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action, but simply cause of action," which words are satisfied if there be such ground of action as would, whether composed of one indivisible cause of action, such as a bill of exchange, or of a divisible aggregate of several, such as a list of items of goods delivered, constitute the materials for a plaint.

We do not press this literal construction of the 63rd clause as necessarily governing every case capable of falling within that clause, but only for the purpose of shewing that the literal construction of the clause is not inconsistent with that which the spirit of the statute would require to be given to it.

Assuming the construction of the statute on this point to be doubtful, the next material question is, how it is to be brought before a superior Court of law. The 90th section provides for removing a plaint entered in a county court into one of the superior courts, by leave of a judge of such courts. But the application of this provision, it is apprehended, will be found to present difficulties. The question, it will be observed, is one of jurisdiction, depending on the construction of the act. If, a plaint being filed, the defendant were to apply to remove it, upon a suggestion that the judge of the county court would entertain it, not having jurisdiction, how is such suggestion to be supported? Would the Court above presume, and, if not, what is the evidence that could be brought to its notice, requiring it to anticipate in the judge of the county court, a determination to decide contrary to law? Could, in fact, an application to a superior court be supported for taking away from the county court the trial of an action expressly committed to it by statute, on the assumption, of course incapable of proof, that the county Court would misconstrue the act of Parliament? We apprehend that the answer to such an application would be, the Court will not suppose, a priori, that the county Court will assume a jurisdiction contrary to law. Let the county Court proceed, and if it does that which is illegal, it will then be time enough for the superior Court to interfere. It is no objection to this view to say, that, if it be correct, the power to remove a plaint, given by the 90th section, is nugatory. The answer is, the 90th section does not apply to a case where the question is the jurisdiction of the Court, but only to cases where, admitting the jurisdiction of the Court, the party ought to be permitted to avail himself of it; or where, admitting the jurisdiction, the powers or process of the Court are manifestly insufficient to enable it to do justice.

It appears to us that removal of the cause will not be the correct mode of proceeding, but that the proper course in the sort of case under discussion, to obtain the opinion of a superior Court, will be by prohibition, restraining the county Court from proceeding in the plaint brought before it, as the power to issue a prohibition is not taken away by the 90th section of the County Courts Act. (Roberts v. Henley, 3 Mee. & W. 124).

MASTERS IN CHANCERY.-The Lord Chancellor has appointed the following gentlemen Masters Extraordinary in the high Court of Chancery:-John Clerevaulx Fenwick, Newcastle-upon-Tyne; Eyles Irwin Caulfield Browne, Kidderminster, Worcestershire.

ON THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS.

(Continued from p. 213).

So, where certain weavers presented a petition to the justices at sessions, praying them to limit a rate of wages under the statute, and the justices, after having heard the petition and witnesses in support of it, came to a resolution that they could not make a rate more beneficial than that existing, the Court of King's Bench refused a mandamus to compel the justices to hear and determine the matter of the petition, although they did not examine the witnesses tendered by the petitioners on oath, the Court saying, that, however clearly the statute imposed the duty on the justices, the manner of exercising it was entirely discretionary; and that the Court could not impose on them the terms in which they were to exercise it. (Rex v. The Justices of Cumberland, 1 M. & S. 190; see Rex v. The Justices of Kent, 14 East, 395; Reg. v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire, 1 New Sess. Cas. 247). Where a notice of grounds of appeal stated, that the pauper's husband, in the years 1828, 1829, or 1830, (subsequently to the settlement proved in the examination), did rent and occupy," for twelve months, "a house and land" in the respondent parish as tenant to C., of the yearly rent and value of 10%. and upwards, "and did pay upwards of 10%. rent for the same, and had thereby gained a settlement" in the respondent parish, the sessions holding that the notice of grounds were insufficient, because they did not shew a residence in the respondent parish, and confirmed the order of removal, without hearing evidence in support of the appeal, the Court of Queen's Bench refused a mandamus. (Reg. v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire, 2 Q. B. Rep. 505; see also Reg. v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire, 2 Dowl. P. C., N. S., 707). Where an appeal against an order of removal came on to be heard at the quarter sessions, which, for some cause, was respited, at the following sessions, when the appeal was called on, the respondents objected to its being tried, as the appellants had omitted to give a fresh notice of trial, which, by the rules of the sessions, they were bound to do; the justices, being of this opinion, confirmed the order, but, at the instance of the appellants, granted a case, in order that the opinion of the Court might be taken upon the subject: the appellants, however, instead of proceeding with the case, applied for a mandamus to the justices to hear the appeal, but the Court refused it, saying that they were very unwilling to interfere with the practice of the courts below, and where they had already granted the appellants a complete remedy, they could not interfere. (Rex v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire, 1 Adol. & Ell. 606; and see Rex v. The Justices of Suffolk, 6 Adol. & Éll. 109; Rex v. The Justices of Northamptonshire, Id. 111, n. Quære, whether the reservation of a case for the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench in such a form, which precludes the appellants from bringing it up, deprives them of their claim to the remedy by mandamus). (Reg. v. Kesteven, 1 D. & M. 113; S. C., 3 Adol. & Ell., N. S., 810; see M. C., 114; R. v. The Justices of the West Riding of also Reg. v. The Justices of Cheshire, 15 Law J., N. S., Yorkshire, 11 Law J., N. S., M. C., 84). Where a statute gave an appeal against the constable's accounts to the overseers, if they should find that the parish was thereby aggrieved;" and seven out of eight overseers of a parish agreed to the passing of the accounts, but the eighth dissented, and appealed against them, and the sessions dismissed the appeal, on the ground that the others had not joined in it: upon an application for a mandamus, the Court of King's Bench refused it, holding that the justices had done rightly, it evidently appearing to have been the intention of the

Legislature, from the word "find," that the appeal should be a deliberative act of the overseers, and should, therefore, have been instituted by a majority at least. (Rex v. The Justices of Manchester, 1 D. & R. 454; S. C., 5 B. & Ald. 755). Nor will the Court grant a mandamus to justices to proceed on the original information, the information brought up to the Court of King's Bench having been quashed for a defect, because it would be calling on the defendant twice to answer for the same offence. (R. v. Jukes, 8 T. R. 625). Where a parish indenture for apprenticing a poor boy belonging to Woolverston, in Suffolk, to a shipowner of Wivenhoe, in Essex, was allowed by two justices of Suffolk, but, upon application to the justices in petty sessions for the county of Essex, they refused to allow it, on the ground that there were pauper boys belonging to Wivenhoe, whom the master might take, and who, being used to the sea, would suit him better: upon application for a mandamus to allow the indenture, the Court refused it, saying, that the justices had a general discretion given them by stat. 56 Geo. 3, c. 139, s. 1, to consider the propriety of the binding, and, as they had exercised it, there was no ground for their interfering. (Rex v. The Justices of Essex, 2 B. & Ad. 578). So, where the justices were authorised by statute to allow a fee to the coroner upon all inquests "duly taken," and they refused to allow a particular item in his account for attending an inquest, considering that it was not a proper case for his interference: upon application, the Court of King's Bench refused to grant a mandamus compelling them to do so, saying, that, as the fees of the coroner were payable only on inquests "duly taken," the justices were alone to judge whether those requisites had been complied with, and, therefore, they could not interfere. (Rex v. The Justices of Kent, 11 East, 229). Where the justices at sessions made an order that prisoners committed to trial who were able to work, and had the means of employment offered them by which they might earn their support, but refused to work, should be allowed bread and water only upon an application for a mandamus to the justices to compel them to provide other food, on the ground that they could not sustain life upon bread and water, the Court, being of opinion that a discretionary power was vested by the Legislature with the justices in regard to the diet of prisoners, and that they were at liberty to make such regulations as they thought fit, refused to interfere by mandamus in the exercise of those discretionary powers. (Rex v. The Justices of the North Riding of Yorkshire, 2 B. & C. 286; S. C., 3 D. & R. 778; Ex parte Beck, 3 B. & Adol. 704). So, where the appellant against an order of affiliation moved the court of quarter sessions, on an affidavit of the absence of a material witness, to defer the hearing of the appeal, which they refused to do, and the appellant declined going into his case, when the order was confirmed, on a motion for a mandamus to the justices to hear the appeal, the Court said, it was entirely discretionary with the quarter sessions whether they would postpone the trial, for if a mandamus were granted under such circumstances, it would be taking upon them to say in each individual case whether or not it was right for the sessions to comply with such an application, and therefore they could not interfere. (Ex parte Beck, 3 B. & Adol. 704). Where upon the hearing of an appeal the appellants admitted the insufficiency of the grounds of appeal, but applied for an adjournment to enable them to deliver fresh grounds, and at the same time offered to pay the costs of the day, but which the magistrates refused, and confirmed the order, the Court would not grant a mandamus commanding them to enter continuances and hear the appeal. (Reg. v. The Justices of Staffordshire, 2 Dowl., N. S., 353). So, where by a rule of practice at the sessions in appeals against a poor's-rate, on the

ground of the appellant being overrated, the appellant is to begin. Upon an appeal being called on, the appellant refusing to begin, the justices dismissed the appeal, and the rate was confirmed. Upon an application for a mandamus, the Court refused to grant it, saying, that the granting a writ which had for its object a reversal of the order of proceeding at the quarter sessions according to the rules of practice which prevail there, was not a jurisdiction which, if the Court possessed, they would be inclined to exercise, unless it was apparent that gross injustice would follow the refusal. (Rex v. The Justices of Suffolk, 6 M. & S. 57; and see Rex v. The Justices of Essex, 2 Chit. 385). Where an application was made for a mandamus commanding justices at sessions to receive and hear a complaint against the trustees of a turnpike-road under a local act, for having erected a certain gate upon the road, and it appeared that the gate had been erected twenty-six years before, the Court held, that even on that ground alone they ought not to interfere by mandamus, but leave the party to his remedy by indictment as for nuisance if he thought fit to adopt it. (Rex v. The Justices of Cambridgeshire, 1 D. & R. 325). So, where an appeal against an order of removal came on to be heard, and the Court confirmed the order, subject to a case for the opinion of the Court above, and the counsel for the appellants drew a case and sent it to the respondents, which was ultimately signed by the Court of quarter sessions, but no certiorari was sued out within six months, the Court of King's Bench refused to grant a mandamus to compel the justices to enter continuances and hear the appeal, although it was sworn by the appellants that the omission was caused by the delay of the respondents in settling the case, saying, that in all cases in which the Court had interfered by mandamus, such proceedings had been taken by the appellant, that the case, if settled, might have been discussed by the Court, and as there was no certiorari in this case, it could not be; and that, if this Court granted the application, it would be making good the laches of the appellant, by doing that circuitously which could not be done directly, upon which the rule was discharged, with costs. (Rex v. The Justices of Staffordshire, 1 Dowl. P. C. 484 Although, as we have before seen, the Court of Queen's Bench will in some cases award a mandamus to the justices to state a case, where, upon the trial of an appeal, the sessions grant a case. (Rex v. Effingham, 2 B. & Adol. 393; Rex v. The Justices of Pembrokeshire, Id. 391). They nevertheless will not direct a mandamus commanding them to grant a case. (Rex v. Jarwin, 9 Dowl. 120). (To be continued).

Review.

A Treatise on the Pleadings in the Court of Chancery, by Lord REDESDALE. Fifth Edition. By JOSIAH Ŵ. SMITH, B.C.L., Barrister. [Stevens & Norton.] It is not, at this day, necessary to say much in favour of Lord Redesdale's Treatise on Equity Pleading. For more than a generation his work has been, not merely a book of study recommended by the most learned practitioners to their pupils as a guide, but a book referred to, as of authority, even by the Bench itself. There is no work to which we can compare it so aptly as to Lord Bacon's Essays. Like that wonderful work, it is at once brief and full-brief in expression, yet full in sense. Not a sentence that is not fit to be read and re-read, and studied and pondered upon, and that will not yield fruit in abundance to the mind that carefully and thoughtfully, and in the spirit of self-improvement, examines it. We are not, of course, attempting to establish an equality between the subjects of the

two works, nor between the minds of the two authors. Far be it from us, lawyers though we are, to treat the science of equity pleading as on a par with the science of moral and political philosophy. All that we wish to do, is, to point out that the same tone and quality of mind that impart to Bacon's Essays their extraordinary terseness, their concentrated wisdom, their capacity for suggesting thought, as well as for imparting actual knowledge, are to be found in Lord Redesdale's treatise applied to the science of equity pleadings. It is a book useless and unintelligible to the impatient and unreflecting lawyer. But to him who brings to his task a thoughtful and painstaking mind, an earnest desire to be informed, and that quality of mind which either intuitively or by patience and long thinking can grasp principles instead of shreds of practice, such a work as Lord Redesdale's is an invaluable book,-a book to be read and re-read, and the effect of which is to saturate the mind of its diligent reader with a knowledge of principles on which he will unerringly act in practice, though he may oftentimes be unable to recall to memory the precise authority for the particular proceeding that he adopts.

A new edition of such a book, in the ordinary sense of the word, would be nearly an impossibility, because it is a book of principles, and because the principles that it lays down, not only are fully and correctly stated, but have been so little varied, or departed from, or added to, since the first publication of the work, that unless collateral matter be introduced, there is really scarcely anything to be done in a new edition of Lord Redesdale, except to reprint the text. The present editor has taken the only course that was open to him, by preserving the text untouched; and introducing in notes such matters of detail in pleading, and in practice immediately connected with pleading, as the orders and decisions of the last twenty years have rendered useful to be considered in connection with the principles of pleading. We shall at once say that the task is well performed, and that, in particular, the long note on parties at the end of the work proceeding from the pen of the editor, is prepared with care and skill, and will be very useful. But we must at the same time say, that the nature of such legal composition as that to which the editor of this edition of Lord Redesdale has very properly confined himself, scarcely requires to be spoken of in the almost solemn tone in which the editor himself speaks of it. And when he tells his readers, in his preface, (p. v.), that "His endeavour has been to divest the cases of those particulars which are of no use to the 'student, and have no essential relevancy to the mat'ters with reference to which such cases are consulted by the practitioner, and to accomplish the difficult 'task of moulding the essential parts of the cases, and the reasons of the decisions, when any are expressed, into succinct yet clearly expressed propositions, placita, or rules, in such a way as to exhibit the parts and principles of pleading which the decisions in those cases serve to establish;" And in p. vii, that, "in extenuation of any inaccuracies and defects which may exist, notwithstanding the great care which has been bestowed by him, he must plead a pressure of professional business towards the close of his editorial labours, which rendered it an extremely arduous and exhausting effort finally to com'plete his notes, and to superintend the printing of the volume;"-one is tempted to think that such pomp and solemnity of style were scarcely needed in speak ing of good wholesome practical notes, and that the learned editor must be easily exhausted, if he could not transact a very extensive amount of professional business indeed, and, at the same time, compose and carry through the press his notes to Lord Redesdale's Treatise. We have, we confess, but little sympathy with these complaints of learned authors, of the

oppression that they suffer in combining the execution of their professional business with the performance of their literary tasks, and are apt to fancy when we meet such moanings and lamentations, that the complainants have been studying the book we have already referred to-Bacon's Essays. "Those," says that great writer on his essay on Envy, "that have joined with their honour great travels, cares, or perils, are less subject to envy; for men think that they earn their honours hardly, and pity them sometimes; and pity ever healeth envy: wherefore you shall observe, that the more deep and sober sort of politic persons, in their greatness, are ever bemoaning themselves what a life they lead, chanting a quanta patimur;' not that they feel it so, but only to abate the edge of envy."

The fact is, that gentlemen who have great business ought not to write books at all; they should leave such labour to those unhappy men-and Heaven knows there is no lack of such men, whose tables do not groan under the pressure of briefs, and whose voices are more known at the bar table than in court.

But to return to the new matter in the fifth edition of Lord Redesdale, we would particularly call attention to the note commencing in page 210, on Multifariousness, in which the editor has collected the modern decisions on that subject; and to some of the notes to the chapter on Pleas. There is also (p. 362) a very useful note on the 38th Order of August, 1841; and, lastly, there is the note on Parties, to which we have already referred, which is a sort of little abridged treatise, very methodically drawn up on the subject of parties, so far as it is governed by the cases decided during the last twenty years.

On the whole, we conceive that this new edition of Lord Redesdale will be found a valuable addition to the equity lawyer's library, and will, notwithstanding the extremely inappropriate magniloquence of the preface, add to the reputation of the learned editor.

That the committee have met, and have taken into their consideration the several bills referred to them.

The committee are of opinion that the provisions in the several acts respecting bankruptcy and insolvency ought to be consolidated; but, before any bill or bills for that purpose can be usefully considered, it appears to be necessary to determine whether one system of law should not be adopted for all cases of insolvency.

An inquiry necessary to lead to a satisfactory result upon this important subject would, in the opinion of the committee, occupy more time than the probable duration of the present session is likely to afford; the committee, therefore, have abstained from entering into that inquiry, but earnestly recommend this important subject to the favourable consideration of the House in the next session of Parliament, entertaining the hope that such assimilation may, under due guards and modifications, be found practicable.

The committee, however, are of opinion that there are some matters connected with the bills referred to them which ought not to be delayed, and which may properly be provided for during the present session.

It having been found unnecessary to continue the Court of Review in Bankruptcy as originally constituted, the jurisdiction of that court is now exercised by one of the Vice-Chancellors, though not in that charac ter, but as a judge of the Court of Review.

The committee are of opinion that the Court of Re