more by accidental apposition, than by essential union: and analysis is nothing more than what its etymology denotes, a loosening of these from each other. In strictness of language, this composition and analysis cannot take place in mind. Even the most complex feeling is still only one feeling; for we cannot divide the states or affections of our mind into separate self-existing fractions, as we can divide a compound mass of matter into masses which are separate and self-existing-nor distinguish half a joy or sorrow from a whole joy or sorrow. The conception of gold, and the conception of a mountain, may separately arise, and may be followed by the conception of a golden mountain; which may be said to be a compound of the two, in the sense in which I use that word, to express merely, that what is thus termed compound or complex is the result of certain previous feelings, to which, as if existing together, it is felt to have the virtual relation of equality, or the relation which a whole bears to the parts that are comprehended in it. But the conception of a golden mountain is still as much one state or feeling of one simple mind, as either of the separate conceptions of gold, and of a mountain which preceded it. In cases of this kind, indeed, it is the very nature of the resulting feeling to seem to us complex ; and we are led, by the very constitution of our mind itself, to consider what we term a complex idea, as equivalent to the separate ideas from which it results, or as comprehensive of them-as being truly to our conception-though to our conception only-and, therefore, only virtually or relatively to us the inquirers-the same as if it were composed of the separate feelings co-existing, as the elements of a body co-exist in space.

It is this feeling of the relation of certain states of mind to certain other states of mind which solves the whole mystery of mental analysis, that seemed at first so inexplicable-the virtual decomposition in our thought, of what is, by its nature, indivisible. The mind, indeed, it must be allowed, is absolutely simple in all its states; every separate state or affection of it must, therefore, be absolutely simple: but in certain cases, in which a feeling is the result of other feelings preceding it, it is its very nature to appear to involve the union of those preceding feelings; and to distinguish the separate sensations, or thoughts, or emotions, of which, on reflection, it thus seems to be comprehensive, is to perform an intellectual process, which, though not a real analysis, is an analysis at least relatively to our conception. It may still, indeed, be said with truth, that the different feelings-the states or affections of mind which we term complex-are absolutely simple and indivisible, as much as the feelings or affections of mind which we term simple. Of this, there can be no doubt. But the complexity with which alone we are concerned, is not absolute, but relative-a seeming complexity, which is involved in the very feeling of relation of every sort. That we are thus impressed with certain feelings of relation of conceptions to conceptions, no one can doubt, who knows that all science has its origin in these very feelings; and equivalence, or equality, is one of those relations, which, from its very constitution, it would be as impossible for the mind, in certain circumstances, not to feel, as it would be impossible for it, in certain other circumstances, not to have those simple feelings which it compares. With perfect organs of vision, and in the full light

of day, it is not possible for to look on a tree, or a rock, without perceiving it; but it is not more possible for us to form a conception of two trees, without regarding this state of mind, simple though it truly is, when absolutely considered, as involving, or as equal to, two of those separate feelings which constituted the conception of a single tree.

On this mere feeling of virtual equivalence is founded all the demonstration of those sciences which claim the glory of being peculiarly demonstrative; our equations and proportions of abstract number and quantity involving continually this analytic valuation of notions as reciprocally proportional. Our conception of an angle of forty-five degrees is one state or affection of mind-one state of one simple indivisible substance; such, too, is our conception of a right angle. Our notion of four, or eight, is as much one affection of mind as our notion of a simple unit. But in reflecting on the separate states of mind which constitute these notions, we are impressed with certain relations which they seem to us reciprocally to bear, and we consider the angle of forty-five degrees as equal to half the angle of ninety degrees; and our notion of eight as involving, or equal to, two of four. If one state of mind which constitutes the notion of a certain abstract number or quantity, had not been considered in this sort of virtual comprehensiveness, as bearing the relation of equality, or proportion to other states of mind which constitute other abstract notions of the same species, mathematics would not merely have lost their certainty, but there could not, in truth, have been any such science as mathematics.'

This passage abundantly invites commentary.

A mass of matter, as we have seen,' argues Dr. Brown, 'is, in truth, not one body merely, but a multitude of contiguous bodies; all of which, at the time, may be considered as having a separate existence, and as placed together, more by accidental apposition than by essential union.'

This view of Matter is in absolute accordance with the views propounded by the Pythagoreans; but how may it accord with the doctrine previously taught by Dr. Brown-the doctrine, viz., that all science rests on our knowledge of things singular'? If matter be always multitude,' things singular' would seem to have no existence.

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That Matter is always multitude, was distinctly taught by Plato. In the Parmenides, the doctrine is emphatically asserted; and Proclus, in his Commentary on that divine work, observes, Everything sensible is a multitude which has an adventitious one; but form is a certain one, comprehending multitude uniformly.' 'As among sensibles, whatever is apparently one, is, in reality, a multitude; so in intelligibles, intellectual conception and being, which are two things, are profoundly absorbed in unity.' All things participate

of forms;-even things deprived of intelligence participate of forms;-for inanimate natures participate of the EQUAL, the

LESSER, and the GREATER, which are forms.'

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Every

form is one, and a multitude, the multitude not giving subsistence to the one according to composition, but the one producing the many idioms of the form.'

The Platonists, therefore, at whom Dr. Brown affected to sneer, inculcated—and in exquisite harmony with the spirit of their system-the doctrine that multitude is involved in every manifestation of matter: while, in asserting this doctrine, Dr. Brown must, on the contrary, be assumed to have forgotten his previous dogma, that things singular' are the only source of science.

The analysis, which may be effected when matter is the subject, cannot, as Dr. Brown assures us, ' take place in mind.'

This doctrine, however, of the indivisibility of mind was proclaimed by the Platonists, at least as emphatically as it has been proclaimed by Dr. Brown. Thus, Porphyry, in his Treatise on the Perception of Intelligible Natures,' observes: 'Matter has, in every respect, a diffused and dispersed existence -is mutable-has its existence in difference-is a compositeexists as the recipient of other things-is beheld in place and in bulk. Truly existing being, on the other hand, subsists from itself has an existence perpetually similar and the same-is immutable according to essence-is uncompounded-is neither dissoluble, nor in place, nor is dispersed into bulk. And is neither generated, nor capable of being destroyed.'

Proclus, in like manner, in his Commentary on the Parmenides, writes: The one of the soul perceives, reasons, desires, deliberates, follows all these energies, and energizes together with them. For we should not be able to know all these, and to apprehend in what they differ from each other, unless we contained a certain indivisible nature, which has a subsistence above the common sense, and which, prior to opinion, desire, and will,' knows all that these know and desire, according to an indivisible mode of apprehension."

Such were the opinions promulgated by philosophers, whom Dr. Brown has charged with inculcating a system of materialism; for such, obviously, according to his view, was the IDEAL system. Thus, he alleges, (p. 169), that, in the philosophy of the Peripatetics, ideas were truly considered as little images derived from objects without.' Such, let us observe, was not the doctrine. of Aristotle. Such was not the doctrine of Plato. Every Platonist, indeed, rested his faith on the denial that IDEAS could be derived from matter.

'We cannot,' continues Dr. Brown, divide the states or affections of mind into separate, self-existing fractions, as we can divide a compound mass of matter.'

This proposition must be regarded as incontestibly true by

C

every supporter of the Platonic system; but the consistency of this proposition with Dr. Brown's primary doctrine is not, assuredly, so obvious. Dr. Brown, as we have seen, teaches, that, ' in nature there are only substances'-that things singular,' things external, in short, are the only source of science; while common qualities,' and species, and genera, and universals, have, on the other hand, we are assured, no real existence. If, then, there be in nature only substances'-and if mind (assuming mind to be a real existence') be a substance' also-why may we not, in conformity with Dr. Brown's doctrine, regard the substance,' mind, as divisible like any other substance? If, again, the operations of mind be, as Dr. Brown has proclaimed, unreal,' why may not mind itself be deemed unreal,' and be pronounced indivisible, only because it is non-existent ?

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Dr. Brown, it may be observed, alludes to the existence of feelings, having the relation of virtual equality, or the relation which a whole bears to the parts that are comprehended in it.' But how may Dr. Brown, by means of his peculiar theory, arrive at the recognition of these feelings of virtual equality'? How, moreover, may he attain to a conception of the relation which a whole bears to its parts?

The EQUAL is, as Plato has shown in the Parmenides, a form. "The LESSER and the GREATER are, in like manner, forms; but as Dr. Brown has denied the existence of forms, how may he arrive at a conception of virtual equality?"

Has not, we ask once again, Dr. Brown expressly declared, that in nature there are only substances?' Are, then, feelings of virtual equality,'' substances'? Has not Dr. Brown declared, moreover, that the individual at the bottom of the scale of perception is the only real independent existence'? Does Dr. Brown claim a real existence' for those feelings of virtual equality,' to which he alludes? If he does, how may he venture to deride IDEALISTS? If, on the other hand, he does not mean to describe those feelings of virtual equality' as 'real existences,' does he mean to describe as unreal,' the sciences which rest on a recognition of the feelings in question?

How, in like manner, might Dr. Brown attain to the conception of whole' and parts'?

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'Whole' is, in the language of Plato, a form. 'Whole' belongs to the order of universals. Dr. Brown, however, has denied the existence of universals,' and of forms.' If, indeed, there be in nature nothing but substances;'-if the individual at the bottom of the scale of perception be the only real, independent existence;'-and if all science rests on the apprehension of things singular,' then, it is, assuredly, impossible that we should ever arrive at a conception of wholes,' or that the conception of wholes' should constitute the basis of science.

'That we are thus,' adds Dr. Brown, impressed with certain feelings of relation of conceptions to conceptions, no one can doubt, who knows that all science has its origin in these feelings.'

That all science has its origin in these feelings of relation' is, however, as we have frequently pointed out, precisely the proposition which Dr. Brown started by denying. He has told us, at the very commencement of his lectures, that science has its origin-not in the perception of universals-but in the perception of things singular. Singularium datur scientia is the maxim adopted by him, in opposition to the maxim of the schools. He has held up to ridicule, the students of the system of universals; because, as he has declared, the system of universals involves an utterly false view of the operations of the understanding. Yet Dr. Brown is, at length, found, virtually, to abjure his peculiar tenets, and to proclaim that it is impossible for the mind, from its very constitution,' not to assume universals, as the basis of all science!

Dr. Brown, in his latest argument, appeals to the demonstrative sciences. According to Dr. Brown's earlier theory, however, the demonstrative sciences could, it is obvious, have no existence. 'Things singular' do not admit of demonstration. Mathematical truths are not derived from the contemplation of substances.' These truths rest altogether on universals-not on things at the bottom of the scale' of perception.

'On what account,' demands Syrianus, in his Commentaries on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, are axioms more manifest and known than particulars, and things demonstrable, if we give subsistence to them by induction from things last, when, prior to this, they had no subsistence? After what manner, likewise, do all men agree in assenting to their truth, unless they had an essential pre-existence in our conceptions? For it is not necessary that we should be unanimous respecting things which we receive through the senses. Again: how is that true, which Aristotle openly admits, that intellect delivers the principles of demonstration to the soul, unless we esssentially received them in our conceptions prior to the energies of sense? For intellect does not become ministrant to us in things, of which the generation is subordinate. Either, therefore, we must reason in a circle, if we assume, and give subsistence to axioms from particulars, while we demonstrate particulars from axioms; or since demonstrations are from things prior, as Aristotle proves, in his Posterior Analytics, we must derive our more simple conceptions of axioms from intellect.

'We neither behold all the figures, nor all the numbers contained in sensibles; nor is it possible for things derived from sensibles to possess mathematical accuracy and certainty. But