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The plaintiff on the trial disclaimed any damage resulting to her from the death of her husband, and also for any injury to her person or her property, and relied solely upon the claim that she had been injured in her means of support.

Upon this state of facts two objections are made by plaintiff in error: 1st. That the phrase "means of support," as used in this statute, is too vague to receive judicial construction; and 2d. That if the meaning of this phrase can be ascertained, still the plaintiff was not injured in her means of support.

This phrase was in common use at the time and long before the passage of this statute. It then was and still is as well understood as most words and phrases in the English language. It is commonly used in the plural form, but often in a singular sense. In its general sense it embraces all those resources from which the necessaries and comforts of living are, or may be, supplied, such as lands, goods, salaries, wages or other sources of income. In its limited seuse it signifies any resource from which the wants of life may be supplied.

We are not called upon in this case to determine the full extent and scope of its meaning, but only to ascertain whether the wages or proceeds of ordinary labor is a means of support" within the meaning of the statute. And of this proposition we entertain no doubt. See Duroy v. Blinn, 11 Ohio St. 331.

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Ordinary labor being a means of support, the next question is, whether the labor of the husband, or its proceeds, can be regarded as the wife's means of support.

such definition or explanation was requested by the party claiming to have been prejudiced thereby.

2d. Nor will a verdict be disturbed because the court charged the jury upon general propositions of law not involved in the issue, if it appear from the whole charge that the jury could not have been misled thereby.

3d. Whatever may be the rules of the common law as to the state of facts necessary to justify the assessment of exemplary damages, it is clear to our minds that exemplary damages may be recovered in any action brought under this section, in which the evidence shows a right to recover actual damages. The amount of such damages is left to the sound discretion of the jury, subject to be controlled by the court when such discretion is abused. In actions under this statute the jury, in the exercise of its discretion as to exemplary damages, ought to consider all the circumstances properly before them tending to aggravate or mitigate the conduct of the wrong-doer.

We find no error in the charges given, or in refusing the charges requested.

The whole amount of damages awarded in this case was $200. We cannot say that this amount was excessive. Judgment affirmed.

Scott, C. J., and Welch, White and Day, JJ., concurred.

COMMISSION OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

DEFENSE.

Action brought by a judgment creditor to reach property fraudulently transferred by the debtor to his wife.

Held, that a general assignment made for the benefit of creditors is no defense. It is not for the fraudulent debtor and his wife, to undertake to guard any rights the assignee may possibly have. If he has any he alone must assert them. Defendants can only object that the assignee is not made a party, and if such objection is not presented by demurrer or answer it is waived. Fort Stanwix Bank v. Leggett et al., impleaded, etc. Opinion by Reynolds, C.

A husband is morally and legally bound to supply his wife with the necessaries and comforts of life. If he has no other resource, it is his duty to contribute his labor and its proceeds to her support. And the wife has a corresponding right to be maintained and supplied, and to that end she has an interest in all her husband's resources. It is upon this principle that alimony is decreed to a wife out of her husband's estate, or charged upon him personally. A wife, then, has an interest in the labor of her husband, and in its proceeds, and especially when that labor is necessary for her support. If she has an interest in her husband's labor and its proceeds as a means of support, she has an interest also in his capacity to labor. Capacity to labor is a means of support; and any deprivation of her rights or interest in the proceeds of his labor, or his capacity to labor, is an injury to her in her means of support. This must be so, especially if she is depend-proportion of the premium for the unexpired term to

ent upon such labor for her living in whole or in part.

Nor is it an answer to say, that because the common law gave her no remedy for the wrongful deprivation of her rights in such case, that, therefore, she was not injured. Her injury was none the less without than it would have been with a remedy. It is not true that the common law gave a remedy for every wrong or injury.

5. It is further objected that the court erred in the charge as given to the jury, and in refusing to charge as requested.

Without referring specially to the charge as given, or to the requests refused, it will suffice to state the rules by which the objections urged must be determined against the plaintiff in error:

1st. The omission of a court, in its charge to the jury, to define and explain doubtful words or phrases contained in a statute upon which the action is founded, does not constitute a ground for reversal, unless

INSURANCE.

Where a policy of fire insurance reserves to the underwriter the right to terminate the insurance on giving notice to that effect and refunding a ratable

cancel the contract it is requisite: 1st. That a notice should be given to the assured that the insurance is terminated, not that it will be at a future day. 2d. That the amount to be returned should be paid or tendered to the assured. He must be sought out and tender made; holding it subject to his call is not sufficient. The underwriter must be certain also that the whole "ratable proportion" is refunded. This is a condition precedent, and payment of a less sum does not terminate the insurance. Van Valkenburgh v. Lenox Fire Ins Co. Opinion by Hunt, C.

MARITIME LAWS-POWER OF SHIP'S HUSBAND OR

MASTER.

1. One part owner of a ship may bind the others, in the absence of any known limitation upon his authority or expressed dissent upon the part of the other owners for necessaries and supplies suitable and proper for the ship. McCready et al. v. Thorn et al. Opinion by Earl, C.

2. A ship's husband may be appointed by a written

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instrument or orally, or his appointment may be inferred from his exercising the duties of that office, with the knowledge and consent of the owners; his duties are to conduct all the affairs and arrangements for the due employment of the vessel in commerce and navigation, and for these purposes he is the agent and can bind the owners. A master of a ship may be appointed by a majority of the owners in interest, notwithstanding the minority dissent, and as such master he becomes entitled to bind all the owners by his acts in the ordinary business of the ship, and this is so although the master has taken her to navigate upon shares (not chartered her), as long as the person giving credit has no notice of the arrangement. Ib.

3. When the circumstances are such as to justify the master, ship's husband, or part owner to purchase upon the credit of the owners, he will be justified even in a home port, in borrowing money to pay for the required articles, to charge the owners in such case, however, the tender must show ordinarily that the money not only was borrowed for a proper purpose connected with the ship or her navigation, but that it was so applied. Ib.

4. The authorities upon the question of the liability of owners of vessels for supplies collated. Ib.

NEGLIGENCE- RAILROAD.

1. Action to recover damages for injuries to plaintiff's horse and wagon and merchandise, alleged to have been occasioned by defendant's negligence. The injury complained of occurred in a street in the city of Elmira. Defendant's train of cars, a long freight train, was standing on it, but not entirely across it. While the train was thus standing on defendant's track, plaintiff, desirous of passing upon the street with his horse and wagon, asked a young man who had got off the train, but who it did not appear was in defendant's employ, if he could pass. He was advised not to do so, as the train migh back at any time. Plaintiff waited a few minutes, and then attempted to lead the horse across the track in the rear of the train, when the train moved backward, struck and injured the horse and wagon.

Held, that this was not such evidence as constituted contributory negligence as matter of law, but the question was one of fact for the jury. Eaton v. Erie Railway Co. Opinion by Lott, Ch. C.

2. The ringing of a bell or the sounding of a whistle of the locomotive attached to a long freight train which is standing with its rear end partially across the street of a city, was not such notice to passengers upon the street of an intended backward movement of the train as will absolve the railroad company from the charge of negligence. Nor does the omission of those signals absolve passengers upon the street from the obligation to exercise proper care and watchfulness. Ib.

NEW TRIAL.

Communication to jury. This case had been submitted to the jury, and while they were deliberating they sent the officer in charge of them to the judge who held the circuit, with a written inquiry "whether the witness M. proved positively on cross-examination that H. did not leave that money on the counter." The judge having read it, directed it to be handed to the stenograper who had taken minutes of the evidence on the trial. He looked over the minutes and wrote on the paper, "No such question was asked." It was then handed to the judge, who directed it to be delivered to the jury, who found a verdict for the defendants.

This occurred without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs, their attorneys or counsel, and they did not learn of it until some days after. Upon these facts they moved for a new trial.

Held, that a party to a trial by jury is entitled to have all the proceedings public, both in respect to the production of proof and to the instructions to the jury by the court; and there ought to be no communication between the judge and the jury after the latter have retired to consider their verdict, in relation to the oral evidence or his instructions to them, unless it takes place openly in court, or with the express assent of the parties. This right is a substantial one, and is not in the discretion of the court, and an order denying a motion for a new trial, which motion was based upon the violation of this right, is appealable to this court. A party moving for a new trial on the ground of a communication between the judge and the jury without his knowledge or assent, is not bound to show affirmatively that such communication tended to his injury. Watertown Bank and Loan Co, v. Mix et al. Opinion by Johnson, C.

SLANDER.

1. Action for slander; the alleged slanderous words imputed to plaintiff the crime of perjury. Defendant's answer alleged, in substance, that the words were

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spoken in reference to a suit between the parties before a justice of the peace, in which plaintiff was sworn as a witness, and falsely deposed and gave evidence" that he made a certain contract with defendant, when, in fact, no such contract was made; also, that said evidence was material and pertinent to the issues. On the trial defendant offered to prove the facts set out in his answer, both as justification and in mitigation of damages. The evidence was excluded. Held, error; that the evidence was not proper in mitigation, because the answer omitted to aver knowledge on the part of plaintiff, and his testimony was false (Lott, Ch. C., dissenting), but that it was competent in mitigation. Spooner, adm'r, etc., v. Keeler. Opinion by Lott, Ch. C.

2. Words spoken in reference to a judicial proceeding, or in reference to a witness therein, charging him with swearing to a lie, or swearing false in such proceeding, impute the crime of perjury, and are actionable per se; and in an action of slander founded thereon it is not necessary for plaintiff to show the pendency of an action or proceeding before a court having jurisdiction, or that the words were spoken in reference to material evidence given by plaintiff therein. Ib.

TRUST.

1. Plaintiff and S. D. D. were married in August, 1848. By an ante-nuptial contract between them, plaintiff constituted S. D. D. "trustee of all her real and personal estate," and as such "to have the entire and sole management, direction and control thereof," which appointment was "declared to be irrevocable." S. D. D., as such trustee, soon after the marriage, took possession of plaintiff's property and appropriated a portion of the avails to the payment of moneys previously borrowed by him to purchase certain real estate, and to the erection of buildings thereon. He subsequently conveyed the real estate (plaintiff joining in the deed), receiving for a portion of the purchasemoney the mortgage of the grantees, covering the premises for a less amount than the sum thus appropriated. The grantees had no knowledge of such appropriation. S. D. D. assigned the mortgage by an

assignment absolute on its face, expressing full consideration. Through various mesne assignments, the title to the mortgage became vested in the defendant. In an action brought to have the mortgage declared to be trust property for plaintiff's benefit,-Held, first, that conceding the mortgage was impressed with a trust in favor of plaintiff, while held by S. D. D., a sale or pledge thereof by him was not a breach of trust, and an assignment to a bona fide holder could not be impeached by plaintiff. Second, conceding that defendant's title could be impeached, if it or the previous assignees had notice of the trust, the ante-nuptial contract conveyed no such notice, actual or constructive; and plaintiff having taken without any notice, express or implied, for a full and valuable consideration, was a bona fide purchaser, and acquired a perfect title thereto, free and discharged of the trust. Dillaye v. Commercial Bank of Whitehall, impleaded, etc. Opinion by Lott, Ch. C.

2. Where a trustee so clothed with full power to manage and control the trust estate, an assignment by him of a mortgage, impressed with the trust to a bona fide purchaser or pledgee, cannot be impeached by the cestui que trust. Ib.

DIGEST OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT OF MAINE.*
ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

If a submission contain no provision in relation to the rules of evidence that shall govern the referees, they are not restricted to the rules of the common law, but may receive the statements of parties without requiring them to be first sworn. Sanborn v. Paul, 325.

ASSUMPTIONS.

1. A mechanic cannot maintain assumpsit against the guardian of a minor for labor performed upon the ward's buildings. Robinson v. Hersey, 225.

2. Where the fraudulent representations of the seller of property, whereby the purchaser was induced to buy, were such as give the latter the right to rescind, and he does rescind the sale and surrender possession to the vendor. the law implies a promise, on the part of the seller, to pay the purchaser for labor and materials in making reasonable repairs upon the property. Farris v. Ware, 482.

ATTACHMENT.

The maxim that in law there are no fractions of a day does not apply to proceedings in bankruptcy, where the exact time when the event occurred is made certain by record; therefore, where a debtor's property was attached at seven o'clock in the afternoon of March 8, and his petition in bankruptcy under the U. S. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, was filed at two o'clock and fifty minutes in the afternoon of the 8th of July next succeeding,-Held, that under section 14, the attachment was dissolved, the time between the two events falling short of four months by four hours and ten minutes. Westbrook Manufacturing Company v. Grant, 88.

CHECK.

1. The taking of a check for an existing debt is not, ipso facto, payment of the debt. Marrett v. Brackett,

524.

2. The acceptance of a check implies an undertaking on the part of the holder to use due diligence in presenting it for payment. Ib.

* From 60 Maine Rep.

3. The holder is in the exercise of due diligence when he presents it for payment in accordance with the usage of the banks where payable, and of the persons having accounts with such banks-provided the usage is well established, reasonable, and lawful, and recognized by the mercantile community and the parties to the check. Ib.

4. And it makes no difference that the check is that of the agent of the debtor. Ib.

CLERK OF COURT.

A clerk of court has, ex officio, no right, without an express order of court, to that effect, to complete, alter, or amend the record kept by a predecessor in that office, whose term has expired. Rockland W. P. Co. v. Pillsbury, 425.

COMMISSION MERCHANT.

It seems that, in the absence of restrictions from his consignor, a commission flour merchant has the authority to warrant the quality and condition of flour sold by him. Randall v. Kehlor, 37.

COMMON CARRIER.

A carrier is not liable for goods lost beyond the end of his route, unless by special contract. Skinner v. Hall, 477.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The legislature cannot constitutionally authorize towns to loan their credit to such persons as, in consideration thereof, will engage therein in manufacturing for their private emolument. Allen v. Jay, 124.

DIVORCE.

A judgment of divorce, a vinculo, obtained by the husband on his libel, is no bar to the granting, by the same court, of a like divorce to the wife on her libel. Stilphen v. Houdlette, 447.

EVIDENCE.

1. Parol evidence is admissible to prove a custom among flour merchants in the place where it is sold on commission, whereby the vendee may rescind the sale and return the flour within ten days, if it prove to be unsound or damaged. Randall v. Kehlor, 37.

2. Parol evidence is admissible to show the division of a line fence made more than forty years before. Harlow v. Stinson, 351.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

If a wife, in the presence of her husband, knowingly aids him in a fraudulent transfer of his real estate to her, the prima facie presumption is that she acted under coercion; but this presumption may be rebutted. Warner v. Moran, 227.

INTEREST.

The owner of land taken for the location of a railroad is entitled to interest on the amount of the damages, from the time of the taking to the time of the assessment. B. & P. R. R. Co. v. McComb, 290.

LAND DAMAGES.

1. In estimating the damages of a land-owner, for the taking of a strip of his land across his lot for the location of a railroad, the award must be restricted to the direct injuries to the lot in question. B. & P. R. R. Co. v. McComb, 290.

2. Thus a sheriff's jury may consider the value of the land taken; and if the remainder of the lot is rendered less valuable by reason of being severed, or disfigured on account of the strip taken and the use made of it, they may allow such sum as they find the injury to be; and in determining the consequent depreciation of the

lot, they may consider the use to which the strip taken is appropriated; the character, situation, present and probable use of the remainder of the lot; the distance of the owner's buildings from the location of the railroad; and any facts which the jury, from a view and the testimony, shall find injure the value of the premises by a proper and legal use of the road. Ib.

3. So, also, they may consider all inconveniences from the sounding of whistles, ringing of bells, rattling of trains, jarring of the ground, and from smoke, so far as they severally arose from the use of the strip taken and upon it, excluding all common and indirect damages. Ib.

4. So, also, if they find that the real value of the remainder of the lot and of the erections thereon was actually diminished, by exposure to fire from the company's locomotives, they may assess such sum as will be a just compensation for such diminution, taking into consideration, at the same time, that by the statute, if property is injured by fire communicated by a locomotive engine, the company using it is absolutely responsible for such injury. Ib.

LORD'S DAY.

An action will not lie to recover damages, arising from the immoderate driving of a horse during a pleasure drive on the Lord's day, for which he was hired. Parker v. Latner, 528. See, contra, Hall v. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251.

PROMISSORY NOTE.

1. A notice to an indorser merely informing him of the non-payment of the note and demanding payment of him, without stating in substance that payment has been demanded of the maker, or giving any legal excuse for not demanding it of him, is insufficient to charge the indorser. Page v. Gilbert, 485.

2. A statement in the official certificate of the notary that he "delivered notice of the non-payment of such note to" the indorser, naming him, "demanding payment of him," is insufficient to charge the indorser. Ib.

SLANDER.

1. In an action of slander, where the words "you swore to a lie, and I can prove it," are relied on as imputing to the plaintiff the crime of perjury, there must be an averment in the declaration that the words were spoken with reference to some proceeding before some specified court, tribunal, or officer created by law, or in relation to some specified matter or thing where an oath is authorized by law; and the allegation must be supported by proof or the action is not maintainable. Small v. Clewley, 262.

2. In such case the general averment, that the defendant intended thereby to charge the plaintiff with the crime of perjury is not sufficient. Ib.

3. An allegation "you have committed the crime of perjury," when supported by proof will sustain an action of slander. Ib.

TELEGRAPH.

The defendant company transmitted messages during the night, known as night messages, at about one-half of the usual rates charged for day messages. And the plaintiffs having received a telegram, offering them a cargo of corn at 90 cents per bushel, went to the defendants' office, and, calling for one of their "night message blanks," on which was printed, "It is agreed between the sender of the following message and this company, that the company shall not be liable for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for

non-delivery of any message beyond the amount received by said company for sending the same," "send the following message subject to the above terms, which are agreed to," replied by writing thereon a message, properly addressed, of the following tenor: "Ship cargo named at 90, if you can secure freight at 10, wire us the result," and paid 48 cents, the rate for night message. The message was sent but not delivered, by reason whereof the plaintiffs failed to obtain the corn at the terms offered, and the price of corn and freight immediately advanced. The defendants admitted their liability to the extent of sum paid.

Held, that the terms of the foregoing condition are not reasonable, and do not exonerate the company from liability beyond the sum paid for the transmission of the message. Held, also, that the rule of damages in such case is the difference between the price named and that which the plaintiff would have been obliged to pay at the same place, in order by due diligence, after notice of the failure of the telegram, to purchase the like quantity and quality of corn, with the same rule in relation to the freight. Appleton, C. J., dissenting. True v. Int. Tel. Co., 9.

LEGAL EDUCATION.

We recently expressed the opinion that the Law School was the best place to commence the study of the law, and in this we have the support of Judge Cole, of the Supreme Court of Iowa, and editor of the Western Jurist. In the August number of that excellent periodical, we find the following article from his pen:

"In the two former articles by Professor Washburn, the reason why a legal education should be obtained, and what was necessary to constitute a legal education, have been set forth in a manner so clear, attractive and instructive as to render any thing further thereon wholly unnecessary.

"How shall that legal education be acquired? Formerly, the only way of acquiring it was by entering, as a student or clerk, into the office of some practitioner, and there, for a series of years, to pursue (nominally) the study of law. While a law student would acquire some knowledge of the law under such circumstances, it was nevertheless of that indefinite kind resulting from absorption rather than of a thorough and certain knowledge, which only can be acquired by continuous and systematic study. Most of the lawyers who then took, or now take, students (so called) into their offices, did then, and still do so, out of consideration for their services as janitors for their offices, as mere clerks for copying papers, preparing and serving notices, etc., etc. Very few, if any, lawyers give any time regularly or specially to the matter of instructing such students in the knowledge of the law. As a rule, the time of the lawyers whose offices are sought by students is too much occupied with their business to allow them to devote any part of it to regular instruction. Besides this, it may truly be said that no lawyer is properly qualified to instruct a student who has not devoted some time to the preparation for such instruction; and no lawyer in full practice can, for any tuition he is likely to receive, afford to give the time requisite to both prepare himself and instruct the student or students he may have.

"And, further than this, a lawyer's office is no place for a student; it is quite impossible to be a student there. It is essential that a student shall apply him

self continuously and systematically to the subject he studies, Unless he does, he will make no satisfactory progress; and this he cannot do in a lawyer's office. His study is frequently, hourly and almost constantly interrupted by the calls and business of clients, the demands for copies of papers, the service of notices, and the social calls of like students from other offices. And without further detail, the whole matter may well be summed up in the declaration, the verity of which every one having experience will approve, that the office of a lawyer, in full practice, is the most demoralizing place for mental discipline that can be found. Hence, to enter a lawyer's office for the purpose of the study of the law, is absurd; it is worse than folly. Such a course will destroy mental discipline, defeat systematic study, override habits of order, extinguish love for thoroughness, and will afford only that indefinite and uncertain knowledge which results from mere absorption, and is ultimately of more detriment than advantage-all that is of real benefit might be better acquired by a patient and attentive listening to the proceedings of a single term of court. The question, therefore, how shall a legal education be acquired, may be answered negatively, not in a lawyer's office.

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"Still the question how shall a legal education be acquired remains unanswered. Law is a science. knowledge of it can only be acquired as we acquire knowledge of other sciences, and that is by patient, persevering, continuous and thoughtful study under the direction and instruction of competent and faithful teachers. The theory that it may be acquired in any other way is a cheat, a snare and a delusion. Law is not only a science, but it is an applied science of the most difficult and complex character. It consists of an infinite number of independent rules, and, as applied to the transactions between men, it is seldom found that their rights are to be determined by any single rule, but by several, each modifying and restraining the others. So that in order to be able to properly aid in the administration of the law (and this is the high duty of lawyers) it is necessary to have a thorough, precise and critical knowledge of the many different rules of law, and also a comprehensive and enlightened judgment respecting them, enabling one to determine the extent of the modification the several rules involved in any case shall have upon each other. The bare statement of these truths, which are well known to every experienced lawyer, abundantly manifest the necessity for thoroughness of instruction by wise and careful teachers.

"But the truths before stated also show the necessity for a thorough and comprehensive education, in the schools, before entering upon the study of the law. For the judgment is improved and the capacity to acquire a knowledge of the law is enlarged by a previous liberal education; and it may be truly said, that, all other things being equal, the young men having such liberal education will excel as lawyers those who have it not. It is, therefore, advisable for all who expect to pursue the study and the practice of the law, to first apply themselves to the attainment of as liberal an education as is practicable; and this as a part of the means of acquiring a legal education. This idea is too often overlooked, and academic studies abandoned in order to take up the law, whereby many only attain to a medium standard in the profession, who might, by a more extended academic course, have attained much greater eminence and usefulness as lawyers. When

ever it is practicable, a full college course should precede the entering upon the study of the law.

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'From what has been said, it must also be apparent that a thorough legal education cannot be acquired in a single year of study. There are two ways in which this 'single year of study' is made up; sometimes it is called a two years course, and is made so by making it occupy two years, but only six months being employed in each year; and, again, it is called a one year course, but the whole year is occupied continuously. Of these two ways, doubtless the latter is the best, since it affords continuous study and instruction and the full benefit of the mental discipline acquired in the first half year is without diminution enjoyed in the last half. But, however this year of study may be accomplished, whether in one year or two, it is intended here to say, that it is too short a time for the acquisition of a full and complete knowledge of the law. It is to be hoped that at an early day, longer courses will be adopted by the law schools of the country and followed completely by those who enter them.

"How shall a legal education be acquired? Answer. In the Law Schools. We shall have something to say hereafter as to the manner and course of instruction therein."

LEGAL NEWS.

Warren S. Lunty has been appointed United States attorney for the western district of Virginia.

Ex-Attorney-General Reverdy Johnson is left, by the death of Mr. Meredith, the sole survivor of General Taylor's cabinet.

The time for the payment of the Geneva award of $15,000,000, under the Washington treaty, expires on the 15th of September next.

The Attorney-General of Illinois is making arrangements to enter suit against various railroads for violation of the new freight-tariff law.

It is reported in England that Mr. Montague Bernard, D. C. L., one of the Treaty of Washington Commissioners on the part of England, is likely to be appointed Baron of the Exchequer.

Hon. Chas. D. Day, late judge of the superior court of Quebec; Hon. Antoine Pallette, judge of the superior court of Quebec, and Hon. J. A. Gowan, judge of the county court at Simcoe, Ontario, have been appointed a commission to investigate the Northern Pacific Railway scandal.

It is reported that Edwin James, the English barrister who was thrown "over the bar" in London for unprofessional conduct, who came to America and practiced unsuccessfully for ten years, and was recently refused readmission to the London bar, will publish his "Recollections of the American Bar."

The following deaths are announced: Hon. Thomas A. R. Nelson, late judge of the supreme court of Tennessee; Hon. William M. Meredith, a prominent lawyer of Philadelphia; Professor James P. Holcombe, for several years law professor in the University of Virginia; ex-Judge Bates, of San Francisco.

The supreme court of Georgia has decided that the law invalidating judgments for notes, whose consideration was slaves, is unconstitutional, and that, unless barred by the statute of limitations, such judgments can be made operative. The court was divided, Judge McCoy dissenting.

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