book, that trial and conviction was set aside, and the prisoner was tried on the 24th May, 1872.

Several of the jurors who had served upon the former trial were called and sworn as jurors on this trial, after having been challenged for cause by the prisoner's counsel.

On the trial, the people gave in evidence the arrest of the prisoner in 1866, and his conviction then of an attempt to commit grand larceny. All these matters were duly excepted to by the counsel for the prisoner.

It is objected that the act in relation to challenges of jurors in criminal cases (Laws 1872, ch. 475), is unconstitutional and void, for the reason that the constitution (art. 1, § 1) declares the trial by jury shall remain inviolate forever, and in article 1, section 6, provides that no person shall be deprived of liberty, etc., without due process of law.

The construction of the sixth section was passed upon by Bronson, J., in Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140, where he says: "The meaning of this section seems to be, that no member of the State shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of his rights or privileges, unless the matter be adjudged against him upon the trial had, according to the course of the common law. It must be ascertained judicially;" and again he says, "The words due process of law cannot mean less than a prosecution or suit instituted and conducted according to the prescribed forms and solemnities for ascertaining guilt."

In Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N. Y. 446, Judge Selden says: "The clause in question was intended to secure to every citizen the benefit of those rules of the common law by which judicial trials are regulated, and to place them beyond the reach of legislative subversion, and Hubbard, J., defines due process of law as meaning an ordinary judicial proceeding; in a criminal case an arraignment, formal complaint, confronting of witnesses, trial, conviction and judgment. Such trials, therefore, are to be regulated and conducted according to the common law, viz., by indictment, trial by jury, proof of guilt, unanimous verdict of jury, and those rules which the defendant at common law had a right to insist upon in his defense. These requisites do not control the legislature as to the rules of evidence, the qualifications of jurors, the nature of crime and the punishment to be inflicted for its commission. All these are matters left to the discretion of the legislature.

Any other rule would prevent the legislature from changing the qualification of jurors, altering the age at which they should be excused from serving, prescribing who may and who may not be witnesses, and many other regulations in regard to trials which do not necessarily violate that provision."

In Walters v. The People, 32 N. Y. 147, 159, Wright, J., says, in regard to these constitutional provisions: "There are no limitations or restrictions upon legislative power, except as to the right guaranteed, viz., a jury trial in all cases in which it had been used before the adoption of the instrument. Trial by jury cannot be dispensed with in criminal cases, but it is obviously within the scope of legislation to regulate such trial." If these views are correct, then there is no force in the objection that the act referred to is in violation of the constitution in regulating the right of challenge to jurors, and providing the necessary qualifications, even if it does alter the rule of the common law on that subject. But does the law referred to make any such alteration?

In regard to challenges to the favor they remain un

affected by that statute. That statute is confined to challenges for principal cause only, and in no way changes the law as to challenges to the favor.

It provides that "the previous formation or expression of an opinion, or impression on which any criminal action at law is based, or in reference to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, or a present opinion or impression in reference thereto, shall not be a sufficient ground of challenge for principal cause, provided the person proposed as a juror shall declare, on oath, that he verily believes that he can render an impartial verdict according to the evidence; that such opinion or impression will not bias or influence his verdict; and provided the court shall be satisfied that the proposed juror does not entertain such a present opinion as would influence his verdict as a juror." It is difficult to see how this law changes the common-law rules as to the qualification of jurors.

If we go back to the common law, as it existed prior to statutory provisions, it must be remembered that jurors were always selected from the vicinage. In Coke's Littleton, vol. 3, p. 464, it is said: "Every trial shall be out of that town, parish or hamlet, or place known out of the town within the record, within which the matter of fact issuable is alleged, which is most certain and nearest thereto, the inhabitants whereof may have the better and more certain knowledge of the fact." And in Cro. Eliz. 260, it is said: "So essential did the common law deem the having some of the neighbors on the jury, that if the visue appeared on the record to be a wrong place it was a mistrial."

Afterward, by statute 16 Charles II, it was provided that the cause might be tried by a jury from any part of the county. These provisions show that, by the common law, it was a matter of right that neighbors should form the jury, because they had more knowledge of the accused, and of the facts connected with the alleged offense. These provisions have been altered from time to time, so that now, partly by the English statutes before the formation of this government, and since then by laws passed by the legislature, the qualifications of jurors have been changed, and all that is now required is that a juror shall be impartial, unbiased, and capable of rendering a true verdict upon the evidence.

The act of 1872 makes no different provision, and takes away no qualification which existed previously. The same rule which is incorporated in this statute has been repeatedly adjudged by the courts and adopted for years previous to its passage. In Durell v. Mosher, 8 J. R. 347, a juror, on challenge, said that he had said that the defendant was wrong and the plaintiff was right, but he also said he had no personal knowledge of the matter in dispute, but, if the reports were correct, the defendant was wrong and the plaintiff was right. The court held that the objection was unfounded. In Freeman v. The People, 4 Denio, 9, 34, the jurors had an impression that the prisoner was guilty, but not an absolute opinion. The challenge was not sustained. In Lohman v. The People, 1 Com. 384; The People v. Bodine, 3 Denio, 122, questions were put to jurors whether they could try the case and render an impartial verdict, notwithstanding their impressions or opinions, and on answering that they could, they were held to be good jurors.

In The Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, where the juror had an opinion, but said it was not strong enough to cause him to prejudge the case or to prevent

a candid judgment on the evidence, he was held to be competent.

Such seems to be the general rule where the opinion is formed from mere rumor or newspaper statements, and would not influence the juror in deciding on the evidence, and he would not be disqualified thereby.

The statute of 1872 does not require any thing different. The juror is not only to declare, on oath, that he believes he can render an impartial verdict on the evidence, and that the opinion or impression he has will not bias or influence his verdict, but the court must also be satisfied that such juror does not entertain such a present opinion as would influence his verdict.

These requisites would seem to require that the juror, before he is accepted, must be free from bias, and must satisfy the court of his impartiality.

The alteration of the qualifications as to the juror, if any such alteration is made by this statute, only applies to the challenge for cause. The objection is not taken away from the other challenge, and the same can be available on the challenge to the favor if it really exists. It amounts then to nothing more than providing that if the juror says he can try the case without being influenced by such impressions, it shall not be a good cause for rejecting the juror on that challenge, and does not compel the trial by a juror not qualified, if the party challenging sees fit to use the challenge to the favor.

If it be conceded that the constitutional restriction included in its provisions the right to have impartial jurors, as stated in The Matter of Vermilyea, 6 Cow. 555, still there is nothing in this law which takes it away or interferes with its exercise. It is a mere regulation of the challenge for principal cause, prescribing what shall not be a sufficient ground to sustain such challenge. The legislature may change or regulate the mode of challenging. So long as the right of a jury trial is preserved, and means provided by which impartial jurors can be obtained, there is no violation of the constitutional guarantee of a trial by jury.

There is no ground therefore on which the act referred to can be held to be unconstitutional.

The objection to the jurors who were held to be competent on the second trial, when they had tried the cause previously, and had found a verdict against the prisoner, is of a different character.

Stephen Price was challenged for principal cause. He stated he was on the first jury and heard the case; that he had formed his opinion; that the view he then had of the case would control him, regardless of what the evidence might be; that his verdict would be the same on the same evidence, and, if sworn, that he would render a verdict of guilty. In answer to a question from the court whether, without regard to previous impressions, he could give a true verdict upon the evidence and try the case fairly and impartially, he answered that he could do so.

The opinion or impression which is referred to in the act of 1872 is not intended to apply to such a case. The words are: "The previous formation or expression of an opinion or impression in reference to the circumstances upon which any criminal action at law is based, or in reference to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, shall not be a sufficient ground of challenge for principal cause," etc. Such an opinion or impression was not intended to include the case of jurors sworn and acting as jurors in the same case on a previous trial. The

duty they have discharged is the rendering a solemn judgment upon the guilt of the prisoner, and that under oath. With the same evidence it is hard to see how any other verdict can be rendered on a second trial by an honest juror. They have done more than formed an opinion. They have rendered a judgment against the prisoner that he was guilty.

Such has been the uniform course of decisions at the common law as to jurors who had acted as such on previous trials of the same case. So long ago as the case of The King v. Titus Oates, 10 Howell's S. T. 1079, it was held that a man who had been one of the indicters could not sit on the petit jury. In the reign of Edward III, this was made a statutory provision, and the same has been incorporated in our statutes, and is now the law in this State. 3 R. S. 1029. The objection to a grand juror is by no means as strong as it is when applied to a petit juror. The grand juror has only heard one side of the testimony, and has not adjudged the prisoner guilty, but merely held that the facts proven were enough to put the prisoner on trial.

So, if a juror hath been an arbitrator in the same cause, he cannot sit on the jury. And the reason given for it is, that a man who has made up his mind and has declared it under his name and placed it upon the record will not be impartial as a juror ought to be. 2 Rawle, 46.

So it was held that if the juror had given a verdict before in the same case, albeit it be reversed by writ of error, or if judgment be arrested, he cannot serve on the second trial.

And the reason given is, that the juror had not only formed and expressed an opinion, but had given a decided judgment under the solemnities of his oath on the merits after he had heard and examined all the testimony.

Various cases might be cited where it has been held that a juror, who had formerly given a verdict in the same cause, between the same parties, could not act as such on the second trial. Co. Litt. 157; Cro. Eliz. 33, p. 13; 2 Brown, 268; Kirby, 166; 2 Rawle, 498; 16 Ind. 208; 15 Ohio St. 155; 20 Ga. 60. Not one case has been cited where such a juror has been held to be competent. We are of the opinion that the challenge should have been sustained, that jurors who have tried and decided a cause are not qualified to sit on a second trial, if such shall be granted, and that the act of 1872, relative to the qualification of jurors, does not apply to such cases. An exception was taken by the admission of the record of the former conviction of the prisoner on another charge, and also to the refusal of the recorder to charge the jury that they could only convict for grand larceny, because there was no proof that the prisoner had been discharged and remitted of the first felony. The recorder refused so to charge, holding that the record and the sentence, which had expired some time since, was evidence that the prisoner had been discharged. This was sufficient to submit that question to the jury. The legal presumption would be, that at the expiration of the sentence the prisoner would be discharged.

We are of the opinion that the judgment was erroneous, on account of the admission of the jurors who were sworn on the first trial being on the jury by which the prisoner was finally convicted, and it is unnecessary to examine the other exceptions in the case. Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.

The Michigan university law school has four lady students.

Action to recover damages caused to the property of plaintiff by the explosion of a steam boiler, while the same was owned, and being used by the Saratoga Paper Company, at their mill, by means whereof the boiler was thrown on to the plaintiff's premises, and through several of his buildings. The defendants Clute were made parties defendant with the Saratoga Paper Company, and Buchanan and Bullard, trustees and agents of said company, on the ground that they were the manufacturers of the boiler, and made the same out of poor and brittle iron, and in a negligent and defective manner, in consequence of which negligence said explosion occurred.

Held, that the manufacturer and vendor of a steam boiler is only liable to the purchaser for defective materials, or for any want of care and skill in its construction; and if, after delivery and acceptance by the purchaser, and while in use by him, an explosion occurs in consequence of such defective construction, to the injury of a third person, the latter has no cause of action because of such injury against the manufacturer. Losee v. Clute et al. Opinion by Lott, Ch. C. NOVATION-ACCORD AND SATISFACTION — ACTION.

1. An order by A, upon his debtor B, in favor of C, does not operate as an assignment of the debt to the amount of the order, and where B pays a portion of such order but does not accept the same or in any way agree to pay the residue, in an action by A to recover the debt, B is only entitled to credit for the amount actually paid, unless it appears that C accepted B as his debtor and discharged A from liability. Noe, Adm'r, etc., v. Christie, impleaded, etc. Opinion by Lott, Ch. C.

2. Plaintiff made a stipulation stating that he consented to, and the suit was thereby discontinued, and the cause of action released in consideration of the payment of the costs and $70 to the plaintiff's attorney. Defendant paid the $70 and tendered the costs, and set up an accord and satisfaction.

Held, that this was, at most, a simple unexecuted accord, and not a satisfaction. Ib.

3. Where one interested with others in a claim, with the authority and consent of the others, employs an agent to collect the claim and to account to him therefor, he stands in the relation of trustee to the other claimants, and an action is properly brought in his name alone against the agent to recover the avails of the collection. Ib.

NUISANCE-JURY TRIAL-NONSUIT.

1. Action to restrain defendant from the use of his steam power in a marble factory in the city of New York. Defendant carried on his business in a building adjoining two buildings owned by plaintiff, his machinery was run by steam power, and its operation produced a jarring and shaking of plaintiff's buildings to

their injury and the annoyance of the occupants. Defendant had leased plaintiff's buildings for a term of ten years, and during the continuance of this lease the alleged nuisance was erected and put into operation. Fourteen days after the lease expired plaintiff brought this action. His evidence as to the injurious effects to his premises was confined to the effects produced during the continuance of the lease.

Held, that plaintiff was entitled to a judgment enjoining defendant from so conducting his business as thus to injure plaintiff; that plaintiff was not bound to take measures to abate the nuisance during the existence of the tenancy, and his delay in commencing suit until the termination thereof was not laches; and the fact of the premises being leased in no way affects the competency or weight of the evidence as to the injuries sustained. McKeon v. See. Opinion by Hunt, C.

2. Upon the cause being moved for trial before a court without a jury, defendant objected that the question was one of fact and that he was entitled to a jury trial. The objection was overruled.

Held, no error, that although the case may have been one entitling defendant to a jury trial, yet having based his objection upon an untenable ground, he must be confined to it. Ib.

3. Defendant moved for a nonsuit at the close of the testimony on the ground that he was entitled to a jury trial by article 1, section 2 of the State constitution, which motion was overruled.

Held, no error, that it was not a ground for a nonsuit, and it was then too late to raise the objection. Ib.

SHERIFF'S SALE- MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE. Plaintiff bid off at sheriff's sale on execution certain premises, upon which was a lien by mortgage prior to that of the judgment. Before the expiration of the time for redemption, plaintiff purchased and took an assignment of the mortgage and accompanying bond, foreclosed the mortgage and became the purchaser upon the sale, under the foreclosure, for a sum less than the amount of the bond and mortgage. He brought this action upon the bond to recover the residue. Held, that by the purchase at the sheriff's sale plaintiff acquired no title in the premises until the time (fifteen months) allowed for redemption had expired, and incurred no obligation whatever, in relation to the mortgage; that he had a perfect right to purchase and take an assignment of the bond and mortgage, and that such purchase did not operate as payment of the bond. Also, that, even if plaintiff had become the owner of the equity of redemption, this would at most only have made the land the primary fund for the payment of the mortgage debt; and if, upon foreclosure and sale, the proceeds were insufficient to pay the same, the obligors in the bond would have been liable for the residue. Southworth v. Scofield, impleaded, etc. Opinion by Lott, Ch. C.

TRUST PRACTICE.

1. A bequest of personal property to four trustees and the survivor of them, in trust to keep the same invested and apply the interest or income to the use of one of the trustees, creates a valid trust. The income in such case, and the manner of its application, is controlled and directed not by the beneficiary, but by a majority of the trustees; and such income, therefore, cannot be reached by a judgment creditor of the cestui que trust and appropriated to the payment of his debt, at least until, by the death of his co-trustee, it shall come

Relation of drawee to payee.-H. consigned twelve bales of cotton to defendant, commission merchant, and drew a draft on them, which contained a memorandum at the foot thereof that it was drawn "against twelve bales of cotton," procured the plaintiffs to discount it, and notified the defendant of the consignment and the draft. The defendant refused to accept the draft, and informed H. by letter that he did so because he had not received the bill of lading of the cotton, but that he would accept the draft on receipt of the bill. Two days later he received the bill, and afterward plaintiff, who had seen his letter to H., presented the bill for acceptance, which was again refused. Upon a subsequent receipt of the cotton, the defendant sold it and credited its proceeds to H., who was his debtor to a large amount.

Held, that plaintiff could not maintain an action against the defendant, either upon his promise to accept the draft, or for the proceeds of the cotton. Exchange Bank of St. Louis v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37.

CHECK.

Relation between holder and drawee. A promise by the drawee to the drawer of a check, draft or bill of exchange to accept and pay the same does not make the drawee liable to an action by a holder, unless the latter has taken the check, draft or bill of exchange on the faith of such promise. Carr v. National Security Bank, 107 Mass. 45.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. Larceny. - A statute, providing that a person who shall bring into the State, property which he has feloniously stolen in another State shall be guilty of larceny, and punished accordingly, is constitutional. People v. Williams, 24 Mich. 156.

2. Legislative appointment of municipal officers.-The legislature has no power to appoint permanent officers whose duties are purely municipal. People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut et al., 24 Mich. 44.

3. Legislative investigations: privilege of witnesses.The provision in the declaration of rights, that no subject shall "be compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself," applies to investigations before a legislative body, and protects a person from being compelled to disclose the circumstances of his offense, the sources from which, or the means by which evidence of its commission, or his connection with it, may be obtained; nor is such protection withdrawn by *To appear in 9th American Reports.

any statute which fails to secure such person from future liability and exposure to be prejudiced in any criminal proceeding against him as fully and extensively as he would be secured by availing himself of the privilege accorded by the constitutional provision. Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172.

DAMAGES.

Measure of, to one unlawfully kept out of office.-One wrongfully kept out of an office of profit, by a claimant thereto, is entitled to recover as damages the whole official salary, without deduction for the services of the incumbent. People ex rel. Benoit v. Miller, 24 Mich. 458.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

Condemnation by State for benefit of United States.The right of eminent domain in a State exists only for its own purposes; therefore, an act of the legislature of a State authorizing the condemnation, by State commissioners, of lands to be turned over to the United States for purposes of a light-house is unconstitutional and void. The People ex rel. Trombley v. Humphrey, Auditor-General, 28 Mich. 471.

INSURANCE.

1. Insurable interest: description of interest in policy. -L. & S., the mortgagees of certain premises, assigned the mortgage and indorsed the mortgage notes to plaintiff, and procured the premises to be insured in their names as mortgagees, loss, if any, payable to plaintiff. Some of the notes were not paid at maturity, the others had not matured when loss occurred. Held, that L. & S. had an insurable interest, and that plaintiff could recover. Williams v. Roger Williams Insur

ance Company, 107 Mass. 377.

2. In a policy of fire insurance, which provides that if the interest of the insured in the property be any other than the entirely unconditional and sole ownership, it must be so expressed in the policy, the interest of a mortgagee is sufficiently described by calling him mortgagee." Ib.

66

JURISDICTION.

Patents.A State court has jurisdiction to compel performance of an agreement to assign a patent. Binney v. Annan, 107 Mass. 94.

JURY.

Right to poll not waived by sealed verdict.-The consent of the defendant in a criminal trial to have a sealed verdict returned is no waiver of his right to have the jury polled. Stewart v. The People, 23 Mich. 63.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Notice to quit: flowage of lands.-Defendant had for many years flowed plaintiff's land by a dam, paying an annual compensation therefor. In an action to recover damages for such flowage, held, that the relation of landlord and tenant existed between the parties, and that plaintiff could not recover beyond the amount of the yearly compensation, without having given notice to quit. Morrill v. Mackman, 24 Mich. 279.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

Computation of time.-A statute provided that every action on a judgment shall be brought within ten years next after the judgment was entered, and not afterward. Judgment was entered March 15, 1859, and an action was commenced on it March 15, 1869. Held, to have been commenced in time. Warren v. Slade, 23 Mich. 1.

LORD'S DAY.

1. Conversion. The owner of a horse let it in the Lord's day, to be driven for pleasure to a particular place. The hirer drove it to a different place, and in doing so injured it.

Held, that, although the contract of hiring was illegal and void, the owner could maintain tort for the conversion of the horse. Hall v. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251. 2. Note made on, when valid. — A promissory note, bearing the date of a secular day, is valid in the hands of a bona fide holder for value, although, in fact, made and delivered on the Lord's day, and therefore invalid as between the original parties. Cranson v. Goss, 107 Mass. 439.

3. Rescinding contract on. A contract which could not be lawfully made on Sunday cannot, if lawfully made, be rescinded on that day. Benedict v. Bachelder 24 Mich. 425.

MARINE INSURANCE.

1. Construction of policy.-A policy of marine insurance on champagne wine provided that the insurer should not be liable for leakage, unless occasioned by stranding or collision. Held, that the insurers were exempt from liability for all leakage, ordinary or extraordinary, and from whatever cause, whether gradual or violent in its operation, except those specified. Cory v. Boylston Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 107 Mass. 140.

2. In a policy of marine insurance on champagne wine, valued by the case, it was provided that the insurers should not be liable "for damage or injury to goods by dampness, rust, change of flavor, or by being spotted, discolored, musty or mouldy, unless the same be caused by actual contact of sea water with the articles damaged, occasioned by sea peril." Held, that so far as the sea water came into actual contact with any case or package, the insurers were liable for any injury occasioned, either by such direct contact, or by any heat or dampness thereby generated, but not for any injury by dampness, or change of flavor to other packages, no part of which came into actual contact with the sea water. Ib.

3. The burden of proving a loss from a cause, and to an amount for which insurers are liable, is upon the assured. Ib.

4. In computing a partial loss, return duties received by the insured from the custom-house are not to be deducted from the amount to which the insurers are to contribute. Ib.

5. Under the suing and laboring clause in a policy of marine insurance, the underwriters are liable for a proportion of any reasonable expenses incurred in preserving the property from the operation of the perils insured against, but not for expenses of ascertaining the amount of the loss, nor for expenses of refitting the property for market. Ib.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

Contract against public policy. The plaintiff contracted with the authorities of a village to build a market-house, and to put it under their control for ten years, in consideration that they would pay over the rents therefor to him, appoint a person to superintend it, permit no other public market-house to be erected or used, nor certain articles specified to be sold elsewhere in the village during the said ten years. In an action for breach of contract, held, that the said contract was against public policy and void. Gale v. The Village of Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. Fire communicated by reason of. A man who negligently sets fire on his own land, and keeps it negligently, is liable for injuries done by its direct communication to the property of another, whether through the air or along the ground, and whether he might or might not have reasonably anticipated the particular manner and direction in which it was actually communicated. Higgins v. Dewey, 107 Mass.

494.

2. Mill-dam.-One who builds a dam across a stream is bound so to construct it that it will resist not only ordinary freshets, but also such extraordinary floods as may be reasonably anticipated. Gray v. Harris, 107 Mass. 492.

NEW TRIAL.

Evidence of jurors.— On a motion for a new trial on the ground of bias on the part of one of the jurors, the evidence of jurors as to the motives and influences which affected their deliberations is inadmissible, either to impeach or to support the verdict. But a juryman may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that influence operated upon his mind. So a juryman may testify in denial or explanation of acts or declarations outside of the jury room, where evidence of such acts has been given as ground for a new trial. Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453.

PROMISSORY NOTE.

1. In an action on a promissory note, payable to bearer, the defendant may show that the plaintiff had no title to the note at the time he brought the action. Hovey v. Sebring, 24 Mich. 232.

2. Consideration against public policy. — In an action on a promissory note, the consideration for which was an agreement by the payee to procure for the maker a substitute in case he should be "drafted so as to do duty in the army," or otherwise to clear him from draft, and the maker was never in fact drafted; held, that agreement was contrary to public policy and the note therefore void. O'Hare v. Carpenter, 23 Mich. 410.

RAILROAD.

Master and servant: action. -The plaintiff, while riding on defendant's horse-cars, upon invitation of the driver and as a passenger without hire, was injured, without fault on her part, through the negligence of the driver, in the course of his employment. Held, that defendant was liable. Wilton v. Middlesex Railroud Company, 107 Mass. 108.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

Parol agreement.-G., owner of a patent hay-fork, and desirous of organizing a company to deal therein, orally promised B. that if he would become one of the company and take shares, and give his note therefor, that he, G., as soon as the company was organized, would find a man to take the shares and pay the notes, without charge or expense to B. Held, that the promise was not within the statute of frauds. Green v. Brookins, 23 Mich. 48.

Judge Nelson, late of the supreme court of the United States, is slowly recovering from his recent severe illness.