the mind with the conviction, that the instrument found in such custody must be genuine. That such is the character and description of the custody, which is held sufficiently genuine to render a document admissible, appears from all the cases. On the one hand, old grants to abbeys have been rejected as evidence of private rights, where the possession of them has appeared altogether unconnected with the persons who had any interest in the estate. Thus, a manuscript found in the Herald's Office, enumerating the possessions of the dissolved monastery of Tutbury, a manuscript found in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, and a grant to a priory brought from the Cottonian MSS. in the British Museum were all held to be inadmissible, the possession of the documents being unconnected with the interests in the property. On the other hand an old chartulary of the dissolved abbey of Glastonbury was held to be admissible because found in the possession of the owner of part of the abbey lands, though not of the principal proprietor. This was not the proper custody, which, as Lord Redesdale observed, would have been the Augmentation Office; and, as between the different proprietors of the abbey lands, it might have been more reasonably expected to have been deposited with the largest; but it was, as the court argued, a place of custody where it might be reasonably expected to be found. So also, in the case of Jones v. Waller, the collector's book would have been as well authenticated if produced from the custody of the executor of the incumbent or his successor, as from the hands of the successor of the collector. Upon this principle, we think the case stated for the opinion of counsel, purporting to be stated on the part of Bishop Dopping, and found in the place and in the custody before described, was admissible in evidence. It was a document which related to the private interests of the bishop, at the time it was stated, for it bears date in 1695, about which time, it appears from other facts found, that Barry, the late incumbent, was dead, and that before 1697 Bishop Dopping collated his own son. It related, therefore, to a real transaction which took place at the time; and although it might be said to have related in some degree to the see, for the right of collation was claimed, as of an advowson granted to the see; yet it is manifest this case had been stated with reference to the private interests of the bishop in the particular avoidance, and that it was more reasonable to expect it to be preserved with his private papers, and family documents, than in the public registry of the diocese. But even considered as a document belonging to the see, it was not unreasonable that it should have been found in the bishop's mansion house; for, upon the evidence, there is only one single ecclesiastical record preserved in the registry of the diocese of Meath of an earlier date than 1717; and on the other hand, the case and grant are found in the same parcel with several papers relating to the see of Meath, and in the same room were several visitation books of the diocese and other papers relating to the see." It appears from this case, that it is not necessary that the custody should be that which is strictly proper: it is sufficient if it be one which may be reasonably and naturally explained (s), and one which affords reasonable assurance of the authenticity of the document (t). But it is not sufficient to produce the documents without calling a witness to prove the custody from which they come (u). It has been doubted whether it is not necessary to show some act of recognition or enjoyment, done with reference to the documents. For in Doe v. Pulman (v), where, in ejectment to prove that an ancient ancestor had been seised of the locus in quo, the lessor of the plaintiff produced from her muniment room the counterpart of an old lease, purporting to be granted by the ancestor, but executed only by the lessee, it was held admissible, without proof that the lessee had actually enjoyed under it. It is said to be an established principle, that nothing said or done by a person having at the time an interest in the subject-matter, shall be evidence either for him or persons claiming under him (x); and, therefore, in a settlement case (y), an old entry in a parochial book was held not to be evidence of the terms under which a pauper resided in the parish. So, entries made by a deceased person, through whom the defendant claims, acknowledging the receipt of rent for the premises in question, are not evidence of title for the defendant (z). (s) Doe v. Sampter, 8 Ad. & El. 154. (t) Per Coleridge, J., Doe v. Phillips, 8 Q. B. 158. (u) Evans v. Rees, 10 Ad. & El. 154. (v) 3 Q. B. 623; sed cf. Malcolmson v. O'Dea, 10 H. of L. Cas. 593. (x) Per Abbott, C. J., R. v. Debenham, 2 B. & Ald. 185. (y) Ibid. (z) Outram v. Morewood, 5 T. R. 123. CHAPTER XI. ON EVIDENCE IN QUESTIONS OF PEDIGREE. IN questions of pedigree, or inquiries concerning relationship or descent, the rule by which hearsay evidence has been excluded is waived, and it is held that The statements of deceased persons, who were connected by blood or marriage, to the family in question, are admissible in cases of disputed pedigree. In Davies v. Lowndes (a), Parke, B. said:-" There seems to be no limitation in the rule as to blood relations; but with regard to relationship by affinity, it is different; it seems to be confined to declarations by a husband as to his wife's relations. It is for the judge to decide, as a question precedent to the admission of the evidence, whether the declarant has been sufficiently proved to have been connected by consanguinity or affinity to the family in question; and it makes no difference that the legitimacy of the declarant happens to be also the only question in issue (b). It is held that the declarations must have been from persons having such a connection with the family that (a) 7 Scott, N. R. 188. (b) Doe v. Davies, 10 Q. B. 314. it is natural and likely, from their domestic habits, that they were speaking the truth, and could not be mistaken (c). The declaration of others than blood relations, and husbands and wives, are not admissible; thus, the declarations of deceased servants and intimate acquaintances are rejected (d); even though coming under the head of dying declarations (e). Nor are the declarations of illegitimate relations received (f). In India, however, the declarations of illegitimate. relations and of persons, who though not related to the family were intimately acquainted with its members and state, are admitted (g). "The law resorts to hearsay of relations upon the principle of interest in the person from whom the descent is to be made out; and it is not necessary that evidence of consanguinity should have the correctness required as to other facts. If a person says another is his relative or next-of-kin, it is not necessary to state how the consanguinity exists. It is sufficient that he says A. is his relation, without stating the particular degree, which perhaps he could not tell if asked. But it is evidence, from the interest of the person in knowing the connections of the family; therefore, the opinion of the neighbourhood of what passed among acquaintances will not do" (h). In this case it was held clear that the declarations by a deceased husband as to his wife's legitimacy are admissible, as well as those of her blood relations. Ac P. (c) Whitelocke v. Baker, 13 Ves. 511. (h) Per Lord Erskine, Vowles v. Young, 13 Ves. 147. H |