other classes of the community suffer. ed severely, it was not a matter of surprise that it should at length encounter misfortune, and it ought not to occasion despondency, though a remedy, if practicable, ought to be supplied. If parliament met the difficulties of the country fairly, and joined to sustain the credit of the country, this would be likely to afford the agriculturist the most effectual relief."

The House divided upon the amendment, which not having been expected, many both of the ministerial and of the opposition members had withdrawn. The address, in its original state, however, was still carried by a majority of 67.

The first subjects which formally engaged the attention of parliament, were the policy of the government in regard to the treaties lately concluded, and the arrangement of the affairs of the continent founded upon their provisions. In discussing these topics, in themselves of so extensive a character, the various speakers, more particularly those of the Lower House, indulged in the display of many arguments and reasonings entirely extraneous, insomuch that the debates were protracted during several successive nights. Upon the whole, however, the substance of the views and principles developed in the course of these evenings, may be reduced to a comparatively small compass. On one point, as might have been expected from the proceedings on the opening of the session, namely, the splendid nature of the exertions and successes of our armies, the members of both houses agreed in expressing the same sentiments of patriotic congratulation. With few exceptions, the propriety of adopting the most vigorous measures on the return of Buonaparte, was now, as in the preceding year, maintained by all parties.

But great difference of opinion was expressed in regard, first, to the justice of those principles of general polity, in virtue of which England was supposed to have concurred with the allies in aiding the restoration of Louis XVIII. to the throne of France; secondly, the wisdom of those measures which the allied powers had adopted for the coercion and punishment of the country in whose internal government they had thus interfered; and, thirdly, the policy of those territorial arrangements, by which the future repose of Europe had been provided for. On each of these points, several long and eloquent speeches were pronounced. With regard to the first, we beg to refer our readers to some observations on the principles of legitimacy, as applied to monarchical right; and on the circumstances under which the second restoration of Louis XVIII. took place, inserted in the last volume of this Register,* because there, as we conceive, the arguments on both sides of the question have already been condensed. The measures of establishing a foreign army of surveillance in France, and of exacting from that country the heavy pecuniary mulct inflicted by the definitive treaty, were attacked on many different grounds by different members of the legislative bodies, but were, on the whole, very successfully defended by ministers, both in the Upper and in the Lower House. The speech of Lord Liverpool, the first delivered in the House of Lords, appears to have comprehended almost every thing that could be, with propriety, advanced. His Lordship began with detailing the events of the campaign terminating in the second occupation of Paris, and of the manner in which the exiled monarch had resumed the exercise of his sovereignty. He then went on to the

ultimate arrangements adopted upon the close of these transactions. It has been asserted," said he, "that no examples existed which could warrant the present conduct of England and her allies with respect to France. It was triumphantly maintained, that no treaties could be found where the principle of such interference had been avowed. How different, it was said, were the proceedings connected with the accession of King William and of the house of Hanover! In answer to such assertions, he would ask-Had the gentlemen who advanced such arguments ever looked into the treaties relative to the accession of these two houses? He would first call the attention of their Lordships to a treaty between Queen Anne and the StatesGeneral, concluded at the Hague on the 29th of October, 1709, in the second article of which it was stipulated, that no power having a right to call in question the succession of the house of Hanover to the throne of Great Britain, and to oppose the laws made to this purpose, by the crown and parliament of Great Britain, the States-General engage and promise to assist and maintain in the said succession, her or him to whom it shall be long by virtue of the said acts of parliament, to assist them in taking possession, if they have not already got it; and to oppose those who would disturb them in the taking such possession, or in the actual possession of the aforesaid succession. In the treaty of January 29, 1718, there was a similar article, where the States-General further engaged, after the decease of the queen, to assist the house of Hanover in obtaining and keeping possession of the throne of England. And in the 15th article of this latter treaty, it is agreed, that all kings, princes, and states, that desire to come into this treaty, may be invited and admitted thereunto." In the 7th article of the

treaty of Triple Alliance, there was likewise a stipulation, that if the government of the house of Hanover were disturbed by any internal plots, France and Holland should furnish the same succours as in case of foreign invasion.

"Here, then, were treaties and solemn engagements made under the sanction of the parliament of Great Britain, not against foreign enemies, but against internal conspiracy and sedition. There were indeed some people who would maintain, that the accession of the house of Hanover was not then desired by the majority of the nation; and certainly all must allow, that at the time alluded to, there existed in this country a most formidable party, in wealth, rank, connexions, and talent, which was decidedly hostile to that illustrious house. The wiser part of the nation had, however, demanded them for its rulers; and he would ask, whether there could be any principle which justified the English nation in then calling upon foreigners for interference, which would not now even more amply justify England in her interference with the internal direction of French affairs? No man could be less willing to become an advocate for the house of Stuart than himself; but he could not help observing, as to the rival dynasties of Stuart and Brunswick, and their probable influence and consequences upon foreign nations, it could have been of very little importance to other states by which of the two houses England might be govern. ed. But here, in the case of France, there was no rational hope of internal tranquillity or safety to any individual state of Europe, unless there was a direct interference with the domestic management of France. He knew that there were some who maintained, that the dismemberment of France would have been better than this continued intermeddling with its affairs; and cer

tainly if any man were to ask him, as an abstract question, whether he would wish to see France curtailed, he would not answer in the negative. But another question arose-To whom the detached members of its territory should be given? For if they were given to a power incapable of maintaining them, such power would be weakened instead of strengthened by the accession. To put the question fairly, he would en quire, Whether, for instance, the security of the Netherlands would not be endangered, rather than confirmed, by the possession of Lille and Valenciennes? If, indeed, the policy had been to humiliate France, or to reduce it as far as possible to a second-rate power, then no measure should have been observed in the treatment of it: It should have been dismembered to any extent, provided its provinces could have been put in possession of those who were able to preserve them. But the allies had very different objects in view. With respect, indeed, to the spoils and trophies of former conquests, it was but just, that when fortune turned in favour of the allies, these acquisitions, should be considered as in some measure the just fruits of victory, as far as related to the restoring them to their original possessors. The mode of removing them might be humiliating, but the principle was just, and such as no sensible Frenchman would dispute. If, on the other hand, the provinces of France had been dismembered, a feeling of hatred would have been excited never to be conquered. And how would any state, though gifted with these accessions, be able to make a stand against the desperate exasperation of a people, stung into putting forth all its strength? And how could such a risk be justifiable, when, as in the case of the Netherlands, the best means of defence in other states were to be found in the states themselves? The great object

of England had been to keep the alliance entire. Where the different interest of the allies excited some natural disputes and difficulties, the ministers of England felt that they should have incurred unpardonable guilt, if they had not given way in matters not of pre-eminent importance, in order to reconcile all parties. It was not unnatural that the countries bordering on France should wish to have their territories augmented, and it was a happy circumstance for this country to be so situated as to be able to be a sort of disinterested mediator in those contentions; for though the proximity of our position to France rendered the state of that country a matter of the highest importance to us, yet our insular situation, precluding the notion of any immediate interest with its condition, allowed our interposition and arbitration to be viewed without prejudice or passion.

"Upon the whole, he might fairly say, that there had rarely been an arrangement where all interests had been so carefully provided for. What was it that had been undertaken? We were bound to restore the unmolested possession of France to its king at the end of five years; but we were not bound to restore it to any other government then existing: and thus time was given to the king to correct those evils which could not be corrected in a moment. Throughout all these transactions, Great Britain had no merely personal object in view; her conduct had been purely disinterested, and she had taken especial care not to prejudice the King of France in the eyes of the people of France. As to the removal of the pictures and statues, that was a great act of justice, whether considered in relation to the past or the future. Whatever partial and temporary exasperation might exist on this subject, sure he was, that if those works of art had remained in France,

they would have been a perpetual rallying sign for revolutionary principles, inasmuch as they were the trophies of revolutionary triumphs. Proud he was of the part which this country had borne in the transaction, because not a single statue or picture had been taken for itself: still prouder was he be cause it had obtained that every one of them should be restored to their origi nal owners. Indeed, so strong was his feeling on this particular point, that, much as he deprecated their remaining in France, he should have preferred even that to their being sent either to this country, or to any to which they did not rightfully belong.

As to another part of the great arrangement, to which the papers on the table related, namely, that respecting the Ionian islands, it was in com. pliance with the general views of the allies and of Europe, that the British government had taken those islands under its protection; and he thought it must be felt that government would not have done its duty, if it declined to accede to that proposition. And here he would ask those who talked so much about the prevalence of a jealou sy in Europe against our maritime power, whether the voluntary surren der of these islands to this country af. forded any ground to justify that opinion? It was, indeed, a most gratifying proof of the general confidence of the allies, to place a people so interesting for various reasons, under the protection of this great and liberal nation; and he felt fully assured, that that confidence would never be found to have been misplaced; that Great Britain would do her duty towards those whom she undertook to protect. "In considering the whole of the great transaction under discussion, feel," said he, "the most sincere sa tisfaction, not only from a review of the object of the great alliance of which we formed a part, but from a

VOL. IX. PART I.

I

·

reflection upon the result. The object was, to put down the principle of universal empire and military despotism, which the power of France was so long employed to promote. Yes, I shall ever maintain, that a project of universal empire filled the mind and actuated the efforts of him against whom this country has so long been compelled to wage war. Views of aggrandisement were, indeed, pursued by the French government, which were utterly inconsistent with the safety of Europe. Yet those were the views of Buonaparte, and of that revolution of which he was the champion. But I believe that no rational being could now be found to entertain a doubt upon this subject in any quarter of the world, namely, that the views of the revolutionists and their principal cap. tain were alike inconsistent with the general safety of Europe, and the establishment of real liberty. The de feat of such views must therefore be grateful to every good man, while in the existing state of mental cultivation there is every prospect of the improvement and advance of rational liberty and the happiness of mankind. What a consolatory contrast does this present to the state and tendency of the late revolutionary government of France! That government was, indeed, a systematically organised despotism. What, for instance, was its conduct with regard to the liberty of the press? That liberty in this country is subject to no restraints, but those which are necessary to the safety of the government; and even with respect to that safety, how many instances might be found where writers are tolerated, while, to use a familiar phrase, they sailed very near the wind' indeed. Yet such is the high and just estimate attached to the enjoyment of the liberty of the press in Great Britain, that abuses of that li berty are often overlooked, lest its

B

importance and utility should be impaired. But what was the system in France under Buonaparte? Why, a censorship was established, the functions of which were not confined to politics merely, but extended to every description of writing. This censor ship was, indeed, often exercised in making a total alteration in the sentiments of a writer, and that, too, in the discussion of moral and philosophical subjects in disquisitions upon topics unconnected with politics. But such was the rigour of the system uni formly pursued by him, whose whole object was the gratification of his own will, in the establishment of a complete military despotism, and in rendering man a mere machine. Thanks, how ever, to the manly perseverance of this country, and the distinguished valour of its allies, that abominable system is put down-put down, too, by efforts on our part to which every quar ter of the world bore honourable testimony for what was the quarter which had not been, in the course of the war, the scene of some glorious achievement for Great Britain?"

As to the general merits of the treaty under consideration, he called upon their lordships to compare it fully with any treaty recorded in our history. In former arrangements, at the conclusion of a war, it had often been represented, that this country neglect ed to keep what she had acquired; but in this instance he rather apprehended, that however some might suppose we had kept too much, it could hardly be alleged that we had kept too little. It had also been objected to former arrangements, that the interests of our allies were sacrificed and our own obligations deserted; but "all Europe" said he, "bear testimony to our good faith and generosity on the present oc

casion."

Lord Grenville proposed an amend

ment on the address brought forward by the Earl of Liverpool, one exactly similar to which was proposed in the other house by Lord Milton. In the speeches pronounced by these noblemen, the right of interfering with the internal arrangements of France, exercised by the allied powers of Europe, was distinctly recognised. "It is my firm conviction," said Lord Grenville, with that manly openness which charac terizes his parliamentary eloquence, "that not only the happiness, but the safety of Britain, depended on the interposition of foreign powers with the internal affairs of France, which appears to some among us so unjustifiable in itself, and so perilous when viewed as a precedent." His lordship then begged the House to advert to the Revolution of 1688, the principles of which would amply justify any steps this government might take with regard to France, in order to prevent the possibility of a speedy renewal of hostilities. "Did not our great deliverer," said he, "with no vested right, and no claim to the crown but the people's will, land upon the British shores with a foreign army? He thought that not only the interest of this country, but the safety of Europe, depended upon his measures. He came to drive away an odious tyrant and the pensioners of France. He claimed to be, in his own words, vindex securitatis Europe, assertor libertatis Britanniæ; and it was for some time a matter of doubt, whether it would not be necessary for him to do that which of late had been so severely reprobated, namely, to call in the aid of a foreign army for the final establishment of the liberties of the country. In the present case, as the war was necessary, it was just, and the conqueror had a right, by the law of nations, to impose upon the conquered such terms as would prevent the recurrence of the evil, for