tion of law.

Part IV., section 7, enacts that every sanitary authority or Administraother local authority having sewers (r) under their control shall give facilities (8) for enabling manufacturers within their district

(7) Sewers in this section includes not only the pipes though which the sewage flows, but also the works which are part of the sewage system: Brook v. Meltham Urban District Council, [1909] A. C. 438.

(8) The question whether sanitary authorities can be compelled to give facilities to manufacturers to send their trade effluent into the authorities' sewers has been the subject of several decisions, but is now explained by the decision of the House of Lords in Brook v. Meltham Urban District Council, supra. In the first place, though section 21 of the Public Health Act, 1875, gives manufacturers the right to connect the drains of their premises with the sewers, it does not give them the right to discharge liquid refuse from their factories. Consequently the only right that manufacturers have is by virtue of section 7 above. In Brook v. Meltham Urban District Council, supra, the question was whether the plaintiffs could compel the defendants to give facilities for carrying 65,000 gallon of liquids a day proceeding from the plaintiffs mills into the sewers of the defendants. The County Court judge found that, although the pipes of the defendants might be capable of carrying the liquids, the works for purifying this effluent were not sufficient, and gave judgment for the defendants. This was reversed by the Divisional Court ([1908] 2 K B. 341), the Court feeling bound by the decision of the Court of Sessions in Guthrie & Co. v. Brechin, 15 R. 385, and of the Court of Appeal in Eastwood Brothers v. Honley U. D. C., [1901] 1 Ch. 645, that sewers in this section did not mean the sewage system, but only the pipes through which sewage was conveyed. On appeal to the Court of Appeal ([1908] 2 K. B. 780) the judgment of the County Court judge was restored. Fletcher Moulton, L.J., after holding that section 21 of the Public Health Act, 1875, did not give manufacturers an absolute right to send their effluent into the sewers of sanitary authorities, said of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act, 1876 : It is clear that the Act treats sewage and poisonous, noxious, or polluting liquid, proceeding from a factory or manufacturing process as two entirely different things; and in my opinion they are in the eye of the law quite different. I hold, therefore, that, though the right given by section 21 of the Public Health Act, 1875, to make the drains of premises communicate with the sewers of the local authority may by necessary implication confer a right to send sewage though those drains into the sewers of that authority, the section does not give a right to discharge liquid refuse proceeding from factories or manufacturing processes into those sewers.

"If that be so, the provisions of s. 7 of the Act of 1876 become quite intelligible. They give to manufacturers a right of discharging manufacturing refuse into the sewers which they did not possess before, but the right so given is a limited right subject to certain reasonable restrictions. After providing that the local authority shall give the facilities which I have already mentioned (an obligation which did not rest upon them before), the section goes on thus: Provided that this section shall not extend to compel any sanitary or other local authority to admit into their sewers any liquid which would prejudicially affect such sewers or the disposal by sale, application to land, or otherwise, of the sewage matter conveyed along such sewers, or which would from its temperature or otherwise be injurious in a sanitary point of view. If the manufacturers already possessed under s. 21 of the Act of 1875 the absolute right to discharge any manufacturing refuse into the sewers, this proviso would, as I have pointed out, be meaningless, but it is full of meaning if, as, in my opinion, is the case, the section gives a new right to manufacturers for the purpose of enabling them to get rid of their manufacturing refuse, subject to the reasonable restrictions mentioned in the section. The first of these is that the refuse so discharged into the sewers must not be such as will prejudicially affect the sewers themselves or the sewage thereby carried, as, for instance, by decomposing it or causing it to become precipitated, or otherwise affecting it, so as to prevent the sale of it, or disposal of it on land, or otherwise, and thus interfere with the performance of the duty of the local authority, which is not only to collect and carry away the sewage, but also to dispose of it. Therefore, if the addition of any manufacturing refuse to the body of the sewage which is carried along by the sewers would either interfere with the operation of the works provided for the disposal of the sewage,

to carry the liquids proceeding from their factories or manufacturing processes into such sewers. Provided that this section shall not extend to compel any sanitary or other local authority

or render the effluent unfit to be discharged into the stream, the local authority cannot be compelled to give facilities for its discharge into their sewers.

The section then proceeds by the second proviso to deal with cases in which the discharge of the manufacturing refuse into the sewers will neither prejudicially affect the sewers themselves, nor the mode in which the disposal of the sewage has theretofore been carried on by reason of the nature of such refuse, but in which the works of the local authority are only sufficient to deal with the sewage proper of the district. In other words, it deals with cases where the objection to receiving the trade effluent is due, not to its nature, but to its quantum. With regard to such cases it provides as follows: Provided also, that no sanitary authority shall be required to give such facilities as aforesaid where the sewers of such authority are only sufficient for the requirements of their district, nor where such facilities would interfere with any order of any Court of competent jurisdiction respecting the sewage of such authority. Therefore, the result of the legislation is that, where, on account of the limited capacity of the existing sewers,' and the volume of the manufacturing refuse which it is proposed to discharge into the sewers, the local authority are unable by their existing sewers to perform for the manufacturers the services which they may require to have performed, the manufacturers have no right to compel them to perform those services. So far as the local authority can by means of their existing sewers assist the manufacturers to get rid of their manufacturing refuse, they are bound to do so, but the manufacturer is not entitled to compel them to incur the expense of enlarging their sewers to enable them to do so, or, as Lord Halsbury puts it in Pasmore v. Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council, [1898] A.C., at p. 391: To establish a manufactory for his own profit, and throw upon the rates, paid by all the inhabitants, who have no concern with the manufactory at all, the necessity for providing for that great source of expense to the manufacturer, of getting rid of his own refuse. Reading the proviso to s. 7 by the light of the interpretation which I have endeavoured to give of the legislation on the subject, and with reference to the reason of the thing, I ask myself what is the meaning of the word 'sewers in that proviso; and the answer seems to me to be that it must mean the system of sewerage, the whole system by which the collection and disposal of the sewage are effected by the local authority. If part of that system consists of settling tanks or other such works required for the purpose of bringing the effluent into such a condition that it can properly be discharged into the river, it is impossible, I think, to suppose that it was intended by the section to allow the manufacturers to throw on the local authority the expense of increasing those works to the extent which would be rendered necessary by the manufacturing refuse which they might discharge into the sewers, while it was felt to be just to spare the authority from the expense of any increase in the size of the barrels of the sewers which might so be rendered necessary. I have, therefore, no doubt that the word sewers in the proviso ought to be construed as meaning the whole sewage system of the local authority." Vaughan Williams and Buckley, L.JJ., also gave judgments to the same effect. On appeal to the House of Lords the judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed. Lord Loreburn, L.C., said [1909] A. C. 440: "The 7th section of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act, 1876, gives to manufacturers certain rights of carrying within their district the liquids proceeding from their factories or manufacturing processes into the sewers. It is by way of grace and of favour. I need not repeat what has been so well said by Channell, J., and Fletcher Moulton, L.J., upon that subject. The right, whatever it is, is qualified by two provisoes. Looking at the second proviso, my own view is that this is a case in which the sewers of such authority are only sufficient for the requirements of their district.' The word sewer does not necessarily bear the same meaning as in the Public Health Act, 1875, whatever the meaning in that Act may be. I think in the present case it includes the works which are a part of the system through which the sewage flows to the river where it ultimately escapes.

Where sanitary authorities give facilities they are bound to take steps effectually to purify the effluent for their sewage farm: Southall-Norwood Urban District Council v. Middlesex County Council (1901), 49 W. R. 376. If they

to admit into their sewers any liquid which would prejudicially affect such sewers or the disposal by sale, application to land, or otherwise, of the sewage matter conveyed along such sewers, or which would from its temperature or otherwise be injurious in a sanitary point of view. Provided also, that no sanitary authority shall be required to give such facilities as aforesaid where the sewers of such authority are only sufficient for the requirements of their district, nor where such facilities would interfere with any order of any Court of competent jurisdiction respecting the sewage of such authority.

Proceedings to enforce Part I. of the Act (law as to solid matter) and Part II. (law as to sewage pollutions) may be taken by-(1) any sanitary authority in relation to any stream being within or passing through or by any part of their district against any other sanitary authority or person in respect of an offence committed within or without the district (t); (2) any county council or joint committee empowered by provisional order (u), (3) the Lee Conservancy Board in respect of the area under their jurisdiction (x); (4) any fishery board (y); (5) any person aggrieved by the commission of the offence

do not, they will be liable for an offence against this Act, and so too will be the manufacturers, for they are not absolved from seeing that their effluent does not cause pollution: Butterworth v. West Riding of Yorkshire Rivers Board, [1909] A. C. 45. Once the consent to the connection is given the sanitary authority must not stop the connection unless they can show that the provisoes to section 7 apply (Eastwood Brothers v. Honley Urban District Council, [1901] 1 Ch. 645), but if the connection has been made without consent, an injunction will be granted to prevent liquid being sent into the sewers which is prejudicial thereto Liverpool Corporation v. Coghill & Son, [1918] 1 Ch. 307, in which case Eve, J., raised the question whether it is possible in law for a sanitary authority to grant to a manufacturer a right to send into the sewers liquid prejudicial to the sewage system. A mandamus will not lie to compel a sanitary authority to augment their sewers so as to enable a manufacturer to have the advantage of section 7: Pasmore v. Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council, [1898] A. C. 387.

(f) Section 8; West Riding of Yorkshire Rivers Board v. Linthwaite Urban Council, [1915] 2 K. B. 436.

(u) By the Local Government Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 41), s. 14, county councils were given the powers of a sanitary authority to enforce the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act, 1876, and the Local Government Board were empowered by provisional order to constitute a joint committee to represent the administrative counties through which any river or part of a river passed. The Committees now existing are the River Ribble Joint Committee; the Mersey and Irwell Joint Committee; and the West Riding of Yorkshire Joint Committee, now the West Riding of Yorkshire Rivers Board.

(r) Section 9. The area of the River Lee is defined in the Lee Conservancy Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. cliv.), but their powers with regard to streams in Middlesex have been restricted by the Middlesex County Council Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict c. ccl.). See also the Lee Conservancy Act, 1900 (63 & 64 Vict. c. exvii.), and the Lee Conservancy Act, 1921 (11 & 12 Geo. 5. c. lxxviii.). The Lee Conservancy Board have power also to enforce the provisions of the Lee Conservancy Act, 1868, under the head" Protection of Water" by proceedings in the County Court, and the provisions of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act, 1876, with respect to summary orders of County Courts and appeal therefrom apply (section 9).

(y) The Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act, 1923 (13 & 14 Geo. 5. c. 16),

Proceedings to enforce Part III. (law as to manufacturing and mining pollutions) can only be taken by a sanitary authority, county council, or joint committee having the powers of a sanitary authority, the Lee Conservancy Board, and fishery boards, but before any such proceedings are commenced the consent of the Minister of Health must be first obtained. The Minister must not give his consent to proceedings by a sanitary authority of any district which is the seat of any manufacturing industry until he has held an inquiry and is satisfied that means to render the liquid harmless are reasonably practicable and available and that no material injury will be inflicted by such proceedings on the interests of such industry. The person against whom it is proposed to take proceedings can insist on being heard by the sanitary authority before they take the proceedings (z).

Before proceedings are commenced it must be ascertained that no other proceedings in relation to the offence are pending, and two months' notice in writing of the intention to take proceedings must have been given to the offender (a). If the offence is against Part III. of the Act, then the consent of the Minister to such proceedings must be obtained before the notice is given (b).

Proceedings for offences against the Act are regulated by sections 10 to 15. County Courts are empowered to make summary orders (c) to restrain offences and perform duties or to impose penalties not exceeding £50 a day during default, and to carry into effect such orders at the expense of the defaulter (section 10) (d). An appeal to the High Court by special case is

(2) Rivers Pollution Prevention Act, 1876, s. 6. If the sanitary authority refuse to take proceedings any person interested may apply to the Minister of Health, who has power, after inquiry, to order the sanitary authority to take proceedings. In the case of proceedings by a sanitary authority whose district is not the seat of a manufacturing industry against a sanitary authority whose district is the seat of a manufacturing industry, the Minister is not bound to hold an inquiry; still he ought to take into account the industrial interests involved in the case: see Buckley, J., in West Riding of Yorkshire Rivers Board v. Linthwaite Urban Council, [1915] 2 K. B., at p. 446.

(a) Section 13.

(b) Section 6. It is no use serving the notice before such consent is obtained West Riding of Yorkshire Rivers Board v. Robinson, [1907] 1 K. B. 431, overruling West Riding of Yorkshire Rivers Board v. Scarr End Mill Co. (1901), 65 J. P. 776; Midlothian County Council v. Oakbanks Oil Co. (1903), 5 F. 700.

(c) The principle to be applied by the Court in exercising its discretion as to the making of an order is that regard must not be had to the amount of pollution already in the river, but that if from a particular place there is sent into the river a quantity of polluting matter which exceeds the minimum of which the law will not take heed, the plaintiffs are entitled to an order: Staffordshire County Council v. Seisdon Rural Council, 96 L. T. 328; 71 J. P. 185; 5 L. G. R. 347. The Court is not bound to make an order or grant an injunction if it thinks that to do so would be useless Yorkshire West Riding Council v. Holmfirth Urban Sanitary Authority. [1894] 2 Q. B. 842.

:

(d) Kirkheaton Board v. Ainslie, [1892] 2 Q. B. 274; Yorks. West Riding v. Holmfirth, supra; see Derby County Council v. Derby, [1896] 2 Q. B. 53,

given by section 11 (e), and by section 12 a certificate by a Ministry of Health inspector that the means for rendering the sewage or other solid or liquid matter harmless are the best or only practicable and available means in the particular case is to be conclusive. By section 13 two months' notice is necessary before commencing proceedings (f), and sections 14 and 15 regulate costs and examination of witnessess, &c.

clauses.

Section 16 is as follows: "The powers given by this Act shall Saving not be deemed to prejudice or affect any other rights or powers now existing or vested in any person or persons by Act of Parliament, law, or custom, and such other rights or powers may be exercised in the same manner as if this Act had not been passed (g), and nothing in this Act shall legalize any act or default which would but for this Act be deemed to be a nuisance or otherwise contrary to law: Provided nevertheless, that in any proceedings for enforcing against any person such rights or powers the Court before which such proceedings are pending shall take into consideration any certificate granted to such person under this Act."

Saving of rights of impounding

Section 17: “This Act shall not apply to or affect the lawful exercise of any rights of impounding or diverting water" (h). Section 18 reserves rights under the Thames Conservancy and diverting Acts, the Lee Conservancy Acts, and the Metropolitan Management Acts.

Section 19 excepts local authorities empowered by Act of Parliament to carry sewage into the sea or tidal waters from liability under the Act.

Section 20 contains definitions, of which the most important are as follows:

664

"'Stream' includes the sea to such extent, and tidal waters to such point, as may, after local inquiry and on sanitary grounds, be determined by the Local Government Board, by order pub

297; Peebles v. Oswaldtwistle, [1897] 1 Q. B. 384. Accidental breaches may not constitute an offence: cf. Lee Conservancy Board v. Leyton Urban District Council (1906), 4 L. G. R. 662.

(e) The appeal is to the Divisional Court and then to the Court of Appeal: Derby Corporation v. Derby County Council, [1897] A. C. 550; West Riding of Yorkshire Rivers Board v. Raventhorpe Urban District Council (1907), 71 J. P. 209.

(f) This section only applies when proceedings are to be taken for an offence, and not when it is sought to enforce an existing order: West Riding of Yorkshire Rivers Board v. Heckmondwike Urban District Council, 110 L. T. 670.

(g) A company whose works had been constructed prior to the passing of the Act, inter alia, stated that they had acquired a prescriptive right to pollute the river, and pleaded that section 16 saved this right. The Court repelled this plea, holding that section 16 saved only rights to prevent pollution: Midlothian C. C. v. Pumpherston Oil Co., Midlothian C. C. v. Oakbank Oil Co. (1903), 5 F. 700; 6 Fraser, 387.

(h) As to the construction of this section, see Ribble River Committee v. Halliwell, [1899] 2 Q. B. 388.

water.