Dock dues dependent entirely on Act of Parliament creating the dock. deepen the harbour, to remove obstacles, to set up within the 66 66 99 66 In Ribble Navigation Company v. Hargreaves (p), which was an action brought to recover from the defendant the amount of certain tolls imposed by the 71st section of the Ribble Navigation Act (q), in respect of goods "carried or conveyed in or upon the "river Ribble," for every time of passing "the Ribble Sea Line " and the Ribble Inner Line" respectively. The point raised was the meaning of the terms owner, shipper as governed by sects. 3, 42 and 45 of The Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 27), which is incorporated with the special Act, and it was held, that one who delivers goods on board a vessel provided by the purchaser is not the "owner or the shipper" within the statutes, so as to be liable to an action for the tolls imposed by the 71st section of the special Act. 46 Where (r) the defendants were empowered by a local Act to levy tolls on all goods landed within their harbour, and in pursuance of a practice which had continued for many years, stones brought along the coast into the harbour were shot from the plaintiff's boat on to the shore, below high water mark, and remained on the spot where they were deposited till they were shipped for exportation from the harbour:-It was held that the stones were not landed within the meaning of the Act. Dock dues are payments made to the owners of docks by the owners of ships using the docks in proportion to the tonnage (s) of (0) See remarks of Lord Campbell, C.J., 4 El. & Bl. p. 931. (q) 16 & 17 Vict. c. clxx. 46 (r) Harvey v. Mayor and Corporation of Lyme Regis, L. R., 4 Exch. 260; 32 L. J. Ex. 141; see remarks of Bramwell, B., as to the term landed." (s) As to right to recover excess rates paid under invalid regulations, see Moss v. Mersey Docks, 26 L. T. 425; 20 W. R. 700. the ship, and by owners of goods, viz., by shippers when they are entered at the customs-house (t). Mr. Gunning, in his work on Tolls (u), points out that the right to dock dues depends in every case upon the particular Act of Parliament under which the docks are erected, and is quite distinct from the question of ports and port dues, and that the property in a port and that in the docks situated within the town which is the head of the port, is frequently in different persons, and he cites Liverpool and London (x) as instances. The powers and rights of owners of docks are usually expressed in the Act of Parliament under which they are erected, and when that is the case they cannot be exceeded (u). Where the Act is silent on this point the public have a right to enjoy the privilege of using the docks upon 'reasonable terms," and the owner cannot impose what tolls or duties he pleases on them (y). The question as to the reasonableness of a particular toll is for the Court and not for the jury to decide (z). The jury are to give their verdict according to the invariable and reasonable custom, the judge alone can decide whether such tolls are reasonable or not (a). 66 The reasontoll is for the Court and not the jury to decide. ableness of a The term port" is used in its popular sense when the limits Meaning of of a place liable to the burden of dock duties requires a legal term "port." construction (b). Thus Goole, which is without the port of Hull, was held not liable to such duties, although Goole and Hull might be considered as a district for the purposes of revenue. But a vessel proceeding with a cargo taken in at Goole to Hull is liable for tonnage dues (c). dock dues. Dock duties, when assigned by virtue of an Act of Parliament, Assignment of are not mere chattels but charges upon the docks; and it was accordingly held that an auctioneer could not be called upon to (t) Encyclopædia of the Laws of England, 2nd ed., vol. iv., p. 683. (r) The London Docks are now vested in the Port of London Authority by the Port of London' Act, see ante, p. 63, n. (o). (y) Allnutt v. Inglis, 12 East, 527; 11 R. R. 482. (z) 2 Inst. 222; Vinkensterne v. Ebden, 1 Lord Raym. 384; 1 Salk. 248; 5 Mod. 366; Carth. 357; Corporation of Stamford v. Paulet, 1 C. & J. 57; 35 R. R. 675; S. C., in error, 1 C. & J. 400. (a) Lowden v. Hierons, Holt, N. P. C. 647; 2 B. Moo. 102; 2 Inst. 222; 19 R. R. 542; Wright v. Brewster, K. B., November, 1832; 38 R. R. 232. (b) Kingston-upon-Hull Dock Co. v. Browne, 2 B. & A. 43; 36 R. R. 459; See Woolrych, p. 318; and Gunning, p. 112, note 2. As to meaning of the limits of a port under private Acts, see Asheton-Smith v. Owen, ante, p. 60. (c) Hull Dock Co. v. Priestley, S. C., 1 Nev. & M. 85; see Woolrych, note (c), p. 318, and ante, p. 60. As to the meaning of "town dues" under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 125, see Mersey Docks v. Hunter, Craig & Co., 80 L. T. 96; 8 Asp., M. C. 489; as to when harbour dues are an interest inland within the Mortmain Act (9 Geo. 2. c. 36), see In re Christmas, 33 Ch. D. 332; In re David, 43 Ch. D. 27; Ion v. Ashton, 28 Beav. 379. Decisions as London pay the duty upon them when viewed in any other light than as interests in land (d). It would be out of place here to enumerate all the various decisions on special Acts relating to docks. We shall, therefore, merely select from the cases such as seem to embody important, principles. The case of Allnutt v. Inglis has already been alluded to (e) as turning on points relating to wharfage payable to the London Dock Company (f); Harden v. Smith and Shroeder v. Smith (g) were important cases with regard to the West India Dock Acts. These were actions against the defendant as treasurer of the West India Dock Company (h) to recover back certain sums which had been paid by the plaintiff (who had purchased certain hogsheads of sugar before then imported from the West Indies into the port of London, which had continued all the time in the company's warehouses, and for which all the importation rates and duties had been satisfied), to the officers of the company for wharfage, and for shipping into lighters sent into the docks by the plaintiffs for that purpose, the same hogsheads of sugar, part for home consumption, part for exportation. The company, on the one hand, contended, that they were only bound, in consideration of the rates and duties received upon importation of the goods, to deliver the same free of further charge from their warehouses by inland carriage; the plaintiffs. on the other hand, maintained, that they had a right, for the same compensation, to receive the goods from the warehouses across the quays, and by means of the cranes thereon into their lighters and so remove them by water carriage, as well as to receive and remove them immediately from the company's warehouses by land carriage. The West India Dock Company is incorporated by Act of Parliament, and section 137 of 39 Geo. 3. c. 69, gives the company certain rates and duties for all goods imported from the West Indies which shall be landed, &c., from on board any ship entering into and using the dock; which rates are directed to be accepted for the use of the docks and the quays, wharves and cranes and other machines belonging thereto, and the land waiter's fees on account of such goods, after being unshipped, and all charges and expenses of wharfage, landing, housing, and weighing such goods, and of such cooperage as the 66 (d) Rer v. Winstanley, 8 Price, 180; 22 R. R. 743. (e) 12 East, 527; 11 R. R. 482; see ante, p. 589. (f) As to the meaning of grain under the Port of London Act, 1872. s. 4, see Cotton v. Voyren & Co., [1896] A. C. 457; 65 L. J. Q. B. 686; 76 L. T. 598; H. L. (E.); see also Scott v. Tylor, 48 J. P. 426. (g) 8 East, 16. (h) Cf. Blackett v. Smith, 11 East, 533, which was an action for wharfage and porterage against the same party. And see Woolrych, p. 317. same may want after being unshipped, and all rent for warehouse room for twelve weeks, and all charges of delivering the same from the said warehouses." The Court held that the latter words include a delivery of the goods into lighters in the dock. as well as any immediate delivery from the warehouses into land. carriages placed under the cranes of the warehouses, although for the purposes of such delivery into lighters it be necessary to put the goods upon trucks in order to carry them across the quay, and afterwards crane them into the lighters. But it seems that if the owner require any work to be done upon the goods ultra the mere transitus of them from the warehouse to the lighters, the company are entitled to an extra compensation, to be settled by convention between the parties, as in other cases out of the Act. Blackett v. Smith (i) was a decision on another part of the same section of this statute (k), in which it was held, that the owner of a homeward-bound ship entering the West India Docks in so leaky a condition as to require immediate unloading and assistance, without waiting her turn to be unquayed and unloaded in rotation in the manner required by 39 Geo. 3. c. 69, is bound to bear, in addition to the ordinary tonnage rates, the extra expenses of labourers for pumping the ship after the crew are discharged, and for delivering the cargo into lighters in the outward dock or basin; also for coopering previous to such delivery into lighters; the company having afterwards unladen the cargo out of such lighters upon the quays, in the import dock and performed the requisite coopering, &c., upon such unloading, in the same manner as they would have done if the cargo had been delivered out of the ship itself in its proper time and place. By section 76 of the West India Dock Act, 1831, the Dock Company are empowered to take certain rates in respect of every lighter entering into any of the docks or lying therein; and by section 83 all lighters entering into a dock to discharge or receive goods to or from on board of any ship or vessel lying therein shall be exempt from payment of rates so long as they are bonâ fide engaged in discharging or receiving such goods. A lighter entered into one of the docks for the purpose of discharging her cargo into a vessel lying therein, but was unable to do so because the vessel was already full, and the lighter thereupon left the dock without discharging any of her cargo. The majority of House of Lords held (1), reversing the decision (i) 12 East, 518; see Gunning, p. 133. (k) 39 Geo. 3. c. 69. (1) London and India Docks Co. v. Thames Steam Tug and Lighterage Co.; The same v. McDougall and Bonthron; The same v. Page, Son and East, Lim., 24 T. L. R. 834, H. L. (E.). of the Court of Appeal (m), that, as the lighter had not discharged any part of her cargo, she was not exempt from rates. Section 136 of the London and St. Katherine Docks Act, 1866, provides that "All lighters and craft entering into the docks. to discharge or receive ballast or goods to or from on board of any ship or vessel lying therein shall be exempt from the payment of any rates so long as the lighter or craft is bonâ fide engaged in so discharging or receiving the ballast or goods.” A lighter finished discharging into a ship in a dock on the afternoon of Saturday, and the next high tide was at midnight. The ship left the dock by that tide, but the lighter remained in the dock until 1 a.m. on Monday. The dock company claimed 6d. per ton on the lighter's tonnage under a rate which provided that lighters, having discharged or received goods to or from a ship and remaining in dock beyond the first available tide, should pay 6d. per ton register per week. Held, that when the lighter stayed on in the dock after midnight of the Saturday she ceased to be "bonâ fide engaged in discharging," and was not exempt from the rate. A lighter entered a dock for the purpose of discharging into a ship which was then lying in the dock. The ship was unable to take the cargo owing to want of cargo space. The lighter then discharged into a ship which came into the dock after the lighter. The House of Lords held, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal (n), that the lighter was not exempt from rates, as it was a condition of exemption that the ship into which the barge discharged should be lying in the dock at the time when the lighter entered (o). There have been two cases on the construction to be put on the Port of London Act, 1908, and the Port of London (Port Rates on Goods) Provisional Order Act, 1910 (p). In the first, the Anglo-American Oil Co., Lim. v. Port of London Authority, the question was whether oil which was imported by a steamer, the Narragansett, in bulk and intended for transhipment was entitled to exemption from rates when in fact it was, with a view of subsequent transhipment, discharged into tanks, which either already contained oil not intended for transhipment, or into tanks which contained oil for transhipment but had been brought in by other vessels. Under the above Acts "transhipment goods," which expression meant and included goods imported for transhipment only, were exempt from port rates, but the goods had to be shipped again" as soon as practicable." It was contended by (m) 23 L. T. R. 590; [1908] 1 K. B. 786. (p) 8 Edw. 7, c. 68; 10 Edw. 7 & 1 Geo. 5.-c. c. |