executed contracts between the State and the corporators, and the rule is well settled that the legislature, if the charter does not contain any reservation or other provision modifying or limiting the nature of the contract, cannot repeal, impair or alter such a charter against the consent or without the default of the corporation, ju ascertained and declared. Subsequent legi ring or modifying such a charter, reservation, is plainly unauthoral to the rights of the corporators, and was passed without their assent. Where such a provision is incorporated in the charter, it is clear that it qualifies the grant, and that the subsequent exercise of that reserved power cannot be regarded as an act within the prohibition of the constitution. College Cases, 13 Wall. 213.

where

ized, i

Such power also, that is, the power to alter, modify or repeal an act of incorporation, is frequently reserved to the State by a general law applicable to all acts of incorporation, or to certain classes of the same, as the case may be; in which case it is equally clear that the power may be exercised whenever it appears that the act of incorporation is one which falls within the reservation, and that the charter was granted subsequent to the passage of the general law, even though the charter contains no such condition, nor any allusion to such a reservation. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 136; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 id. 51.

Matters of fact, though not in dispute, must be first ascertained, in order that the questions involved in the case may be properly presented for decision. Briefly stated, the material facts are as follows, as appears by the finding of the court of original jurisdiction, and from the concessions of the parties:

That the railroad company is a corporation duly organized under the general railroad act of the State, passed on the 2d of April, 1850, and that the articles of association were, on the 10th of July, of the succeeding year, filed in the office of the secretary of State; that the articles of association provided for the construction of a railroad from Rochester to Portage, a distance of fifty miles, with a capital of $800,000, to be divided into eight thousand shares each for $100, as therein specified; that the stock subscribed for the corporation, paid and unpaid, amounted to nine thousand seven hundred and seventy-five shares, of which only five thousand five hundred and fifty-two shares were ever fully paid, and for which certificates have been issued. Authority was conferred upon the city of Rochester, by an act to amend the charter of the city, to subscribe for or purchase stock of that railroad company to the amount of $300,000, and the provision was, that by virtue of that subscription or purchase, the city should acquire all the rights and privileges and be liable to the same responsibilities as other stockholders of said company, except in certain particulars not necessary to be mentioned. Sess. Acts 1851, p. 768.

Pursuant to that authority the proper officers of the city subscribed for that amount of the stock of the railroad company, and it appears that the proper officers of the railroad company elected to receive the subscription, and that the full amount of the subscription was paid, and that the certificates of the shares were duly issued to the city, and that the city has ever since been the holder and owner of the whole number of said shares.

Power was also conferred upon the city, in case the company "elected to receive their subscription," to

nominate and appoint one director for every $75,000 of capital stock held by the municipality, at the time of each election of directors, but the further provision was that the city should have no voice in the election of the remaining directors; consequently the common council of the city, at the time of cach annual election of directors, elected four-the number being limited by law to thirteen- and the other stockholders elected nine, without any interference from the city authorities.

Complaints arose from the fact that $452,300 of the stock, subscribed by parties other than the city, had never been paid in, nor had certificates ever been issued for any part of that unpaid subscription. On the contrary, the same was not in existence as stock, having long before been extinguished and forfeited for non-payment, in consequence of which the railroad company had abandoned the construction of their road south of Avon, and assigned all their right of way, property and franchises beyond that point to another corporation, so that their railroad as constructed and operated terminates at Avon, and is only eighteen and three-fourths miles in length.

Control of the railroad, by a change of circumstances not contemplated when the plan was organized, being in the hands of stockholders owning a minority of the stock, the legislature of the State, on the 9th of March, 1861, enacted that the common council of the city should "have the power to nominate and appoint one director of the company for every $42,855.71 3-7 of capital stock of the said railroad company held by the said city, at the time of each election of directors of said company." Session Acts 1867, p. 92.

Thereafter the common council of the city, as the plaintiffs claim, became entitled at each annual election of directors to elect seven of the number allowed by law, and that the other stockholders were entitled to elect the remaining six only, as authorized by the apportionment prescribed by the amendatory act of the legislature. Accordingly, the common council of the city, at the annual election held in June of the succeeding year, elected seven directors, but the other stockholders, denying the validity of the amendatory act, elected nine directors under the old law, and the persons so chosen immediately entered upon, used and exercised the said offices as directors of said corporation, and without any warrant or authority, as insisted by the plaintiffs.

Deprived of their rights as defined by the amendatory act the plaintiffs brought the present action, in the nature of a writ of quo warranto, in the supreme court of the State, alleging that the nine directors elected by the other stockholders have usurped the offices of directors of the railroad company. Service was made and the defendants appeared and filed an answer. Hearing was had and the supreme court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendants transferred the cause to the court of appeals, where the judgment was affirmed; thereupon the losing party sued out a writ of error and removed the record into this court.

They seek to reverse the judgment of the State courts upon the ground that the act of the State legislature, authorizing the common council of the city to elect seven of the thirteen directors in the railroad company, is unconstitutional and void as repugnant to their act of incorporation, and in support of that theory they submit the following propositions: 1. That the signers of the before-mentioned articles of association, when the

articles were filed in the office of the secretary of State, became a corporation by the name specified in those articles, with all the powers and privileges granted by the general law of the State upon that subject. 3 Edm. Stats. 618. §§ 1-4. 2. That the powers and privileges thus conferred were granted by the State, and that the grant, as an act of incorporation, became and was an executed contract. 3. That the powers and privileges of the charter are prescribed and defined in the general railroad law of the State. 4. That the persons named as corporators in a charter cannot be compelled to accept the act of incorporation, nor any modification or extension of the powers and privileges granted, whether conferred or modified or extended, by a special act or by virtue of a general law. 5, That a contract created by an act of incorporation, when once complete, is unalterable by either party without the consent of the other.

Undoubtedly the powers and privileges of the railroad company in this case are the same as they would have been if the company had been incorporated by a special act, and it may also be conceded that the charter, when the articles of association were filed in the office of the secretary of State, became an executed contract, subject to the restrictions ordained by the constitution of the State, and to the reservations contained in the general law of the State relating to corporations, and also to the general railroad act, which it is admitted prescribes and defines the powers and privileges of the railroad company.

Section one of article eight of the constitution of the State ordains as follows: Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special act except in certain cases. All general laws and special acts passed pursuant to this section may be altered from time to time or repealed. Const. 1846, art. 8, § 1.

Provision is also made by the eighth section of the act defining the powers, privileges and liabilities of corporations, that the charter of every corporation that shall hereafter be granted by the legislature shall be subject to alteration, suspension, and repeal, in the discretion of the legislature. 1 Rev. Stats. 600.

Articles of association for the incorporation of railroad companies cannot be filed and recorded in the office of the secretary of State until at least one thousand dollars of stock for every mile of railroad proposed to be made is subscribed thereto, nor without complying with the other conditions specified in the second section of the general railroad act; and the first section of the act provides that such corporation shall be subject to the provisions (except those enacted in the seventh section) contained in title three of chapter eighteen of the first part of the Revised Statutes, which includes section eight, containing the reservation that the charter of every corporation that shall hereafter be granted shall be subject to alteration, suspension, and repeal, in the discretion of the legislature. Sess. Acts 1850, 212, § 1.

Such a reservation, therefore, is not only ordained by the constitution of the State but it has been twice enacted by the legislature, and it is conceded that both of those statutes are in full force. Superadded to those reservations is the further one, contained in the fortyeighth section of the general railroad act, which provides that the legislature may at any time annul or dissolve any corporation formed under this act, the effect of which, it is admitted by the defendants, is to incorporate into the grant a power of revocation, which

seems to supersede all necessity for any further remark upon the subject. Sess. Acts 1850, p. 234.

Much consideration was given to the question under consideration in the case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 675, in which the right of the State was denied to amend the charter granted to the college by the crown before the revolution, and to modify and restrict the same without the consent of the trustees under the charter. Four propositions were decided by the court in that case he opinion being given by the chief justice: (13 he charter was a contract within the meaning of that clause of the constitution which ordains that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. (2) That the charter was not dissolved by the revolution. (3) That the acts of the State legislature altering the charter in a material respect, without the consent of the corporation, was an act impairing the obligation of the charter, and was unconstitutional and void. (4) That the college, under its charter, was a private and not a public corporation.

Concurring opinions were also given by two of the associate 'justices, and Judge Story, in enforcing his views, remarked that where a private corporation is thus created by the charter of the crown, it is subject to no other control on the part of the crown than what is expressly or implicitly reserved by the charter itself. Unless a power be reserved for this purpose the crown cannot, in virtue of its prerogative, alter or amend the charter or divest the corporation of any of its franchises, or add to them, or augment or diminish the number of trustees, or remove any of the members, or change or control the administration of the funds, or compel the corporators to receive a new charter.

Prior to that adjudication the supreme court of Massachusetts had decided that rights legally vested in a corporation cannot be controlled or destroyed by any subsequent statute, unless a power for that purpose be reserved to the legislature in the act of incorporation; and the learned judge having referred to that case, remarked that the principles there laid down are so consonant with justice, sound policy, and legal reasoning, that it is difficult to resist the impression of their perfect correctness, showing very plainly that such legislation would be valid if the power for that purpose is reserved in the act incorporating the company. S. C., 4 Wheat. 708, Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 146.

Conclusive evidence that such was the opinion of that learned judge is also derived from his subsequent remarks in that same case, in which he says that any act of the legislature which takes away any powers or franchises vested by its charter in a private corporation or its corporate officers, or which restrains or controls the legitimate exercise of them, or transfers them to other persons, without its assent, is a violation of the obligations of the charter, adding: "If the legislature mean to claim such an authority it must be reserved in the grant." S. C., 4 Wheat. 712; Cooley's Const. Lim. 279.

Where such a provision is incorporated in the charter, it is clear that it qualifies the grant, and that the subsequent exercise of that reserved power cannot be regarded as an act within the prohibition of the constitution. College cases, 13 Wall. 313.

Members of banking associations, it was enacted by the general banking law of New York, should not be individually liable for the debts of the association, unless it was so provided in the articles of organization, but this court held, in the case of Sherman v. Smith, 1

Black, 587, that a subsequent statute imposing such a liability upon the shareholders of the association was a valid law, as the charter reserved to the legislature the power to alter or repeal the act of incorporation. Such a conclusion was earnestly resisted at the bar, as the conditional exemption from such liability was embodied in the articles of association, but the court overruled the defense upon the ground that the reservation in the charte of the right to alter or repeal the act was paramount controlling. Decision e State courts, in repeated instances, both before and since that time, have been made to the same effect. When that case was before the court of appeals, before the record was removed here for revision, the court of appeals decided that the provision reserving to the legislature the power to alter or repeal the general banking law became a part of the contract with every association formed under it, and that the State might modify it prospectively or retrospectively without infringing the article of the Federal constitution, which ordains that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, and this court affirmed the judgment in that case. Oliver Lee's Bank, 21 N. Y. 16.

Laws could not be enacted under the constitution in force when the general banking law was passed, to create, alter, continue, or renew any body, politic or corporate, without the assent of two-thirds of the members in each branch of the legislature. Consequently it was contended that the members of such associations, subsequently created, could not be affected by the statute declaring that shareholders should be liable individually for the debts of the association, but the court of appeals re-affirmed the decision in the preceding case, and determined that the statute imposing that liability was a valid exercise of the power reserved in that act, and that its effect was that the franchises and privileges granted were at all times subject to abrogation or change by the legislative power of the State; that the power reserved was one to be exercised at any time by the existing legislative authority, however constituted and in any mode conforming to the organic law of the State for the time being. The Reciprocity Bank, 22 N. Y. 14; White v. Railroad Co., 14 Barb. 362.

Exactly the same principle was adopted in the case of Railroad v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 348, where it was held that an alteration of the charter of the company, made by the legislature, in pursuance of the power reserved to alter or repeal the act, by changing its name, increasing its capital, and extending its road, did not discharge a subscriber to the stock from liability for his subscription, whether such alteration was or was not beneficial to him, the alteration having been duly made and without fraud on the part of the company. See, also, Plank Road v. Thatcher, 11 N. Y. 110.

Under such a reservation it is also held by the same court, that a member of the corporation holds his stock subject to such liability as may attach to him in consequence of an extension or renewal of the charter, made without his application or consent, and that the estate of an intestate succeeds to the individual liability imposed on the owner in his life-time as a stockholder in a corporation whose charter would have expired if it had been renewed, but was extended after his death; and that his administrator was liable for debts of the corporation contracted after the death of the intestate. Bailey v. Hollister, 26 N. Y. 116; Clark v. City of Rochester, 28 id. 631; People v. Hill, 35 id. 449.

Even the defendants admit that the exact question presented for decision in this case was decided by the supreme court of the State in the case between these same parties, or some of them, and which was subsequently transferred to the court of appeals and was there reversed upon an exception involving a question of local law. People v. Hills, 46 Barb. 344.

Nearly forty years earlier the same question substantially was decided in the same way by the chancellor of that State, in which he held that where a State legislature reserves to itself, in the very charter it grants to a private corporation, the right of altering, amending or repealing the act of incorporation, a subsequent repeal of the charter is valid and constitutional; that such a reservation in the charter of a corporation, upon common-law principles, is not repugnant to the grant but a constitutional limitation of the powers granted. McLaren v. Pennington, 1 Paige's Ch. 102.

Few or none, it is presumed, will question the correctness of that rule, but the court here is of the opinion that the reservation is equally valid and effectual if it exists in the constitution of the State, or in a prior general law. College cases, 13 Wall. 213; General Hospital v. Ins. Co., 4 Gray, 227; Roxbury v. Railroad, 6 Cush. 424; Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 363; Angell & Ames on Corp. (9th ed.),§ 767, p. 787.

So where the legislature in granting à charter to an insurance company reserved the right to alter it, and they subsequently exercised that right by declaring that if the assets of such corporation should pass into the hands of a receiver he might make assessments upon the premium notes, it was held that this was a legitimate exercise of the reserved power, and that it fully authorized the receiver to make assessments whenever it became necessary to carry the intention of the legislature into effect. Hyatt v. McMahon, 25 Barb. 467.

Power to legislate, founded upon such a reservation in a charter to a private corporation, is certainly not without limit, and it may well be admitted that it cannot be exercised to take away or destroy rights acquired by virtue of such a charter, and which by a legitimate use of the powers granted have become vested in the corporation, but it may be safely affirmed that the reserved power may be exercised, and to almost any extent, to carry into effect the original purposes of the grant or to secure the due administration of its affairs so as to protect the rights of the stockholders and of creditors, and for the proper disposition of the assets. Com. v. Essex Co., 13 Gray, 253; Miller v. Railroad Co., 21 Barb. 517.

Such a reservation, it is held, will not warrant the legislature in passing laws to change the control of an institution from one religious sect to another, or to divert the fund of the donors to any new use inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the charter, or to compel subscribers to the stock, whose subscription is conditional, to waive any of the conditions of their contract. State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570; Zabriskie v. Railroad Co., 3 C. E. Green, 180; Railroad Co. v. Veazie, 30 Me. 581; Sage v. Dillard, 15 B. Monr. 357.

Attempt is made in this case to show that the right to elect all of the directors, except four, had become vested in the stockholders owning a minority of the shares, and that the amendatory act giving to the city the power to elect seven impairs that vested right, but the court is entirely of a different opinion, as the legislature, in conceding that right, made the concession subject to the reserved power to alter or repeal the charter, as ordained in the constitution of

the State, and also in the several statutes mentioned, which clearly give to the legislature the power to augment or diminish the number or to change the apportionment, as the ends of justice or the best interest of all concerned may require.

All parties supposed, when the charter was formed, and when the subscriptions to the stock were paid, that the capital stock would be $800,000, and that the right conceded to the city to elect four out of the thirteen directors would give the city a fair proportion of the whole number, but circumstances have changed in consequence of the failure of a large class of the subscribers to the stock to make good their subscriptions. Payments being refused the corporation found it necessary to reduce the capital stock, and to shorten the route, as before explained.

These changes from the original design made new legislation necessary to the ends of justice, and the amendatory act was passed to effect that object, and the court is of the opinion that the amendatory act is a valid law, and that the judgment should be affirmed. Mr. Justice Bradley dissenting.

COMMISSION OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

ACTION PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

The firm of J. H. & Son were agents for five steamships forming a line to California, having different owners, and each receiving the profits of its own labors, and being charged with its own expenses. They purchased coal for the use of said ships, giving the firm notes therefor. An action was brought upon the notes against the members of the firm and the different owners of the steamers jointly claiming to charge the latter as dormant partners. By order of the court plaintiff was permitted to discontinue as to the owners, and upon trial the complaint was dismissed as to the other defendants.

Held, error; that there was nothing in the nature of a partnership in the business relations between the owners of the steamers, and no joint or several liability on their part upon the notes; that J. H. & Son were liable, both because there were no principals behind them to whom plaintiff could look for payment, and because they gave their firm notes with nothing upon them to indicate that they did not assume a personal responsibility, and that plaintiff was not precluded from enforcing the liability by the fact of having attempted, in the first instance, to hold all the associates in the line liable as partners. Snelling v. Howard, Surv'r, etc. Opinion by Hunt C.

ACTION -- SUBROGATION.

Where the owner of a piece of land sells the same subject to a mortgage executed by him thereon, given to secure his bond, and upon payment of the bond the obligor is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the obligee, so that he can re-imburse himself by recourse to the mortgaged premises, and he may require an assignment of the bond and mortgage to an assignee of his nomination for his benefit; and if, upon tender of the amount unpaid, the holder of the bond and mortgage refuses to assign, an action can be maintained to compel such assignment. Johnson v. Zink. Opinion by Lott, Ch. C.

ATTORNEYS.

An attorney who brings an action in the name of another, in which he is beneficially interested by virtue

of an agreement, by which he is to receive a portion of the recovery as compensation for his services, is liable the same as the plaintiff for the defendant's costs. (2 R. S. 619, § 44.) His liability has not been affected by the provision of the Code (section 303), legalizing such agreements. Voorhees v. McCartney. Opinion by Gray, C.

BONA FIDE HOLDER-FRAUD.

One B, through fraud, procured of defendants goods upon credit, for which he gave his notes, and as collateral security a mortgage upon lands which he did not own, and transferred a fictitious note and a policy of life insurance. To settle defendants' claim B, without their knowledge, fraudulently procured plaintiff's indorsement to two notes made by B, and payable to defendants, which were to be and were used in taking up the old notes, and upon receipt defendants surrendered said notes and collaterals. Upon discovery of the fraud, plaintiff brought this action to have his indorsements canceled.

Held, that although the presumption of law from the face of the note was that plaintiff was only liable as subsequent indorsers, yet, it appearing that he intended to become security for the debt to the payees, he was liable as such; that the surrender of the original notes was a sufficient consideration to make defendants bona fide holders of the new notes, and that their position as such was not affected by the fact that they were the payees named therein, and that plaintiff therefore had no cause of action. Clothier v. Adriance et al. Opinion by Hunt, C.

BONDED WAREHOUSEMAN.

1. Action against defendants as keepers of a bonded warehouse for the refusal to deliver goods deposited with them. Defendants gave evidence tending to show that their warehouse was broken open and the goods removed by burglars, and that they used such precautions as ordinary prudence would dictate to protect their warehouse from burglars. The court charged the jury in substance, that the evidence must be such that from it they could fairly assume that the goods were lost by means of the burglary. Held, no error. Schwerin et al. v. McKie et al. Opinion by Gray, C., and Earl, C., dissenting.

2. Upon failure to deliver the goods upon which the duties have been paid, the burden of accounting for them is cast upon the keeper of the bouded warehouse, and in an action against him, interest upon the value of the goods from the time of demand and refusal to deliver is a proper item of damages. Ib.

3. The provision of the act of congress of 1852, extending the warehouse system, etc. (10 U. S. Stat. at Large, 270), which provides that goods deposited in a private bonded warehouse authorized by that act, shall be at the exclusive risk of the owner or importer, was intended solely for the benefit of the government, and does not relieve the warehouse keeper from the duty of exercising ordinary care and prudence, nor from the liabilities of other warehousemen to their patrons. Ib.

EVIDENCE- ESTOPPEL.

1. Plaintiff sued as indorsee and owner of a promissory note. It appeared upon the trial that after the time when he claimed the note was transferred to him, he, as attorney, brought suit thereon in the name of the payee, which action was discontinued.

Held, that while the testimony was pertinent and proper to be considered by the jury, in determining

1. Plaintiff claimed, as a copartner, and received onefourth interest in a lease taken by defendants in their own name. An extra allowance was granted him under the second clause of section 309 of the Code, based upon the value of the lease.

Held, error; that the subject of litigation was simply the one-fourth value of the lease, and adopting either of the three classes specified in said clause, the recovery, the claim or the subject-matter involved, it would embrace not the whole value of the lease, but only the one-fourth thereof. Struthers v. Pearce et al. Opinion by Lott, Ch. C.

2. Where an order of the general term recites the fact of an appeal from the order of special term considered therein, it will be assumed that such an appeal was taken, although no notice of appeal is contained in the case. Ib.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. Action to set aside an assignment made by W. C. to assignees for the benefit of his creditors as fraudulent, on the ground of a preference given to his wife for a debt alleged to be due from him to her for money borrowed. It appeared that W. C. married prior to the passage of chapter 200, Laws of 1848, an act for the more effectual protection of the property of married women, and that he declined to assert his marital rights to the personal property of the wife, but that he borrowed money of her with the understanding and agreement that it should be repaid.

Held, that the agreement was for a good consideration, and imposed equitable obligation upon the husband, and a preference of the debt in good faith and without an intent to defraud, was legal and did not vitiate the assignment. Jaycox et al. v. Caldwell. Opinion by Lott, Ch. C.

2. There is no distinction between cases where, at the time of the marriage, the property consisted of money in the possession of the wife and those where it consisted of choses in action. Ib.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-NEGLIGENCE.

1. Action for damages for injuries received by falling into a cistern on defendant's premises. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant kept a public boarding-house, and that she contracted with him for board and lodging; that upon returning to the house after dark, by the usual path, she fell into a cistern which had been negligently left open. The answer denied the allegations of the complaint, and alleged, that at the time of the injury plaintiff was unlawfully on defendant's premises, etc. On the trial it appeared that the premises had been deeded to defendant's wife and that the bargain for board had been made by plaintiff with her, but it did not appear that the wife's grantor was signed or possessed of the premises, or that she entered claiming to hold under the deed.

Held, that the ownership of the premises was not put in issue by the pleadings, but on the contrary, the answer by necessary implication, admitted defendant's

title to the premises at the time of injury, and that, therefore, an erroneous charge of the court, as to the liabilities of the husband in respect to property owned by the wife, could have done no injury, and was no ground for reversal. Fiske v. Bailey. Opinion by Gray, C.

2. Where a husband and wife live upon premises, the separate property of the latter, the former is not, in legal presumption, so in control thereof as to make him liable for injuries sustained by the careless leaving of a cistern uncovered thereon. In order to make him jointly and severally responsible,some evidence must be given of his participation in the wrong, or of an obligation upon his part to obviate the cause. Ib.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. Where a lease to a copartnership gives a privilege to the lessors, of continuing the lease for an additional term, upon giving notice of their intention to continue prior to the termination of the original term, in case of the death of one of the partners, the survivor can as such give the required notice and enforce a fulfillment of the covenants of the lease for the extended term. Betts v. June.

2. Notice to quit.-- Defendant entered into possession of certain premises under a lease which expired April 18, 1865. He held over, without the permission of his landlord, the plaintiff, until June 18, 1865, when this action commenced to recover possession of the premises. Plaintiff had served no notice to quit.

Held, that no notice was necessary, and that plaintiff was entitled to recover. Smith v. Littlefield. Opinion by Earl, C.

3. A tenant who holds over a definite term for a brief period, without the consent of his landlord, does not thereby become a tenant by sufferance, and is not entitled to notice to quit before the commencement of summary proceedings or the bringing of an action to recover possession. To entitle him to notice, the holding over must be continued for such a length of time, and under such circumstances as to authorize the implication of an assent upon the part of the landlord. Ib.

PARTNERSHIP.

This action was brought to secure to plaintiff (an outgoing partner) an interest in a lease, of which the defendants (the continuing partners) had obtained a renewal during the existence of a continuing copartnership of undetermined duration. The defendants obtained the new lease, in their own names, of the premises leased and used by the firm, and without the knowledge of plaintiff.

Held, that the new lease became partnership property, and upon dissolution of the firm, plaintiff was entitled to his proportion of its value. Struthers v. Pearce et al. Opinion by Lott, Ch. C.

An international patent right congress will convene in Vienna on the 16th of August. An imperial commission has been appointed to arrange the preliminaries. The language used at the congress will be German, but French and English will be permitted. The decisions of the congress will be communicated through the several commissions to their respective governments. Inventors and proprietors of inventions are actively moving in the matter, and a large and important gathering is anticipated.