A Treatise ON THE LAW OF FIXTURES. PART I. ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN FIXTURES. CHAPTER I. ON THE NATURE OF FIXTURES. THE term fixtures is used by writers with various signifi- The term cations; but it is always applied to articles of a personal fixtures. nature which have been affixed to land. Very frequently no further idea is intended to be conveyed by the term than the simple fact of annexation to the freehold (a); and hence have arisen the popular expressions of landlord's fixtures (b), and tenant's fixtures; of removable and irremovable fixtures. The name of fixtures is also sometimes applied to things expressly to denote that they cannot legally be removed; as where they have been annexed to a house, &c., and the party who has affixed them is not at liberty afterwards to sever and take them away. Thus, it has been said that an article shall fall in with the lease Part I. Fixtures defined. Meaning of annexation. to the landlord, or descend to the heir with the inheritance, because it is a fixture. The term fixtures, however, may, it is thought, be most accurately defined as denoting those personal chattels which have been annexed to land so as to become part of it, but which may be afterwards severed and removed by the person who has annexed them, or his personal representative, against the will of the owner of the freehold (c). But, it should be observed, that the term has been used by the Courts and amongst text writers without much precision; and it is difficult to determine in which of the above senses it is most frequently employed. On the whole it will be found that, in cases which do not immediately involve the question of removability, the term is generally used as denoting merely articles which, on account of their annexation to the freehold, have ceased to be chattels. The above definition divides itself into two branches; first, a consideration of what is meant by annexation; secondly, of what is intended by a right of removal against the will of the owner of the freehold (d). With respect to the first branch of the definition, it is necessary, in order to constitute a fixture, that the article in question should be let into or united to the land, or to some substance previously connected with the land. It is not enough that it has been laid upon the land, and (c) Since the adoption of this definition in the first edition of the work, it has been recognized in the following cases: -Hallen v. Runder, 1 Cr. M. & R. 266, 276; Ex parte Reynal, 2 M., D. & D. 443, 448. Accord. Ex parte Barclay, Re Gawan, 5 D., M. & G. 403, 410; Parsons v. Hind, 14 W. R. 860, 861; Climie v. Wood, L. R., 4 Ex. 328, 329; Boyd v. Shorrock, L. R., 5 Eq. 72, 78; Holland v. Hodgson, L. R., 7 C. P. 328, 333. (d) As to the second part of the definition, see post, P. 31. The definition requires brought into contact with it. Chap. I. annexation. The case of Culling v. Tufnal (f), tried at Hereford in What not a 1694, before Treby, C. J., affords an early example of this sufficient class of decisions; and it is the more remarkable, because it was not till later times, when the doctrine of fixtures came to be better understood, that the decision of the case in question was treated as resting upon the circumstance. of incomplete annexation to the freehold, the determination having originally proceeded on a different ground. There the article in dispute was a barn, which was placed upon pattens or blocks of timber lying upon the ground, but not fixed in or to the ground. The explanation which has been given of this case by Lord Ellenborough is, that the party who erected the barn might unquestionably treat it as a mere moveable chattel, because the terms of the statement excluded it from being considered as a fixture: as it was not fixed in or to the ground (g). (e) See Turner v. Cameron, L. R., 5 Q. B. 306, 311; Bain v. Brand, 1 App. Cas. 762, 772. The reader should be apprised, however, that there are certain exceptional cases of constructive annexation Bul. N. P. p. 34. at p. 55. Part I. utensils in distillery. In another case (g), the property in dispute was the Horn v. Baker, stock of a distiller, which consisted of certain stills set in brick-work, and let into the ground; certain vats, supported by and resting upon brick-work and timber, but which were not fixed in the ground (h); and some other vats standing on horses, or frames of wood, which also were not let into the ground, but stood upon the floor. In this case the Court thought that there was a material distinction between the stills that were actually affixed to the ground, and the vats that were placed upon brick-work or frames; these latter they considered to be mere goods and chattels, from the mode in which they were stated to be connected with the premises (i). Wansbrough v. Maton, barn resting on staddles. Metal flooring-plates, tram-plates, &c. Again, in Wansbrough v. Maton (j), a barn built of wood rested on, but was not fastened by mortar or otherwise to the caps of certain blocks of stones called staddles, which were fixed into the ground or let into brick-work; the brick-work being in part built in and let into the ground. The barn rested on the foundation by its own weight alone. It was held that such an erection was not united to the freehold and formed no part of it, and was not therefore a fixture (). So, too, it has been held that metal plates laid upon the surface of the ground in an iron rolling mill as a flooring, and "straightening plates" used in the mill and laid in the same manner, are not fixtures (7); although if such articles are fitted into the ground (g) Horn v. Baker, 9 East, 215. (h) See the remarks on this case in Ex parte Reynal, 2 M., D. & D. 443, 454. (i) Accord. Chidley v. West Ham, 32 L. T. 486. (j) 4 A. & E. 884. (k) See also Wiltshear v. Cottrell, 1 E. & B. 674; Naylor v. Collinge, 1 Taunt. at p. 21. See, too, the instance of a post-windmill in R. v. Londonthorpe, 6 T. R. 377; of a windmill resting on a brick foundation, R. v. Otley, 1 B. & Ad. 161; of windowsashes, R. v. Hedges, 1 Leach, C. C. 201; of a cistern, Mather v. Fraser, 2 K. & J. 536, 559. As to constructive annexation, see post, p. 20. () Metrop. Counties, &c., Society v. Brown, 26 Beav. and overlaid with the permanent floor they do become fixtures (m). Decisions to the like effect are not wanting; as in the case of a steam winch bolted to a heavy stone which lay upon the floor of a building but was not attached to it (n); and of tram-plates fastened to sleepers laid upon the surface of the ground (o). In both these cases it was held that the articles were mere chattels. Chap. I. It follows from what has been already said, that where Ex parte an article is not actually affixed to the soil, the mere fact Astbury, weighing that it is placed upon a foundation or in a receptacle which machines. has been prepared for it, is not sufficient to make it a fixture. In Ex parte Astbury (p), the Court had to consider this point with reference to certain weighing machines placed in holes in the ground faced with brick-work, and resting at the bottom of the holes but not fixed in any way thereto, there being a space of half an inch or more between the machines and the sides of the holes. It was held by Giffard, L. J., that the preparation of the soil did not make the machines fixtures (g). 454. The Court remarked that the fact that a portion of the plates accidentally penetrated the ground for a few inches, did not make them fixtures; as to which see Wood v. Hewett, 8 Q. B. 913, 919; Huntley v. Russell, 13 Q. B. 572, 577, note; Duke of Beaufort v. Bates, 3 D. F. & J. 381. (m) Ex parte Astbury, L. R., 4 Ch. 630, 637. (n) Irish, &c. Building Society v. Mahony, Ir. R., 10 C. L. 363, 369. (0) Duke of Beaufort v. Bates, 3 D. F. & J. 381. It may be otherwise if the sleeeprs are laid in the soil or in ballast, Turner v. Cameron, (p) L. R., 4 Ch. 630, 637. (q) See, too, Hutchinson v. Kay, 23 Beav. 413; Metropolitan Counties, &c. Society v. Brown, 26 Beav. 454. So, if there were a foundation of granite for a cannon or a large telescope, neither the cannon nor the telescope would necessarily be a fixture, Ex parte Astbury, L. R., 4 Ch. at p. 639. And see Tod's Trustees v. Finlay, 10 M. 422. |