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Again, that

forms. But if, while investigating matter, we admit it to be some particular thing, definitely differing from other things, we shall fall upon something else, and not on matter; for matter has not any relative difference, since all formal difference is quality; SO THAT THE KNOWLEDGE OF MATTER IS RATHER IGNORANCE, since the things which are changed about it, being the last of forms, receive the last sensible knowledge.... which abides in all mutation, we say, is matter?' Simplicius proceeds to distinguish between matter' and 'body. Body,' he observes, possesses, according to Plato, a triple interval; for this is signified by its possessing depth. But a thing of this kind has number co-essentialized with it, and figures, and especially if all body is finite, as it appeared to be both to Plato and Aristotle. Matter, however, has of itself none of these; but when it participates of forms, then it is figured with forms and numbers. That Aristotle was of opinion that the first subject is not body, he clearly evinces, when he says, "There is the same matter of a large and a small body," for the matter of body will not be body. In short, body is comprehended by reason, and is affirmatively known; but matter, according to Plato, is comprehended by a spurious reason, and according to Aristotle, and prior to him the Pythagoric Timæus, by analogy alone. It is not possible, therefore, for the first matter to be body.'

Plotinus, too, the mightiest perhaps of all the mighty commentators on Plato, has observed on this question, It is impossible that the first matter should be body, void of quality; for if no physical form is essentially inherent in matter, which is the subject to all physical forms, it is evident that neither figure nor magnitude will be inherent in it; for these are forms. And it will be invested with figure and magnitude if it is body; so that it will no longer be any thing simple, but a composite from matter and form. Matter, however, is simple; so that you may syllogize as follows:-Matter possesses of itself neither magnitude, nor figure, nor number. Body possesses of itself magnitude, figure, and number. Matter, therefore, is not body. Again, matter is not a composite from matter and form; body is a composite from matter and form. Matter, therefore, is not body!'

These passages prove, how crude were Dr. Brown's notions and MATTER. about the opinions of Aristotle, as to FORM, BODY, These passages show, too, in what sense Aristotle and the Platonists held matter' to be less 'real' than 'form;' and in what sense, moreover, form' was held to impart to 'matter,' all the 'reality,' of which matter' participates.

Let us now consider Dr. Brown's peculiar views as to form. He tells us that in nature there are only substances.' He tells us, moreover, that form is not any thing separate from the

elementary atoms of a mass, but is merely the relation of a number of atoms co-existing in apparent contact. This relation is, we are subsequently assured, nothing real-nothing, in fact, but a name, which we have invented, to denote something which, in itself, has no existence.'

This doctrine seems to lead to certain startling conclusions. If there be, as Dr. Brown maintains, nothing in nature but substances;' and if the 'relations' which connect these substances be unreal-be non-existent; and if, moreover, these relations be mere perceptions of the mind-be mere states of mind-be merely mind itself, existing under certain influences; then, it should seem to follow, that the non-reality, which Dr. Brown ascribes to our perceptions of relation, must, in conformity with his doctrine, be ascribed to MIND itself. Mind must, in short, be, according to Dr. Brown, regarded as non-existent; for mind, assuredly, cannot possess more of 'reality' than its own conceptions; and our conceptions of relations are declared by Dr. Brown to be absolutely 'unreal.'

The sculptor, Dr. Brown assures us, communicates, by his toil, no new qualities to the block of marble. The artist merely, we are told, separates from the block a number of corpuscles, which were formerly included by us in our conception of the continuous whole.' If, however, the divine form in the block remains unaltered, why, let us ask, should the sulptor take the trouble to separate the corpuscles from the mass? We are encouraged by Dr. Brown to believe, that form cannot exist separately from a substance;' yet we are told that the sculptor, at every stroke of his chisel, alters the form of the block of marble. What then, let us ask-since forms cannot exist separate from substances becomes of the forms which the sculptor must be assumed, with every stroke of his chisel, to destroy? Since, besides, the sculptor does not alter' the divine form inherent in the mass of marble, why does he regard one of the many divine forms inherent in the marble as more divine than another?

Does, however, the sculptor in reality submit to us nothing but what is in itself unaltered?" Whence, may we not ask, are the sculptor's conceptions derived? Does the removal of certain corpuscles generate the sculptor's conceptions of form, or do the sculptor's conceptions of form prompt the removal of the corpuscles in question? Is it not in obedience, simply, to the influence of the IDEA within him, that the sculptor, in the first instance, addresses himself to his task? According to Dr. Brown's theory, the soul of the sculptor (assuuming the sculptor to possess a soul which, as we have already seen, Dr. Brown's theory would lead us to deny) is a substance,' inferior in its attributes to the materials on which the sculptor works, since form, we are assured,

resides eternally in the block of marble, and is, from the block of marble, transferred to the sculptor's conceptions!

In order to strengthen this very peculiar theory, Dr. Brown has, as we have seen, ventured to adduce the testimony of a poet. The lines quoted happen, however, oddly enough to contradict Dr. Brown's theory. The poet does not, it may be observed, charge Phidias with stealing his conceptions of beauty from the marble on which he expended his energies. No; Phidias is, on the contrary, emphatically recognised as the bestower of all the beauty, which the 'black' and formless' block, ultimately assumed. The form was, in short, confessedly derived from the artist.

'Informis, ater, sub pedibus jacet,
Donec politus Phidiacá mani
Formosa tandem destinatæ
Induitur lapis ora divæ.'

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We have already pointed out certain views entertained by Dr. Brown as to the origin of human knowledge. He has sneered, as we have seen, at Porphyry's theory of genera and species, and affirmed that the individual at the bottom of Porphyry's scale of perception is the only real, independent existence. In like manner Dr. Brown declared that, in nature there are only substances, and that all the substances in nature are every thing that truly exists in nature.' He held up to scorn the doctrine that universals' are the source of knowledge; and he has affirmed, broadly, (p. 153,) that to believe in the IDEAL System, is not to intellectualize matter, but to materialize intellect.'

·

Let us now mark some of the self-contradictions into which this very narrow theory betrays Dr. Brown, when he comes to deal with certain classes of mental phenomena.

When treating, for instance, (p. 4,) of our instinctive belief in the continual similarity of the future to the past,' Dr. Brown observes, It is not to experience, then, alone, that we must have recourse for the origin of the belief, but to some other principle which converts the simple facts of experience into a general expectation or confidence that is afterwards to be the guide of all our plans and actions. This principle, since it cannot be derived from experience itself, which relates only to the past, must be an original principle of our nature.

Dr. Brown, when he penned this exposition of the existence of an universal law of belief, obviously forgot his denunciations of the doctrine of universals'-forgot his declaration, that all knowledge takes its rise in things singular'-forgot his doctrine, that in nature there are only substances,' and that beyond these substances, all is unreal.'

'There is a tendency,' he adds, (p. 34,) in the very constitution of the mind,' which adds to the mere facts of experience,' and may truly be termed instinctive.' Yet Dr. Brown scoffed at the doctrine of IDEAS, and at the belief of the schoolmen in 'things existing in the mind!'

Again, Dr. Brown (p. 51) has proclaimed that, the foundation of all inquiry, with respect to phenomena as successive, we found to be, that most important law, or original tendency of our nature, in consequence of which we not merely perceive the changes exhibited to us at one particular moment, but, from this perception, are led irresistibly to believe, that similar changes have constantly taken place in all similar circumstances, and will constantly take place, as often as the future circumstances shall be exactly similar to the present.'

Here, we are assured, that our ' perceptions' and 'belief' of a certain kind constitute a law of nature.' Shall we regard the 'law' in question as a substance?' a substance?' 'In Nature,' we had been previously told, there are only substances.' Is, then, a 'law of our nature,' which is declared to be the foundation of all philosophy, to be regarded as a part of Nature?

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Yet again, Dr. Brown (p. 54) proclaims, that 'if our knowledge of matter be relative only, our knowledge of mind is equally so.' As, then, according to this doctrine, we know only 'relatives,' are these relatives' to be classed with substances,' which alone, as we have been elsewhere assured by Dr. Brown, exist in Nature? What, in truth, did Dr. Brown wish the world to believe on this subject? He had previously declared that 'substances' have alone a real existence-and that things singular' are the source of all science. He has here, on the other hand, declared, that we can know-not substances-but only the 'relations' of matter, as well as of mind;-while, in yet another passage of his work, (p. 35,) he has defined our conceptions of relation' to be unreal'-' non-existent.' Will it not, from this last definition, follow, that our knowledge must be unreal,' and 'non-existent' also?

On the sources of human knowledge, the incoherences of Dr. Brown are, indeed, manifold. He observes, (pp. 55-6,)

'But for memory, there can be no question that the relation of thought to thought could not have been perceived In analysing and arranging the mental phenomena, then, we consider phenomena that are diversified, indeed, in individuals, but in species, are still common to all. Genius is but a form of general tendencies of

association, of which all partake.'

How may these doctrines be reconciled with Dr. Brown's previous denial of the existence of universals,' as a source of knowledge?

In treating, however, of the feeling of resemblance,' (292-3,) Dr. Brown's inconsistency presents itself in startling relief.

It is from the laws of the mind which considers them, that the relation is derived, not from the laws or direct qualities of the objects considered. But for our susceptibilities of those affections or states of the mind, which constituted the feeling of similarity, all objects would have been to us, in the scholastic sense of the phrase, things singular, and all language, consequently, nothing more than the expression of individual existence. Such a language, it is very evident, would be of little service, in any respect, and of no aid to the memory, which it would oppress, rather than relieve. IT IS THE USE OF GENERAL TERMS; that is to say, of terms founded on the feeling of resemblance, which alone gives to language its power, enabling us to condense, in a single word, the innumerable objects which, if we attempted to grasp them all individually in our conception, we should be as little able to comprehend as to gather all the masses of all the planets in the narrow concavity of that hand, which a few particles are sufficient to fill, and which soon sinks, oppressed with the weight of the few particles that fill it.'

In this passage, general terms'-common species,'—UNIVERSALS, in other words, are distinctly admitted to be the instruments, by the aid of which, all our highest acquisitions in knowledge are effected. Without the agency of universals,' Dr. Brown here, in short, avows that we should never have risen above the barren level of things singular.' Had Dr. Brown forgotten his previous declaration, that, in Nature, individuals at the bottom of the scale' of perception, have alone, ' a real, independent existence'-that the belief in universals' constituted, for ages, a barrier to the progress of true philosophy-and that, in a knowledge of things singular,' all science has its existence? In these last quotations, at all events, we find Dr. Brown, after all his denunciations of what he mistook for the Peripatetic and Platonic systems, assuming, as the source of science, universals,' forms,' and laws of thought,' which exhibit as little affinity, as IDEAS do, to those substances,' which alone, according to Dr. Brown, NATURE comprehends. Aristotle has procliamed, that without universals, science cannot be attained;' and Dr. Brown, after attempting to deride the philosophy of Aristotle, is compelled to abide in the same conclusion.

Dr. Brown teaches, that the phenomena of mind' are to be regarded in two points of view-as successive,' and as coexisting,' or 'virtually complex.' In explaining how, according to his theory, these virtually complex' phenomena may become the subject of analysis,' he is betrayed into startling confusion of thought. He states, (pp. 60, 61,)

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A mass of matter, as we have seen, is, in truth, not one body merely, but a multitude of contiguous bodies; all of which, at the time, may be considered as having a separate existence, and as placed together