Profits of rated where they are earned. Dock Co. houses and buildings mentioned in the Act, and, therefore, that the appellants were rateable at the higher amount. Profits, if rated at all, must be rated where they are earned (c). docks must be In Reg. v. Bristol Dock Co. (d) it was held that no portion of the dues payable by ships on entering the port was a profit arising from a new basin, and that the basin was rateable to the relief of the poor as ordinary land, and not in respect of such dues (e); Reg. v. Hull and in Reg. v. Hull Dock Co. (f), where the company constructed a harbour and docks, but had no property in the harbour, though the soil of the docks was vested in them, and were empowered to take toll on all vessels, whether they used the docks or not, coming into the harbour, the Court held that they were rateable. only for such dues as were paid by ships using the docks." As to those ships which do not come into the docks," said Lord Denman, C.J., and which never are on the property of the company at all, the case is very different. The toll given to the company, and which such ships are obliged to pay, is doubtless given in respect of the company having made those docks, but still it does not arise from the use of the docks, nor is it earned in them. It is a naked toll, just as much as toll paid by vessels passing lighthouses in similar cases." Apportion 66 The view of the law taken in these cases has, however, been modified by subsequent decisions, and railways and other properties are now habitually rated parochially for earnings collected elsewhere (g). "Speaking generally the method of valuing docks and harbours is similar to that used in the case of a railway; that is to say, from the gross receipts are deducted the working expenses, the tenant's share of the profits, the cost of maintenance and insurance and the sinking fund for ultimate renewal, the residue being the rateable value" (h). In the case of The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. ment of earn- Overseers of Liverpool (i), the appellants occupied docks in Mersey Docks several parishes and townships on the Lancashire and Cheshire ings of docks. v. Overseers of Liverpool. (c) Reg. v. Bristol Dock Co., 10 L. J. M. C. 105; see Castle, p. 304; cf. R. v. Hull Dock Co., 7 T. R. 219; R. v. Hull Dock Co., 5 M. & S. 394. (d) 10 L. J. M. C. 105; 1 Q. B. 335; 1 G. & D. 76. (6) See judgment of Lord Denman, C.J., and the cases there cited, 10 L. J. M. C. 111. (f) 14 L. J. M. C. 114; 7 Q. B. 2; 9 J. P. 405; distinguished in Reg. v. Berwick-upon-Tweed Union (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 493, and virtually overruled in Blyth Harbour Commissioners v. Newsham, [1894] 2 Q. B. 293, 675; cf. R. v. Dock Company of Hull, 1 T. R. 219; R. v. Hull Dock Co., 5 M. & S. 394; and Berwick Harbour Commissioners v. Tweedmouth, 54 L. T. 159; 5 Asp. M. C. 532; 51 L. J. M. C. 84. (g) Castle's Law and Practice of Rating (4th ed.), pp. 303 et seq. (i) 41 L. J. M. C. 161; L. R. 7 Q. B. 643; 26 L. T. (N.s.) 868; 37 J. P. sides of the Mersey, which they held and administered under their Act of Parliament as one estate, the docks on the Lancashire side of the Mersey being by far the most profitable part of the undertaking, which was carried on at a loss on the Cheshire side of the river. The appellants had been rated by the parish of Liverpool on the principle of ascertaining the net income of the docks, &c., locally situated within the parish of Liverpool, without taking into account the profits of the whole undertaking. and it was held, that the parochial principle must always, except in cases of insuperable difficulty (k), be preferred; that no such difficulty was shown in the present case, and that the assessment was accordingly right. This decision was approved in the recent case of Sculcoates Union v. Hull Dock Co. (l), in which it was held, that in assessing to the poor rate docks extending over more than one parish, the rateable value should, wherever it is possible (m), be ascertained by attributing to each parish the receipts earned and the expenses incurred in that parish, and not by obtaining a rateable value for the whole of the docks and then allocating this value to each parish in proportion to the water area of the docks in that parish. The occupiers of property capable of beneficial occupation are Beneficial liable to be rated in respect of its full rateable value, without occupation. regard to the amount of benefit which they themselves derive from that occupation (n). The true test of beneficial occupation is not, however, whether a profit can be made, but whether the occupation is of value (o). Where railway and tramway lines formed part of a dock system, but the dock company were prohibited by statute from taking any tolls for the use of the lines, it was held, that as the dock company were prevented from earning rent because of the statutory prohibition, the rent which could have been earned but for prohibition ought not to be taken (k) As in The Queen v. Kingston-upon-Hull Dock Co., 21 L. J. M. C. 155; 18 Q. B. Rep. 325. () [1895] A. C. 136; 64 L. J. M. C. 49, H. L. (E.). See also London and India Docks v. Poplar Union, (1900) 83 L. T. 371; 64 J. P. 820. (m) Cf. as to this the remarks of Lord Herschell, [1895] A. C., at pp. 144-145, on the distinction between Reg. v. Hull Dock Co., 18 Q. B. 325, and Mersey Docks v. Liverpool, L. R., 7 Q. B. 643; Castle (4th ed.), pp. 167 et seq., 308. (n) Reg. v. Rhymney Rly. Co., 10 B. & S. 198; 35 L. J. M. C. 75; L. R. 4 Q. B. 276; Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Birkenhead, L. R. 8 Q. B. 445; 42 L. J. M. C. 141; 29 L. T. 454; 21 W. R. 913; Glamorganshire Canal V. Merthyr Tydvil Union, (1902) 88 L. T. 85; 67 J. P. 52 (C. A.). (0) London County Council v. Erith Overseers, [1893] A. C. 562; Reg. v. School Board for London, 17 Q. B. D. 738; Burton-on-Trent Corporation v. Churchwardens of Egginton, 24 Q. B. D. 197. As to rating of unoccupied warehouses, see Bootle Overseers v. Liverpool Warehouse Co., (1901) 85 L. T. 45; 65 J. P. 740; R. v. Henderson (1905), 92 L. T. 662; 69 J. P. 294; 3 L. G. R. 756. 1 Exemption of the Crown from rates. The Mersey into consideration in determining the value of their property (p). In Reg. v. Southampton Dock Co. (q), the premises of the company consisted in part of the custom house, rented and occupied by her Majesty's commissioners of customs, and a manufactory and several workshops, rented and occupied by the West India Mail Packet Company and J. W., and it was held that section 25 of 13 Geo. 3. c. 50 (r), which provided that every person, whether landlord or tenant, who should let out his house in separate apartments or ready furnished to lodgers, should for the purposes of the Act be deemed the occupier and liable to be rated, did not apply to the part of the company's premises of which they were not the occupiers. Allan v. Overseers of Liverpool, and Inman v. Overseers of Kirkdale (s), raised the question as to whether certain persons were rateable as occupiers through the fact that the Mersey Dock and Harbour Board, under the powers of their Act, appropriated certain accommodation in the docks for their use, in the first case certain berths for the use of steamers with sheds attached, and in the other a certain space as a coal depôt; and it was held, that the board had not parted with the occupation of any part of such sheds so as to render the appellants rateable in respect of such occupation: but where the dock company had demised certain vaults for use as a bonded warehouse, the occupiers were rightly rated (t). Fixed hydraulic cranes in a dock have been held as increasing the rateable value of the dock undertaking, as they were on the premises for the purpose of making them fit as premises for the purposes for which they were used (u). Dockyards in the occupation of the Crown, or occupied for Government purposes, are exempted from the payment of rates, but tenants of the Crown holding for their private benefit are rateable; and it has been held, that the Crown not being named in 43 Eliz. c. 2, property in the occupation of the Crown or of persons using it exclusively in or for the service of the Crown is not rateable to the relief of the poor (x). (p) Sculcoates Union v. Hull Dock Co., [1895] A. C. 136; 64 L. J. M. C. 49; 71 L. T. 642; 43 W. R. 623; cf. Sutton Harbour v. Plymouth Union, 63 L. T. 772; 55 J. P. 232. (q) 20 L. J. M. C. 155; 14 Q. B. 587. (4) An Act for the better regulating the poor, &c., of Southampton." (s) 43 L. J. M. C. 69; L. R. 9 Q. B. 180; followed in Rochdale Canal Co. v. Brewster (1894), 2 Q. B. 852. (t) Young & Co. v. Liverpool Assessment Committee, [1911] 2 K. B. 195; 80 L. J. K. B. 104. (u) London and India Docks v. Poplar Union (1900), 33 L. T. 371; 64 J. P. 820. (x) Jones v. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board; Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Cameron, 11 H. L. Cas. 443; 35 L. J. M. C. 1: Castle (4th ed.), pp. 17-20. In Sion College v. Corporation of London, [1901] 1 K. B. 617; 84 L. T. 133, it was held by the Court of Appeal affirming the Queen's Bench Division that the exemption of certain lands reclaimed from the Thames Various deductions have been allowed by the Courts with Deductions respect to the assessment of docks. allowable in the assess A dock company empowered by their Act to build or provide ment. out of their income steam-tugs for towing vessels into or out of the docks from or to Southampton or to any part of the English Channel, had in use a steam-tug which offered considerable advantages, though it was not indispensable, to those who used the docks, and was conducive to the general profits of the dock business; and attached to the freehold and essential to the business of the company was a certain fixed plant, consisting of cranes, steam engines, derricks, and other ponderous machinery, which, however, were capable of being detached as easily and with as little injury to the freehold as tenant's fixtures put up for the purposes of trade and business, and usually valued as between incoming and outgoing tenants. Held, that the steam-tug must be taken as ancillary to the docks, and a part of the floating capital, and that the expense of it was a proper deduction to be made in estimating the amount of the company's assessment to the rate; but that the cranes and other ponderous machinery were properly included in estimating the rateable value of the company's premises (y). Where, however, a steamboat was used for towing barges filled with mud out to sea and back, a deduction of £1,200 therefor (under the head of moveable plant) was disallowed while the boat was used only for the purpose of constructing the dock; though it was held that it would be permissible in future rates if the boat became necessary for permanent use in removing silt (z). The expenses of dredging a harbour have been held a proper deduction under section 37 of the Poor Law (Scotland) Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 83), (1) because physical structures such as quays and wharves derived their whole use and value from being pertinents of a harbour, and that the expense of dredging was from all taxes and assessments whatsoever under 7 Geo. 3. c. 37, s. 51, applied only to existing taxes and assessments and did not apply to the 'consolidated rate under the City of London Sewers Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. clxii), which was substantially a new imposition; whereas in London Corporation v. Netherlands Steamboat Co. (1905), 93 L. T. 566; 69 J. P. 443; 3 L. G. R. 1087, H. L. (E.), the above case was distinguished, and it was held by the House of Lords, affirming the Court below, in a case in which the Crown has assumed a statutory liability for the payment of a commutation in lieu of rates upon property in the hands of the Crown, and the statute provided that such property shall be .. to all intents and purposes free and exempt from the payment of all and all manner of rates and assessments 64 (z) Reg. v. Tyne Improvement Commissioners, 6 L. T. 489. necessary to maintain the harbour in a condition in which it could be used as a harbour; and (2) that the harbour as a whole, including that part of it occupied by sea and extending below low water mark, was a complex heritable subject assessable to poor rates, and that the expenses of dredging below as well as above low water mark were necessary to maintain that complex heritable subject in its actual state (a). But the annual cost of dredging to enable vessels to get to a wharf at a ship-building yard has been held not to be an expense necessary to maintain the rateable premises in a state to command the rent within section 1 of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836, and therefore could not be deducted in ascertaining the net rateable value thereof (b). It was also held in Reg. v. Southampton Docks (c) that as an allowance to the directors for management, another proper deduction to be made was a reasonable amount of remuneration for personal trouble and expense, and for the exercise of the skill and judgment of a supposed lessee of the company in managing the affairs of the docks, independently of the profit on capital employed by him; but a similar deduction (under the head of disbursements) of £300 as "allowance for direction" was disallowed in the case of Reg. v. Tyne Improvement Commissioners (d), where the Act under which the commissioners constructed the dock gave them no power to remunerate themselves out of the dock funds for their services. In the latter case deductions of £500 for cash balance (under the head of capital for carrying on the dock), and also £150 for watching by means of a public boat paid for out of other than dock funds, were disallowed; while a deduction in respect of stores in hand was permitted (e). It has been held that no deduction could be made for income tax in respect of the estimated profit of a supposed tenant of the docks, that not being a tax upon the subject-matter rated, but upon the net income of the tenant after paying the rent of the premises (f); and in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Liverpool Overseers (g) the appellants were held not to be entitled to a deduction for tenant's profits in addition to the cost of collecting the rates they were authorised by their Act to charge (a) Burghead Harbour Co. v. George, (1906) 8 F. 982, Ct. of Sess. See Leith Harbour Commissioners v. Leith Assessment Committee, post, p. 622, and Blackpool Pier v. Fylde Union, ante, p. 22. (b) White Brothers v. South Stoneham Assessment Committee, [1915] 1 K. B. 103; 84 L. J. K. B. 273. (c) 20 L. J. M. C. 155. (d) 6 L. T. 489. (e) 6 L. T. 489. (f) 20 L. J. M. C. 155. (g) L. R. 9 Q. B. 84; 43 L. J. M. C. 33; 29 L. T. 454; 38 J. P. 27. |