54 & 55 Vict. c. 76.

uniform throughout such limits by the repeal of sections 35, 36, and 44 of the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847, so far as applicable to the Board, and of portions of the special Acts relating to the Metropolitan companies whose undertakings have been purchased by it (section 5). Section 7 deals with the obligations of the Board with respect to the laying of mains and pipes, and section 8 with those with regard to the supply of water to owners and occupiers for domestic purposes, which are defined (by section 25) as including "waterclosets and baths, constructed or fitted so as not to be capable of containing, when filled or filled up to the overflow or waste pipe (if any), more than eighty gallons" (r). Such supply is to be furnished at an annual rate not exceeding 5 per cent. of the rateable value of the house or building, or part of a house or building, in respect of which it is required, and is, subject to the provisions of the Act, chargeable uniformly under all circumstances to all consumers entitled to receive it (section 8). The rate for supply to houses let to monthly or weekly tenants is made payable by the owner, instead of the occupier (section 26), and the Board is empowered to compound with owners for the payment of rates (section 27) (8).

By section 48, sub-section 1 of the Public Health (London) Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 76), sections 48-54 of which relate especially to water, an occupied house (t) without a proper and sufficient supply of water shall be a nuisance liable to be dealt with summarily under the Act, and, if a dwelling-house, is to be deemed unfit for human habitation." The sanitary authority is empowered to make bye-laws for securing the cleansing

66

(r)" Domestic purposes does not, however, include supply for steam, gas, motor and other engines; railway purposes; ventilating purposes; working machines or apparatus; consumption by or washing of horses or cattle; washing carriages or other vehicles; watering gardens by outside taps, hose, or sprinklers, &c. ; fountains or ornamental purposes; cleansing or flushing sewers and drains; street-watering; fire extinction; public pumps, baths, or washhouses; trade or manufacturing purposes; and any bath so constructed as to contain, when filled up to the waste pipe (if any), more than eighty gallons (section 25). It does include drinking and washing water supplied to a factory: Colley's Patents, Lim. v. Metropolitan Water Board, [1912] A. C. 24; 81 L. J. K. B. 126; and water to a public house, where luncheons are served, for cooking and washing-up: Metropolitan Water Board v. Avery, [1914] A C. 118; 83 L. J. K. B. 178; but the Board are not bound to supply a restaurant except by meter: Oddenino v. Metropolitan Water Board, [1914] 2 Ch. 734; 84 L. J. Ch. 102. As to the supply of water for building purposes, see Metropolitan Water Board v. Johnson & Co., [1913] 3 K. B. 900; 82 L. J. K. B. 1165; see also ante, p. 335, n. (y).

(s) Sections 28, 29 and 31 relate to the rates for supply to Government buildings, parks and gardens, and public purposes; and section 32 provides that the Board shall not be required to afford a supply of water for other than domestic purposes if, and so long as any such supply would interfere with the sufficiency of the water required to be supplied for domestic purposes.' (t)" Occupied house in this section means structure as let," and does not apply to one floor only where a house is let in three floors to three separate tenants Field v. Southwark Borough Council (1907), 96 L. T. 646; 5 L. G. R. 567; 71 J. P. 240.

:

of cisterns (section 50), to maintain public cisterns, reservoirs, wells, fountains, pumps, and works used for the gratuitous supply of water (section 51), and, on the representation of persons in their district, to close wells, tanks, and cisterns, &c., so polluted as to be injurious to health (section 54); and water companies which are authorised to cut off the water supply of dwelling-houses for the non-payment of rent are required to give notice of such closing to the sanitary authority within twentyfour hours after exercising their right (u) (section 49). Section 52 imposes penalties for causing water to be corrupted by gas washings, and section 53 for fouling or maliciously damaging the water of wells, fountains, and pumps used for drinking or domestic

purposes.

charges.

By the Water Undertakings (Modification of Charges) Act, Modification 1921 (11 & 12 Geo. 5, c. 44), the Minister of Health may of statutory in certain cases make an order modifying any statutory or other provision affecting or regulating charges to be made by a water undertaking in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be just and reasonable, but the order must not enable the undertakers, where they are a company, to pay more than the maximum dividend or to make up any deficiency on previous dividends.

The rateability of water companies will be treated of in a Rateability. subsequent chapter (x).

III. Docks.

Docks (y) usually consist of a series of basins connected by Definition. locks, together with quays, wharves, and warehouses, and are used for the convenience of unloading cargoes from vessels, as well as for refitting and repairing ships that have sustained.

damage during a voyage.

Though they are always erected in connection with some Ownership of. port or harbour, they are quite distinct therefrom; the property

in a port, and that in the docks situated within the town, which

is the head of the port, being frequently in different persons, as is the case both in the Liverpool and the London Docks (2).

(u) Turning off water to prevent waste through a leak is not "cutting off under this section so as to require notice: Young v. Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co. (1893), 5 R. 432; 69 L. T. 144.

(z) See post, Chap. IX.

(y) As to ports, harbours, and docks, see also ante, Chap. I., p. 60.

(z) Gunning on Tolls, p. 129. By the Port of London Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7. e. 68), the undertakings of the London and India, the Surrey Commercial, and the Millwall Dock Companies are transferred to the Port of London Authority for the purposes of administering and improving the port.

c. 27.

They may be in the hands either of trustees for the public benefit (a), or of a company of adventurers (b); but in each case they are usually established under a special Act of Parliament, by which the rights and duties of the proprietors are defined; and when that is the case, such rights cannot be exceeded (c). When the Act is silent on this point, the public have a right to enjoy the privilege of using the docks upon "reasonable terms,' and the owner cannot impose what tolls or duties he pleases on them (d).

The number of special Acts relative to docks led to the 10 & 11 Vict. passing of The Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 27) (e). By this statute, which is framed on the model of the Lands Clauses and Waterworks Clauses Consolidation Acts, various provisions usually contained in Acts. creating dock companies are consolidated, and it extends to such harbours, docks, and piers as shall be authorized by Acts hereafter to be passed, which shall declare that this Act shall be incorporated therewith" (section 1); the term "the undertakers being defined by section 2 to mean "any person authorized by a special Act to construct any harbour, dock, or pier" (f).

Amongst other provisions the Act empowers the dock authority to construct warehouses and other works, and to lease them for terms not exceeding three years (g); to appoint harbour

(a) Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, L. R. 1 H. L. 93; 35 L. J. Ex. 225; 14 L. T. 677.

(b) Reg. v. Bristol Dock Co., 2 Rail. Cas. 599.

(c) Gunning on Tolls, p. 123.

(d) Allnut v. Inglis, 12 East, 527; 11 R. R. 482, and see Gunning, p. 123. For the subject of dock dues, see post, Chap. IX., p. 579.

(e) The following other general statutes apply to docks.

By 28 & 29 Vict. c. 106, the Admiralty were empowered to draw a sum of £300,000 from the Consolidated Fund as a loan for constructing docks in British possessions in 1865.

The Bank Holiday Acts (34 & 35 Vict. c. 17; 38 & 39 Vict. c. 13; 39 & 40 Vict. c. 36, s. 8) apply to persons employed in docks.

By the Larceny Act, 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. 5. c. 50), s. 15, stealing from docks, or vessels lying therein, is made a felony, punishable by penal servitude not exceeding fourteen years. Setting fire to or injuring docks are also constituted felonies by sections 4, 30 and 31 of the Malicious Damage Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 97).

(f) For other general statutes relating to docks, see ante, Chap. I. pp. 60 et seq.; and post, Chap. VII. pp. 490 et seq.

A barge propelled by oars only is not a vessel within the third section of 10 Vict. c. 27, and the 100th and 101st sections of 27 & 28 Vict. c. 178 (London and St. Katherine's Docks Co. Act, 1864 (local)), so as to render the owner liable to the penalty imposed by the latter Act, as being the owner of a vessel left in the Royal Albert Docks without any person on board: Hedges & Sons v. London and St. Katherine Docks Co., 55 L. J. M. C. 46; 16 Q. B. D. 597; 54 L. T. 427.

(g) Section 23 empowers the undertakers to lease any warehouse, buildings, wharfs, yards, cranes, machines, and other conveniences for terms not exceeding three years. This includes power to lease a graving dock for that term: Glebe Sugar Refinery Co. v. Trustees of Port and Harbours of Greenock, [1921] 2 A. C. 66; 90 L. J. P. C. 162.

masters, who have power to give directions for the regulation of the vessels using the dock; and to remove unserviceable vessels, wrecks, or other obstruction. If vessels in the docks do not obey the orders of the harbour-master as to mooring, unmooring, &c., he may at the expense of the owner do what is required (h). There are also provisions relating to the delivery of cargoes and the appointment of meters and weighers; the protection of the dock and the vessels therein from fire or injury (i); and for the making of bye-laws for regulating the use of the dock, the powers of the harbour-master, the admission of vessels into, and their removal from, the dock, the shipping, unshipping, and removing of all goods within the limits of the dock, and for regulating the duties and conduct of all persons, as well the servants of the undertakers as others, employed in the dock (k).

It is, however, to the special Act that reference must be made, to ascertain the rights of the dock proprietors; that Act constituting the form of contract (1) between them and the

(h) Sections 51-65; see also post, p. 354. The orders of the harbourmaster must be strictly obeyed, unless it is evident that disaster will result thereby. If in carrying out the directions of the harbour-master prudence dictates that a particular precaution should be taken-e.g., the use of a check rope-neglect to do so will be negligence: Reney v. Magistrates of Kirkcudbright, [1892] A. C. 264; The Cynthia (1877), 2 P. D. 52; The Excelsior (1867), L. R. 2 A. & E. 268. The owners of the vessel acting under the orders of a harbour-master are not liable for any damage caused by his negligence: The Mystery, [1902] P. 115.

The 63rd section, which imposes a penalty upon the master of any vessel who shall without permission of the harbour-master moor the same in the entrance (or within the prescribed limits) of any dock or harbour, and who shall not remove the same upon notice, overrides and extinguishes all local and private rights of property therein. The assertion of such local or private rights does not exclude the jurisdiction of the justices under the Act: Gardner v. Whitford, 4 C. B. (N.S.) 665.

(i) Sections 66-76, 81-83. Though sections 81 and 82 empower the dock authority to appoint and license meters and weighers, they do not give them the exclusive right of providing weighing machines: Port of London Authority v. Cairn Line of Steamships, Lim., [1913] 1 K. B. 497; 82 L. J. K. B. 340.

(k) A dock company, who were the undertakers under a special Act, made bye-laws that no lumpers should be allowed to work on board any vessel in the dock but such as were authorised by the company, unless permission in writing had been previously obtained from the superintendent of the dock, and that the servants of the company only should be allowed to work within the dock premises whether on ship, lighter, or shore :-Held, that the bye-laws were in excess of the power conferred on the dock company by section 83, and were therefore invalid: Dick v. Baddart, 10 Q. B. D. 387; 84 L. T. 391. As to effect of regulations not confirmed as bye-laws under this section, see London Association of Shipowners v. London and India Docks, [1892] 3 Ch. 242; 67 L. T. 238; 7 Asp. M. C. 195. See also Anglo-Algerian Steamship Co. v. Houlder Line, post, p. 357, note (d), as to liability for negligence by a third party. When the dock authority are unable to supply men to unload a ship, they are not empowered to refuse to allow a shipowner to import labour for this purpose: Milligan & Co. v. Ayr Harbour Trustees, [1915] S. C. 936.

(1) A contract for the use of a dock between the owners and the public is not an interest in land within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, and does not require to be under seal: Wells v. Kingston-on-Hull Corporation,

L.W.

23

Liability of

harbour and dock autho

rities.

public, and being regarded in the light of a bargain, any ambiguity in its terms will be construed as against the undertakers and in favour of the public (m).

By Act of Parliament, the Hull Dock Co. were authorised to make a dock, &c., and all goods which should be landed or discharged upon any of the quays, &c., should be liable to pay the like rates of wharfage as were usually taken for goods, &c., loaded or discharged on quays in the port of London. It was held that, as the premises were only vested in the company for the purposes of the Act, they had no common law right to compensation for the use of them, and that the statute did not give them any right to claim wharfage for goods shipped off from their quays; Lord Tenterden, C.J., saying, "The plaintiffs cannot claim anything that is not distinctly given ” (n).

The principle on which a private person or a company is liable for damages occasioned by the neglect of servants (0) applies to a corporation which has been entrusted by statute to perform certain works (as, for instance, to erect and manage docks), and to receive tolls for the use of the works; although these tolls, unlike tolls received by a private person, are not applicable to the use of individual members of the corporation, or to that of the corporation generally, but are devoted to the maintenance of the works, and, in case of any surplus existing, the tolls are themselves to be diminished. If knowledge of the existence of a cause of mischief makes persons responsible for

L. R. 10 C. P. 402; 44 L. J. C. P. 257; 52 L. T. 615. As to the construction of a contract for exclusive use of a pier, see City of Dublin Steam Packet Co. v. R., 24 T. L. R. 657, 796.

(m) Hull Dock Co. v. La Marche, 8 B. & C. 51; 32 R. R. 337. See, too, Leeds and Liverpool Canal v. Hustler, 1 B. & C. 424; 36 R. R. 746, 748; Lord Tenterden's remarks in Stourbridge Canal v. Wheely, 2 B. & A. 793; 36 R. R. 746; Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal, 1 M. & K. 162, 169; 36 R. R. 289; and Lord Brougham's judgment in Stockton and Darlington Rly. v. Barrett, 11 C. & F. 590; 8 Scott, N. R. 641.

(n) Kingston-on-Hull Dock Co. v. La Marche, 8 B. & C. 42 ; 32 R. R. 337. (0) A dock-master exercises an exclusive control and direction over the movements and navigation of vessels entering, using or quitting the docks owned by the corporation whose servant he is. The dock authority, whether it be a corporation trading for profit, e.g., a dock company, or a public body having merely the power of levying tolls on shipping using the port and applying them for the benefit of the port, e.g., the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, is liable for the acts and defaults of its servants and for the proper condition of its docks: Thompson v. N. E. Rly. Co., 2 B. & S. 106; Lancaster Canal Co. v. Parnaby, 11 Ad. & E. 223; Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, L. R. 1 H. L. 93; Encyclopædia of the Laws of England (2nd ed.), Vol. IV., p. 684; and with respect to the duties of a dock-master and liabilities of the dock company employing him, see also The Excelsior, 57 L. J. Adm. 54; L. R. 2 A. & E. 268; 19 L. T. 87; Lloyd v. Iron, 4 F. & F. 101; Reney v. Kirkcudbright Magistrates, 61 L. J. P. C. 23; [1892] A. C. 264; 61 L. T. 474; 7 Asp. M. C. 221, H. L. (Sc.); Duckham v. Gibbs, 69 L. J. Q. B. 127; [1900] 1 Q. B. 394; 48 W. R. 239; The Apollo, [1891] A. C. 499; The Bilbao, Lush. 149; The Cynthia, 2 P. D. 52; The Belgic, 2 P. D. 57; The Rhosina, 10 P. D. 24, 131.