for the use of their docks; but in Port of London Authority v. Orsett Union Assessment Committee it was held by the House of Lords that an allowance might be made for tenants' profits. and overruled the Mersey Dock case so far as it decided to the contrary (h). A rating authority is entitled to take into consideration the liability of the occupiers of a dock to pay excess profits duty when assessing the rateable value of a dock (i).

In valuing the undertaking of the Leith Harbour Commissioners, under 55 & 56 Vict. c. clxxvii., the assessor proceeded according to the "revenue" method, and he distinguished between landlord's expenditure and tenant's expenditure, allowing only the latter as a deduction from the gross revenue. He further did not allow any deduction in respect of tenant's profits. The commissioners maintained that as the undertaking was not capable of earning profits, the whole expenditure, other than capital expenditure, ought to be deducted, or alternatively, that a sum should be deducted in name of tenant's profits.

Held, that the undertaking was to be valued as a profitearning subject; that consequently the only expenditure to be deducted from the gross revenue was tenant's expenditure; but that a sum in name of tenant's profits ought also to be deducted.

The magistrates allowed in name of tenant's profits a sum reached by taking 10 per cent. on tenant's capital. The commissioners maintained that tenant's profits ought to be fixed by taking a percentage on the balance of revenue left after deducting the tenant's expenditure.

Held, that in the circumstances the sum allowed by the magistrates as tenant's profits was fair and reasonable.

The commissioners claimed that the whole expense of dredging the harbour and docks ought to be deducted from the gross revenue. The magistrates, being of opinion that the expense of dredging the waterways and accesses to the docks was landlord's expenditure, held that only the expense of dredging inside the docks was to be deducted.

The magistrates further allowed as deductions 60 per cent. of the expenses of management and half of the expenses of an inquiry by the Home Office with a view to regulations as to loading. The commissioners maintained that 80 per cent. of the expenses of management and a larger proportion of the expenses of the inquiry ought to be deducted.

The magistrates further fixed the tenant's floating capital at

(h) Port of London Authority v. Orsett Union Assessment Committee, [1920] A. C. 273; 89 L. J. K. B. 481.

(i) Ibid., [1919] 1 K. B. 84; 88 L. J. K. B. 797.

Rateability of marine property not actually occupying

the soil.

Floating piers and floating docks.

Reg. v. Leith.

one-third of the expenditure. The commissioners maintained that two-thirds ought to be taken.

Held, that there was no ground for altering the determination of the magistrates on any of these points (k).

In ascertaining the net rateable value of the property assessable to the poor rate, an allowance is to be made for rates and taxes, and such allowance ought to be made upon the net rateable value after the rates and taxes themselves, in addition to all other proper allowances, have been deducted (1). Property is to be valued in communibus annis, that is as it may be considered to exist in ordinary years, and not as it may accidentally happen to be in exceptional years (m); and a dock company has been held rateable in respect of tonnage duties received under 14 Geo. 3. c. 56, though it appeared that the expenditure in repairs during the period for which the rate was made exceeded the amount of such duties (n).

There have been many decisions as to the rateability of bodies, like floating piers or docks, barges, hulks, and the like. which, while not themselves occupying the soil, are either attached to floats, &c., fixed in it, or otherwise kept permanently in the same position; the question being usually whether they are in permanent beneficial occupation of the soil in the parish, and also whether such bodies have increased the rateable value of the occupation of the moorings (0).

In Reg. v. Leith (p), a steamboat company were rated in respect of their floating pier or landing-place, by the description of tenement, land, landing-place and premises, and the brow or brows, barge or barges, &c., lying upon, fixed to, or connected with, the same tenement, land, landing-place or premises, and

(k) Leith Harbour Commissioners v. Leith Assessment Committee, [1907] S. C. 751, Ct. of Sess.

(1) Reg. v. Tyne Improvement Commissioners, 6 L. T. 489; Tyne Improvement Commissioners v. Churchwardens and Overseers of Chirton, 32 L. J. M. C. 192; cf. R. v. Hull Dock Co., 2 B. & C. 516. Where lands were charged with a rent-charge under Commissioners of Sewers for the protection of land from the sea it was held that tenants assessed were entitled to a deduction from their rateable value in respect of the share of other lands which benefited but were not assessed Green v. Newport Union, Stead v. Newport Union, [1909] A. C. 35, H. L. (E.). Rates levied under the Sewers Acts must be equal upon all properties benefited: Knight v. Langport Drainage Board, 67 L. J. Q. B. 482; [1898] 1 Q. B. 585; 78 L. T. 260; 46 W. R. 392; 62 J. P. 245. But see Metropolitan Board of Works v. Vauxhall Bridge Co., 26 L. J. Q. B. 253; 7 E. & B. 964, and ante, p. 40.

(m) Castle (4th ed.), pp. 184-186. Expenses of one company such as superannuation allowances or rents of premises made payable by such company upon an amalgamation of several companies ought not to be deducted: London and India Docks v. Poplar Union (1900), 33 L. T. 371; 64 J. P. 820.

(n) R. v. Hull Dock Co., 5 M. & S. 394, 400; R. v. Mirfield, 10 East, 219; 25 R. R. 412, 413.

(0) See the remarks of Mr. Castle as to floating bodies, Law and Practice of Rating (4th ed.). pp. 286, 287.

(p) 21 L. J. M. C. 119; 1 E. & B. 121; 18 L. T. (o.s.) 121; 16 J. P. 310.

the easement or easements, anchorage or anchorages, held, used, or enjoyed therewith," &c. The pier consisted of three floating barges, kept in their places by chain cables fastened to anchors. sunk in the bed of the river, and connected by wooden bridges, the first of which rested on the first barge at one end, the other end being fastened to a platform resting upon an abutment made. fast to the wall of a building on the shore, the ground floor of which was rented of one J. S. by the company, and formed part of a mill, the residue of which was occupied by J. S., and both. bridges and barges rose and fell with the tide. Passengers embarking by the steamboats passed through the ground floor of the building, which floor, as well as the pier and landing-places, were in the exclusive occupation of the steamboat company. was held, that the rate was laid not on the barges, &c., as distinguished from the land, but on the landing-place and premises together with the floating barges, &c., by which the occupation of the land was rendered more profitable, and was therefore valid; also that the assessment in the rate of J. S. for "the mill and premises, exclusive of the steamboat pier," meant to exclude not the floating barges, but the ground floor and landing-place, and, therefore, that the latter were not twice rated.

It

A floating pier on the Thames, rising and falling with the tide and kept in its place by an iron chain attached to an iron post affixed to landing stairs, and fastened to anchors in the bed of the river by iron chain cables, has also been held rateable to the poor (g).

In Reg. v. Morrison (r), however, where a ship dock, which floated at high water, and grounded at low water, and was moored by chains to the bed of a tidal navigable river and to a building yard on the bank, the chains being capable of being slackened, to enable the dock to be taken into deeper water, which often occurred, while the harbour-master sometimes removed the dock altogether, Lord Campbell, C.J., distinguishing the case from Reg. v. Leith, since the pier was there permanently fixed to the landing-place, held, that the floating dock could not be rated as accessory to the yard.

Similarly, a boat club composed of the members of the University of Oxford were held not to be rateable as the occupiers of a barge floating on the river, and moored, at about thirty feet from the bank, by two iron rings passing loosely

(q) Reg. v. Forrest, 30 L. T. (o.s.) 284, and cf. Forrest v. Greenwich Churchwardens, 8 E. & B. 890; 2 J. P. 130.

(r) 22 L. J. M. C. 14; 1 E. & B. 150; 20 L. T. (o.s.) 190; 17 J. P. 24; cf. Castle, pp. 286, 313.

round fixed posts in the bed, of such a diameter as to allow the barge to rise and fall with the water of the river (s). In the case of Cory v. Bristowe (t), however, where the appellants, by permission of the Thames Conservancy, lowered stones and ballast into the river so as to make permanent moorings for certain floating hulks for loading and unloading coal, and paid rent for the accommodation to the conservators, at whose pleasure the moorings were removable at a week's notice, it was held by the House of Lords, affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal, that the appellants were in the exclusive, permanent and beneficial occupation of the moorings and rateable in respect of the same. In the case of Tyne Pontoons Co. v. Tynemouth Union (u), the company excavated a creek on land on the tidal portion of the Tyne of which they are occupiers and owners and placed in it two pontoons into which ships could be received for repairing purposes, and which were attached to piles and dolphins by shackles, easily detached, and joined to the land by a movable gangway. The pontoons could be towed out, but had not been moved, except for repairing purposes, for ten and four years respectively, and it was held that they were rightly rateable as being in occupation of the land over which they floated, and also that the occupation of the land was enhanced by reason of their being attached and used in connection therewith.

In Smith's Dock Co. v. Tynemouth Corporation (x), which was a case relating to similar excavated land, the Court of Appeal held, (1) that the appellants were in occupation of the excavated land so as to be rateable in respect of it, inasmuch as they were in occupation of it before and after its excavation, and afterwards the most important part of their business was done over the site, and (2) that the excavated ground over which the pontoons floated was "land covered with water within the meaning of section 211, sub-section 1 (b) of the Public Health Act, 1875 (y). It is not essential to bring a case within this section of the Act, that the land should for every hour in the course of the year be covered by water. It is a question of degree and depends on the facts of each case. Thus the foreshore is within the section

(s) Grant v. Local Board of District of Oxford, 38 L. J. M. C. 39; L. R. 4 Q. B. 9; 19 L. T. 378; cf. Watkins v. Assessment Committee of Gravesend and Milton Union, 37 L. J. M. C. 73; L. R. 3 Q. B. 350; 18 L. T. 601; 32 J. P. 294; and Cory v. Churchwardens of Greenwich, 41 L. J. M. C. 142; L. R. 7 C. P. 499; 27 L. T. 150.

(t) 2 A. C. 262; 46 L. J. M. C. 273; 36 L. T. 594; 41 J. P. 709.

(u) 76 L. T. 782; cf. Reg. v. Morrison, 1 El. & Bl. 450; see also Swansea Harbour Trustees v. Swansea Union, ante, p. 615.

(x) [1908] 1 K. B. 948; 77 L. J. K. B. 560; 99 L. T. 136; 72 J. P. 201; 6 L. G. R. 486; 24 T. L. R. 432 (C. A.).

(y) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55.

though dry docks into which ships are floated for the purpose of repairs are not (z).

In determining the rateability of certain wharves, it was held Wharves. in Reg. v. Dowlais Iron Co. (a), that certain wharfage dues were

to be taken into account in addition to the rent of the wharves

themselves.

"Anchorage and beaconage tolls" have been held to be Anchorage rateable as connected with the use of the soil (b).

tolls.

house tolls.

c. 60.

The non-rateability of public lighthouses is provided for by Lighthouses and lightsection 731 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60) (c). This exemption does not, however, apply to light- 57 & 58 Vict. houses belonging to or under the control of private authorities, the occupier of which is rateable in respect of the annual value of the lighthouse machinery, &c., but not in respect of the tolls (d).

The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board had a statutory right to levy, inter alia, light-dues so fixed that, with other receipts applicable to conservancy purposes, the receipts must not exceed the expenditure on those purposes, so that no profit could accrue to the board in respect of the lighthouses, and they owned, as part of their conservancy apparatus, a tower used as a lighthouse, a telegraph station, and houses near the tower inhabited by their lightkeepers and workmen. It was held that the board were not liable to be rated in respect of the tower, inasmuch as its use was so limited by statute that no profit could arise therefrom and there could be no beneficial occupation of it by any tenant; but that they were liable to be rated in respect of the adjoining houses, in estimating the value of which the fact of their proximity to the lighthouse tower ought to be taken into account (c).

Where rivers have been entrusted by Acts of Parliament to Rivers.

(z) Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Birkenhead Corporation, [1916] 1 K. B. 695; 85 L. J. K. B. 784.

(a) 10 B. & S. 208, n.; cf. Sutton Harbour v. Plymouth Union, 63 L. T. 772; 55 J. P. 232.

(b) Reg. v. Durham, Earl of, 28 L. J. M. C. 232; 2 E. & E. 230; 1 L. T. 30.

(c) This section is as follows:-" All lighthouses, buoys, beacons, and all light-dues, and other rates, fees, or payments accruing or forming part of the Mercantile Marine Fund, and all premises or property belonging to or occupied by any of the general lighthouse authorities or by the Board of Trade, which are used or applied for the purposes of any of the services for which these dues, rates, fees and payments are received, and all instruments or writings used by or under the direction of any of the general lighthouse authorities or of the Board of Trade in carrying on those services, shall be exempted from all public, parochial and local taxes, dues, and rates of every kind.”

(d) R. v. Rebowe, Cowp. 583; Cald. 155, 351; S. C., Lofft, 77; Const. 142, pl. 177; Nolan's Poor Law, vol. i. p. 99; cf. R. v. Tynemouth, 12 East, 46; 11 R. R. 328; R. v. Coke, 5 B. & C. 797; 29 R. R. 408.

(e) Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Llanellan (Overseers), 54 L. J. Q. B. 49; 14 Q. B. D. 770.

L.W.

40