no rule; for we can neither obey nor disobey a law that we cannot understand: and therefore from this idea of religion, that it is a rule of action, there lies a very plain objection against admitting mysteries in religion: and let the objection have its full force, the gospel is secure from the blow; for the rule of life contained in the gospel is the plainest, as well as the purest, that ever the world was acquainted with. In the precepts of Christianity there is no mystery, no shadow of a mystery, to be seen; they are all simple, and to men of the lowest understandings intelligible; the duties which it requires us to perform to God, to ourselves, and to our neighbors, are such as, when offered to us, we cannot but in our minds and consciences approve: and therefore the gospel, as far as it is a rule of life, is far from being mysterious, since both the sense and the reason of the law are open and plain, and such as we cannot but see, and, when we see, consent to.

But since this is not the only notion or idea of religion, that it is a rule of life; let us consider whether, according to the other ideas which belong to it, it be equally absurd to suppose it in some points mysterious. Let us examine it then under this notion, as containing the means by which God is reconciled to sinners.

And first, it is obvious to observe that here is not the same reason against mysteries as in the other case: for, though we cannot practise a law without understanding it, yet God may be reconciled to us, and we have the assurance of it without our being able to comprehend and account for every thing that was done in order to it. A malefactor may receive a pardon, and enjoy the benefit of it, without knowing what it was that induced his prince to grant it; and would, without doubt, be thought mad to stand out against the mercy, merely because he could not dive into the secret reasons of it. Could not a sinner receive the benefit of God's mercy without understanding all the methods of it, it would then be necessary indeed, that even this part of religion should be free from mysteries, and made plain to every man's understanding but since a sinner may be saved by a mercy which he cannot comprehend, where is the absurdity of offering sinners mercy, and requiring them to rely on it, or, in other words, to believe in it,

though it be never so incomprehensible or mysterious? Were it unreasonable or impossible to believe things to be, without knowing how they came to be, faith could never be reasonable in religion, or in any thing else: but since the knowlege of the essence of things, and of the existence of things, are two distinct kinds of knowlege, and independent of one another, our ignorance of the essence of things, and of the relation they have to each other, can never be a good argument against the belief of their existence: and yet this objection contains all the argument that unbelievers bring against the mysteries of Christianity. Why do they, for instance, refuse to believe Christ to be the Son of God? only because they cannot comprehend how he can be the eternal Son of God: and if they will be true to their principle, and carry the objection as far as it will go, they must in time come to deny the existence of every thing in the world, themselves not excepted. Since then to comprehend the reason and nature of things is neither necessary to our believing the reality of them, nor yet to our receiving benefit and advantage from them, how comes it to be necessary that in religion there should be nothing that we do not understand? Necessary it cannot be to our salvation, for we may be saved by means we comprehend not; nor yet to our faith is it necessary, for we may, and do daily believe the reality of things without knowing any thing of the nature and reasons of them. And, if mysteries may set forward our salvation, and are not destructive of our faith, on what other views they can be excluded from religion I cannot conceive.

Thus much then may serve to show that according to this notion of religion, that it contains the means by which God is reconciled to sinners, no argument can be drawn to weaken the authority of any religion, because some parts of it are mysterious but if you consider it farther, it will appear that this part of religion must necessarily be mysterious, and the means of reconcilement such as reason and nature cannot comprehend. This I partly observed to you in a former part of this discourse, and shall therefore the more briefly touch it now.

The principles from which this consequence I think will follow, are these: that men are sinners: that God must be re

conciled to sinners in order to their salvation: that religion must contain the words of eternal life,' or the certain method by which we may obtain eternal life. The consequence of these principles is evident, that religion must contain the means by which God is reconciled to sinners; for since this reconcilement is necessary to eternal life, religion cannot have the words of eternal life' without it. Now then, if there be no such means of reconcilement, which reason and nature can either discover or comprehend, this part of religion must necesşarily be mysterious; since what reason cannot comprehend is mysterious. Now, from the natural notion we have of God and his attributes, there arises such a difficulty in this case as reason cannot get over: for it is certain, according to all the natural notions of our mind, that it is just for God to punish sinners: it is likewise certain that God can do nothing but what is just if therefore he forgives sinners, and receives them to mercy, and remits their punishment, it is then certain that it is just for God in this circumstance not to punish sinners. Now, reason cannot comprehend how it should, with respect to the same individual sinners, be just to punish, and just not to punish them. If it be not just to punish sinners, there wants no reconcilement for sinners; and if it be not just not to punish them, no reconcilement can be had, for it is contrary to the nature of God to do what is not just.. The same argument lies from all the attributes of the Deity, which are at all concerned in the redemption of mankind: his wisdom and holiness, and even his mercy, are as indiscernible as his justice: Now try how far reason can go towards discovering the means of reconcilement lay down first these certain and allowed principles-that it is just for God to punish sinners-that God can do nothing but what is just-and try how you can come at the other conclusion, which must be the foundation of a sinner's reconcilement to God; namely, that it is just for God not to punish sinners, and righteous in him to receive them to favor. If reason cannot discover or comprehend how both these propositions should be true at the same time with respect to the same persons, it is impossible that it should discover or comprehend the means which God makes use of to reconcile himself to sinners; that is, it is impossible for God to make use of

any means that are not mysterious, that is, above the reach and comprehension of human wisdom.

This difficulty must for ever remain as long as we attempt to scan the divine justice by our narrow conceptions of it; and this is the very difficulty that makes many things in the gospel to be mysterious. The scripture tells us that God has been reconciled to sinners by the death of Christ-that he made atonement for the sins of the whole world.' These are great mysteries: we cannot see that there is any proportion between the sufferings of one and the sins of all; or, if there were, wę cannot see the justice of laying the sins of the wicked on the innocent head. If we could see the reasons on which the justice of God proceeds in this case, here would be no mystery; and therefore the mysteriousness of the whole proceeding arises only from hence, that our finite minds cannot comprehend the reasons and limits of the divine justice. Most certain it is, that, if God be reconciled to sinners, satisfaction must be made to his justice; for he may as well cease to be God as to be just. Whatever satisfaction is made, it must be founded in the reasons of his own justice, that is, of justice directed by infinite wisdom. The reasons of such justice we cannot comprehend; and therefore we must either be saved by means that are mysterious to us, or God must give us infinite wisdom to comprehend the reason of his justice. You see then that from this notion of religion, considered as containing the means by which God reconciled himself to the world, it is so far from being absurd to suppose it in some parts mysterious, that it is not possible it should be otherwise.

To redeem the world is the work of God: he only could find the means of reconciliation, and he only could apply them it is our part merely to accept them, and to obey the terms and conditions on which he offers them. Religion therefore, which is founded on redemption, must needs consist of these two parts; an account of the redemption wrought by God, and instructions to men on what terms they may reap the benefit of the redemption. As far as our part goes in the gospel, there is nothing mysterious; we have nothing to do for ourselves, but what we very well know how to do. As to the other parts of the gospel, we are not required to comprehend

and account for God's method of salvation, but only to accept them; which, as I before observed, are two distinct acts of the mind, and not dependent on each other. As for the work of God in our redemption, it is indeed wonderful and mysterious; and why should it seem strange to you that it is so? Are there any other works of God which are not mysterious? Consider the creation and formation of this world; consider the sun, the moon, and the stars, the works of his hand; tell me by what secret power they move, by what rule their different motions were at first impressed, and by what secret in nature or providence ever since preserved. Or, if you think it hard to be sent to consider the heavens at a distance, do but consider the earth, and the meanest creatures of it can you tell how they are formed? how they live, and move, and have their being?' Nay, can you name that work of God which is not mysterious? Is there any thing in nature, the first principles of which you can discover and see into? If in all the works of God there is no such thing, why should we think it strange that in his work of redemption he has appeared so like himself, and that in this as in every thing else his ways are past finding out?' We live by the preservation of providence, and enjoy the comforts and pleasures of this life; and yet how mysterious is our preservation! how little do we know of the methods by which we are preserved! and yet the benefits of it we enjoy, notwithstanding our ignorance of the means: and why is it a greater absurdity to suppose that men may be redeemed, without comprehending all the means made use of in their redemption? In all other instances whatever, the miraculousness of an escape adds to the pleasure and joy of it, and is always remembered with a kind of ecstacy in the relation. Salvation is the only instance in which men demur on the means, and are unwilling to receive the mercy, because they cannot understand the methods of obtaining it. In any other case a man would be thought beside himself, who should act in the same manner.

As to the other two points, the cleansing sinners from their iniquity, and enabling them to live virtuously for the future; or, in other words, the sanctification and grace promised in the gospel; I shall not enter into the consideration of them parti