or any tidal water is entrusted to the Board of Trade (i). The Board appoints the persons who are to act as receivers of wreck. Whenever a ship is wrecked, stranded or in distress on or near the coasts of the United Kingdom or any tidal water within the limits thereof the receiver of wreck for the district must proceed to the site of the wreck and take the necessary steps to save the vessel, her cargo, and persons on board. He may require any person to assist him and demand the use of any vessel, wagon, cart, or horse, and he and his assistants may pass over any land and deposit the salved property upon it without being guilty of trespass. Persons plundering, creating disorder or obstructing the salvage operations may be arrested (k).

Anyone who finds or takes possession of wreck within the limits. of the United Kingdom or outside those limits and brings it within, must if he is the owner give notice thereof to the receiver of the district, if he is not the owner he must deliver the wreck to the receiver. If he omits to do so it may be taken from him by force (1). On receiving the wreck the receiver has to post up a description of it at the Custom House, and if he thinks it is worth more than £20 send a similar description to the Secretary of Lloyd's for inspection there (m). The owner of the wreck, on establishing his claim within one year from the time it came into the hands of the receiver, on paying the salvage, fees, and other expenses due, is entitled to have it, or if it has been sold, as it was of small value or of a perishable nature or not of sufficient value to pay for warehousing, the proceeds of the sale (n).

Wreck which is unclaimed by the owner within the year is either handed over to the person who has established his title to receive unclaimed wreck found at the place where the wreck was found, after payment of expenses, costs, fees, and salvage, or is sold and the proceeds, after deducting expenses, fees and salvage, are paid for the benefit of the Crown (a) if claimed in right of the Duchies of Lancaster or Cornwall to the Receiver General of the Duchy, (b) if not so claimed to His Majesty (o).

(1) Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), s. 566.

(k) Ibid. 511-514. In the absence of the receiver of wreck, the following persons, in the order named, may act in his place, i.e., chief officer of customs, principal officer of the coastguard, officer of inland revenue, sheriff, justice of the peace, commissioned officer on full pay in the Navy, commissioned officer on full pay in the Army (s. 516).

(1) Ibid. ss. 518, 519; ibid. 1906 (6 Edw. 7. c. 48), s. 72. Section 518 does not apply to salvors who have restored the property to the owners (The Zeta, L. R. 4 A. & E. 460), nor to a person who thought the wreck was his own property (The Liffey, 6 Asp. M. L. C. 255).

(m) Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 520.

(n) Ibid. ss. 521, 522. In the case of wreck which has formed part of a foreign ship, the Consul-General or other authorised consular officer, shall, in the absence of the owner or his agent, be deemed to be the agent of the owner. (0) Itid. ss. 524, 525. After the passing of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, the Board of Trade caused inquiries to be held as to the title of claimants

Royal fish.

Bathing.

Royal fish-i.e., whale, sturgeon and porpoise-whether thrown on the shore or caught within the realm, are the property of the Crown and not of the finder. They may be the property of a subject by grant or prescription in the same way as wreck (p).

Bathing in the open sea and in tidal rivers in 1821 was held by the Court of King's Bench, by a divided opinion, not to be a common law right, so as to justify the public in passing over those parts of the shore which are private property, in order to gain access to the water for that purpose (q). The plaintiff in this case was lord of the manor and owner of the shore by grant from the Crown, on the river Mersey, an arm of the sea, and had also the exclusive right of fishing on the shore with stake nets. The defendant was servant of an innkeeper on the shore, who kept bathing machines, and he drove the machines across the shore to the water. No prescriptive right was claimed for the passage of machines, though it was proved to be the custom for people to pass on foot for the purpose of bathing. The defendant claimed a common law right for all the king's subjects to bathe in the sea, and to cross the shore for that purpose on foot, and with horses and carriages. Best, J., took the defendant's view of the case, on the broad ground of the sea being the great highway of the world, of the importance of a free access to the sea, and of a necessity of a right to bathe in the sea as essential to the health of so many persons; but the majority of the Court (Abbott, C.J., Holroyd and Bayley, JJ.), held that there was no such common law right, and that in the absence of prescription the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the trespass (r). In Brinckman v. Matley (8), where the defendant. claimed a right to bathe from the foreshore by dedication, prescription and custom, the Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed the judgment of the majority of the judges in Blundell v. Catteral, Vaughan Williams, L.J., saying: "In my judgment we should be doing very wrong if we were now to re-open those questions which were determined once and for ever in the judgments of the majority of the Court in that case.

It would appear that the only restraint which by the common law is imposed upon the common liberty of bathing in the sea

to unclaimed wreck, and in many cases admitted the titles produced at the inquiries.

(p) De Prerogativa Regis (17 Edw. 2, st. 2, c. 11); Stuart Moore's History of Foreshore, p. 753; Stephen's Blackstone, vol. ii. p. 540 (7th ed.). See Paterson's Fishery Laws, 24, 165; Woolrych on Waters, 83.

(q) Blundell v. Catteral, 5 B. & Ad. 268; 24 R. R. 350. See Ilchester v. Rashleigh, 5 T. L. R. 739; 61 L. T. 477.

(r) See Angell on Tidal Waters, 28.

(s) [1904] 2 Ch 313; 78 L. J. Ch. 160, 642, C. A.; affirming Buckley, J., 52 W. R. 363.

and tide waters, where no right of private property is involved, is that which is imposed by decency and a respect for public morals. The laws of decency must be enforced in all places which become the habitations of civilised man (t). Hence it has been held that it is an indictable offence for a man to undress himself on the beach and to bathe in the sea near inhabited houses, from which he may be distinctly seen, although the houses may have been recently erected, and although it may have been usual up till then for men to bathe in great numbers at the place in question (u).

In places where the Towns Police Clauses Act, 1847, s. 69, Bathing machines the Public Health Act, 1875, s. 171, or the Public Health Acts and chairs. Amendment Act, 1907, 88. 82, 92, apply the local authority has power to make bye-laws regulating bathing in the sea, but the licensees of the local authority are not thereby authorised to place their machines on any part of the foreshore which is private property (x).

In the case of Ramsgate Corporation v. Debling and others, where a claim was made by seven different defendants to place chairs on the foreshore and let the same for hire, it was held (1) that a custom for the inhabitants of Ramsgate to do what was claimed had not been proved, and (2) that a right in individuals to place chairs on the sea shore being a right in gross could not be claimed by prescription under the Prescription Act (y).

The public have no right of passage over the foreshore except Public in the exercise of the rights of navigation or fishing, neither may meetings. they stray or recreate there. Though by immemorial custom the inhabitants of a parish or the fishermen of a village may have acquired an easement over the foreshore (z), the general public cannot do so, but the Courts are somewhat reluctant to restrain them by injunction when their acts cause no injury thereto. Thus it has been held in Llandudno Urban District Council v. Woods (a)

(t) Angell, 34.

(u) Rex v. Crunden, 2 Camp. 89; 11 R. R. 671.

(r) 10 & 11 Vict. c. 89; 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55; 7 Edw. 7. c. 53; see Mace v. Philcor, 15 C. B. (N.s.) 600.

(y) (1906) 22 T. L. R. 369; 4 L. G. R. 495; 70 J. P. 132. As to the validity of bye-laws under local Acts for prohibiting and regulating erections on the foreshore, see Williams v. Weston-super-Mare Council, 98 L. T. 537; 6 L. G. R. 92: 72 J. P. 54; cited (No. 2) 103 L. T. 9; Parker v. Mayor of Bournemouth, SL. T. 449; and for regulating selling and hawking, see Moorman v. Tordoff, 99 L. T. 416; 6 L. G. R. 360; 72 J. P. 142; Cassel v. Jones, 108 L. T. 806, and for fixing places for public meetings, see Glee v. Meadows, (1911) 105 L. T. 327; and regulating the price to be charged for bathing machines, towels and Costumes, see Parker v. Clegg, 2 L. G. R. 608.

(z) Blundell v. Catteral, 5 B. & A. 268; Brinckman v. Matley [1904] 2 Ch. 313; 73 L. J. Ch. 642; Mercer v. Denne [1904] 2 Ch. 534; 74 L. J. Ch. 123; Aiton v. Stephen, 1 A. C. 456; Behrens v. Richards [1905] 2 Ch. 614; 74 L. J. Ch. 615; Llandudno Urban District Council v. Woods [1899] 2 Ch 705, at p. 708; 68 L. J. Ch. 623.

(a) [1899] 2 Ch. 705.

Rights to

sand, shells and seaweed.

that a clergyman has no right to hold services on the sea shore between high and low water mark, and a declaration to that effect was made on the application of the plaintiffs, lessees of the Crown, though an injunction was refused on the ground that the matter was too trivial. Cozens-Hardy, J., in delivering judg ment, says, at p. 208 of the report: "I think I am bound by the decision of the majority of the judges of the Court of King's Bench in 1821, in Blundell v. Catteral (b), to hold in strict law, this proposition is well founded. The public are not entitled to cross the shore even for the purposes of bathing or amusement. The sands on the sea shore are not to be regarded as, in the full sense of the word, a highway (c). . . . The plaintiffs have, therefore, every right to treat every bather, every nursemaid with a perambulator, every boy riding a donkey, and every preacher on the shore at Llandudno as a trespasser. In the present case there is no evidence from which I can find the existence of a legal usage or custom entitling the defendant to deliver sermons or addresses on the shore at Llandudno. . . . I feel bound to say that I consider this action wholly unnecessary, and one which ought not to have been brought. It is no part or duty of the council, as lessees from the Crown for an unexpired term of two years, to prevent a harmless user of the shore. . . This action is an attempt to assert rights which the Crown would never have thought of putting forward, and which are in no way necessary for the peace and good order of the town of Llandudno. I cannot refuse to make a declaration that the defendant is not entitled without the consent of the plaintiffs to hold meetings or deliver addresses, lectures or sermons on any part of the foreshore in lease from the Crown. But I decline to go further. I decline to grant an injunction. That is a formidable legal weapon which ought to be reserved for less trivial occasions. And I make no order as to costs."

However, under somewhat similar circumstances, Warrington, J., in Brighton Corporation v. Packham (d) considered he was bound by De Morgan v. Metropolitan Board of Works (e), and held that the right of holding public meetings on private property was a right which was not known to the law and granted an injunction.

Sand, shells, shingle, and seaweed, being natural products of the shore, or when washed up there, belong to the owner of the

(b) 5 B. & Ad. 268.

(c) Cf. Maddock v. Wallasey Local Board, 55 L. J. Q. B. 267.

(d) 72 J. P. 318. The injunction was from holding or taking part in any meetings or delivering lectures or addresses, singing hymns, and/or preaching

sermons.

(e) 5 Q. B. D. 155.

shore whoever that may be, who may deal with them as he pleases and license others so to do (f), and there is no general right in the public to enter the shore and take them (g). When, however, the soil is in the Crown, it is to be presumed that the taking of them would be permitted if it was not injurious to the navigation (h). A lord of a manor cannot claim a right to cut seaweed below low water mark except by grant or prescription from the Crown (i). Seaweed thrown on the land belongs to the owner of the property on which it is thrown (k); so does sand drifted by the wind (1). Seaweed cast or growing on the shore between high and low water mark is the property of the owner of the shore but is not the subject of larceny, though trover or trespass will lie for it (m). The regular taking of seaweed by the owner or his licensees is evidence of his possession and ownership of the shore (n).

tion.

A right to take sand, shells, shingle, and seaweed may exist By prescripand be claimed by prescription. As such a claim is, however, the claim to a profit à prendre in the soil of another, it cannot be supported by proof of a custom in the inhabitants of a township; for such a custom would be void, as a profit à prendre can only be claimed by grant or prescription (o). Nor could it be claimed by such inhabitants by prescription, as it was a claim by persons not a corporation, and thus incapable of taking by grant; and, moreover, was not claimed by them in a que estate (p). Where,

(See per Best, J., in Blundell v. Catteral, 24 R. R. 353; Howe v. Stawell, 1 Al. & Nap. 356, and note at p. 357; Hale, c. 6; Harg. Law Tracts, p. 27; but a natural barrier must not be removed, Att.-Gen. v. Tomline, 12 Ch. D. 214, ante, p. 42; Anderson v. Jacobs (1905) 21 T. L. R. 453; 93 L. T. 17, ante, p. 37, n. (e); Burton v. Hudson [1909] 2 K. B. 564, ante, p. 25, n. (c); Angell on Tidal Waters, 260.

(g) Howe v. Stawell, 1 Al. & Nap. 356; Bagot v. Orr, 2 Bos. & Pul. 472; 5 R. R. 668; Hamilton v. Att.-Gen. for Ireland, 5 L. R. Ir. 555; see also Musselburgh Real Estate Co. v. Musselburgh (Provost) [1905] A. C. 491, H. L. Sc.

(h) Per Best, J., in Dickens v. Shaw, Hall on the Sea Shore, App. 68. (1) Benest v. Pipon, 1 Knapp, P. C. 60. As to duty to remove decomposed seaweed which had become a nuisance, see Margate Local Board v. Margate Harbour Co., 2 L. T. 564.

(k) Lowe v. Govett, 3 B. & Ad. 863; 37 R. R. 560; Baird v. Fortune, 7 Jur. (5.8.) 926, per Lord Campbell, C.J.

Blewett v. Tregonning, 3 A. & E. 554; 42 R. R. 463.

(m) Reg. v. Clinton, Ir. R. 4 C. L. 6; Calmady v. Rowe, 6 C. B. 861 Brew v. Haren, 11 Ir. R. C. L. 198; Mulholland v. Killen, 9 Ir. Eq. 471; possession of the foreshore is sufficient to support trespass, Corporation of Hastings v. Ivall, L. R. 19 Eq. 588; Stoney v. Keane, infra.

(n) Lord Advocate v. Blantyre, 4 A. C. 770; Daly v. Murray, 17 L. R. Ir. 185; Healy v. Thorne, 4 Ir. R. C. L. 495; Calmady v. Rowe, supra; Stoney v. Keane, 37 Ir. L. T. 212.

(0) See Fitzhardinge (Lord) v. Purcell, ante, p. 51, n. (q). As to claim of inhabitants to dredge for oysters, see Goodman v. Saltash Corporation, 7 App. Cas. 633, and remarks of Kay, J., on this case in Tilbury v. Silva, 45 Ch. D. 98, post, p. 365; as to prescription to dry nets on private land, see Mercer v. Denne, ante, p. 50, n. (i).

(p) Constable v. Nicholson, 14 C. B. (N.s.) 230; Pitts v. Kingsbridge, 19 W. R. 884; see also Bland v. Lipscombe, 24 L. J. Q. B. 155, n.; Race v.