impression of natural conscience, and the sense of being accountable for their actions, they all equally want direction; and as the experience of the world shows, all men will have some religion, either good or bad. To say therefore that reason was sufficient for the purposes of religion before the publication of the gospel, and to prove it by showing that it served this purpose in four or five instances in an age, whilst millions and millions had no help from it, is quite mistaking the point: we want something to be of use to all men, and which all men stand in need of to their well-being: you have found something that will serve perhaps one in a million, and think that you have discovered an adequate supply for the general want. But what must become of the many thousands who are incapable of being the better for your method? If the whole nation were infected with the plague, it would be worth while to send even to the Indies for a man who could cure them; but if his remedy could cure only two or three in the kingdom, it would be of no great consequence whether he came or staid away. But it may be said that what reason did for a few, it was capable of doing for all, if it had been duly attended to; and, consequently, that reason was a sufficient foundation for true religion, notwithstanding that true religion was lost in the world; which was not through a defect in reason, but through the abuse and misapplication of it by the generality of mankind. : I agree the case to be so; but we are still where we were before for this general abuse of reason, or inattention to the voice of it, which had spread over the whole world, had certainly a root in some general evil and corruption that had infected mankind: and whatever reason was in itself, yet it stood in great want of a remedy for this evil, that had so universally darkened and obscured it. Suppose I should say such a man was blind; will it be a proper reply to say, No, his eyes are sound and good, excepting only that there is a very thick film over them, which intercepts all sight? `or would it be proper to insist that the man wanted no cure, because he had sound eyes? What shall we do with this film then? for till it is removed, the man might as well be without eyes. This was the very case of the heathen world. You say they had reason sufficient for all the purposes of religion: be it so; yet, in fact, it is certain they were never able to make this use of it for ages together. Since the coming of Christ the world has been able to make this use of their reason and now, at last, it is become a great question whether a cure has been wrought or no. But consider farther, when we talk of reason abstractedly as a principle of human actions, it is right to say that reason can do whatever we see any man perform by the help of his reason; and therefore it is true that reason can measure the magnitude and distances of the heavenly bodies: but is it also true that every man's reason can do this? by no means; and therefore to consider all men as capable of doing what we see some great geniuses able to do, is absolutely absurd. Now, the few whom you suppose to have attained to a just notion of God and of religion in the heathen world, what were they? Men brought up in retirement and study, of great industry and application, who spent their lives in searching into the causes of things: and even of those many who followed this method of life and study, there are but few who can with any pretence be said to have discovered the truth: the crowd of philosophers talked much more, but knew as little as the people. But the people themselves, what must become of them? they have no time for study, and they must have true notions of religion at a cheaper rate, or not at all. As religion is a thing in which all men are concerned, it must be conveyed in a manner that suits men of all conditions. Supposing therefore that you have found a way by which some few thoughtful men obtained true notions of religion, you are far from having found a way of propagating true religión in the world. Reasoning will not do the business: and therefore the gospel set out in another manner, by proposing the great truths of religion in the plainest and simplest manner in an authoritative way, but by an authority supported by the plainest and the strongest proof, the proof of miracles; an argument that was adapted to men of all conditions, and made its way to every understanding. It is become a fashion to dress up the great doctrines and proofs of religion in axioms and theorems and demonstrations; and those who have taken pains in this way may have done great service to men of thought and contemplation: but had the gospel set out at first with this air of mathematics, it had lost one strong proof of its divine original, arising from the plainness of its doctrine, and the simplicity of the evidence which was offered in its behalf; which made the gospel to be a proper tender to all mankind. All mankind are concerned in the great truths of religion; and nothing can be more absurd, and contradictory to the notion of God's wisdom and goodness, than to suppose God to intend to establish true religion in the world, and yet to offer it in a method which could possibly have an influence but on very few. Whoever will reflect seriously on the nature and condition of mankind in general, will be able to give himself a clear reason why God did not call in the assistance of the wisdom of the world' to propagate the gospel, but chose rather to establish it by the 'foolishness of preaching,' as it is called, and by the demonstration of the Spirit,' manifested in signs and wonders and mighty works. I have hitherto considered this plea, drawn from the case of some great men in the heathen world, on supposition that what is said of them is true, and that they had indeed extricated themselves from the superstitions of their country, and attained just notions of true religion: but this thing, which has been often said, has never been proved, and I am afraid never will. I do not wonder that those who have been conversant in the writings of the ancients, and have been entertained with the just and fine reflections to be met with on the attributes of God, considered as Maker and Governor of the world, and of mankind in particular, should conclude that those who thought and talked so clearly of the great attributes of the Deity, and of his providence over the world, had also as clear notions of the religious service due to him, and to him only. What has led to this conclusion I conceive to be this: there is so plain a connexion between the relation we bear to God, and the religious duty owing to him, and the argument is so familiar to us, that we almost naturally suppose that every man who maintains the principle, cannot fail of seeing the conclusion. The conclusion indeed is so natural, that, if it were overlooked, nothing can more sensibly prove the weakness of hu man reason in opposition to inveterate errors and superstition; and nothing can more effectually show us how unable these wise men were to reform the world, since with all their wisdom they were not able to reform themselves. Yet this was the truth of the case; and it was not at random, and without knowlege of the fact, that St. Paul lays this to the charge of the wise men of the world, that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools; and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things.' To prove the truth of the Apostle's assertion, that even the wise men, who knew God, did not glorify him as God,' by an induction of particulars, would be undertaking a work which could hardly be well discharged in this place. But yet the point is too material to be passed over in silence. Let us then consider the case of one only, but of one, who among the good men was the best, and among the wise ones the wisest. I shall easily be understood to mean Socrates, the great philosopher of Athens and were the wise men of antiquity to plead their cause in common, they could not put their defence into better hands. We have an account of the speculative opinions of many of the wise men of Greece preserved to us in authors of great credit; but of their practice and personal behavior in life little is said which makes it hard to judge how far their own practice and conduct was influenced by their opinions, or how consistent they were in pursuing the consequences of their own doctrines. The case might have been the same with Socrates, had not a very particular circumstance put him under a necessity of explaining his conduct and practice with respect to the religion of his country. He had talked so freely of the heathen deities, and the ridiculous stories told of them, that he fell under a suspicion of despising the gods of his country, and of teaching the youth of Athens to despise their altars and their worship. On this accusation he is summoned before the great court of the Areopagites; and happily the apology he made for himself is preserved to us by two of the ablest of his scholars, and the best writers of antiquity, Plato and Xenophon: and from both their accounts it appears that Socrates maintained and asserted before his judges that he worshipped the gods of his country, and that he sacrificed in private and in public on the allowed altars, and according to the rites and customs of the city. After this public confession, so authentically reported by two so able hands, there can be no doubt of his case. He was an idolater, and had not, by his great knowlege and ability in reasoning, delivered himself from the practice of the superstition of his country. You see how far the wisdom of the world could go : give me leave to show you what the foolishness of preaching could do in the very same case. : St. Paul was in the same case: he was accused in the same city of Athens of the same crime, that he was a setter-forth of strange gods; and before the same great court of Areopagites he made his apology, which is likewise preserved to us by St. Luke in the seventeenth chapter of the Acts. We have then the greatest and the ablest among the wise men of Greece, and an Apostle of Christ, in the same circumstances. You have heard the philosopher's defence, that he worshipped the gods of his country, and as his country worshipped them. Hear now the Apostle Ye men of Athens,' says he, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious: for as I passed by, and beheld your devotions, I found an altar with this inscription, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you: God that made the world, and all things therein. This God,' he tells them, is not worshipped with men's hands, as though he needeth any thing:Nor was the godhead like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device.' He then calls on them, in the name of this great God, to repent of their superstition and idolatry, which God would no longer bear: because he hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness, by that man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in that he hath raised him from the dead.' |