for this purpose. If A.'s intent is to retain in himself all the privileges of passage over the strip in question that he had as owner, the privileges are said to be held by him in gross. In this case it is to be noted that the law for reasons of policy may limit A.'s powers with regard to the privileges thus retained by him. Whether he is able to transfer these privileges to a third person, or whether they are personal to him, involves a consideration of the general nature of easements in gross that is apart from the scope of this discussion, for there is in this nothing peculiar to easements created by exception. The same result would follow if B. owning Blackacre granted a right of way in gross to A., his heirs, and assigns for ever. The circumstances of the exception may be such as to show that, while it was the intent of the grantor to retain in himself personally the privileges that he had as owner of the granted premises, it was his intent to retain them only to the extent that he should wish to use them for certain particular purposes. This was the situation in Reifler and Sons v. The Wayne Storage Water Power Company, above referred to. The grantor in that case, as owner of the subsequently granted premises, had of course the privilege of maintaining ponds there and using the water therefrom for any purpose that he wished. But the fact that the owner was a corporation chartered for a particular purpose, coupled with other facts in the case, made it a natural and reasonable inference that the Canal Company, in making the conveyance of the land, intended to and did keep out from the operation of the conveyance the privilege of ponding water only so long as it should wish to do so for canal purposes. It is arguable that this privilege could have been transferred to a third person. But when the attempt was made to pond the water for other than canal purposes, the act was in violation of the rights of the then owner of the land, not because no such privilege was granted by the owner of the servient estate, but because, although the grantor of the land at the time when he owned it had the privilege as owner of ponding water no matter what he wanted to do with it, and although he might have retained this privilege to this same degree of fullness, in fact, as the circumstances show, he retained it only to this limited degree. Consequently the privilege that was actually retained by the grantor and transferred to the present defendant was not one of impounding water for use other than for canal purposes, and hence did not justify the conduct of the defendant. If the intent of the grantor in making the exception does not definitely appear to be to retain the privilege in himself as an individual, either as fully as possible, or qualifiedly, then the courts, following the same rule of policy which prevails in the case of easements newly created by grant, will hold the privilege to be appurtenant to the land still kept by the grantor, and as such to pass with the dominant estate to a grantee thereof. 66 It may be interesting to examine as a matter of legal analysis the precise mechanics of this last-mentioned transaction. The situation is that A. conveys Blackacre to B. excepting or reserving a right of way. The circumstances are such that the court will find that it is appurtenant to Whiteacre, although nothing is said to that effect in the deed to B. The rights of the parties as to Blackacre have already been sufficiently set forth. Coincidentally with the existence in A. of this group of rights with regard to Blackacre, A. still has the same group of rights with regard to Whiteacre that he formerly had, and which we call title. A. now executes to C. a conveyance of Whiteacre. The effect of this conveyance is to extinguish in A. not only the group of rights that he had with respect to Whiteacre, which are expressly covered by the language of the conveyance, but also the group of rights that he still retained in Blackacre, which are not in terms mentioned in the conveyance, and to create in C. two similar groups of rights. This is a result that could not have been produced in this way had A. remained the owner of the complete group of rights with regard to both Whiteacre and Blackacre. 66 It follows in the case in hand because the rights kept by A. in Blackacre are appurtenant to Whiteacre, that is, that the easement was for the benefit of himself and his heirs as owners of Whiteacre. Of course this is nothing more than is done in the case where B., as the original owner of Blackacre, grants to A., as appurtenant to Whiteacre, a right of way over Blackacre. The difference is that in the latter case the power of A., the owner of the group of rights, thus to affect them, arises as a consequence of the creation of the rights in A. by the transfer from B., while in the former case it arises as a consequence of a conveyance by A. operating upon rights already owned and still retained by him. To summarise, then, it may be said that if the above analysis is correct, an exception or reservation of an easement in a conveyance of land is merely a keeping out of a small group of privileges that the grantor already had by virtue of his ownership of the land. The very act of excepting or reserving this small group may be sufficient to relate it to the rights possessed by the grantor with respect to another piece of land, that, without any specific mention of these reserved privileges, they may be transferred by an operative act sufficient to transfer the general group of rights relating to this second piece. An allied and equally interesting problem is the question whether it is or is not possible for the grantor, by the very act of reserving these privileges, so to annex them to the title of some third person in another piece of land that they will pass by a conveyance of that piece. This is a problem that will have to be left for further consideration. HARRY A. BIGELOW, University of Chicago Law School. West Virginia University College of Law. LAW SOCIETIES TO SECRETARIES.-Reports of meetings should reach the office not later than Wednesday evening to ensure insertion in the current number. UNITED LAW SOCIETY A MEETING was held on Monday, the 23rd inst., in the Middle Temple Common Room, Mr. C. P. Blackwell in the chair. The house discussed the following motion: "That in the opinion of this House the Law relating to Money-lenders requires drastic revision in the interests of the Public." Mr. G. B. Mountford opened; Mr. G. W. Tookey opposed. There also spoke : Messrs. L. F. Stemp, F. B. Guedalla, S. Redfern, S. R. Braithwaite, B. Ogle, and Sydney Ashley. The opener, having replied, the motion was put before the house and carried by two votes. On Monday, the 9th March, in the Middle Temple Common Room, Mr. S. R. Braithwaite will open: "That this house would regret any attempt to introduce Imperial Preference." Mr. Wentworth Pritchard will oppose. ROCHDALE LAW ASSOCIATION THE annual general meeting of the above association was held on the 18th inst., Mr. J. H. Chadwick (the president) being in the chair. The hon. treasurer's statement of accounts for 1924 shows a balance in hand of £61 9s. 3d. The following officers were elected for 1925: President, Mr. J. H. Chadwick; hon. treasurer, Mr. J. H. Stott; hon. secretary, Mr. L. W. Taylor; hon. auditors, Messrs. S. L. Coupe and S. Turner; committee, Messrs. J. B. Clegg, G. L. Collins, C. B. Hudson, J. A. Hudson, J. A. Milns, and R. R. Osborne. BRADFORD LAW SOCIETY AT the annual general meeting of the Bradford Incorporated Law Society, held on the 19th inst., Mr. Frederick A. T. Mossman was elected president for 1925, Mr. W. L. Bird and Mr. H. A. Demaine were elected vice-presidents, and Mr. R. C. Maude and Mr. E. J. Bairstow joint hon. secretaries. HASTINGS AND DISTRICT LAW SOCIETY THE annual general meeting of this society was held on the 14th inst. The report and accounts were considered and passed, the latter showing a credit of £23 in favour of the society. Mr. F. C. Sheppard (Battle) was elected president for the year, and Messrs. Davenport, Jones, Harrison, and Favoargue were elected to fill the vacant places on the committee. The society is still increasing in numbers, and now has fifty-seven active members, including practically all the solicitors in Hastings, Battle, Rye, and Bexhill. The annual dinner is fixed for the 17th March at the Victoria Hotel, St. Leonardson-Sea. Mr. Thomas Garth Jones, solicitor, of Ruthin, Denbighshire, left estate of the gross value of £2606. Mr. William Webb, solicitor, of Devonshire-place, Bishopsgate, E.C., left estate of the gross value of £14,643. Mr. James Mead Sutherland, solicitor, of Clement's Inn-passage' W.C.. left estate of the gross value of £2041. LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL STUDENTS' SOCIETIES LIVERPOOL. A meeting of the Liverpool Law Students' Association was held on the 18th inst., at the Law Library. The chair was taken by Mr. F. A. Sellers, and thirty-two members were present, when the following question was debated: "A chauffeur leaves his master's car on a slope and in his absence the car runs down the slope and injures several children who were playing in the road. An eye-witness rushes to the mother of one of the injured children and tells her that her child has been knocked down and killed and as a result the mother drops dead from shock. Can the husband of the mother obtain damages from the owner of the car for the death of his wife?" Mr. G. R. Hodnett opened for the affirmative, and Mr. J. H. Bromfield for the negative, and Messrs. E. Holland Hughes, A. Lawrence Kershaw, S. S. Silverman, E. T. Furlong, and Miss O. Morris took part in the ensuing discussion. After a thorough summing-up by the chairman, the motion on being put to the meeting was lost by twenty-four votes to four. 66 SHEFFIELD AND DISTRICT.-At a meeting of the above society, held in the Law Library, Bank-street, Sheffield, on Tuesday, the 17th inst., the subject for debate was as follows: That the case of Mercer v. The South-Eastern and Chatham Railway Company (127 L. T. Rep. 723; (1922) 2 K. B. 549) was wrongly decided." Mr. J. C. Auty was in the chair, and the speakers were: For the affirmative, Messrs. J. Renwick and J. B. Willis; and for the negative, Messrs. A. N. Schofield and C. R. Arksey. When the meeting was thrown open a lengthy and interesting discussion followed. After Mr. Renwick and Mr. Schofield had replied and the chairman had summed up, the motion was lost by two votes. The next meeting of the society will be held on Tuesday next, the 3rd March. The society's annual dinner will, this year, be held on Thursday, the 26th March, at the Royal Victoria Hotel, Sheffield. APPOINTMENTS Mr. CHARLES BOLINGBROKE LEATHES PRIOR, Solicitor, of East Dereham, has been appointed to be Official Receiver for the Bankruptcy District of the County Courts of Norwich and Great Yarmouth, in succession to Mr. H. P. Gould, who has resigned. Mr. Prior was admitted in 1906, and is a member of the firm of Messrs. Girling, Ransom, and Prior, of East Dereham. NOTES AND QUERIES 21. ASSIGNMENT OF CHATTELS BY LIMITED COMPANY-REGISTRATION. Can any of your readers tell me whether an absolute assignment of chattels by a limited company requires registration under any Act? In one or two text-books it is stated that the Bills of Sale Acts do not apply to a limited company, but I am inclined to think that this statement is confined to mortgages or charges. If a document is in such a form that were it executed by an individual it would be a bill of sale, it is clear that it falls within sect. 93 of the Companies Act 1908, and must be registered thereunder. But that section only applies to mortgages and charges, and has nothing to do with an absolute sale of chattels. I believe the doctrine of " reputed ownership "does not apply to limited companies which are being wound up. This being so, it would seem that an absolute assignment of chattels which are to remain in the possession of the company does not need registration of any kind to make it valid. I shall be glad to have your readers' NORTHERNER. views. ANSWERS (Q. 18.) LEASE-COVENANT-GARDEN.-I should like to refer to my reply to this query again to point out that by sect. 2 (5) of the Conveyancing Act 1881, "conveyance" includes a lease. G. O. S. (Q. 19.) SALE BY TRUSTEES OF A RELIGIOUS BODY.-This is a difficult query to answer. Questions arise as to whether this charity is endowed or not, and whether the Charitable Trusts Acts 1853 to 1894 apply. The trustees may be able to sell under sect. 29 of the Charitable Trusts Act 1855. But numerous charities are excepted from the operation of the above-mentioned Acts: (see sect. 62 of the Act of 1853 and sect. 4 of the Act of 1894). If those Acts do not apply the trustees might call a meeting of the members of the religious body and take the decision of the majority of those members present at that meeting as to the proposed sale and purchase. G. O. S. See precedent and note at p. 723, vol. 1, Key and Elphinstone, 11th edit. JOHN BOYD. (Q. 20.) LEASE-INSURANCE.-If A. insures he is not bound to lay out the insurance moneys in reinstatement: (Leeds v. Cheetham, 1 Sim, 146; Lofft v. Dennis, 1 E. & E. 474). In neither of those cases was the help of sect. 83 of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 invoked. This section is of general application: (Sinnott v. Bowden, 107 L. T. Rep. 609; (1912) 2 Ch. 414). There seems to be no reason why B. as a person interested should not, under that section, request the insurance office to cause the insurance moneys to be laid out in reinstatement. G. O. S. I think only an express covenant to repair would cast any obligation upon the landlord to rebuild in case of fire: (Weigall v. Waters, 1795, 6 T. R. 488). B. should insure: (see Reynard v. Arnold, 1875, L. Rep. 10 Ch. 386). JOHN BOYD. CORRESPONDENCE This department being open to free discussion on all Professional topics, the Editor does not hold himself responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it. TRUSTEES' POWERS OF ATTORNEY.-I am frequently called upon to advise on powers of attorney delivered on behalf of trustees in connection with the transfer to or by them of stocks, and it is remarkable to me how many solicitors in preparing such powers seem to ignore or to overlook the rule that a trustee may only to a very limited extent delegate his duties or powers, such rule being founded on the maxim: Delegatus non potest delegare. Cases frequently occur where trustee donors purport to give to their attorneys authority involving the exercise of discretion (as opposed to merely ministerial powers), which, it is submitted, such trustee donors have no power to do unless the instrument creating the trust so authorises. This view is emphasised by the fact that, during the War, it was deemed necessary to pass emergency legislation authorising trustees and also executors and administrators on war service to appoint attorneys to carry out their fiduciary duties. Having regard to the frequency with which the maxim quoted above is tacitly disregarded by solicitors, I suggest that the time has come when either (1) solicitors should in preparing instruments creating trusts make specific provision for delegation of the trustees' powers and duties or (2) the Legislature should consider whether the law of trusts should not be amended to deal with the common (and doubtless convenient) practice of trustees appointing reputable attorneys to carry on their trust business, while they themselves are prevented through absence abroad or otherwise from attending to their duties. FIDUCIARY. OBITUARY Mr. FREEMAN ROPER, solicitor, died at Chard on the 17th inst., in his sixty-third year. Mr. Roper was the eldest son of the late Mr. Freeman C. S. Roper, of Eastbourne, and was educated at Radley and New College, Oxford. He practised in London for fifteen years and retired in 1903. Mr. Roper was a J.P. for the county of Dorset, and also served as High Sheriff for the same county. Mr. WILLIAM JORDAN, chairman of Jordan and Sons Limited, died on the 21st inst. He was born in Bedfordshire on the 30th June 1840, and settled in London, and was on the staff, as a press corrector, of The Times and the now defunct Standard, to which and to other journals he was an occasional contributor. In 1876 he joined his elder brother Richard, who, since 1863, had been carrying on business as agent for the registration of companies under the Companies Act 1862. In 1866 his brother had produced a Handbook on Joint Stock Companies, and in 1886 William Jordan became joint author. After the death of his brother in 1889 he was joined in the authorship by Mr. F. Gore-Browne, and this association was maintained until the death in 1922 of his SITTINGS OF THE COUNTY COURTS FOR MARCH AND APRIL LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.-A., Admiralty; A.O., Administration Orders; Adj., Adjournments; B., Bankruptcy; E., Equity; E.L., Employers' Liability G., General Business; J.S., Judgment Summonses; L., List; P., Plaints only; Pos., Possession Cases; R., Registrar; R.B., Registrar in Bankruptcy; S., Special Sittings; W.C., Workmen's Compensation; † No Returns received. Friday 13.. 10 Thursday 23 Blyth. Friday 27.. Monday 30.. Tuesday 31.. Monday 16.. 10.15 Chesham 10.15 Chester 10.15 Chesterfield Accrington Alcester. Aldershot Monday 16.. Monday 20.. 9.30 Wednesday 4 Fri 3 (if nec) Boston. Bourne Bournemouth. Thursday 30. 10.30 Wednesday 1 12.30 Wednesday22 10.30 Wednesday22 Bow 10 Friday 17... 10 Friday 6 (R). Friday 3.. 9.45 Arundel. Friday 3. Ashbourne Ashby-de-la-Zouch Ashford Ammanford Andover Appleby Wednesday 4 Saturday 25. 11 Thursday 12. Thursday 16. 10.30 Monday 2... Monday 6... 10 10.30 Saturday 18. 10.30 Wednesday11 Wednesday 8 9.30 Wed 18 (JS). Wed 22 (JS). 9.30 Thursday 5.. Thursday 2.. 10 Wed 11 (R).. Friday 3.... 10 Tuesday 17.. Tuesday 21.. 10 Wednesday18 Wednesday22 10 Thursday 19. Thursday 23. 10 Monday 2... Wednesday 1 Tuesday 3... Thursday 2.. Wednesday 4 Friday 3.. Thursday 5.. Monday 6... Friday 6.... Tuesday 7. Tuesday 10.. Wednesday 8 Wednesday11 Wednesday22 Thursday 12. Thursday 23. Friday 13... Friday 24... Monday 16.. Monday 27. Tuesday 17.. Tuesday 28. Wednesday18 Wednesday29 Thursday 19. Thursday 30. Friday 20... Mon 23 (RB). 9.15 9.15 Mon 30 (RB). Tuesday 31.. 9.15 Braintree Friday 6. Brampton Brecon Brentford " Thursday 12. Thursday 23. Friday 13... Friday 24... Tuesday 3... Wednesday15 11 Tuesday 28.. 10 Monday 9... Monday 6... 10. Thurs 12 (B). Thurs 2 (B). 10 Thurs 19 (B). Thurs 16 (B). 10 Monday 27.. 10 Wednesday 4 Wednesday 1 10 11 10 Tuesday 17.. Saturday 18. 10.15 Thursday 19. Thurs 16 (R). 10.30 Wednesday25 Tuesday 17.. Wednesday 1 10.30 Wednesday 18 Thursday 2.. 10.30 Thursday 19. Tuesday 7... 10.30 Friday 20... Wednesday 8 10.30 Tuesday 31.. Thursday 9.. 10.30 Tuesday 21. 10.30 Wednesday22 10.30 Cranbrook Thursday 23. 10.30 Crediton Wednesday29 10.30 Crewe 11 Orewkerne 10.30 Crickhowell 10.30 Croydon 10.30 Mon 9 (RB). Mon 6 (RB) Wednesday11 Wednesday 8 11 Tues 24 (S).. Tues 28 (S).. 11 Wednesday 1 10.30 Tuesday 28.. 10.30 " Tuesday 17. Monday 23.. t " Tuesday 24. Wednesday25 Tuesday 28.. 10 Friday 13.. Wed 4 (R).. Wed 1 (R) Mon 2 (Adj.). Wednesday 1 10 Thursday 26. Thursday 30. 10 Monday 16.. Monday 20.. 10.30 10 Thursday 2.. 10 Darwen Daventry Deal.. Denbigh Derby Friday 20... Monday 16.. Mon 9 (S) Thursday 12. Thursday 23. 10 Friday 13 (S) Thursday 19. Friday 24 (S) 10 Thursday 30. 10 Friday 20 (8) " Thursday 26. Friday 27 (S) Bromley Bromsgrove Bromyard Monday 9... Thursday 2.. 10 Buckingham. Fri 27 (Adj.). 10 Builth Mon 30 (Adj.) Tuesday 31.. Monday 16.. Tuesday 19.. t Bishop's Stortford.. Wednesdayil t Bishop's Waltham.. Blackburn Wednesday25 Wednesday29 10 Thursday 2.. 10 Friday 24... 10 Monday 2.. Monday 6... Friday 20... Dunmow, Durham Tues 24 (B).. Monday 9... Monday 6... 10.15 Tuesday 10.. Tuesday 7 10.15 Burslem Burton 9.30 Wed 4 (RB). Wed 8 (RB). 10.30 Monday 9... Monday 27.. 9.30 Bury Monday 16.. 9.30 Monday 23.. 9.30 " Monday 30. 9.30 Blackpool Wednesday 4 Wednesday 1 Bury St. Edmunds Buxton 9.45 Caistor Fri 6 (RB)... Fri 3 (RB) 3 " Wednesday11 Wednesday29 9.45 Calne Cambridge Thursday 12. Wednesday18 9.45 9.45 " Fri 27 (& R). 10.30 " Wednesday25 9.45 Camelford Ely. Saturday 28. † 12 Blaenau Festiniog.. Blaenavon Wednesday29 Thursday 9.. 10.30 Friday 13... Friday 24... 10 Monday 2... Thursday 2.. 10.15 Tuesday 3.. Friday 3.... 10.15 Thursday 5.. Monday 6... 10.15 Friday 8. Canterbury Cardiff.. Tuesday 3... Tuesday 7... 10 Saturday 14. Saturday 18. 10 Wednesday 4 Thursday 16. 10.30 Thursday 5.. Friday 17... 10.30 Friday 6.... Saturday 18. 10.30 Saturday 7.. Epsom Evesham Exeter. Wednesday11 Wednesday 1 Friday 27 Friday 24 10 Tuesday 3... Tuesday 7... 10 10.30 Fakenham Tuesday 7... 10.15 Cardigan Falmouth Friday 20 Wednesday 4 Wednesday 8 10 Friday 13 Tuesday 28.. 11.45 Tuesday 28.. 10 Monday 27.. 11.30 Monday 16.. Monday 20.. 10.30 11.15 Saturday 14. Wednesday 25 Monday 20.. Monday 23.. New Malton Monday 2 New Mills Wednesday 1 10 Monday 2... Monday 6... 10 10 Monday 16.. Monday 20.. Monday 2. Wednesday 1 10 Tu 3(B,10.30) Thursday 2.. 10 Wednesday 4 F 3(BA&WC) 10 Thursday 5.. Monday 6.. 10 F6 (BA&WC) Tu 7(B,10.30) 10 Monday 9... Wednesday 8 10 Tu10(B,10.30) Monday 20.. 10 Wednesday11 Tu21(B,10.30) 10 Thursday 12. F 24 (BA&Wc) 10 F 13 (BA&WC) Monday 27.. 10 Monday 16.. Tu28(B,10.30) 10 Tu17(B,10.30) Wednesday29 10 Wednesday18 Thursday 30. 10 Thursday 19. F 20 (BA&WC) Monday 23. Monday 6.. Friday 24 Wednesday25 † ... 9.30 11 Monday 6... 10.30 Wednesday11 Wednesday 8 Wednesday 1 10 Tu 3 (RB) Tu 7 (RB).. 10.30 Thursday 12. Thursday 23. 10 Friday 13... Friday 24 ... 10 Monday 16.. Monday 20.. 10 Saturday 25, 11 Thursday 19. Halstead Haltwhistle Saturday 7 Friday 6 Hanley Friday 20 Harrogate Friday 13 Friday 3 10 10 Friday 27 10 North Walsham Northwich Harwich Hastings Monday 2... 10 Norwich Llandovery 39 Llandrindod Wells Hereford Tuesday 17.. Tuesday 28. Tuesday 28 10 Tuesday 7. Llandudno 10 Hertford Wednesday 4 Wednesday 8 11 Hexham & Bell'gham Saturday 7.. Monday 20.. 10 Llanfyllin Friday 20... M 9 (R),at 11 Friday 17 ... 10.30 Llangefni Tuesday 3 Hitchin Holbeach Holsworthy Holt. Holyhead Holywell Honiton Monday 9... Llanidloes 10 Monday 9 9 999 9 10 10 10 Tuesday 10.. 10 Thursday 12. Thursday 2.. 9.30 Tuesday 10.. Wednesday15 10 Friday 13 Wed 22 (R).. 10.30 Long Eaton Thursday 5.. 11 Loughborough Pembroke Dock Penrith Ormskirk Oswestry Thursday 26. Horncastle Huddersfield Thursday 26. Thursday 23. Thursday 12. Friday 6 12.30 Maidstone Malmesbury Tuesday 10.. Tuesday 21.. 10 Tuesday 31.. 10.45 9.30 10.30 9.30 Monday 30. Tuesday 31. Hungerford Monday 16. Huntingdon Hyde Hythe Friday 24 Ilford. 10 10.30 10.30 Tuesday 17.. Wednesday11 Wednesday 8 10 Thursday 12. Thursday 9.. 10 Friday 13 ... Friday 17 .10.30 Thursday 12. 10.30 10 Wednesday25 10.15 Mansfield Tuesday 10.. Tuesday 28.. 10 Poole Saturday 21. † Tuesday 24.. Tuesday 28.. 10 10.30 Thursday 5.. Thursday 2.. 10 ... Market Bosworth Port Talbot Porth. Portmadoc Portsmouth 10 Tuesday 3... Friday 24 Friday 20 ... Tuesday 17.. Tuesday 28.. 10.30 Kingston-on-Thames Friday 13 Friday 3 ... Friday 20 Tuesday 21 Friday 27 Friday 24 Tuesday 10.. Tues 7 (R) Friday 24 Friday 3.. Tu 10 (R9.30) Wednesday 1 10.30 10.30 10.30 Saturday 11. 10 Friday 6... Friday 3.... 10 Friday 27. 10 Thursday 12. Thursday 2.. 10 Wednesday11 Wednesday15 11 Monday 23.. 10 Monday 2.. Th 2 (JS&AO) 10.15 Th 5 (JS & AO) 10.15 Tues 10 (RB) Tues 7 (RB). 11 W 11, at 10.15 Tu 21 (RB).. 11 Thursday 12. Wednesday22 10.15 Friday 13... Thursday 23. 10.15 Monday 16.. Friday 24.. 10.15 Th 19(JA&AO) Monday 27.. 10.15 Tu 24 (RB).. 11 Matlock. 10 Monday 2. Pwllheli. Ramsgate Rawtenstall Reading Fri 3 (R) Tuesday 7... Redditch. Redruth Wednesday18 † Menai Bridge Merthyr Tydfil. Millom. ... Richmond (Yorks) Tuesday 17.. Thursday 30. 9.30 Rochester Romford Romsey. Friday 13 Ross. Tuesday 10.. Tuesday 7. 11.30 Rotherham. Monday 27.. 10 Tuesday 17.. 10.30 Royston Friday 24... 12 Rugby. Friday 13... Friday 24... 10.30 Monday 6... 10 Saturday 28. 9.30 Friday 6 (R). Friday 3 (R). 9.30 Fri 20 (JS).. Fri 17 (JS).. 9.30 Wednesday11 Wednesday 8 9.30 Thursday 12. Thursday 9.. 9.30 Monday 20.. 11 Tuesday 21.. 11 Friday 3.... 10.30 Saturday 18. Tuesday 3... Tuesday 7.. 10.30 Wednesday 4 Wednesday 8 10.30 |